Join CIMSEC’s DC chapter for our 2nd Annual Beer Garden Book Swap next Tuesday! Print out your latest work or an old read with maritime connections to swap with friends and relax with a refreshing drink.
Time: Tuesday, 06 September, 6:00-8:00pm
Place: Dacha Beer Garden, 1600 7th Street NW
Washington, DC (Shaw/Howard Metro stop)
All are welcome – RSVPs not required but appreciated: director@cimsec.org.
Featured Image: (pinterest.com/pin/571112796474714722)
Distributed Lethality Topic Week
By Megan McCulloch
Today’s global security situation is increasingly complex with challenges in multiple areas of operation. Many of today’s challenges take place in the littorals yet much of the surface Navy remains uncomfortable operating within this environment. Over the last three decades, the Navy focused primarily on power projection from uncontested deep water. Our focus on power projection, specifically from aircraft carriers (CVN), has highlighted the CVN as our center of gravity – both militarily and politically. These CVNs are not suited for contested littoral operations. Unfortunately, the increasing proliferation of land based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) makes operating within sight of land progressively risky for any grey-hulled ship. Instead, high speed, easily maneuverable vessels with relatively shallow drafts should conduct shallow water and littoral operations in contested environments.
In the event of a conflict within the littorals, operating a group of distributed small crafts may be a better option than sending an Aegis ship or CVN into the fray. One option for adaptive force packages (AFP) might be to employ “up-gunned” LCACs, possibly pairing them with a San Antonio-class LPD or a pair of Platform Supply Vessels (PSV), and an LCS. The below scenario shows how this unconventional adaptive force package can provide greater flexibility in the event of a slide from Phase 1 to Phase 2 operations as well as enabling sea control over sea lines of communication.
Scenario
Increasingly hostile political rhetoric in the region has led leaders to question the availability of a major SLOC to U.S. forces or international shipping. Balancing fears of escalation with the impact of the SLOC closing, U.S. forces reinforce a partner nation’s Navy to prevent the forced closure of the SLOC. Due to a multi-axis threat environment in the littorals, leadership has decided to send an AFP composed of two PSVs, each carrying 2-3 LCACs, an LCS, and a DDG to patrol an adjacent area in the event of kinetic engagement. The AFP is initially deployed in a de-escalatory posture meant to reassure partners without further provoking tension. A single DDG is to remain in the area, but not enter the SLOC or its immediate vicinity unless tensions increase. To allow for strong back-up against the opening salvo of a kinetic environment against higher end surface threats, the DDG is loaded with several new SM-6 missiles1 and is equipped to conduct a remote launch based on information from any of the other ships – including the LCACs. Each LCAC is armed with a machine gun, a re-fitted 2.75-inch advanced precision kill weapons system2, and a small drone for laser guided targeting. The PSV has a RAM launcher with four ESSM for limited self-defense capability and can make speeds of 15-17 knots (and possibly up to 28 knots with upgrades) when fully loaded. Once in the patrol area, the PSV launches the LCACs in a rotational cycle and serves as a small tender carrying spare parts, a 3-D printer, a spare drone, and berthing for the off-cycle LCAC crews.
| PHASE 0 | Deter |
| PHASE 1 | Shape |
| PHASE 2 | Seize the Initiative |
| PHASE 3 | Dominate the Enemy |
| PHASE 4 | Stabilize |
| PHASE 5 | Enable Civil Authority |
Naval Doctrine Publication 1 – Phases of an Operation or Campaign
In either case, while the DDG and LCS provide an overt presence, the PSV could remain in a covert posture providing backup should the situation escalate. Securing its military-grade radars and operating solely with commercial navigation, a PSV could be camouflaged to remain largely indistinguishable from surrounding shipping. Launching a single LCAC at night, the LCAC could then operate beyond the horizon and serve as a picket, a communications relay, conduct sanctions or legal enforcement via a qualified board and inspection team, or a simple force multiplier beyond the horizon. The LCAC is a perfect vessel to conduct such duties as it has the ability to operate beyond the horizon, has a reduced radar cross-section for limited early warning, can be configured in multiple ways prior to launch from the PSV, and is capable of maneuvering at high speeds to outpace most other small surface craft.
