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A History of the Philippine Navy in the Korean War (1950-1953)

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By CMDR Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard

Introduction

On Sunday June 25, 1950, the existence of the Republic of Korea as a democratic nation was shattered when armored and infantry elements of the North Korean People’s Army crossed the border into Seoul. The surprise attack caught the Republic of Korea Armed Forces off guard who lacked the equipment to withstand a massive communist invasion.

On that same day, the United Nations Security Council Resolution Number 82 was enacted which called for the immediate withdrawal of the belligerent forces. After it went unheeded this prompted the world body to pass UNSC Resolution number 83 calling on member countries to support militarily the ROK in deterring communist aggression.

Although having its own counterinsurgency problem, the Philippines became the first Southeast Asian country to deploy troops in support of the UN cause and the Third member of the UN Body to do so. On September 7, 1950, President Elpidio Rivera Quirino announced the historic decision of the deployment of Filipino Soldiers to the embattled republic. It fulfilled the country’s obligation as a member and signatory of the United Nations and the interest of combating the spread of communism in the Asia-Pacific region.

Unknown to many, the Philippine Navy (PN) would actively participate in the Korean conflict. The five Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) of the Service Squadron of the Philippine Navy, namely RPS Cotabato (T-36), RPS Pampanga (T-37), RPS Bulacan (T-38), RPS Albay (T-39), and RPS Misamis Oriental (T-40) would serve as the workhorse in transporting Filipino soldiers to and from Korea for five years. Another great significance for the service was the assignment of two Filipino naval officers at the Philippine Liaison Group-United Nations Command in Tokyo, Japan.

BRP ALBAY (LT-39) Ferried troops of the Philippine Army’s 19th and 14th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) to and from Korea from 1953 to 1954. She is skippered by LTSG JOSE ORDONEZ PN. (Photo by Richard Leonhardt, courtesy Navsource.org)

This paper seeks to provide a summary of the Philippine Navy’s role and exploits during the Forgotten War and the naval legacy that was fortified between the two navies after the conflict.

The Philippine Navy in 1950

Five years after the end of the Second World War saw the reestablishment of the offshore patrol  (OSP). The swarm of former OSP personnel-turned-guerillas were eager to re-join their mother unit. A modest rearmament of the service followed as surplus naval vessels from the United States found its way to the OSP fleet in the form of patrol craft escorts (PCE), submarine chasers (SCs), patrol craft (PC), minesweepers (AM), and landing ship tanks (LSTs).

During that period the order of battle of the Philippine Naval Patrol (PNP) under Commodore Jose Francisco AFP (USNA ’31) comprised of the following: The fleet minesweeper and flagship RPS Apo (PS 21) which also served as the Presidential Yacht in which President Quirino and his cabinet met during the opening days of the Korean conflict. The Patrol Force under LCDR Heracleo Alano PN (PMA ’40) is composed of RPS Cebu (PS 28), Negros Occidental (PS29), Leyte (PS 30), Pangasinan (PS 31), IloIlo (PS32). The rest of the fleet is made up of 16 submarine chasers, six survey vessels, two landing craft infantry (LCI), one rescue tug, and six auxiliary ships.

Departure for Korea

Eight days after the signing of Republic Act 573 “Philippine Military Aid to the United Nations Act” by then President Elpidio R Quirino, the whole element of the 10th Battalion Combat Team boarded the U.S. naval transport USNS SGT Sylvester J. Antolak (T-AP-192) for a four-day voyage to the Korean peninsula. She was escorted from the vicinity of Corregidor Island up to the outskirts of the South China Sea by RPS Negros Oriental (PS 26) and RPS Capiz (PS 27). The battalion would be the first of the five BCTs, namely the 20th, 19th, 14th and 2nd to immortalize the Filipino soldiers gallantry and courage on the field of battle. Each Battalion would serve for about a year in Korea with the last troops leaving for Manila in 1955.

USNS SGT Sylvester J Antolak (T-APA-192)- Brought in to the Korean Theater of Operations the First contingent of 1,303 Filipino Troops (Army, Air Force and Navy) of the 10th BCT, Philippine Army arriving at the Port of Pusan on 19 September 1950 after 4 days of voyage from the Port of Manila.

The combat service support operations of the Navy would begin with the homecoming of the 10th BCT in April 1951 aboard RPS Cotabato and the departure and return to and from Korea of the 20th, 19th, and 14th BCT’s. The 2nd BCT would have the distinction of being ferried to and from Korea aboard U.S. naval vessels.

Early Philippine-Korean Naval Relationship

Quite unknown from the early days of the ROK and the formation of the Korean Naval Defense Corps to the Korean Coast Guard (later becoming the Republic of Korea Navy), Filipino naval officers played a pivotal role as it brought in the first ships of the KCG to Korea from Subic Bay Naval Base. It was in August 1947 that then LTSG Ramon A. Alcaraz, PN (PMA ’40) was designated as head of mission to ferry former U.S. and British Royal Navy auxiliary motor minesweepers that would form the backbone of the Korean Fleet, where their ports of destination were 3 of the 7 ROK Naval bases namely Chinhae, Busan, and Seoul.

Another notable skipper of one of the ships to be transferred is LT Dioscoro E. Papa, PN (the Second Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard). Later on at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, now Commander Ramon A. Alcaraz would be the service squadron skipper of the five LSTs that served as the mainstay of the fleet in ferrying troops of the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) Battalion Combat Teams.

A Naval Officer in the Battle of Yuldong

On April 22-23, 1951 during the Chinese communist spring offensive which could have ended the conflict, Filipino soldiers, airmen, and sailors demonstrated prowess on the battlefield in the greatest defensive operation etched in the annals of Philippine military history. Although outnumbered 10 to 1, the 900 strong 10th BCT withstood a massive attack of the Chinese 12th Army at Yultong Ridge, known today as the Battle of Yultong (Yuldong).

Emilio S Liwanag- Then-LCDR Emilio S. Liwanag PN was attached to the 10th BCT as Supply Officer and later designated as Senior Naval Advisor to the Philippine Representative Mission in Korea. He is shown here as a Captain during the SEATO Naval Exercises as Exercise Director (Photo Courtesy, N-3, Headquarters Philippine Navy from Capt Liwanag’s AGO Card).

A notable naval role was the presence of then LCDR Emilio S. Liwanag, PN (PMA ’38) as the logistics and artillery officer of the 10TH BCT who commanded a battery of 105mm howitzers during the battle. LCDR Liwanag was a graduate of the Advanced Infantry Gunnery Course at Fort William Mckinley in 1950 days prior to his deployment to Korea. Early on, as a logistics officer LCDR Liwanag was also responsible in securing from an American depot a squadron of U.S. made M24 Chafee light tanks and heavy weapons for the tenth’s reconnaissance and heavy weapons company.

