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Education

The Theoretical Edge: Why Junior Officers Should Study Military Classics

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By Jack Tribolet

Throughout history, war has tested human ingenuity, often deciding the fate of empires, nations, and ideologies. Imagine looking out over an active battlefield, the air thick with tension and kinetic projectiles. Each choice could alter history, and you suddenly have a consequential decision to make with lives on the line. This is not only a hypothetical scenario but a possibility for which junior officers must be mentally prepared. While proficiency in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) is essential, broadening their understanding of the warfighting domains is equally important. This broader understanding can be achieved by studying military theory in a challenging era where the history discipline is contracting.1

Studying prominent military theorists before mid-level Professional Military Education would give junior officers a comprehensive understanding of the warfighting domains, enhancing their situational awareness and decision-making abilities. By studying theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and John Boyd before mid-level Professional Military Education (PME), junior officers can enhance their situational awareness and decision-making capabilities, increasing their lethality.

Dominant military theorists such as Clausewitz, Mahan, and Giulio Douhet provided perspective to their respective eras and domains of war, adding clarity and grammar to chaos. Others, such as Antoine Jomini, Julian Corbett, and Boyd, refined and built upon previous theorists, sometimes not amicably. For cadets, midshipmen, and junior officers, delving into the works of these great minds is not merely an academic exercise but an integral piece of their professional development. By studying military theory in officer accession programs, officers could gain additional tools to think critically and lead effectively, ensuring they are well-equipped to face the increasingly complex modern battlefield.

By understanding the evolution of warfare and the application of historical lessons to contemporary conflicts, officers can develop what the French call coup d’œil — “a glance that takes in a general view.”2 Clausewitz defined coup d’œil as an “inward eye” enabling a “rapid and accurate decision” that would typically only be perceived “after a long study and reflection.”3 Coup d’œil requires trained observation and an exhaustive look at previous campaigns—strategy, tactics, decision points, technology, and truisms—all best encapsulated by military theory.

The great captains of military history, Caesar, Napoleon, Patton, and Mattis, have demonstrated the value of applied military theory. Each read history voraciously, Napoleon famously stating, “Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of the great commanders.”4 Therefore, the early introduction of this practice has infinite potential for the training of junior officers.

Defining Military Theory

Some might question the necessity of studying military theory before attending PME. To answer this, we need to understand the role of theorists. Clausewitz explains, “The theory of any activity, even if it aimed at effective performance rather than comprehensive understanding, must discover the essential, timeless elements of this activity, and distinguish them from its temporary features.”5

In other words, theorists identify and describe enduring principles of warfare. These principles remain functional across time and space, providing a framework for understanding historical and modern conflicts.

Niccolo Machiavelli, who predated Clausewitz by three centuries, said, “In peace he (the warfighter) should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.”6 Machiavelli’s discourse recodified the ancient Roman way of citizen war and reintroduced the Roman practice of applied history. His treatise was placed on the first papal Index of Prohibited Books in 1559 for his effort.7 It is ironic that perhaps the premier military theorist, Clausewitz, had suspicions of applied theory, warning, “Theory can never lead to complete understanding, which is an impossibility, but it can strengthen and refine judgment.”8 He believed theory should “guide him [the warfighter] to self-education” and hazarded against it accompanying “him on the field of battle.”9

Despite Clausewitz’s warnings, studying theorists affords officers essential battlefield grammar: friction, center of gravity, lines of communication, strategic versus tactical bombing, and many more vital employable descriptive terms. Clarity in writing equates to clarity in thought. Many senior leaders use these terms colloquially, sometimes confusing an untrained audience, which prompted their quick introduction into the midshipman’s repertoire at the University of Southern California Naval ROTC unit so that they could decipher “Colonelese.”

Ultimately, studying military theory links the past and present in the officer’s mind, developing an internal timeline for the continuum of conflict and facilitating the identification of timeless principles from precedents. Clausewitz’s emphasis on enduring principles and Machiavelli’s advocacy for continuous study highlights the timeless relevance of military theory in developing critical thinking and decision-making skills.

Historical Context and the Evolution of Warfare

Individual theorists define their age, but more importantly, correspond to their chosen domain of war. Battlespace environments or military domains, defined by physical characteristics, require “unique doctrines, organizations, and equipment for military forces to effectively control and exploit in the conduct of military operations.”10 Consequently, theorist grammar produces the archetypes of their respective warfighting domain, defining the realm and rules for operation.

Prominent theorists can be assigned to domains as follows:

Land Domain

Clausewitz and Jomini, who fought against and with one another in the Napoleonic Wars, endeavored to describe the fundamental nature of war but ultimately became the golden standard for land-centric campaigns. Jomini spent most of his literary career struggling against Clausewitz’s ghost, calling his logic “frequently defective.” However, he provided a valuable counterbalance to Clausewitz’s theories.11

In the scrum of theorists, Clausewitz has emerged as the champion, peerlessly describing war as a “continuation of policy with the addition of other means.”12 However, while Jomini’s attempt to entirely “sciencefy” war failed, his concepts of interior lines and the application of force are integral to land domain comprehension.13

Sun Tzu, who predates Clausewitz and Jomini by two thousand years, remains shrouded in mystery as the author’s existence and when he wrote his treatise fall under scrutiny. However, Sun Tzu provides insight into Chinese war grammar and way of thought, which is valuable in light of the inevitable Taiwan Crisis. His use of creative naturalistic dialectical metaphors to tether common sense principles to practices is absent in Western literature. Using dialectical oppositional pairs to capture a concept challenges the Western military mind and provides insight into the pacing threat.14

Other prominent land theorists include Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Miyamoto Musashi, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Mentecuccoli, Maurice Marshal de Saxe, Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Henry Lloyd, Helmuth von Moltke, B.H. Liddell Hart, and Heinz Guderian—an all-star lineup of some of history’s finest commanders.

Maritime Domain

Mahan and Corbett clashed on naval warfare in the age of the ever-enlarging capital ship, taking opposing views on employing fleets. Mahan advocated for decisive fleet-on-fleet battles involving capital ships, believing such engagements would determine naval supremacy. In contrast, Corbett viewed maritime power as a means to support land operations, emphasizing the importance of controlling sea lines of communication to ensure the movement and supply of land forces. These differing perspectives continue to influence modern naval strategy, as seen in the strategic deployment of carrier strike groups and the protection of critical maritime routes.

