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China’s Military Modernization: The Legacy of Admiral Wu Shengli

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This article originally featured on the Jamestown Foundation’s China Watch. You can view it in its original format here.

By Jeffrey Becker

Earlier this month, Caixin reported on another round of Chinese military promotions, highlighting the youth and operational experience of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) newly minted generals (Caixin, August 12). Moreover, in roughly two years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its 19th Party Congress, a critical time to enact important military and civilian leadership changes. One change that is all but certain to occur as the PLA continues to promote a new generation of leaders is the appointment of a new PLA Navy (PLAN) commander. While rumors swirled in the Hong Kong press before the 18th Party Congress in 2012 that long-tenured PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli might retire or be appointed Defense Minister, neither of those scenarios occurred (China Leadership Monitor [CLM], January 14, 2013). Instead, Admiral Wu remained PLAN Commander, becoming the oldest member of the Central Military Commission and one of the longest tenured commanders in China’s naval history. [1]

With no more than two years left before his likely retirement, it seems appropriate to begin looking back on the career of one of the PLAN’s most influential and successful commanders. This article attempts to begin that process. The challenges Wu faced and overcame in his early career provide insights into his leadership as PLAN commander. Additionally, Wu’s career has spanned the largest and fastest buildup in the PLAN’s history. Examining the Chinese Navy’s greatest accomplishments under his tenure may therefore help point toward future directions the PLAN could take under the possible candidates to succeed him in the post-Wu era.

A Product of China’s Revolutions

Admiral Wu’s early life and military career reflects some of the most tumultuous periods in modern Chinese history–the war of resistance against the Japanese, the Chinese civil war and establishment of the People’s Republic, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Born in August 1945, Wu was raised in Zhejiang Province as a well-known “princeling” (太子)–the son of the famous Wu Xian, a Red Army political commissar during the Anti-Japanese war and the Chinese Civil War. Indeed, Wu is purported to have been given the name shengli (“victory” 胜利) in commemoration of the victory over Japan (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015). After the wars, the elder Wu held important political positions, to include mayor of Hangzhou and vice governor of Zhejiang. Although Wu was raised by his father in Zhejiang, his family’s ancestral home is in Wuqiao County, Hebei Province, about 200 miles south of Beijing. [2]

Wu joined the PLA in August 1964, and began studying at the PLA Surveying and Mapping College in Xi’an, earning a degree in oceanography in 1968 (Guoqing, February 1, 2012). His timing was fortuitous, as his affiliation with the PLA likely helped shield him as the Cultural Revolution decimated Chinese social, government and Party institutions in what amounted to a low-intensity civil war. Over 12 million of Wu’s generation, including current senior PLAN officers, were forced to work on rural communes as part of China’s “sent down youth” movement. [3] As a member of one of the only institutions left standing, however, Wu was saved from this fate by joining the PLA. However, given what we know about the Cultural Revolution’s impact on the nation’s academic institutions, the quality of training he received in Xi’an was highly questionable, and Wu would not receive formal training again until 1972, when he attended the captain’s course at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy. [4]

After Xi’an, Wu’s early career was spent gaining experience as a surface warfare officer in the East and South Sea Fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, serving as both commander of the East Sea Fleet’s (ESF) 6th Destroyer Flotilla and as deputy chief of staff for the Shanghai Naval Base. The fact that future President Jiang Zemin was serving as Shanghai Party secretary at this time has led some PLA-watchers to speculate that Wu may have cultivated ties with Jiang. [5]

Yet Wu and his colleagues lacked combat experience. The closest that Wu is known to have come to combat was as the commander of the ESF’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla, when he had authority over the FrigateYingtan (CNS 531), one of the vessels which took part in the 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish with Vietnam. [6]

In 1992, Wu became chief of staff of the ESF’s Fujian Support Base. This was soon followed by an appointment as commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, a highly influential post, which allowed him to affect the direction of training for future PLAN officers. Wu returned to the ESF as a deputy commander in 1998. He was appointed South Sea Fleet (SSF) commander in 2002, and promoted to vice admiral in 2003. In 2004, he became one of the few naval officers to serve as a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, a position equivalent to a commander of one of China’s seven Military Regions and the second-highest-ranking operational officer in the PLA Navy (Center for China Studies [Taiwan], June 5).