The Sea Voyage Rough Seas, Storms, and Typhoons

On the evening of September 30, 1951 the last elements of the 10th BCT would depart the port of Busan aboard RPS Cotabato under LCDR Florentino Buenaventura, PN, on a 2,400 kilometer voyage by way of Japan (as the LST would undergo four days of repair and provisioning at Yokusuka Naval Base). Upon reaching open seas they would encounter heavy gales and the ship’s entire complement mercilessly fought the waves for hours. As furious waves became stronger they sought refuge at Kagoshima Bay. On October 23, 1951 RPS Cotabato escorted by a pair of submarine chasers that entered Manila Bay with a tumultuous welcome from surrounding ships, a flyby from a formation of P-51 Mustangs of the PAF, and a jubilant crowd.

In September 1951 both RPS Cotabato and RPS Pampanga under CDR Tomas C. Robenul, PN would again undertake the task of bringing the second Filipino battalion the 20th BCT under Col. Salvador Abcede to the Korean theater of operations. A year later, the return voyage of the first batch (Albay) and second batch (Misamis Oriental skippered by LTJG Pablo Pascua, PN) of the 20th BCT would again be hampered by a tropical storm off Northern Luzon but the ships would go unscathed with the skillful maneuvering of the vessels officers and crew. A warm welcome and a jovial parade would again be received by the troops and sailors as they approached Manila’s Pier 7.

BRP MISAMIS ORIENTAL (LT-40) Brought home troops of the 20th Battalion Combat Team. (Photo Courtesy Navsource.org).

On March 1953 RPS Bulacan under CDR Tandiko Centi, PN – the First Filipino Muslim naval officer and LTSG Jose Ordonez, PN of RPS Albay –  lifted anchor at South Harbor. Aboard the two ships was the fourth Filipino contingent to the UN Command, the famed 14th BCT also known as the Avengers, a veteran unit of the HUK campaign. Based on the book These are your Boys by the battalion itself, the passage was eventful with film showing singing and guitar playing among the soldiers and sailors and the chow line serving Paksiw (fish cooked and simmered in vinegar with garlic, salt and spices) and Sinigang na Bangus (stewed milkfish in tamarind broth).

From a 14th BCT veteran’s account the expedition to Korea was cut short as an essential stopover was made at Poro Point, La Union to repair and replace a part of the one of the ships engine. With these developments adding some free time sports competitions were held between the townsfolk and sailors stationed at the naval base with the PEFTOK troops emerging as winners. Four days later, the ships hauled anchor and again encountered rough and heavy waves often bigger than the ships seen at the Balintang channel, the crossroads of the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

Twelve days after departing Manila, the Albay and Bulacan dropped anchor at the Port of Busan, although prior to entering harbor the troops and allied naval ships observed the proficiency of Filipino ships and sailors as anti-aircraft and anti-submarine drills were practiced with U.S. Navy counterparts involving one of their submarines which surfaced beside RPS Albay.

The combat service support and escort operations of the Philippine Navy during the Korean War

Prior to debarkation, the Avengers thanked the ships officers and crew along with CDR Octavio Posadas, PN (N4) who handled the administrative and logistical matters in support of the Philippine contingent.

Philippine-Liaison Group United Nations Command, Tokyo, Japan

CDRE Santiago C Nuval AFP- Then Commander Santiago C Nuval was the head of the Philippine-UN Mission in Tokyo, Japan. He later became the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy. (Photo Courtesy N-3, Headquarters Philippine Navy)

As mentioned earlier, after his stint with the 10th BCT, CDR Emilio S. Liwanag, PN would serve as the Assistant Commander of the Philippine mission to the United Nations Command in Tokyo, Japan instead of CDR Santiago C. Nuval, PN (PMA ’38 and a future PN FOIC) as head of the mission. The veterans recall the massive support of the two officers to Filipino troops while in Japan. CDR Liwanag was also the senior naval advisor to the Philippine diplomatic mission in Korea which would earn him the U.S. Legion of Merit for valuable logistical assistance to Filipino troops in the Korean conflict.

Naval Legacy Braced by War

The LSTs mentioned were originally built from 1942-34 and eventually transferred to the Philippines in 1948 and would have a long career. They would again answer the call to arms with the deployment of Filipino troops during the Vietnam War. RPS Cotabato (a veteran of the 1944 Normandy landings) and RPS Pampanga were decommissioned in early 1978, while RPS Albay, Bulacan and Misamis Oriental were mothballed in 1979. The escort ship RPS Negros Oriental was transferred in 1948 and was sunk during a Typhoon at Guam in 1962. On the other hand, RPS Capiz was stricken from the Fleet list in 1979. The Flagship RPS Apo was acquired in July 1948 and would undergo several name changes as well as refits and served as a command ship into the 1960s. It was re-classified as a corvette of the Miguel Malvar class and eventually retired from the service in 1970.  

RPS Capiz- 15 September 1950 Escorting USNS SGT Sylvester J Antolak (T-AP-192) carrying troops of the Philippine Army’s 10th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) to Korea. She is one of the 16 Submarine Chasers then in service with the Philippine Navy (Photo Courtesy of the late 1LT Faustino Tumamak PA (Ret) 10TH BCT).

24 years after the conflict, the Philippine Fleet would receive the ROKS Kyong Ki (DE-71) and ROKS Kang Won (DE-72) in 1977. The former was the ex-USS Sutton (DE-771) while the latter was the ex-USS Muir (DE- 770). The ships were of the Cannon-class destroyer escort type in which at that period the PN has three in its inventory, namely RPS Datu Kalantiaw (PS-76), RPS Rajah Humabon (PF-6), and RPS Datu Sikatuna (PF-5).

Regrettably, the Kyong Ki and Kang Won were never commissioned but were utilized as sources for spare parts for the three active units. Almost 20 years later another milestone in Philippine-Korea Naval relations occurred as 12 Haeksang and Chamsuri-class patrol craft were sold to the Philippine Navy at a friendship price as the Republic of Korea valued the splendid bilateral relations between the two countries that begun in 1949.

The Haeksang (Conrado Yap) and the Chamsuri (Tomas Batilo) class patrol craft entered the fleet in 1993 and 1995, respectively. These ships were acquired during the incumbency of then President Fidel Valdez Ramos, himself a Korean War veteran and reconnaissance platoon leader who captured Hill Eerie on May 21, 1952 against Chinese communist forces.