Other prominent maritime theories/theorists include La Jeune École, John and Philip Colomb, Herbert Richmond, and Hyman G. Rickover. However, due to the nature of maritime combat, naval theorists are as much technologists as strategists.

Air and Space Domains

Douhet, John Boyd, and John Warden arose in the 20th century with the advent of air power and had the difficult task of describing a rapidly shifting air domain. Douhet recognized the game-shifting application of air power in WWI and addressed the future of strategic bombing campaigns, which would shape Allied strategy in WWII. Boyd and Warden penned their concept of Strategic Paralysis in the aftermath of the precise bombing campaign of the Gulf War. Unsurprisingly, Boyd and Warden recognized the value of striking critical command and control centers; however, despite this leap in targeting capabilities, the priority of tactical versus strategic bombing remains in question, and both are seen in the current Ukraine War.15

Other prominent air theorists include Hugh Trenchard, William Mitchell, Thomas C. Schelling, and Robert J. Aumann. Unlike other domains, air power exists on an exponential technological curve, representing a formidable challenge for an air theorist to stay ahead of innovation.

Cyber and Informational Domains

Newest to the fight, these domains remain up for grabs for a future military theorist. The recently published Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 8-10 made a significant leap forward in informational doctrine, recognizing the new dimension of social media and access to information witnessed in the current Ukraine and Israeli Wars. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 8-10 must become required reading for all military members, regardless of position or rank, as it concisely captures a new aspect of modern warfare.

In culmination, the warfighting domains encapsulate the entirety of warfare, each with unique doctrines, responsible organizations, and history. Participants in these domains must endeavor to comprehend their battlefield and dissect their associated theorists to gain situational awareness to develop a refined intuition.

Strategic and Tactical Proficiency

Unlike standard military history, theorists exist in the realm of application, deducing principles from precedents. Mahan cautioned against mistaking precedent with principle, “a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success.”16

Principles of war guide the development and refinement of TTPs. For example, understanding the “economy of force” principle can help officers allocate resources more effectively during operations.17 By grasping the theoretical foundations of their TTPs, officers can enhance their tactical proficiency and make more informed decisions in the heat of battle. TTPs ultimately reflect the handed-down knowledge from competent predecessors, thus representing an ever-changing chain of lessons learned.

For example, at the Battle of Midway, Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky intuitively understood the Mahanian principle of a decisive naval battle enabled by his superior coup d’œil. Dangerously low on fuel, he continued the search for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers, putting his squadron into fuel extremis, knowing that he had to break his TTPs for the chance of decisive victory. McClusky’s actions at Midway demonstrate the practical application of Mahanian principles, underscoring the value of understanding military theory for effective decision-making. The IJN were strict adherents to Mahanian theory, and they forced Midway to become a decisive battle, just not in the manner they expected.18

Leadership and Decision-Making

Dominant battlefield methodology develops directly from technological innovation, and the rate of change increases the complexity of battlefield TTPs. Consequently, TTPs serve as a lagging indicator of technological progress. Increased complexity has downstream effects; as Clausewitz would say, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”19 The increased situational awareness gained by studying timeless military principles gives officers the required perspective in a fluctuating scenario to make critical decisions. “Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.”20

When becoming an aircraft commander, pilots are expected to learn their systems in and out—limits, emergency procedures, and TTPs—which become second nature through study. The end state of this learning profile enables the aircraft commander to understand when and how to break procedures as McClusky did. This analogy applies to learning domain warfare—by understanding the domain paradigm—junior officers have the foundational knowledge to understand the cause and effect of sometimes necessary TTP rule-breaking in warfare decision-making.

Beyond domain comprehension, some theorists provide critical insight into the decision-making process. Boyd’s OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) exemplifies how theoretical frameworks can enhance rapid decision-making, a crucial skill for junior officers in dynamic combat situations. For instance, during aerial combat, pilots who quickly observe the enemy’s actions, orient themselves to the situation, decide on the best course of action, and act swiftly are more likely to succeed. When internalized and practiced, this process can significantly enhance an officer’s ability to make rapid and effective decisions under pressure.

Case Studies and Practical Applications

Theory provides the realm of possibility, the domain’s boundaries, enabling a scenario-driven decision point. One example of a scenario-driven event is the Decision Forcing Cases (DFC) model used in the United States Marine Corps. DFCs represent a valuable tool for training cadets, midshipmen, and young officers. These scenarios encourage situational learning and critical thinking and facilitate stress through time restrictions and real-time instructor feedback.

However, instruction must include a deep dive into historical campaigns to maximize scenario-based theory learning and understand possibility boundaries. For example, an in-depth look at Napoleon’s conquest of Europe includes grand strategies such as logistical considerations and pairs them with tactical decision-making. Where do you apply force, and how?

Furthermore, what were the consequences of critical decisions made in the historical context? In 1812, Napoleon’s intuition failed him due to a lack of temperance. His Russian campaign provides a clear example of the importance of strategic decision-making. Initially aiming for a quick victory, Napoleon pressed on past his initial objectives, leading his troops deeper into Russia with Moscow in sight. This decision resulted in severe logistical challenges as supply lines stretched beyond their limits. The harsh winter compounded these issues, ultimately leading to an apocalyptic retreat where only 100,000 men of the 612,000 that crossed the border returned.21 Analyzing this campaign helps officers understand the critical balance between ambition and logistical feasibility in military strategy and should provide a warning to pair objectives with temperance.

A deep understanding of the continuum of change in war enables officers to identify truisms and trends, which expands their ability to anticipate further evolution—”Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war.”22 The current conflict in Ukraine has spotlighted the real-time evolution of drone warfare. Consequently, future drone theorists and AI integration arbiters are likely already in the service or will soon be joining. These fundamental changes to warfare outline a ripe opportunity to deliver the grammar of these technologies into doctrine, thus necessitating these future service doctrine-writing members to have a firm grasp on previous theories as they initiate the testing phase.