Shepherding the PLAN’s Transition

Wu’s background, family connections and professional experiences made him a strong candidate for top leadership roles. Thus, when cancer forced Admiral Zhang Dingfa into retirement in 2006, Wu was promoted to PLAN Commander just as the navy was on the cusp of an organizational transformation. In 2004, Hu Jintao gave his landmark address on the PLA’s “New Historic Missions,” which declared that China’s interests abroad were expanding, and that the PLA had an important role to play in defending those interests (Xinhua, June 19, 2006).

This new direction provided the PLAN with a substantially increased role in the implementation of China’s national security and military engagement policy. For Admiral Wu and his contemporaries, this challenge was exacerbated by years of isolation from the international naval community, which, along with the domestic effects of the Cultural Revolution, led to a dramatic erosion of professional and technical skills, as well as a severe decline in human capital and basic quality of life within China’s navy. [7] Indeed, Admiral Wu seems to have personally taken an interest in improving the quality of life of China’s sailors. Wu’s writings include details about the difficult and backwards conditions onboard PLAN ships earlier in his career, noting how PLAN sailors routinely “would go into port but not go ashore, eat while squatting on deck, hold meetings on folding stools and sleep on metal siding.” [8]

This makes Admiral Wu’s success in overseeing the PLAN’s transformation all the more compelling. While he and members of his cohort were responsible for overseeing a rapidly transforming navy, complete with formally trained officer candidates, they themselves had only limited formal training. Though tasked with preparing the PLAN to conduct blue water operations, the navy Wu Shengli had joined was still overwhelmingly a coastal defense force. Despite these challenges, within a few years of assuming command, the PLAN would be conducting anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden, evacuating Chinese citizens far from China’s borders, (first in Libya in 2011 and later in Yeman in 2015), and participating in progressively more complex multinational maritime exercises, including the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2014 (RIMPAC-14) (China Brief, April 3; China Brief, May 1; Also see “Six Years at Sea… And Counting”).

Viewed in this context, what Wu and his contemporaries have accomplished in transforming the PLAN has been even more remarkable. The PLAN Commander and his staff must have truly been followed Deng Xiaoping’s aphorism to “cross the river by feeling the stones,” in part learning as they went about modernizing the PLAN and partly relying on younger, more technically trained PLAN officers–individuals who constitute the next generation of PLAN leadership. The history of China’s naval transformation in the 2000s has yet to be written, but understanding how Admiral Wu and his advisors managed this will be fascinating reading when the details come to light.

Improving USN-PLAN Relations

Navies often play the lead role in a country’s foreign military relations, and after having spent almost a decade developing the personnel relationships and diplomatic acumen that facilitates international engagement, Admiral Wu has in many ways become the face of the PLA abroad. Nowhere is this influence more apparent than in the PLAN’s growing engagement with the United States Navy (USN). Throughout this time, Admiral Wu has been a constant presence, meeting with each of the past three U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In 2014 alone, CNO Greenert met with Wu on four separate occasions, the most of any foreign navy leader (USN, September 8, 2014).

Like any PLA officer with whom the U.S. Navy interacts, Admiral Wu’s talking points have been carefully selected and vetted by the Party. His statements in official settings reflect what the Party views as primary objectives for the military-to-military exchange. However, Wu’s long years of experience appears to have helped create a degree of stability in the U.S.-China navy-to-navy relationship not seen in the past. The two navies have worked together in multiple settings, including in the Gulf of Aden and in Hawaii at RIMPAC-14. They have conducted reciprocal port visits in Zhanjiang, San Diego and Hawaii, established the Code of Conduct for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) through cooperation in the Western Pacific Navy Symposium (WPNS) and continue to move forward on additional confidence building measures (Xinhuanet, April 23, 2014; Xinhuanet, December 14, 2014).

At the same time that the PLAN appears to have pushed its relationship with the U.S. Navy to new heights, the PLAN continues to play a vital role asserting China’s interests closer to home. For Admiral Wu, this ability to do both simultaneously reflects an adept and skillful use of maritime diplomacy. As China continues this assertive behavior however, this skillful balancing act may become increasingly difficult to maintain. Moreover, as Wu Shengli moves closer to retirement, his experience in helping manage this tension will surely be missed.