12 of the Haeksang and eight of the Chamsuri were transferred during those years and through the recommendation from the Philippine Navy to President Ramos on June 24, 1995 presidential approval was granted to name them after Filipino Korean War heroes and veterans, in which the lead ships were named after Captain Conrado D. Yap, PA and then 1LT Tomas G. Batilo, both of the 10th BCT PEFTOK.

The other units of both classes were named after the PEFTOK BCT Commanders, NCOs, and enlisted personnel who sacrificed their lives during the Korean conflict in the name of freedom and democracy.

Three years ago in 2015, the ROK Navy transferred the landing craft utility (LCU) ROKS Mulgae and announced the prior year what would be the second largest naval vessel allocation in terms of size and tonnage from the ROKN to the Philippine Navy in the handover of a Flight III Pohang-class corvette (Ex-ROKS Chung-Ju PCC-762).

Conclusion

Although none of the LSTs and submarine chasers were directly engaged in action around Korean waters, the invaluable role of their combat service support and escort operations along with the naval exercises conducted with allied navies in theater enabled the Philippine Navy to hone its tactics in the various aspects of naval warfare and contribute to the mission. The Navy’s mission enabled the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) troops to accomplish and succeed its its mission in upholding democracy against communism and maintaining the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.

CDR Mark R. Condeno is the Liaison Officer, Foreign Armed Forces Attache Corps, International Affairs Directorate. He was briefly the Research Officer of the Office of the Naval Historian, Philippine Navy in 2007 and Projects Officer of the Maritime Historical Branch of the Fleet-Marine Warfare Center, Philippine Navy. He holds a BS Degree in Architecture from Palawan State University. He is a 1997 Graduate of the Basic Naval Reserve Officers Training Course, Philippine Navy and with the Bravo Class of 1999 Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary Officer’s Indoctrination Course. He also took up the Aerospace Power Course from the Air University, United States Air Force in 2002. He is a longtime member of CIMSEC and published “Navies for Achipelago Nations” for CIMSEC’s 2013 Maritime Futures Project.

References

1. The Fighting Tenth by Major Mariano Manawis
2. These are your boys by the 14th BCT (PEFTOK)
3. Notes on the Korean War by the author
4. Veteran accounts as related to the author
5. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1981-82
6. Conway’s All the Worlds Fighting Ships 1947-1995
7. Newspapers from the 50’s detailing the deployment and return of Filipino Soldiers to and from Korea.
8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emilio_S._Liwanag (Accessed 17 October 2013)

Featured Image: T 36 10th BCT- October 1951- Troops of the 10th BCT aboard RPS Cotabato (T-36) bound for Manila. (Photo Courtesy of the late 1LT Faustino Tumamak PA (Ret) 10TH BCT).

Capability Analysis, Europe

A New Gap in the High North and Forward Defense Against Russian Naval Power

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By Steve Wills, CNA Analyst

The stand-up of a new NATO Maritime headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, the re-establishment of the U.S. Navy’s East Coast-based Second Fleet and the prospect for a new NATO Maritime Strategy this year have again fueled interest in naval warfare in the wider Atlantic Ocean. One of the most commonly mentioned landmarks in this emerging environment is the iconic Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The scene of the German battleship Bismarck’s passage to the Atlantic and the transit highway of early Russian ballistic missile submarines to their patrol stations near the United States and Europe, the GIUK Gap is synonymous with naval warfare in the Atlantic. Unfortunately, current references to the GIUK gap harken back to a different time and strategic situation that is markedly different from the situation today.

Despite early assessments that the Soviet Union was going to target the sea lines of communication (SLOC) crossing the Atlantic, the Soviets never intended to make interdiction of Atlantic convoys a priority mission. Defense of their ballistic missile submarines, countering Allied aircraft carrier battle groups, and littoral defense and support to the Soviet Army were always their main priorities. Today’s much smaller Russian Navy has similar missions and strategic geography, but now boasts long range cruise missile armament.

The NATO Alliance must return to a deterrent posture similar to that of the Cold War in order to prevent potential Russian aggression, but the locus of action is much further north than Iceland. The real “Gap” where NATO must focus its deterrent action is the Greenland, Svalbard, North Cape line at the northern limit of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas. It is again time to consider deterrent action and potential naval warfare in the “High North.”

Never the GIUK Gap Anyway

While important in the Second World War and perhaps the early and middle Cold War, the GIUK Gap did not have the same geographic significance in the late 1970s and 1980s. While earlier Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) had to first sail close to the U.S. coast and then to the middle Atlantic in order to launch their weapons, the advent of the Delta and Typhoon classes with improved sub-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) allowed Soviet missile boats to launch their weapons from the safety of Soviet littoral waters. Intelligence gathered by U.S. and Allied sources in the late 1970s suggested that rather than conduct a rerun of the failed German U-boat campaigns of the World Wars, Soviet submarines were to be deployed in a largely defensive posture close to the Soviet homeland. Earlier work by the Center for Naval Analyses had suggested that Soviet attack subs would be prepared to defend their own SSBNs, attack U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, and perhaps venture forth to attack U.S. SSBNs. But attacking logistics and commerce on the Atlantic SLOCs was a fourth-priority mission at best.

The High North region.

By the 1980s, the U.S. Navy was planning, in the event of a failure of deterrence, to take the war to the Soviet littoral waters and homeland. This was a global effort that included U.S. and Allied action against the Soviets in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans, and the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black Seas. U.S. submarines would stalk and sink their Soviet counterparts and SSBNs while U.S. carrier battle groups would attack Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula (as well as other locations around the periphery of the Soviet state) to prevent a correlation of forces that allowed for a successful Soviet land attack in Central Germany.

A series of exercises begun in the early 1950s at the dawn of NATO’s existence had exercised both naval attacks on the Soviet homeland and the defense of Atlantic SLOCs, but the exercise effort moved into high gear in the 1980s. The advent of the aggressive Maritime Strategy meant the Navy would no longer focus on just the defense of SLOCs as it had been told during the Carter administration. Encouraged by Reagan administration Navy Secretary John Lehman and led by experienced flag officers such as Admirals “Ace” Lyons, and “Hammerin Hank” Mustin, a string of aggressive naval exercises in both the Atlantic and “high north” practiced to defend Norway, drive the Soviets back to their home waters, and attack their bases on the Kola peninsula. Instrumented by the SOSUS system and patrolled by aircraft based in Iceland, the GIUK Gap was a strong symbolic barrier, but it was at best the southern signpost of a war to be fought much further to the north. The late Cold War focus on the maritime high north “put Norway on both Brussels’s and Washington’s military strategic maps in an unprecedented way.”