Conclusion: Preparing Junior Officers for Modern Warfare

Integrating military theory into early education—officer ascension programs, and training would equip junior officers with essential principles for effective leadership and decision-making— coup d’œil. Officer Candidacy School, ROTC, and the academies must strive to add the study of theorists to curriculums inside and outside the classroom. Furthermore, this instruction must continue into active units, which could be as simple as guided discussion groups led by unit commanders. Military theory provides a framework for understanding historical and contemporary conflicts by distilling complex concepts into coherent truisms. Effective decision-making lies at the heart of officership, and studying military theory refines and strengthens this critical skill. As the adage goes, “He who desires peace should prepare for war.”23

By incorporating military theorists into their early education, junior officers and officer candidates engage with the primary sources of war, which better prepares them to lead confidently in the challenges of modern warfare.

Lieutenant Jack Tribolet is Assistant Professor of Naval Science at the University of Southern California ROTC and is the course coordinator for Seapower and Maritime Affairs. He is a naval aviator.

References

1 Bret Devereaux, “The History Crisis Is a National Security Problem, Foreign Policy, March 10, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/10/the-history-crisis-is-a-national-security-problem/

2 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “coup d’oeil,” accessed July 8, 2024, https://www.oed.com/

3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 102.

4 Kevin Kinley, “Thumbing through the Napoleonic Wars: The Words of Napoleon and Others Who May Have Influenced His Methods,” The Napoleon Series, Accessed July 17, 2024. https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/napoleon/c_quotes.html

5 Clausewitz, On War, 11.

6 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W.K. Marriott, (New York: NY, Fall River Press, 2017), 62.

7 John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (Westminister: UK, Penguin Books, 2018) 110.

8 Clausewitz, On War, 193.

9 Clausewitz, On War, 4.

10 Michael P. Kreuzer, “Cyberspace is an Analogy, Not a Domain: Rethinking Domains and Layers of Warfare for the Information Age,” The Strategy Bridge, July 8, 2021. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/8/cyberspace-is-an-analogy-not-a-domain-rethinking-domains-and-layers-of-warfare-for-the-information-age

11 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008) 127.

12 James Holmes, “Everything You Know About Clausewitz Is Wrong,” The Diplomat, November 12, 2012. https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/everything-you-know-about-clausewitz-is-wrong/

13 Jomini, The Art of War, 77.

14 Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 66.

15 David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1995) 13, 23.

16 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Boston: Little Brown, 1902), 7.

17 Paul Murdock, “The Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force,” Parameters 32, no. 1 (May 2002): 86.

18 Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 215-216.

19 Clausewitz, On War, 119.

20 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, (New York: NY, Fall River Press, 2015) 69.

21 T. Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “French invasion of Russia,” Encyclopedia Britannica, July 11, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/French-invasion-of-Russia.

22 Giulio Douhet, The Command of The Air, trans. Dino Ferari (Eastford, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2020), 30.

23 John Clarke, “De Rei Militari by Flavius Vegetius Renatus” in Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time, edited by Thomas R. Phillips, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 124.

Featured Image: Painting “Rescue of the crew of Achille during the Battle of Trafalgar,” by Richard Brydges Beechey, 1884. (Via Wikimedia Commons)

Interviews

Iron Leadership – A Conversation with RADM Mike Studeman, USN (Ret.)

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By Commander Christopher Nelson, USN

I recently had the opportunity to correspond with Rear Admiral Mike Studeman (Ret.), who retired after over 35 years of distinguished service as a naval intelligence officer. He has authored a compelling book on leadership entitled, Might of the Chain: Forging Leaders of Iron Integrity. What stood out to me was how he skillfully wove personal experiences into his leadership lessons. The book not only offers valuable insights into leadership, but also provides a rare, humanizing glimpse into his personal journey. Our discussion explores both the practical advice and the personal stories that have shaped him, offering a deeper understanding of the leader behind the lessons.

Your book is rich with memorable quotes and epigrams. It is also full of short, interesting stories about past experiences. Why write this book, and do you journal? How do you capture in writing what matters to you for later use?  

Thank you for the positive feedback on my leadership book. I wrote the book out of concern for growing dysfunction in American society and the failures of some in positions of power to lead properly—in principled, enlightened, and inspiring ways grounded in character, accountability, and fundamental decency.

I have been writing in personal journals since I joined the Navy (so for over 35 years now), making entries once or twice a month to record something worth remembering about family or life’s adventures. I have also kept separate professional journals to capture the wisdom of the world as I encountered it, no matter what the source. I found that manually copying quotes or insightful intellectual tidbits into a separate journal served as a form of memory reinforcement. Keeping information all in one handy place also facilitated ease of retrieval. The payoff over the years has been awesome, and I am glad I stay disciplined in using this expansive journaling practice.

What is the most underrated leadership quality in your opinion? And what is the most overrated?

I think authenticity is the most underrated leadership trait. Hollywood has created an impression that ideal leaders are hard-charging, independent, charismatic, and fearless individuals. In fact, leaders come in all forms and shapes—each can be highly successful in using their own combination of strengths to inspire others and achieve amazing results. The best leaders are always learning from others, but they know that their journey is a honing, not a disowning process. They are comfortable in their own skins. Being authentic is being true to you, taking pride in your origin story, and using it as a source of supreme foundational strength for continuing growth and impact.

The most overrated leadership quality may be extroversion. Over the long haul, I have seen a greater number of more effective introverted leaders than extroverted ones. I think this might be because extroverts sometimes try too hard to be everything to everyone. Introverts usually tend to be truer to themselves, which ultimately earns more trust from followers.    

If your actions caused someone to lose trust in your leadership and you were aware of this, what steps would you take immediately to begin rebuilding that trust? What advice would you give to others in a similar situation? 

If a leader is acting at all times in an ethical, caring, open, and constructive way then the likelihood of losing people’s trust is substantially lower. Trust can erode for any number of reasons. If people suspect the leader may not be well-intentioned, if they are not given an opportunity to understand the “why” behind directed actions, if the method for achieving a given outcome is questionable, the list goes on.

If I encountered such a situation, I would seek to understand the grievance and address it forthrightly with the people concerned. Many trust issues can be nipped in the bud by a leader simply showing up to listen to their people face-to-face and demonstrating an ability to factor in their concerns. Ignoring subordinates’ concerns, viewing complaints as illegitimate, and cutting off opportunities for healthy dialogue is the quickest way to fall off the trust cliff.