As tensions in the area increase and overt, continuous exploitation of the EM spectrum intensifies, the force must operate with limited communications. One way of allowing intermittent communications without conceding the tactical advantage of the force’s exact location is using point-to-point communications. Although point-to-point communications require line of sight, the speed and maneuverability of the LCAC and LCS allows for set patrol boxes where ships come into communications range at pre-determined intervals to pass quick bursts of information, updates, and any changes to mission tasking. The largest drawback to communications in this manner is the fueling requirements to maintain a high OPTEMPO of patrols and communications. Here, the PSVs could also double as refueling platforms. Serving as a tanker may limit their ability to ballast and deballast, but also offers greater flexibility to the AFP and provide greater staying power.3 In the event of increased on station time or greater OPTEMPO a single PSV could also rendezvous with an oiler outside the contested area and then transit back to the AFP.
Increasing tensions would lead to a message sent to the DDG of increased hostilities, changes in the rules of engagement, and a list of reactions to any hostilities. Once the information had been relayed to the proper PSV, a small, prepositioned landing force would then conduct an amphibious landing in order to secure and hold the land surrounding the SLOC. The landing of forces would be the responsibility of several LCACs while one LCAC and the LCS serve to protect the landing force from any seaborne threats. Once secure, the landing force would be able to set up equipment for localized counter A2/AD. The landing force could also serve as a relay station for information between the smaller ships and senior officers beyond the horizon via point-to-point communications relays. Finally, as landing forces secure the SLOC from being closed via land, the LCACs would then transition to serve as escorts for shipping through the SLOC, conduct boarding operations of suspicious vessels as directed, and serve as resupply vessels for the shore based landing forces. The LCS would then continue to serve as an escort or conduct mine hunting as appropriate.
Should missiles be launched from either hostile ships or shores, the AFP would be capable of limited self-defense as well as second-strike retaliation. Specifically, the LCAC provides a very complex target with low radar cross-section as well as an innate defense against IR or millimeter wave seekers which have reduced capability getting a lock on target due to the spray generated by an LCAC at maximum lift.4 With a drone providing laser guidance, the LCAC would be able to fire at other ships while remaining outside small arms range and possibly provide targets for over-the-horizon launches from the Aegis vessel and quickly relocating before counter-targeting can be successfully achieved.
Flexible Multi-Role Platform
While the scenario above focused on the slide from Phase 1 to Phase 2 operations, the listed platforms could also have a significant impact during Phase 0 or Phase 1. In peacetime operations such as security cooperation engagements with regional partners who have smaller navies, a more versatile LCAC provides a greater range of engagement options. A nimbler LCAC could also be used to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance in brown water areas to increase delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid and improve knowledge and operating experience for the LCAC crews and operational planning for CTF Ops and Plans.
The construct of vessels for the above scenario injected one new ship and an existing craft with increased capabilities. The LCAC with a .50 caliber machine gun, some other close in weapon, as well as surface-to-surface missiles is much more capable than the current platforms. These craft would be able to operate more independently and would provide a significant force multiplier. A similar comparison might be the difference between the SH-60B and SH-60R. The 60R with its advanced radars and increased capabilities operates with a much greater range and tactical impact than the 60Bs. Giving greater independence to the LCAC would also increase the ability to operate inshore.
Conclusion
We cannot neglect the littorals as the world grows increasingly complex with challenges in multiple regions. Such waters surround many of our allies, friends, and partner nations. In order to meet our commitments as well as to maintain dominance at sea we must strengthen our ability to operate in the littoral domain. While our skills in power projection and deep-water tactics remain strong, we must re-evaluate our risk calculus as situations vacillate between the various phases of war and employ existing assets creatively. Expanding the uses and armament of LCACs (“If it floats, it fights”) is a simple place to start.
LT Megan McCulloch is a surface warfare officer currently studying at the Surface Warfare Officer School. Megan is thankful for CAPT John Devlin’s (ret) input and expertise in developing this article. John C. Devlin, CAPT (ret), USN, is Director of Navy Programs at ISPA Technology, Inc. The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and are presented in a personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any other agency.
1. In reference to ongoing efforts to provide SM-6 with anti-surface capability.
2. “Advanced Precision Kill Weapon (APKWS) System – Laser-Guided Rocket | BAE Systems | United States.” (This missile is simply an example, of the type of rocket or close-in surface-to-surface missile that might be added to the existing frame.)
3. The impact to the ballast/deballasting capabilities of a PSV might also be negligible. The PSV currently has a slip mud tank which can hold 400,000 gals. If reconfigured to hold fuel for the LCACs then 100,000 gals of additional fuel equals about 20 refuels of the current LCAC for 600 nm legs in a light load condition.