The Reality of New Great Power Competition in the High North

The return of a revanchist Russia to the business of great power competition after a quarter century of decline has brought back Norway and its adjacent seas into U.S. and NATO strategic focus. The Russian Navy submarine force is less than a fifth of the size of its Soviet forebear. Many of these units will soon be ready for retirement, and are spread over four fleets. Despite those handicaps, Russian units are now equipped with the 3M-54 (Kaliber) cruise missile, which significantly extends Russian combat capability. This is also why the Russian Navy’s mission set now includes an emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence.

Soviet forces operating within their “bastion” defenses in the Barents Sea during the Cold War had to come south in order to engage NATO maritime forces and lacked a land attack cruise missile capability. Today’s Russian Navy can remain within its Barents bastion and still launch accurate attacks against ships in the Norwegian Sea and NATO land targets without leaving these protected waters. If the Russians do leave their bastions it would most likely be on raiding missions enabled by land attack cruise missiles. Russia has a long tradition of raiding for short-term tactical and longer-term strategic gain, and such operations could manifest themselves in the maritime environment.

Possible zones of Russian bastion defense. (RUSI)

NATO faces significant challenges in dealing with this renewed Russian threat. The Alliance’s naval forces are significantly smaller than during the Cold War and the United States Navy is less than half the size of its 1980s counterpart. Norwegian naval force structure is shrinking and even with planned qualitative improvements will not alone be sufficient for potential naval combat in the High North. Norway is set to significantly reduce its surface force through a planned decommissioning of its Skjold-class missile corvettes and remaining mine warfare ships in the next several years. The reductions are necessary in order to pay for new German-built submarines, P-8 Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), and F-35A aircraft. The submarines and MPA purchases are appropriate force structure for potential combat in the Norwegian Sea south of Svalbard and north of Iceland, but reductions will result in a lack of surface patrol units necessary for maintaining sea control.

The F35A can support sea control, but may be occupied elsewhere in defense of Norwegian shore-based infrastructure. For example, the Russian Air Force has launched a number of mock attacks on the Norwegian Joint Command Center at Bodo in recent years and F-35 aircraft may be largely focused on the defense of Norwegian C4I infrastructure. The Norwegian Coast Guard which contributes significantly to patrol efforts in the region has decreased in strength from 31 to 15 units from 1992 to the present. These Coast Guard units are also lightly armed and insufficient for contesting and retaining sea control in the region.

The only significant Norwegian surface force structure in the next decade is likely to be the AEGIS Nansen-class frigates. These ships are capable multipurpose surface combatants, but their small numbers will require a significant commitment of NATO forces to the Norwegian Sea early in a conflict with Russia to ensure that Russian units, especially nuclear attack submarines, do not transit the Norwegian Sea “SLOC” to the North Atlantic. A key element of the Nansen’s antisubmarine capability, the NH90 helicopter, has failed to deliver on its promised number of flight hours. While there may be enough helicopters for the frigates, there are no NH 90 helos with which to equip the Norwegian Coast Guard for its mission of Norwegian and Greenland Sea patrol and surveillance. The Norwegian Joint force is growing in capability, but even with improvements in air and subsurface units it likely cannot prevent passage of Russian Northern Fleet submarines through the Norwegian Sea.

The Royal Norwegian Navy frigate KNM Roald Amundsen (F311) underway in the Atlantic Ocean on 16 February 2018 as part of the U.S. Navy’s Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) while conducting its composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Scott Swofford)

Organizing for Maritime War in the High North

Once just the remote operating grounds of Russian ballistic missile subs, the Eastern Barents and Arctic Seas can now serve as bases for cruise missile platforms to threaten NATO units and land-based targets in and facing the Norwegian Sea. The NATO Alliance is moving in the right direction by reinstituting an Atlantic Maritime headquarters but more must be done to prepare for a conflict in the High North.

Increased Alliance submarine operations in the Norwegian, Barents and Arctic Seas serve to operationalize those headquarters changes. The North Atlantic SLOCs are important, but the Russians are not looking at the mid-Atlantic except for perhaps targets of opportunity. Joint and combined Allied activities that make use of the numerous air and port facilities around the Norwegian and Greenland Seas should be the main focus of JFC Norfolk. A NATO Joint Task Force (JTF) element, perhaps forward deployed afloat or ashore, may need to be present in the immediate area to direct operations.

Unmanned systems technology holds the promise of mobile, underwater detection grids that unlike the Cold War SOSUS nets can move themselves to better identify and localize submerged targets. The Norwegian and Greenland Seas are NATO lakes and receding sea ice has made for a wider and more open battlespace that allows for greater use of shore-based facilities in the region over a longer portion of the year. Small surface combatants such as the U.S. FFG(X) and LCS might operate in conjunction with unmanned units and maritime patrol aircraft and submarines to conduct a regional joint and combined antisubmarine warfare campaign.

Conclusion

A revanchist Russia does not directly threaten North Atlantic sea lines of communication, and the place to deter or engage them won’t be the GIUK gap. NATO must prepare to deter and if necessary engage Russian naval forces in the High North long before these units can get into range of resupply ships or NATO nation port facilities on the European mainland. The Alliance has taken positive steps to meet this renewed maritime challenge, but must not be haunted by U-boat and Soviet ghosts from past Atlantic wars. The place to respond to a new Russian naval threat is close to its home base and not astride critical transatlantic communication routes.

Steven Wills is a Research Analyst at CNA, a research organization in Arlington, VA, and an expert in U.S. Navy strategy and policy. He is a Ph.D. military historian from Ohio University and a retired surface warfare officer. These views are his own and are presented in a personal capacity.

Featured Image: Norweigan Navy Skjold-class corvette.

Global Analysis

Sea Control 149: Former Secretary and First Lady of the Navy, John and Margaret Dalton, Pt. 1

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By Travis Nicks

We were honored to speak with former Secretary of the Navy John Dalton and his wife, Margaret Dalton, about their service during the Clinton administration.

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 149: Former Secretary and First Lady of the Navy, John and Margaret Dalton, Pt. 1

TN: Hi, and welcome to another episode of Sea Control. I’m Travis Nicks, the Vice President of CIMSEC, and on behalf of CIMSEC, I’m honored to be joined today by the former Secretary and first lady of the Navy, John and Margaret Dalton. Secretary Dalton served as the Secretary of the Navy from 1993 to 1998. In that time, Mrs. Dalton was instrumental in many quality of life improvements in our Navy, to include improvements in base housing, and has conducted many outreach efforts, even holding frequent visits to aircraft carriers for groups of congressional spouses. Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Dalton, thank you for joining us.