How do you differentiate between intuition and bias in your decision-making process? 

I love this question. All experienced leaders intuit to some degree and grow to trust their instincts over time. However, this can be a double-edged sword as you imply. Leaders can grow overconfident, even arrogant, about what they think. The key to guarding against bias is subjecting ideas derived from individual intuition to the scrutiny of truthtellers in one’s circle of confidants, colleagues, and friends. The more diverse and widely experienced that circle, and the greater the willingness of a leader to take advice, the less likely bias will take root. At a minimum, a leader listening to the inputs of others will become more sensitized to second or third-order impacts and find themselves better equipped to anticipate dangers along any chosen path.

Can you share a time when your intuition proved right, but had to defend it against perceptions of bias? 

My intuition after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 was that a China led by the CCP would be the next major dissatisfied, powerful, and globally revisionist nation-state challenge after the fall of the Soviet Union. That proved correct. During my career, I faced repeated perceptions of Indo-Pacific bias as I tried to articulate emerging dangers. It was hard to watch China’s rise remain largely unaddressed except by the excessively wishful thinkers in the engagement crowd while America remained embroiled in the Middle East. China used 20 years of American distraction in the Global War on Terror to gain incredible levels of power and global influence to undermine the West and the current international order.

What is the best book about leadership you have read – but it was not explicitly a leadership book?  

I am a fan of Alfred Lansing’s Endurance, describing Sir Ernest Shackleton’s trans-Antarctic expedition gone terribly wrong and the leadership he demonstrated to save his crew against incredible odds.

If you were a member of an interview panel, what is one question you would ask about someone’s leadership style that could lead to three distinct reactions: being immediately dissuaded from hiring them, feeling neutral or unimpressed, or being instantly impressed?

“Describe your greatest leadership success.” You can quickly tell by someone’s answer whether they focus on their individual efforts or a team’s. Do they make themselves the hero of their own story or do they humbly take pride in the collective contributions of a group and describe how acts of togetherness overcame a great challenge? You will get your answer in the first two sentences of the reply.

Senior executives in the private sector often work with leadership or skill coaches to refine their abilities. Atul Gawande, surgeon and writer for The New Yorker, wrote a compelling piece a few years ago about his experience using a retired surgeon as a coach. This coach observed him in the operating room—how he led his team, conducted surgeries, and interacted with nurses. DoD seniors do engage with “senior mentors” – retired flag officers, generals, and civilians. But this is often done in specific venues, not say, someone spending a week shadowing a senior. What are your thoughts on coaching and mentorship? 

I agree that quiet shadowing during a leader’s day-to-day activities over the course of many days can yield important insights into how someone operates. I say this with caution, however. Sometimes it can be misleading if a shadowing period occurs during a period of quiescence when the leader is not facing high-pressure moments or a crisis where a leader’s behavior might alter in significant ways. This is one of the reasons why retired senior coaching in the military is normally done during exercises, which induce stress and thorny situations that can be a better test of a leader’s full range of capabilities.

Superb leaders know that personalized coaching is a rare luxury and therefore encourage their personal staffs to provide unsolicited advice on their performance. If, as a leader, you can build psychological safety for those around you and encourage them to speak truth to power, they can create an omnipresence of collective coaching that can benefit everyone.   

You have been married to your wife for over 30 years and raised two boys. How do you think about being a husband and a father, and how leading at work might differ from how you think about leading – and following – at home? 

Lynne and I have been happily married for almost 33 years. We started dating in college when we were only 19. I trust her implicitly and she is the most caring and intelligent person I know. She was selected into the Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society at William & Mary—I was not. Because Lynne is also an incredible mother, I usually follow her lead on the home front. Her intuition and instincts are impressive and I continue to learn from her in how she employs her high emotional quotient to navigate a wide range of intra-family issues. What I learned through active followership at home, if you want to put it that way, I added to my kitbag of skills at work. I think fatherhood and marriage can make you a better leader if you remain mindful of continually learning from all those roles.

How do you think people best adopt leadership principles and tools that fit their style or personality?  

People should pay attention to the lessons of other leaders in their midst and experiment with techniques to see what works for them. Biographies of impressive leaders and books on leadership are helpful. In my book, I advise putting your own imprint on any borrowed advice. People should follow their instincts in this respect, but always pay particular attention to how their different approaches affect other people. Maintaining a sense of awareness of others and about yourself, without being overly self-conscious, can provide the right sensory inputs to enable fine tuning. Add your own stylistic stamp to anything you learn and apply, because in the end people still want your authenticity to shine through.

RADM Mike Studeman, USN, retired in 2023 after 35 years in the Navy. He led thousands of intelligence professionals at sea and ashore. He commanded a Global Communications Center, the Cyber Intelligence Center, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. He was also Intelligence Director for the Indo-Pacific and South America regions. In 2005 he was presidentially appointed as a White House Fellow, the nation’s premier program for leadership and public service. He currently consults, speaks, and is a National Security Fellow for the MITRE Corporation. He and his college sweetheart, Lynne, have two sons and live in Virginia.

Commander Christopher Nelson, USN, is a career intelligence officer and a regular contributor to CIMSEC.

The questions and comments here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Featured Image: Rear Adm. Mike Studeman assumed command of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and directorship of the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), during a ceremony in Suitland, Md., Aug. 1. (U.S. Navy photo)

Commentary

Navigation Plans Need Leadership and Resources to Get the Navy Truly Underway

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By Brent D. Sadler

Introduction

On September 18, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Lisa Franchetti released her Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN) laying out the course ahead for the Navy. The main takeaway is that the Navy must be ready to deter a militarily confident China by 2027. Achieving this is a tall order. NAVPLANs have been used by senior naval officers to provide guidance and caution against potential pitfalls along a course. CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert began using these documents in 2015 to inform the path to rebuilding the Navy. In recent years, the Navy’s NAVPLANs have taken on urgency to deter a rapidly expanding Chinese fleet.

That said, these plans have been ineffective for the better part of 10 years. The fleet has only grown from 271 warships in 2015 to today’s fleet of 295. This happens at a time the Navy, White House, and Congress have all committed to a fleet of 355 warships. But it took several years to even get a plan that could achieve that goal and by now should have delivered a fleet of 314 warships. Instead, the Navy is 19 ships behind.