4. This statement is currently theoretical, due to lack of testing. The theory is sound and should hold, however is not a definitive and should not be taken as fact yet. For more information, please contact John Devlin, CAPT, USN (ret) at jdevlin@ispatechnology.com.
Featured Image: WHITE BEACH, Japan (Sept. 25, 2013) A landing craft air cushion (LCAC) assigned to Naval Beach Unit (NBU) 7 approaches the well deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) during the offload of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st MEU). Bonhomme Richard is the flagship of the Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group and, with the embarked 31st MEU, is conducting routine joint-force operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Joshua Hammond/Released)
Distributed Lethality Topic Week
By Richard Mosier
Background
The U.S. Navy’s distributed lethality strategy is to deny sea control to adversaries claiming sovereignty over international waters through the use of small offensive Surface Action Groups (SAGs) that operate in areas covered by the adversary’s anti-access, sea denial sensor systems and supported by land based command and control, interior lines of communication, and defensive platforms and weapons. The Navy strategy is for these SAGs to transit to positions to attack enemy ISR, command and control, and defending forces; and deny them sea control. The success of distributed operations ultimately depends on Information Warfare (IW) operations to deny the enemy the data required to target and attack Surface Action Groups.
Anti-access, sea denial capabilities of near-peer nations present a high threat to surface navy operations. The use of multiple offensive SAGs complicates the enemy’s defense but only if these groups avoid detection, tracking, targeting, and attack. If they operate with active sensors, datalinks and voice and network communications transmitting, they reveal their location, track, classification/identification, and group composition. Moreover, these emissions provide a readily available source for targeting the SAG. If attacked, the resulting battle damage and depleted stock of defensive weapons would most likely require the group to withdraw.
For distributed lethality to succeed, SAGs have to avoid being engaged while in transit to the attack position, attack with the advantage of surprise, avoid attack while repositioning, and if attacked, effectively defend the force. If, as must be anticipated, some or all of the units in the SAG are located and the enemy begins defensive operations, the first objective is to avoid being targeted by possibly denying the attacking force the information required to attack. If these measures fail and a SAG is located and targeted by the enemy, the goal is to transition instantaneously to full active defense in a tactically advantageous manner. Destroying the aircraft, surface ships, submarines, or land based sites is preferable to defending against large numbers of fast moving incoming anti-ship weapons.
While emission control (EMCON) is essential to deny targeting, the ships in a SAG will have to communicate to coordinate movements, exchange information, and execute defensive and offensive activities. These datalinks and battle group communications will have to be carefully selected to minimize the probability of intercept by enemy ISR systems.
Implications for Surface Navy Information Warfare
When in EMCON, the SAG will be reliant on own-force passive sensors, organic airborne surveillance systems, and the full range of information from nonorganic Navy, joint, and national ISR systems. This information will enable the tactical commander to gain and maintain both information superiority and speed of command, defined by VADM Cebrowski as: “knowing more things which are relevant, knowing them faster and being able to convert that knowledge into execution faster than the adversary.”
SAG tactical situation awareness requires the capability to automatically correlate relevant active and passive information from organic and non-organic sensors with intelligence at all classifications and compartments for presentation to the commander. This automation is essential to the commander’s situational awareness and speed of command. Surface ships will have to integrate the capabilities to correlate information from the ship’s combat system with intelligence and information from off board sources. Speed of command is dramatically slowed and tactical advantage lost if the commander has to mentally integrate three separate sets of information with some only available in a separate physical space.
Knowing the relevant facts faster than the adversary drives a requirement that off board intelligence and information systems must meet a Key Performance Parameter for time latency, measured from time of sensing to receipt onboard ship. It also indicates the need for a similar metric for ship combat systems measured from time of information receipt on ship to presentation to the commander. Speed of command is the key to tactical success in distributed operations.
Even when exercising electromagnetic and acoustic EMCON to avoid detection, surface ships can be detected by radars, visually, and by electro-optical sensor systems. Assessing whether the SAG has been detected will depend on factors such as enemy sensor location and altitude, platform type, sensor types on the platform, and a detailed understanding of enemy sensor performance. Sensor performance estimates require not only detailed technical intelligence, but also the assessment of effects of atmospheric and acoustic conditions on enemy sensor performance at any time during the mission. This suggests that combat systems will have to incorporate new automated IW functionality that, among other things, integrates track information with technical intelligence and meteorologic/oceanographic data to assess whether the ship has been detected or not.