So starting off Secretary Dalton, you served as Secretary of the Navy from 1993 to 1998. Do you mind sharing how you became the Secretary of the Navy?

JD: Sure. I’ll be glad to. The reason I think I was considered to be Secretary of the Navy was because I had prior military service, and also prior service as a government official. I was president of Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association in the Carter Administration. And after lunching in Dallas, and sat next to him, and got acquainted with him, and liked him, and decided to work in his campaign, and was actively involved in his campaign. When he was elected, he appointed me to be President of Ginnie Mae. That was my first government service. I really enjoyed it, and did that for two and a half years. And when they formed the Reelection Committee,– I was named Treasurer of the Carter-Mondale Reelection Committee. And I was a young man – I was 37 at the time. I was 35 when I got the Ginny Mae appointment, and 37 when I became the National Treasurer of the campaign. And we had, you know, children. When the seat became available on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, after having worked in the campaign for about 6 months, I decided to ask the Chief of Staff of President Carter, Hamilton Jordan if I could have this seat at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. I would still work on the campaign, but I, I’d taken a pay-cut to go into government, and another pay-cut to go on the campaign, and I have small children, and so I thought that would be a better way – better for me personally – so I was able to work that out and do that. After the election in 1980, when President Reagan was elected, I had another – well, on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the term didn’t end with the administration. It actually went through June of ’82. And so I stayed on for a number of months, and a headhunter approached me, and I took a job in San Antonio, Texas, and lived in San Antonio for twelve years in the savings and loans business, and then in the private equity business, and then back in the investment banking business – where I’d originally been when I was working for Goldman Sachs – when I met Jimmy Carter (Governor Carter).

But how I became Secretary of the Navy was, I was active in the Clinton campaign. I was active in the Democratic Leadership Council, which was the more moderate wing of the Democratic Party. And Governor Clinton was Chairman of the DLC, or the Democratic Leadership Council. So I got to know him through that. And when he announced his candidacy for president, I supported and was active in his campaign and when he was elected, because of what I’d done in the campaign, and the fact that I had served on active duty and been involved in the Carter Administration, so I had government experience.

Actually, what happened was, Henry Cisneros was Mayor of San Antonio, and he approached me about two weeks before the election and said who with their work in the campaign could serve adequately in the new administration. So I went there, and he said, “Would you please think about that and come see me, and tell me,” since Henry Cisneros was on the transition team. They were, eight or nine people that were on the Transition Committee before the election, and he was one of them. He solicited my advice about people who would serve in the administration. We talked a couple of weeks before the election, and he said, “We’re going to win, and you know, thank you for the names of these people that you think could serve well. But what about you?”

And I said, “You know, Henry, this is not a good time for me – personally, financially. And the only way I would go back into government service is if there were something meaningful that I could do.”

And he said, “I don’t know what you mean by meaningful, but the Cabinet is spoken for. Is there anything other than the Cabinet that you think you would be interested in?”

I said, “Yes, there is one job. The Secretary of the Navy.”

And he said, “I think you’d be great at that.” And he said, “Get me your resume. I’m going to go to Little Rock tomorrow, and I’m going to see Warren Christopher, who’s the chairman of the Transition Committee, and I’ll give him your resume.”

That’s how it happened.

TN: So you started off your time in the Navy at the U.S. Naval Academy and then with submarines, and then afterward, went to the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. How did the Naval Academy help you in your professional career? And how did those early formative experiences in your career help you become Secretary of the Navy, and then your career afterward?

JD: Well, it helped me a great deal. First of all, some background. I had an uncle who was a Navy hero in WWII. And, you know, I was a young boy – I was born in ’41, so, I was. But the first naval officer I ever heard about was my uncle, Roy, who actually won the Navy Cross, the Silver Star, and five Distinguished Flying Crosses. I mean, he was a genuine hero in WWII. And so my impression of the Navy was very positive from the get-go, and I wanted to go to the Naval Academy. You know, as a young man particularly, in high school.

But I didn’t get the appointment out of high school. That’s truly the only place I applied, and I was sure that was where I was going to go, and I had good grades, and I was on the student council – and all that kind of thing. So I thought I would get the appointment, but I didn’t. And so I went to LSU for a year, and that was a great experience. And I was active in government politics, was elected to the student government association, and president of my pledge class – that kind of thing. And then, I went to see the Congressman here again – what we’re talking about earlier, the personal aspect of seeing the decision-maker is key – and I went to see Overton Brooks, who was our Congressman, and told him that he had not given me his principle appointment the previous year, but I’d gone to LSU and done well, and I hoped that he would give me the appointment this year. And, I said, “It’s not something you’ll regret, because I will do well there.”

He gave me the appointment and I went to the Naval Academy. I didn’t get off to a great start. The first time they published an UNSAT list, my name was on it. And I went out for the crew team and got cut and so forth. But I made the varsity plebe team, in soccer and lacrosse, and enjoyed that. And, you know, early on was the first time they had the aptitude scores for our company. I was number one in our company. In my youngster year – sophomore year – they took a group to the Air Force Academy. At that time, everybody spent a weekend at the air army at West Point, but this was the first time anybody there had gone to the Air Academy, and I was in the group that was selected for that. And I was a group commander in the second class year, and went on a foreign exchange cruise to the Royal Navy my first class year.

All those experiences were very helpful to me, both in my active duty service and in the training that we had. And the leadership skills we learned, and so forth, were helpful to me – both in business, and when I became Secretary of the Navy.

TN: Over the last decade, rapid innovation in technology has been at the forefront of discussion topics in the maritime security community – particularly in the U.S. Navy. And many specialized organizations – DIUX, CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell, Deep Blue, et cetera – have been established and disestablished by Navy leaders with the initial objective of speeding up innovation. The relatively slow speed of integrating innovative technology into the Navy has been heavily criticized – inside and outside the Navy.

You served as the Secretary of the Navy during the mass-adoption of the World Wide Web, the personal computer, the cell phone, and other new technologies. How did you achieve the high speed of integration of innovative technologies that occurred under your leadership in the 90s, and in your experience, what is the most effective way for a Navy leader to set up our institution to more rapidly integrate modern technology into things like personnel management, maintenance, and operations?

JD: Well when I was in office, we had some major challenges with respect to acquisition. And we thought that the system needed an overhaul. So we adopted what was called “acquisition reform.” Nora Slatkin was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition – RDA – she was very good in that job. John Douglas came after her, and he also was very good.