Meanwhile the Chinese Communist Party has grown its Navy – the PLAN – by over 112 warships between 2004 to 2022, while the U.S. Navy’s size shrunk by three ships. Buoying the PLAN’s meteoric rise is a massive, modern commercial shipbuilding industry that is over 200 times the capacity of the U.S., giving China the ability to out-produce the U.S. fleet in a prolonged war. The challenge of growing the fleet is also hampered by inadequate munitions production and capability. In short, getting the Navy on course will require more than just building new warships.

Setting a Course

Given these challenges, in the NAVPLAN CNO Franchetti makes a clear preference for action focused on readiness by 2027. This framing provides needed urgency and focus to ensure a large organization of over half-million officers, sailors, reservists, and civilians act in concert with limited resources.

With limited warships and munitions, creative new ways of waging naval war are required. Enter the Navy’s almost decade-old concept – Distributed Maritime Operations. By dispersing the fleet across a wider area, China would have to deploy more sensors, platforms, and weapons to degrade the U.S. Navy. This concept assumes a high degree of connectivity across U.S. warships, submarines, and aircraft to work. Rightly, the new NAVPLAN embraces this concept and focuses effort on maturing critical enabling capabilities, including autonomous systems, big data analytics, and the maritime operating centers to fuse multiple data streams into actionable information for commanding officers at sea.

The rationale for CNO Franchetti’s update to the last NAVPLAN issued in 2022 by her predecessor is the more dangerous security environment today. To address this, and the most interesting aspect of the NAVPLAN, is Project 33. This refers to her core objectives as the 33rd Chief of Naval operations, and encompasses seven key targets:

1. Readiness – By 2027, achieve and sustain an 80 percent combat surge-ready fleet.

2. Robotics – By 2027, integrate mature autonomous platforms into every deploying carrier strike group and expeditionary strike group.

3. Warfighting Headquarters – By 2027, all numbered fleets will have fully functioning Maritime Operation Centers (MOC) to coordinate naval operations across the globe.

4. Manning – By 2027, achieve 100 percent active and reserve components manning, with 95 percent of authorized deployed billets filled.

5. Improved Quality of Life – By 2027, eliminate involuntary billeting onboard ship while in homeport, which is critical for sailors stuck in shipyards for prolonged maintenance with unsatisfactory onboard living conditions.

6. Better Fleet Training – By 2027, implement more realistic wartime exercising of the fleet for high-end warfare, especially through Live Virtual Constructive training (LVC).

7. Infrastructure – By 2027, act to address the Navy’s antiquated infrastructure and shipyard capacity to sustain the fleet.

Admiral Franchetti’s emphasis on 2027 is welcome given China has invested significant resources and political capital on being ready to persevere in a war with the U.S. by that year. Making a down payment alone on Project 33 will require growing the Navy’s budget three to five percent above inflation. Fully addressing the needs of the Navy will likely be a taller order.

Aside from specifics to remedy outdated shipyards unable to sustain today’s Navy, another issue not raised was the need to fuel the fleet. Since before World War II, the U.S. military had stockpiled fuel at the strategically important Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage facility in Hawaii. Due to years of neglect, that facility has been shut down, and no replacements have yet to been announced. Without adequate fuel reserves and the ability to move fuel to the ships and aircraft using it, the Navy is in a potentially precarious position. The DMO concept also depends on a robust logistical foundation that could outstrip the Navy’s current capabilities. Distributed logistics and robust fuel access are not effectively described in the NAVPLAN, an oversight that will need to be addressed in the near future by the CNO.

Without adequate manning and infrastructure the fleet will not grow to meet the threat nor can it be sustained. On this point the NAVPLAN’s details are too thin. It has been clear for many years that the Navy needs more shipyard capacity to build new warships and repair them. Yet no call for returning public shipyards to do nuclear maintenance on submarines nor calling for the building of new drydocks is mentioned. There is a political dimension to this of course, which is why leadership is required to get the Navy these needed resources from Congress.

Where the NAVPLAN is scant on details, it must not necessarily mean inaction. Seeking a new public shipyard is a herculean political and fiscal task, and would be a first since World War II. Congress in recent years has been willing to support larger budgets for getting the Navy needed resources, but the Department of Defense has been less willing. As such, leadership is required to propose a plan for a new public shipyard, which is well past due.

Another point that is caught between the bullet points of Project 33 is practicing for the next war. Standing up a maritime operations center (MOC) at each numbered fleet is past due, as is fully leveraging real-world exercises with virtual environments to most closely approximate wartime conditions. Yet to be truly ready, the fleet needs to be exercised in the harshest environment and threat conditions to persevere against a foe like China. Missing in the NAVPLAN is the value and urgency for exercising at the fleet-level to challenge planning assumptions, test systems performance, and validate crew competencies. With Congressional support, the Navy should evolve the current Fleet Battle Problem series of exercises into events similar in scale and design to the Fleet Problem series of exercises of the interwar period to prepare for modern naval warfare.

Finally, new approaches to recruiting and preparing sailors for the rigors at sea are urgently needed. Diversity, Equity and Inclusion was ostensibly intended to expand recruitment, but the record is far less than positive. That said, the Navy and the nation needs every physically able, patriotic citizen who seeks a life at sea to succeed. This means investing more in wider recruitment while not alienating traditional sources of recruits.

Getting the sailors the Navy needs means investing more in new recruits as well. This will of course add to the Navy’s budget and delay entry of these new sailors to the fleet. The Navy must accept that not everyone starts at the same point, but those giving their all are needed in these dangerous times. As such, more is needed to ensure new recruits are kept and brought up to meet and exceed technical training requirements. For this reason, programs like BOOST that were ended in 2008 need to be brought back and given an update. BOOST was intended to give promising enlisted sailors from disadvantaged education systems preparation for college and officer commissions. Today this is needed for able-bodied and driven recruits to prepare for not only commissions, but for highly technical specialties in short supply, like nuclear mechanics.

Conclusion

Admiral Franchetti clearly takes inspiration from her predecessor, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who was CNO from 1970 to 1974, during a tumultuous period for the Navy. As she more forcefully pushes the rudder over on a new course for the Navy, another Admiral’s words come to mind, Admiral William J. Crowe, “The CNO . . . can turn the helm, but the rudder doesn’t necessarily go with it, because there are a bunch of people down in the bowels pushing it the other way.”