The Chinese Navy in the Post-Wu Era

While PLA decision making has become more transparent, opaque factors, including personal connections, family relationships and ever present corruption, make predicting who Wu’s successor will be impossible. That however, has never stopped China analysts from putting forth possible candidates for future promotion. With that in mind, the following three officers have been discussed at length as possible candidates to replace Admiral Wu:

Admiral Sun Jianguo: As the PLA’s deputy chief of staff in charge of intelligence, Admiral Sun is the second highest-ranking operational officer in the PLA, a position that Admiral Wu once held before becoming PLAN Commander. [9] Unlike Wu, Admiral Sun’s experience has largely been as a submariner, and he has captained both conventional and nuclear submarines, including those involved in espionage missions in the Taiwan Strait. [10] However, as a contemporary of Wu’s (Sun was born in 1952 and joined the PLA in 1968), he would be 65 by the 19th Party Congress, and thus would likely serve only an abbreviated tenure as PLAN commander.

Vice-Admiral Tian Zhong: A less likely but interesting alternative choice is Tian Zhong, who earlier this year was transferred from his former position as North Sea Fleet commander to deputy PLAN Commander, a position that provides him a seat on the PLAN Party Standing Committee. Relatively young at 59, Tian’s has moved through the ranks at a rapid pace. In 2007, he was promoted to NSF Commander after serving only a year as NSF chief of staff (Center for China Studies, August 3). Perhaps more tellingly, Tian was the youngest and lowest-ranking PLAN officer to serve on the CCP Party Central Committee. While still a fleet commander, Tian served on this elite organization alongside PLAN Commander Wu Shengli, PLAN Political Commissar Liu Xiaojiang and Admiral Sun Jianguo (Xinhua, November 14, 2012).

Vice-Admiral Jiang Weilie: Like Tian Zhong, former SSF commander, Jiang Weilie also became a PLAN commander in 2015. Jiang appears to be something of a technocrat, having served in the PLAN Equipment Department in 2010. [11] This is a highly unusual career move–few operational officers spend time in technical departments, a separate career track. [12] While in this department, Jiang was tasked with overhauling the PLAN’s equipment acquisition systems, after which he was rewarded with a fleet command. As the PLAN seeks to replace Wu’s international engagement experience, it should be noted that Jiang has also had multiple engagements with his U.S. Navy counterparts, most recently traveling to Hawaii in 2014 to serve as China’s VIP during its first-ever participation in RIMPAC-14 (Phoenix Online, July 22, 2014).

Conclusion

Whoever is selected as Admiral Wu’s replacement will be taking charge of a dramatically different force than the one Wu Shengli took command of in 2006. Thanks in part to his leadership, China’s navy today is far more capable, active and engaged with the rest of the world. It is staffed by more professional and formally trained personnel than at any time in China’s recent history, and enjoys a stable and robust working relationship with the USN and other international navies in large part due to his years of experience in maritime diplomacy and careful cultivation of relationships.

Notes

1. Although former PLAN Commander Xiao Jingguan nominally served as PLAN Commander for almost 30 years from 1950 to 1979, he was effectively sidelined during much of this time as a result of factual political infighting during the Cultural Revolution.

2. Jeffrey Becker et al., Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2013), p. 136

3. This includes for example current North Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Yuan Yubai. Before joining the PLAN in 1976, Admiral Yuan spent two years as a full-time member of his “Basic Line Education Work Team,” in Gongan County, Hubei Province. “Work Teams” were ad-hoc organizations invested with local authority during the Cultural Revolution. Jeffrey Becker et al., Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy, p.183.

4. Cheng Li, “Wu Shengli – China’s Top Future Leaders to Watch,” Brookings, accessed March 18, 2015.

5. Ibid.

6. Yang Zhongmei, China’s Coming War: The Rise of China’s New Militarism (中國即將開戰: 中國新軍國主義崛起) (Taipei: Time Culture Press, 2013), p. 210–211

7. Admiral Liu Huaqing’s biography provides some exceptionally painful examples of just how far the PLAN had fallen immediately following the Cultural Revolution. See Liu Huaqing, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, (刘华请回忆录), (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 417-432.