The two major weapons systems that we had to deal with were the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the Seawolf submarine. That was the biggest aviation challenge that we had, and that system was very successful in that it came in on time, on budget, and underweight. And that was unusual in that typically, major new weapons systems cost more and were delayed and, there were a number of alterations that were having to be done on them. So I think the acquisition reform that we instilled was able to project and to perform, and that system – that weapon system – was very successful.

Similarly, another major weapons system was to get the third Seawolf submarine built because it was a political issue. The previous administration, the George H. W. Bush administration, had been opposed to building the third Seawolf, and President Clinton wanted to have it done. But it was a political football. And I thought that we needed to build it for the industrial base. I mean, we needed to have that submarine so that Electric Boat at New London, and also the submarines that were built in Newport News, would not lose all their people if we went two or three years without building a submarine. And we were able to prevail on that issue, and you might recall, going back politically – Clinton was elected in ’92, and in ’94, it was a big sweep from the standpoint of the Republican Party winning most of the seats. I asked some of my friends on the Hill about the possibility about getting the third Seawolf built. And, you know, Phil Gramm (R-Texas) and others that I knew from Texas and other states said, “You can forget it. You’re not going to build or pull that off.”

Well, I thought it was so important that we dedicated a lot of resources to get that third Seawolf built. And we were successful, and we ended up getting 75 votes in the Senate for it. That’s not the exact number, but anyway, it wasn’t close, because we really worked it hard, and it was important. And then once we got that done, the next big thing was the new attack submarine – which is the Virginia-class submarine. And that, too, was an important victory for the Navy Department. And similarly we moved forward with the V-22 in the Marine Corps, and that was a big weapons system that was controversial and had some early failures in terms of people being killed – testing it and so forth. Those were big weapons systems that were all important and all needed some leadership to get done, and we were able to get that done.

In terms of the internet and the other things that you mentioned, that was all late in my term. I can remember having a tutor come in to help me learn how to use a computer, you know, he’s coming in once a week. I was a novice – and still am in many ways. At any rate, some of the technology that you mentioned was late in my administration.

TN: Was it a priority to integrate computers and the internet?

JD: Yeah. I knew there were some people who were using email. But I remember sending my first email to Richard Danzig who was more savvy than I was with new technology. And I said something about something that he sent me, and he sent me an email back that said, “Welcome to cyberspace.”

TN: That’s pretty good.

JD: Yeah, he’s a great guy. He was a great undersecretary and also an outstanding successor.

TN: The two of you worked together – you and Secretary Danzig created programs like NAVFIT98, the eval and fitness report system that we still use today, and a series of programs that were created in the mid-90s and were used for more than a decade, and in some cases, for decades afterward. From a personnel standpoint, did it seem like it would be important to inject the internet and computers and software into personnel management and into communications?

JD: Absolutely. I think those tools that you mentioned were very important. And I think that what we emphasized the most in the five-and-a-half years I was there was people and the importance of treating people with dignity and respect. I mean, the emphasizing our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. When I came into office, we had some significant issues with respect to dealing with people. We had the Tailhook Convention, and the discipline of all that was on my plate. We had the cheating at the Naval Academy. We had the change in the culture of the Navy from the standpoint of gays in the military and women in combat. And both of those things happened within six months of each other – which was a big culture shock to the Navy. When I assumed office, I had been there two weeks before there was a major headline in the Navy Times which read, “Navy Moral at All Time Low.”

TN: Wow.

JD: I had a leadership challenge on my hand, and I think we answered the bell with respect to that. But personnel and evaluation reforms – doing all of that properly and using the technology that we helped developed was very important to evaluating people and making sure that everybody got a fair say.

TN: What was it like dealing with those kinds of situations in the Naval Academy and Tailhook? I mean, I guess Tailhook was very early on.

JD: Well, Tailhook was the biggest. It was the thing I spent more time on than, early in my tenure, than probably anything else. And it was – some refer to it as the biggest blow the Navy has taken since Pearl Harbor. It was on the front page three days out of seven, some kind of story dealing with Tailhook for a long period of time. And so you can see how the people would be concerned about morale, when you’re reading negative stories about your organization all the time, on the front page of the newspaper.

MD: It also happened before he got there.

JD: Yeah, it happened two years before I got there, but the discipline of it was my responsibility.

TN: I’m just wondering – we’re going through what they’re calling the Fat Leonard Scandal right now, and it sort of has the bell ringing of the Tailhook time, particularly because of the impact it’s having on promotion, and other things.

JD: You know, it’s a very similar problem.

TN: How did you maintain morale in the Navy at all levels – in the Pentagon and in the fleet?

JD: I made a big point of accountability and responsibility. I let it be known that everyone in a position of authority was going to be held responsible. If they were in charge with a duty with respect to people, they had to carry out those responsibilities. And accountability and responsibility, treating every individual with dignity and with respect, and living by our core values of honor, courage, and commitment, were key. And you know, if people didn’t measure up, they weren’t going to be promoted. I took a tough stand on that.

MD: He also made it a point to visit as many ships and bases as he could and to let them know that not only did he expect that from them, but he also let them know that he cared about them and he cared about the Navy and what they were doing and what they were contributing.

JD: And I really do feel like that, when I left five-and-a-half years later, I felt like the Navy was stronger, the morale was better. The other problem we had was how we’re going to drawdown from the military and spend this money on other things.

Well, as a result, promotion rates were much lower than the normal, and I remember a year – less than a year – after I assumed office, we went to the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day in England. And President Clinton came aboard a ship – an aircraft carrier – to talk to all the sailors. And I saw David Kirken before the President had gotten there (he got on board earlier), and he was a principle adviser to President Clinton. And he came to me. He said, “What should the President know about the status of morale of the Sailors?”

And I said, “We got a problem.” And I said, “The problem is, promotion rates are really behind. But the good news is, promotion rates this year are higher than they were last year, and promotion rates are going to be higher next year than they were this year. And within three years, we’re going to be back like we’ve always been with respect to promotion rates.”

And he said, “I want you to tell the President that when he gets here.”

And so, the president already had his remarks planned for what he was going to say, but David Kirken called him over and the three of us visited for a moment, and I told him the same thing. I said, “Mr. President, these are the facts. Because of the drawdown, promotion rates have really been slow. And as a result, morale is slow. But, the good news is…”

And so President Clinton, without a note, gets up and goes through his spiel and he says, “But before I leave you today, I want you to know this. I know you’re concerned about your advancement rates and your level of promotion. But let me tell you young men and women, your promotion rates this year are going to be better than they were last year. And your promotion rates next year will be better than they were this year. And within three years, you’re going to be right back like you’ve always been.”