A strategy or checklist will not deliver results alone. Bold leadership is called for, from the deckplate to the CNO. Admiral Franchetti’s NAVPLAN is welcome and needed, but its success will not be decided by how convincing the document is. She will need the support of forceful leaders throughout the organization who are driven by the vision of what is required, and who are held accountable beyond the limited tenure of their current assignments.

The consequences of further delays and procrastination only benefits the designs of rivals. The CNO has stated she intends to act vigorously and provide a stronger Navy for her successor. Hopefully there are more such leaders in the ranks with the backing required to finally bend the too-long downward trajectory of the Navy and get it on track for facing down today’s great power threats.

Captain Brent Sadler (Ret.) joined the Heritage Foundation as a Senior Research Fellow in 2020 after a 26-year naval career in nuclear submarines and as a foreign area officer. He has extensive operational experience in the Western Pacific, having served at Seventh Fleet, Indo-Pacific Command, as Defense Attache in Malaysia, and as an Olmsted Scholar in Tokyo, Japan.

Featured Image: Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 314 launch and recover F-35C as they work to renew their carrier qualifications onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by 1stLt. Charles Allen/Released)

History

Name a Virginia-Class Submarine for Medal of Honor Recipient Henry Breault

7 Comments

By Ryan C. Walker

Introduction

On October 28, 1923, as USS O-5 was beginning its transit through the Panama Canal to participate in fleet exercises, it collided with the United Fruit Company’s Abangarez, sinking in less than a minute.¹ Most of the crew managed to escape, but one sailor made a fateful decision that saved the life of his shipmate. That sailor’s Medal of Honor Citation reads:

“For heroism and devotion to duty while serving on board the U.S. submarine O-5 at the time of the sinking of that vessel. On the morning of 28 October 1923, the O-5 collided with the steamship Abangarez and sank in less than a minute. When the collision occurred, Breault was in the torpedo room. Upon reaching the hatch, he saw that the boat was rapidly sinking. Instead of jumping overboard to save his own life, he returned to the torpedo room to the rescue of a shipmate who he knew was trapped in the boat, closing the torpedo room hatch on himself. Breault and Brown remained trapped in this compartment until rescued by the salvage party 31 hours later.”²

Eight submariners have been awarded the Medal of Honor while serving aboard submarines, but only one was an enlisted man. He happened to be the first as well: Torpedoman’s Mate First Class (TM1, he received the award as a TM2) Henry Breault.

After receiving his award, Breault continued to serve despite failing health, only ending his service when he passed on to Eternal Patrol due to congestive heart failure two days before the attack on Pearl Harbor – December 5, 1941. He rests in St. Mary’s Cemetery in Putnam, CT, but lives on as a submariner folk hero. There has never been a naval vessel named to honor Breault. Naming a Virginia-Class submarine after Breault would not only honor his extraordinary courage but serve as a lasting reminder of the values that continue to guide submariners today.

“Letter of Commendation,” from The National Archives (US), St. Louis, Persons of Exceptional Prominence, Series: Record Group 24 Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel 1798 – 2007 Official Military Personnel Files, 1885 – 1998, Official Military Personnel File for Henry Breault 145766579.

The Rescue

The Canal community’s efforts to rescue USS O-5 are described by Julius Grigore Jr. in two articles published in the Military Engineer (1969) and Proceedings (1972). They stand as the comprehensive accounts of the collision and rescue, though some inaccuracies remain, such as the number of attempts to raise the vessel and reported date of Breault’s Medal of Honor award ceremony (Grigore reported April 4, 1924, likely the date Breault returned to Coco Solo).³

According to Grigore’s account, when reports of the collision and sinking arrived, divers mobilized to locate O-5 and determine if there were any survivors. Through knocks against the hull, Breault and Brown were able to signal their location in the torpedo room. While they were thankfully in shallow water, once they had made contact, their active role ended; they had to wait for 31 hours with no food or water and only a flashlight as the Panama Canal community made efforts to rescue them.

At that time, no formal procedure existed for rescue from a disabled submarine resting seven fathoms deep other than to escape via the torpedo tubes, an evolution which had only been attempted with divers in controlled environments close to the surface.4 Further, due to interlocks, one individual would have had to remain behind to open the torpedo tube. Assessing their options, Breault and Brown made the fateful decision that either both of them or neither of them would escape their refuge.

Commander, Submarine Base Coco Solo, Amon Bronson assumed command of the rescue operation and requested the heaviest lift capacity crane barges, Hercules and Ajax from the Panama Canal. Both crane barges were on the other end of the canal and in a twist of fate, unable to immediately respond due to a landslide at the Gaillard Cut that occurred at nearly the same time as the collision: the vessels needed to wait for the rubble to be cleared, and the first rescue attempt began 13 hours after the collision.

Upon his arrival, civilian diver Sheppard Shreaves would relieve USN divers and spend nearly 24 hours clearing debris and mud, and attaching the lifting hook to the disabled O-5. He would receive the Congressional Gold Lifesaving Medal and a gold watch gifted by submariners for his efforts. Three lift attempts failed, but on the fourth attempt, the O-5 was raised to the surface and Breault and Brown were able to exit via the torpedo room hatch.5

Submarine O-5, 1923. (Library of Congress photograph)

While Grigore asserts that Brown fainted from prostration upon rescue, it is more likely that it was actually Breault, who was inflicted with Caisson Disease, colloquially known as the bends. As a result, the primary account of the rescue did not belong to Breault, but to Brown. Brown “seemed no worse for wear” and he was in a lucid enough state to retell their story.6 Brown states that he was resting before his watch when he felt the crash from the Abangarez. Alerted by Breault, “We both went into the torpedo room, closing the door behind us. The boat sank in thirty seconds, settling in forty feet of water at an angle of 70 degrees to starboard.” Finding themselves trapped in a compartment with 12 inches of water, holding fast to a ladder with only a flashlight for illumination, Brown recalled that “the first hour was the hardest”:

“Breault and I separated to pound on each of the boat’s sides. In this way, the rescuers would know that were two of us. Breault played a kind of tune with his hammer, indicating to the diver that we were in good shape and cheerful. Neither of us knew Morse Code. We had no food or water, and only a flashlight. We were confident we could stay alive for forty-eight hours.”