Conclusion
The effective planning and command of SAG IW activities requires line officers that are trained, have specialized in IW during their careers, and are ready to perform the IW functions required for success in distributed operations. That is, to achieve superior situation awareness and speed of command, influence enemy decisions, deny the enemy information superiority, disrupt enemy decision making, and protect and defend own force information and information systems from external or internal threats.
As the concept of distributed lethality matures and the Navy gains an appreciation of the necessity for and potential of IW at the tactical level, the Navy will have to adjust to more clearly define IW, describe the missions and functions of IW, establish a career path for Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) IW specialists, and equip surface combatants with the information warfare capabilities required for successful distributed operations.
Richard Mosier is a former naval aviator, intelligence analyst at ONI, OSD/DIA SES 4, and systems engineer specializing in Information Warfare. The views express herein are solely those of the author.
Featured Image: The Arabian Gulf (Mar. 23, 2003) — The Tactical Operations Officer (TAO), along with Operations Specialists, stand watch in the Combat Direction Center (CDC) aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) monitoring all surface and aerial contacts in the operating area. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate Airman Tiffany A. Aiken)
Distributed Lethality Topic Week
By Elee Wakim
The days of majestic leviathans harnessing the power of the elements for propulsion to cruise the world’s navigable waters are long past. What has evolved are voracious beasts which tear across the world with little concern for all but the largest of wind and wave. The appetite of the engines that propel these vessels can only be satiated by a routine supply of petroleum. The United States Navy has established a global logistics network to feed this hunger, the backbone of which is a fleet of tankers, manned by the merchant mariners of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Hand in hand with the ability to refuel the Navy’s ships is the ability to send fresh food, replacement parts, and ammunition to surface assets without the need to have them return to domestic ports and safe havens. This steady stream of supplies allows the United States to project power around the world. Given the importance of our MSC fleet, they will likely be a priority target in the opening stages of a conflict against a near-peer adversary. Given their vulnerability, these vessels will be faced with the prospect of withdrawing from the area of responsibility (AOR) or being sunk. Whatever the outcome, the cruisers, destroyers, and littoral combat ships at the tip of the spear will retain the requirement of contesting the battlefield until sufficient forces arrive in theater to relieve them. How then to supply these vessels and ensure they have what they need to do what is demanded of them? This paper seeks to address this concern and provide a possible solution to the disruption of our supply chain in the Western Pacific.
Distributing Logistics
One possible solution harkens back to the late 19th century, when nations desiring to project naval power around the world were confronted with a need for coaling stations to support their relatively short legged ships. The 21st century Navy, borrowing from this concept, could build a series of logistics hubs throughout the Western Pacific. These miniature logistics hubs could be built in small inlets, coves, and atolls – anywhere with sufficient draft to support our surface assets. They would function as temporary sanctuaries where thirsty ships could quickly gas up and resupply before turning around and returning to the fight. The infrastructure required to support this concept need not be excessive. A small tug, a fuel barge, and the personnel to man them would be the extent of the investment.
Depending on the potential threat (largely driven by its proximity of an adversary’s weapons systems, or lack thereof), the Navy could expand beyond the aforementioned bare necessities to provide additional support to its vessels. A runway could be constructed to allow for replacement ordnance or repair teams to be flown in. To complement this, cranes could be prepositioned to support reloading of expended VLS cells. Any combination of support equipment could be staged to support rapid augmentation via air during wartime. Indeed, if we were feeling particularly ambitious, we could use these locations to facilitate the forward repair of battle damage, using vessels like the USNS Frank Cable (AS-40) with their extensive machine shops to establish floating forward repair facilities.
There are several advantages that such outposts offer our frontline commanders. First and foremost is that, in a scenario where our logistics ships are driven off, sunk, or otherwise unavailable, the captains fighting their ships would have multiple locations to replenish and get back into the fight. This would facilitate greater time on station which is crucial to maintaining their ability to shape the conflict, contest the battle space, and disrupt an adversary’s plan.