Aboard, the troops just rallied – I mean, he was as good a politician. He just heard what I said and he walked out onto the platform, and brought it to life. He came into office as the – I’m sure he didn’t get 20 percent of the vote from the armed forces, personally. But he earned the trust of the leadership and ultimately, the rank and file because he was able to do stuff like that. I mean, he was a good Commander in Chief even though the typical armed services personnel didn’t think he was going to be. But I think he genuinely earned their trust, and he was a fine Commander in Chief.

TN: You spoke about the drawdown and the reduction in funding, and the peace dividend, and the subsequent, dramatic drop in budgeting for the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy. Much has been made in recent months about the strain of life while deployed at sea, and how that conversation has been driven by the collision of USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald recently. The Senate Church Committee was very interested in the work week for sailors – how sleeping is, and the short maintenance in training timelines, and some of that that has been attributed to the remnants of the peace dividend period. I’m just curious how you see the budgeting from the 1990s having played out over the last 20 years, the predictions that you and undersecretary Danzig, and the three CNOs that you served with– how those predictions have manifested over time.

JD: Well, I think it’s the civilian leadership’s responsibility to make sure that the military has adequate resources. And we went through the quadrennial defense review every four years and reviewed what the needs were, and it was our job then to articulate those needs to the Congress and to the public and to generate the necessary resources. And I think we did well at that. I think you always want more than you can get. But I think we did well from the standpoint of generating the resources. And then the other thing you talked about was training, and I think that is more the leadership of the military’s responsibility. We don’t get – civilian leadership doesn’t get involved in the actual training of people and the dealing of the amount of sleep and the kind of thing you talked about. But I tried to always emphasize the importance of our people and that means quality of life issues, and Margaret was very helpful with respect to those issues. I can tell you some stories, and she’ll talk to you about that as well. But we made quality of life a priority, and Margaret deserves a lot of credit for things she did with respect to that. I know at that time we had six months deployments. That was a hard stop. And the CNO had to come see me if a ship was going to be deployed longer than six months. And it didn’t happen very often because he didn’t want to come to talk to me about a six-month deployment being longer than that. And so, it rarely happened in the five and a half years that I was there. And it sort of set the tone, that the Secretary of the Navy was interested enough in the quality of life of the Navy and the Marines. That was a stipulation that the CNO had to get it cleared for me if there was going to be a deployment longer than six months. And that sort of mindset permeated the Navy Department.

TN: As recently as 2011, I know that there was one aircraft carrier that went on deployment for 11 months, then turned around and went back to sea very shortly thereafter for several months at a time – that’s just incredible to hear.

JD: People start voting with their feet when that happens. I mean, today, I don’t think we have a retention problem. But if you continue to do 11 month deployments and they become commonplace…people have families and obligations and those kind of deployments, that long, really deteriorates the morale of Sailors and Marines. They understand if there’s an exception and they have to do something for the national security and that’s what they’re there for, but by the same token, they have personal lives that require our looking out for them.

TN: How were you able to strike that balance? Sounds that like you made a decision that you would focus more on quality of life than operational tempo, and I’m just curious how that conversation played out with the admirals that are focused more on operational tempo.

JD: Well, I think part of it was, you know, what I inherited with Tailhook and the cheating scandal and the drawdown and so forth. I wanted to emphasize people. And you know, if the Secretary of the Navy is talking about that kind of stuff…the admirals know that I select who goes where, in terms of who is going to be in what job, and if they flop the things that I’m for, it’s not going to be in their interest. So I think the tone does get set at the top. Clearly, you work with the admirals and generals of the Navy and the Marine Corps and they know more about the operational aspects of it than I do. I’d been out of the Navy – I left in 1969, I became Secretary in 1993. I mean, that’s a good period of time to be away from the naval service. I think I had the ability to assess the situation and make good decisions.

TN: Do you feel like your time that you’d been in business in those intervening years between 1969 and when you became Secretary of the Navy helped you make decisions quickly? We’ve been talking in the last year or so about how this particular administration’s been talking a lot about the importance of having business practices interjected into government. And you did have that experience. You had a long career in business and then came into government again.

JD: Well, I think that having a business background is useful. I mean, we’ve had many successful Secretaries of the Navy and Secretaries from other services who were not in business, but I think the practicality of meeting a payroll and assessing a bottom line and having things work well are useful. But I mean, similarly there are high qualities and traits that come from being a lawyer and from other occupations as well. I mean, I think my business experience was helpful. I also think my prior government service was helpful. I also think having served on active duty was helpful. There are plenty of fine Secretaries who didn’t do those things, but I think they were helpful to me.

TN: So shifting gears just a little bit, one more question about the drawdown, the financial drawdown, and the reduction in budgeting. 1990 saw a consolidation of the defense industry from about 37 firms to five prime firms. And we ended up with Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. I’m just curious how you feel like the consolidation of the defense industry has impacted the Navy.

JD: I mean, I still believe we have enough quality providers of resources, providers of equipment and operation needs that there’s enough competition from those five firms that (and they’re all quality firms and well-run organizations) and I’m not concerned about the consolidation. I think there’s adequate competition today.

John Dalton served as the 70th Secretary of the Navy from 1993 to 1998. 

Mary Dalton is Secretary Dalton’s spouse.

Travis Nicks formerly served as the Vice President of CIMSEC. These questions and views are presented in a personal capacity.

Cris Lee is Senior Producer of the Sea Control podcast. 

Future Tech

Harnessing Tech Innovation from Blockchain to Kill Chain

1 Comment

By Jimmy Drennan

With all of the hype surrounding bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, it can be difficult to sort through the noise and it might seem trendy to ask the question “How can this technology benefit my organization?” After all, a cryptocurrency started as a joke in honor of dog memes recently achieved a $2B valuation. Still, the underlying technological innovation behind Bitcoin, the blockchain, has real, concrete advantages that can impact numerous industries, from banking to logistics.

Applications in maritime operations are no exception. Blockchain is essentially a distributed database that incentivizes network consensus to make it extremely difficult to alter recorded data. Think of it this way: blockchain is like a museum that offers free entry, but heavily secures each exhibit with anti-tamper systems such that they can only be observed, not stolen or defaced. That so-called “immutability property” makes blockchain useful any time data integrity (i.e. preservation of data) is more important than data security (i.e. privacy of data).