The pair’s patience was rewarded once they heard the activity of the Panama Canal community working to affect their rescue.7 While being treated, Breault estimated that the compartment pressure was between 25 and 50 pounds but the medical professionals treating Breault disputed these numbers, deciding they were unlikely, but agreed that the two men had been subjected to high pressure in the compartment for an extended period.8

When asked why he stayed on-board instead of jumping for safety, Breault stated simply, ‘I wanted to stay and help, if I could.”9 Surprisingly, this appears to be the extent of what Breault shared after his rescue as no official statements were recorded in his Official Military Personnel File on the subject and only one letter was identified as being from him. The letter is available today thanks to its publication in the New York Times:

“Just a line to let you know that I am still alive. You have no doubt read about the sinking of the submarine. We were down there for hours and had no food. There was water in the lead tanks, but we did not dare to use it because it had been there for months and we were afraid of lead poisoning. I sure was a sick boy but am well now. I have been out helping to raise the submarine. She is all right except the central control room where she was struck. The craft will soon be in condition again. But some of the crew will never go down in a submarine again. Fortunately it did not bother me at all.”10

At the time, the story was well reported, but public sentiment and interest was best captured by Omaha’s Sunday Bee on November 4, 1923:

“Simple enough, when told in words, but tremendously important when calmly viewed. It is the real glory of the service, for it was not done in presence of the embattled foeman, but as a routine act when danger and death threatened in an unexpected form. Henry Breault’s name goes down with other heroes who have brought honor to themselves and pride to Americans.”11

October 29, 1923 – The USS O-5 is raised by the Panama Canal crane Ajax during salvage and rescue operations. Two men who were trapped in engine room are shown shortly after rescue. One is in the white T-shirt being helped off deck. The other is kneeling on deck holding a wire stay. They are Lawrence T. Brown, chief electrician’s mate, and Henry Breault, torpedoman second class. The Captain of the Panama Canal launch Rodman reaches out to pull Torpedoman Second Class Henry Breault on board as others rush to assist Chief Lawrence T. Brown. Breault and Brown of the submarine O-5 had been trapped for 31 hours. (Photo by Panama Canal Review via Wikimedia Commons)

Remembering Breault a Century Later

Barring reports following the event and Grigore’s research, Breault remained largely forgotten until the early 1990s, when several submariners uncovered research conducted by the Aspinock Historical Society in Putnam, CT, and the Submarine Force Library and Museum (SFLM) in Groton, CT. The SFLM did not have an exhibit for Breault in its Medal of Honor section, and he was included only after Curator Stephen Finnegan discovered Grigore’s two articles in the 1990s.12

Jim Christley built on this research and introduced it to the submarine force, leading to renewed interest by the USN that began to culminate by the turn of the millennium. A new pier was named for Breault in Pearl Harbor, HI, on June 18, 1999 and on May 19, 2001, a memorial was dedicated at Naval Station New London’s Wilkinson Hall in Groton, CT.13 Breault’s hometown of Putnam, CT also dedicated a footbridge in his memory on 11 November 2003, ensuring Breault would never be forgotten.14

Over time, these efforts have contributed to Breault’s growing status as submarine folk hero. On March 8, 2024, the centennial anniversary of Breault’s award, a Basic Enlisted Submarine School class named in Breault’s honor graduated on that same day, where he was remembered as 96 aspiring submariners moved on to their next commands, with guest speakers including representatives from CT’s federal legislature and RADM (ret.) Arnie Lotring, who gave a speech honoring Breault. On March 15, 2024, the Honorable Vermont State Representative Michael Morgan invited local submariners to read House Concurrent Resolution 167 on the Vermont House floor recognizing Breault and the submarine service.15 The final tribute to offer as his this centennial year passes, could only be to name a Virginia-Class submarine the USS Henry Breault.

Why the USS Henry Breault

Virginia-class submarines were intended to be named after states, a legacy carried on from the Ohio-class. Recently, deviations from this tradition have come under scrutiny as recent vessel names have transitioned from states to fish (Tang, Wahoo, Barb, and Silversides), cities (San Francisco and Miami), and even regions (Long Island). As a Congressional Research Report noted in 2024:

“Until 2020, Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines were named largely for states, but the most recent eight have been named for four earlier U.S. Navy attack submarines, a former Secretary of the Navy, an island, and two cities, suggesting that there is no longer a clear naming rule for the class”

As there is no longer a hard rule that guides the naming convention, it is an ideal time to ask, why not include a Medal of Honor recipient? John Warner, Hyman G. Rickover, and John H. Dalton either have Virginia-Class submarines named after them or will. Before that, Jimmy Carter, Mendel Rivers, Henry M. Jackson, the ’41 for Freedom’ and so many other dignitaries have been honored as submarine namesakes. Breault’s impact on the submariner community alone, notwithstanding his heroism, warrants his consideration – naming a boat in his honor will aid in recruitment and retention efforts, connect communities (old friends and new) to the submarine force, and remind sailors of their heritage.

USS Henry Breault will Support Recruitment and Retention

In an era where the USN is struggling with recruitment and retention, the publicity generated by naming a submarine after an enlisted Medal of Honor recipient would be significant. It would demonstrate that the USN understands the sacrifices that the enlisted corps has made and will to protect freedom and democracy around the world. The USN’s recruitment goal in FY24 was 40,600 new recruits, an increase from the previous fiscal year “despite two years of missing its aim for new sailors,” for a total of 40,978 new active-duty recruits enlisted.16 This is good news, but those recruits do not immediately address unfilled at-sea billets, which in May 2024 number nearly 18,000.17

Naming a submarine in honor of the only enlisted submariner to receive the Medal of Honor would emphasize the contributions of the enlisted corps of the submarine force and potentially inspire more men and women to enlist. The publicity generated would positively influence public perceptions of the role of enlisted submariners and similarly enhance the prestige of the undersea warfare community as the naming of a Ford-class aircraft carrier for Petty Officer Third-Class Doris Miller has achieved for the aviation and surface communities.