Secondly, these dispersed outposts would allow for fixed locations to refuel. In a degraded C2 environment, this is no small consideration when the ship in question may not have the ability to locate, communicate with, or sufficient endurance to reach surviving oilers. By dispersing potential resupply locations across a greater expanse, we inherently complicate potential adversaries ISR and force distribution calculations. No longer could it be assumed that naval vessels will be taking the most direct route to or from Guam, Japan, Singapore, or the Philippines. Instead, the foe must now picket additional lines of approach and disperse limited assets.
It is a very different tactical problem to protect widely dispersed oilers with a handful of assets than those steaming in company with a strike group. If our logistics ships are to survive in an increasingly lethal anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) environment, they will require an escort to provide sensor and kinetic coverage, primarily from hostile airborne and subsurface threats. This coverage will necessarily be supplied by large surface combatants. This coverage would likely require a one to one matchup between these – the shepherds – and their quarry. Freeing them of the need to ride herd on our logistics (at least until they initially transit out of the theater) will make them available for other tasking.
Considerations and Challenges
There are a host of questions to consider, one of which is the sustainability of these stations. Operating upon the high seas takes a heavy toll upon equipment, which requires a great deal of maintenance to remain operational. These outposts would require personnel to ensure the airfields are capable of supporting aircraft, the cranes of swinging VLS cells, and the pumps of pushing fuel. Exact expenditure and allocation of personnel would need to be worked out on a case by case basis. The current U.S. Army facilities on Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands provide a possible blueprint for use elsewhere. The island possesses a harbor, tug, fuel barge, and runway, which do not require burdensome manning. Additional requirements would necessarily be subject to further study.
Another question which merits consideration is the diplomatic expenditures necessary to enable the placement of these logistics hubs. Should the United States construct these facilities on the territory of regional partners or should it seek to, like the People’s Republic of China, improve upon maritime features scattered throughout the Pacific? Both lines of approach have inherent hurdles. Establishing them on the territory of another nation will require a greater initial investment of political capital and defining legal framework to permit their existence. Building upon unclaimed maritime features risks a charge of hypocrisy against the United States relative to its stance on the Spratly Islands, though this could largely be mitigated through a decision to forego claiming a surrounding exclusive economic zone. Ultimately, some combination of the two may ultimately prove desirable.
A third matter that should be addressed is that of targeting by long range weapons of an adversary. The proposed logistics hubs, like their seaborne counterparts, would be prime targets in the opening hours of a conflict while, unlike their counterparts, they would be unable to dodge. How then to prevent them from being anything other than a target or a drain of resources? There are two potential paths to their salvation. The first draws from the Russian concept of maskirovka, or military deception. Given the pervasiveness of satellite imagery, it will be difficult to actually hide the locations, making it necessary to convince an adversary that they serve a different purpose. They will be far less likely to waste precious missiles on a naval construction battalion facility or medical facility than a place to replenish a warship. The other path, for those facilities which would be emplaced on foreign territory, would be the protection afforded by the sovereignty of that nation. Potential adversaries may not want to draw unnecessary third parties (such as the Philippines or Japan) into a conflict with the United States by lobbing missiles at their territory, especially if the third parties are not obligated to join the United States.
Conclusion
George Patton once quipped, “fixed fortifications are monuments to man’s stupidity.” This paper does not advocate turning these proposed positions into heavily manned bastions. Rather, their physical security would be derived from geographic remoteness and light covering forces such as Patriot batteries and Naval Expeditionary Combat Command detachments. This paper also does not seek to posit that our MSC fleet lacks utility; indeed, it is quite the opposite. Those ships are the defining variable in determining not only whether we can emerge victorious from a prolonged conflict, but whether we can simultaneously support our global commitments.
This paper offers an alternative means to supply our fleet in the opening stages of a conflict against a near-peer adversary who is capable of tracking and targeting our logistic ships at great distances. If we have sufficient forces in theater to meet mission obligations and protect our logistics ships, then there is no harm in having built up such a capability. If, however, our opponent has denied these vessels the ability to safely operate where they are most needed, then such a low-cost investment may prove decisive in allowing our ships to hold the enemy at risk. Let us not forget that if she runs out of gas, no amount of advanced sensors or weapons will prevent a ship from being anything more than a target.
LTJG Elee Wakim is a Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy. He is currently stationed in Singapore with the Maritime Staff Element of Destroyer Squadron SEVEN. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the United States Department of Defense or any other organization.
Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 30, 2016) The forward-deployed Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) conducts an underway-replenishment with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet replenishment oiler Joshua Humphreys (T-AO 188). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kevin V. Cunningham/Released)