Ideas are already being formulated by the Secretary of the Navy’s Innovation Advisory Council on how blockchain can improve additive manufacturing. Perhaps the most intriguing example of how blockchain can assist naval operations lies in ensuring an accurate recognized maritime picture (RMP). In naval warfare, nothing is more important when forming a kill chain than ensuring one has properly identified the target. RMP is even more critical when relying on networks, and the U.S. Navy has invested heavily for decades to become the world’s preeminent networked force. Blockchain has the potential to solve two of the Navy’s biggest problems associated with building RMP: ambiguity and manipulation. In fact, the broader maritime industry can also benefit from the use of blockchain due to inherent security flaws in the widely used automatic identification system (AIS).

What is a Blockchain?

A brief primer on how blockchains work will help to illustrate how they can impact naval operations. A blockchain used to record financial transactions, called “cryptocurrency,” is perhaps the best example to use. It is a distributed ledger that keeps track of every transaction ever conducted. Bitcoin, the original and most well-known cryptocurrency, relies upon a large network of independent users to prevent “double spending.”  Since cryptocurrency is just data, and not something tangible that is traded for goods or services, it would normally be easy for someone to spend it twice and delegitimize the entire system. Bitcoin’s unique process solved the double spending problem by calling upon its network users to work together to verify each transaction. Bitcoin conducts “consensus building” by offering a prize (currently 12.5 bitcoin) to a randomly selected user helping to verify the latest transaction. Once consensus is built and a transaction is verified, a new 12.5 bitcoin is awarded (i.e. mined) and the transaction is recorded to the blockchain. Each subsequent transaction is built upon the last, making it very difficult to retroactively manipulate data on the blockchain. In fact, the only way for a nefarious actor to alter a previous transaction or record an invalid transaction would be to achieve 51 percent of the computing power on the bitcoin network. For reference, today the world’s most powerful supercomputer, China’s Sunway Taihulight, would comprise just 0.6 percent of the bitcoin network’s computing power, which is growing exponentially.

Recognized Maritime Picture

U.S. and coalition navies rely on secure tactical data networks to share information from a variety of sensors to build RMP. Since RMP is built from the input of numerous, widely distributed users in these networks, they are susceptible to errors like “dual tracks” (i.e. a single ship or aircraft being broadcast to the network as two contacts) or faulty navigational data causing a ship to misreport its own course and speed. These errors can lead to ambiguity in RMP that could lead to critical delays in successfully identifying a threat. Tactical data networks are also susceptible to intrusion and manipulation, no matter how secure they are. Like any cybersecurity system designed to keep unauthorized users out, navies constantly strive to make their tactical data networks more secure against ever more determined adversaries.

Blockchain technology can help navies mitigate the problems of ambiguity and manipulation in building RMP. By building tactical data networks on a blockchain foundation, ambiguity will be resolved naturally as “consensus” develops around new tracks and they are distributed throughout the network. Once consensus is built around a track, blockchain’s immutability property makes it very difficult for subsequent users to clutter RMP with errant data on that track. Likewise, an unauthorized user trying to manipulate RMP by infiltrating tactical data networks will be challenged to alter data on established tracks. Even if a cyber attack attempted to insert new false tracks into the network, specialized blockchain features could be developed to override track data that is not corroborated by friendly sensors. A blockchain that utilizes special features and operates on secure networks is an example of a  private blockchain. Going back to the museum example, a private blockchain is like a museum that employs robust anti-tamper systems on the exhibits, but also restricts entry to museum members only. A disadvantage of a private blockchain is the reduction in available computing power, due to limited users, to ensure data integrity. The cost of rebuilding U.S. and coalition navy tactical data networks from the ground up utilizing blockchain will likely be significant; however, the advantages in data integrity by mitigating ambiguity and manipulation are worth analyzing.

Much as U.S. and coalition navies could benefit from private blockchain, the maritime industry at large could benefit from public blockchain to improve its RMP. Worldwide, mariners use AIS – an open network of ship position, course, and speed data – as a primary tool for building RMP. Implemented in the early 2000s, AIS has been critical to improving safety of navigation. Still, AIS has inherent flaws that blockchain could be used to fix. Because it is open source, AIS data can easily be manipulated to make a ship appear in a different location, report false course and speed, or even mimic another ship’s identity. As Glenn Hayes explains in the Maritime Electronics Journal, AIS “is vulnerable to malicious transmissions and runs the risk of being manipulated by individuals seeking to deceive the system.”  Illegal fishing, piracy, and smuggling are just a few of the reasons one might seek to deceive AIS. As use of AIS spreads, potential security issues will only increase. The data manipulation that AIS is susceptible to is exactly the type of vulnerability that blockchain was developed to address. With targeted funding and industry-wide effort, blockchain can provide data integrity to AIS to improve maritime safety and deter illegal activity at sea.

Countering Maritime Smuggling

Another potential application of blockchain in maritime operations could be in supply chain improvements to counter maritime smuggling of drugs, weapons, or any illicit cargo. Lieutenant Junior Grade Henry Bond wrote an insightful article for U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings on the potential for blockchain to protect the DoD supply chain. Lieutenant Bond’s analysis can be expanded to include the global shipping industry. Specifically, smugglers often exploit the inherent difficulties in conducting cargo inspections on container ships by concealing contraband within legitimate cargo in innocuous, unmarked containers. Economic and operational constraints do not often allow for the time it would take to open and inspect hundreds of containers pierside, and physical constraints usually prohibit at-sea inspection. So, to counter maritime smuggling via container ships, navies and law enforcement agencies must focus on deterring the use of containers vice locating illicit cargo in transit. Blockchain portends to act as a potential deterrent by openly and irrevocably recording the status of every container in the supply chain. Essentially, each container could be treated like a “transaction” in the blockchain, so that once it is loaded as part of a legitimate shipment, its status relative to all other nearby containers is “locked down,” making it very difficult to mix in an illegitimate container at a later point. Events like the opening or repositioning of a container could also be recorded as “transactions” to further complicate smugglers’ to conceal illicit cargo.

Ideas like those of Lieutenant Bond or the SECNAV Innovation Board are sound, but they require further development because blockchain is still a nascent technology. DoD, and the maritime industry at large, would do well to assign additional research funding to pursue ideas for applying blockchain in national defense and maritime safety.

Jimmy Drennan is the Vice President of CIMSEC. These views are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of any government agency.

Featured Image: ORLANDO, Fla. (August 12, 2014) Sailors train on a new diesel generator simulator during a project review at Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division in Orlando, Fla. (U.S. Navy photo by Darrell Conley/Released)