“NH 86982 Torpedoman Second Class Henry Breault, USN.” (Naval History and Heritage Command, Digitized Picture of Navy Times)

“Fish Don’t Vote”

Allegorically, Hyman G. Rickover once shared at a dinner party that submarines were named after locations rather than fish because “fish don’t vote.”18 This has often driven their naming to be connected to locations, but deviating from this tradition would in this case serve to amplify the vessel’s connection to many communities across the nation, as Breault has significant local ties in several states. He was born in Putnam, CT, but moved to White Plains, NY in his childhood. He enlisted from Vermont, offering an address in Grand Isle, VT. When he was active-duty, Breault spent time in San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco in CA, and referred to Marysville, WA, as “home” in official paperwork. When he passed, he was stationed in Newport, RI, where he also attended recruit training and “A” school. Breault’s service emphasizes the contribution these states have made to the success of the submarine force and if connected, would allow several major regions in the US to benefit from the namesake. It would remind many that building submarines is a nation-wide effort that we must support and maintain.

The Essential Duty of the Submariner: Ship, Shipmate, Self

When I was active-duty, the first man that came to mind when I heard the line in the Sailor’s Creed, “I represent the fighting spirit of the Navy and those who have gone before me to defend freedom and democracy around the world.”, was Henry Breault. Breault received the Medal of Honor for attempting to save the ship and when he realized nothing more could be done, doing everything he could to save a shipmate. He saved the life of at least one of his shipmates (Lawrence Brown), and likely purchased time for another (Charles Butler) to escape. Breault’s willingness to “cast all personal safety aside” as described by his commanding officer, Harrison Avery, represents the expectation of every enlisted submariner today.19

The USN must take every opportunity it can to reconnect its sailors and the American public to its mission and values, and a USS Henry Breault would certainly become such an embodiment. Breault represents not only the fighting spirit of the navy, but the trust we place in our shipmates. Even during routine evolutions or transits, we could be called to perform unbelievable heroic tasks: because we trust all we serve alongside.

March 8, 1924 – Henry Breault receiving the Medal of Honor from President Calvin Coolidge. (Library of Congress photo)

Conclusion

USS Henry Breault has the potential to be a unifying force for the USN and the nation, as recognized by the nearly 1,600 people who signed the petition to name a submarine in his honor, and local leaders in numerous communities such as Putnam, CT have signaled their intent to support the submarine. History was made when the USS Doris Miller, was announced, named in honor of Doris, “Dorie” Miller, and in Breault, the submariner community finds an opportunity to name a submarine in honor of one of its own.

The USS Henry Breault would connect sailors to their heritage, recognize the efforts of several states to the submarine force, and aid in recruiting and retention efforts. In a time when sailors are so needed, let us remind them that we remember why.

Sign the petition here.

Ryan C Walker served as a submariner in the USN from 2014-2019. After being honorably discharged, he worked in the defense industry while attending Southern New Hampshire University and University of Portsmouth, receiving in the former his BA in History and in the latter his MA in Naval History. Ryan is a PhD candidate at Portsmouth and has published several articles and chapters in edited collections on American submariners, American Naval-Capital towns, and British Private-Men-of-War. His first book, The Silent Service’s First Hero, was released this year and is a microhistorical investigation into the life and times of Henry Breault.

Endnotes

[1]. Julius Grigore, Jr., ‘The Luck of the Submarine O-5’, The Military Engineer, 61, No. 402

[2]. Congressional Medal of Honor, “Henry Breault,” https://www.cmohs.org/recipients/henry-breault.

[3]. Julius Grigore, Jr., ‘The Luck of the Submarine O-5’, The Military Engineer, 61, No. 402

(1969), 267-69; Julius Grigore, Jr., “The O-5 is Down!,” (February 1972), Proceedings, 98, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1972/february/o-5-down.

[4]. ‘How to Escape from a Sunken Submarine’, Scientific American, 102, No. 23 (1910), 460.

[5]. Grigore, “The Luck of the Submarine,” 268-69; Grigore, “The O-5 is Down,” Website Reprint.

[6]. “They Stared at the Clock,” Newspaper Clipping, SFLM.

[7]. Grigore, “The Luck of the Submarine,” 268-69; Grigore, “The O-5 is Down,” Website Reprint.

[8]. Jones, “Medical History Sheet,” OMPF, 452.

[9]. “They Stared at the Clock for 15 Hours,” United Press Associations, October 31, 1923, Newspaper Clipping, SFLM.

[10]. “They Stared at the Clock,” Newspaper Clipping, SFLM.

[11]. The Sunday Bee, (Omaha), November 4, 1923, Page 8.

[12]. Interview with Stephen Finnegan and Wendy Gulley, September, 8 2021.

[13]. Robert A. Hamilton, “Memorial Honors Enlisted Hero,” The Day, (New London) 19 May 2001, Newspaper, Submarine Force Library and Museum, Submarine Archives, Biography Collection, Medal of Honor, Breault Collection.

[14]. James E. Ratte Jr, “Speech Given During TM1 Henry Breault Bridge Dedication, 11 November 2003,” Speech Transcript, Submarine Force Library and Museum, Submarine Archives, Biography Collection, Medal of Honor, Breault Collection.

[15]. Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress,” https://news.usni.org/2024/07/19/report-to-congress-on-u-s-navy-ship-names-23

[16]. Heather Mongilio, “Navy, Marines Exceed Fiscal Year 2024 Recruiting, Retention Goals,” USNI News, October 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/10/01/navy-marine-exceed-fiscal-year-2024-recruiting-retention-goals.

[17]. Jared Serbu, “Navy grapples with at-sea shortages as recruiting lags,” Federal News Network, May 20, 2024, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/navy/2024/05/navy-grapples-with-at-sea-shortages-as-recruiting-lags/.

[18]. John F. O’Connell, “FISH DON’T VOTE,” The Submarine Review (October 2023): Website Reprint, https://archive.navalsubleague.org/2003/fish-dont-vote

[19]. H. Avery, BREAULT, Henry, TM2c (210-83-03), Recommendation for Navy Cross, Coco Solo, 19 November 1923, RBNP, Official Military Personnel File for Henry Breault.

Featured Image: Henry Breault, March 8, 1924, Library of Congress Photograph, https://www.loc.gov/item/2016836978/