8. Wu Shengli, “Beginning to Bid Farewell to Sleeping and Eating Aboard the Ship in Port: The Lifestyle Revolution for Chinese Sailors,” PLA Life (Jiefangjun Shenghuo; 解放军生活), no. 9 (2010).

9. Jeffrey Becker et al., Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy, p. 173.

10. Shih Min, “Hu Jintao Actively Props up ’Princeling Army,” Chien Shao, April 1, 2006, no. 182.

11. Ma Haoliang, “High-Ranking Officer Adjustments in the Navy with a Focus on Having a Technologically Strong Military (海軍將領調整 凸顯科技強軍),” Ta Kung Pao, February 9, 2011

12. Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens, The Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel(China Maritime Studies Institute, 2014).

OK, Explain Again Just Why the American Taxpayer Should Pay For All This (Series Finale)

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OK, Explain Again Just Why the American Taxpayer Should Pay For All This

This article, the sixth of the series, presents reasons why Congress and the American taxpayer should pay for all the drones, buoys, railguns and the additional necessary ships to deploy them at sea introduced earlier in the series. Some of the justifications briefly discussed below are sure to be familiar to the reader, some less so. In either event, please feel free to mentally rearrange them according to your own priorities. Read Part One, Part Two, Part Three, Part Four, Part Five

Expensive Assets

These are not inexpensive assets that can be squeezed into the Navy’s spending plans somehow. With a likely cost of $3 billion plus for the CVLN and CARN classes, less the cost of at least one, possibly two DDGs that a CARN replaces in a carrier task force and $2 billion plus cost for an AORH, Congress and the American taxpayer are going to have to be persuaded to purchase these as additional assets for the Navy. So why should they do so?

Deterrence

Adding large quantities of ISR and ASW drones along with a dozen, or more, railguns as a matter of routine will provide a credible defense against the increasing A2AD threat the Navy faces. Presenting a potential adversary with overwhelming force in a potential area of conflict is a time proven technique for preventing conflict and promoting dialogue. It should also be noted that while these additional assets are expensive, combined they are still less than half the construction cost of just the CVN being protected, much less the air wing embarked aboard.

Protection

For CVNs

Much of the surface warfare assets the Navy possesses are routinely dedicated to protecting other critical ship classes and their embarked sailors. The CVNs operating in their dedicated task forces normally find themselves free to go where they please given the protection against air, submarine and surface threats the surrounding ships provide. Adding a CVLN and a CARN to this operating procedure is simply adding to a proven recipe by countering the increasingly formidable A2AD assets other nations are steadily acquiring.

For amphibious assaults

The Marine Corp routinely catches a ride on an ARG provided by the Navy. Most of the time there is no need to provide the extra protection provided by the suggested new ship classes. Come the big moment though, both during the few days leading up to and then during an amphibious assault placing a CARN, an AORH and a Zumwalt class destroyer between the opposing forces ashore and the ARG can very substantially improve the chances of success and measurably lower the anticipated casualty rates amongst the Marines making the landing. By providing substantial ASW assets in the coastal waters involved, numerous ISR and target spotting assets from the AORH, formidable fire support abilities from the CARN and Zumwalt and substantial anti-missile, rocket or artillery shell protection courtesy of the twelve railguns the new ship classes will significantly improve the Navy’s ability to support an amphibious invasion. Plus the Marines making the ride ashore will be able to start from just over the horizon thanks to the presence of multiple targeting drones and railguns instead of the much discussed fifty mile seasick inducing slog currently anticipated.

Ally reassurance

Protecting the carrier strike groups also means reassuring our allies that we will be able to fulfill the defense commitments we have made, particularly in the Western Pacific. However, building and deploying the means to allow the fleet to go where it wants is a globally useful capability, allowing the U.S. to confidently assert it will be there in time of need.

Multi-polar world

We live in a multi-polar geopolitical structure. China, Russia, India, Europe, the Gulf States, Brazil and others already are jostling with the U.S. for influence and trade. Including a China who already is in some respects, and will remain our economic equal in world affairs. This economic equivalence is something the U.S. has not had to deal with since our enormous industrial expansion in the last three decades of the 19th Century. We need to refresh our thinking with some of the concepts that worked well for us as we dealt with Great Britain, the existing economic power back then.

That said being a rival is not the same as being an enemy. There certainly are many areas where the U.S. and China will find ways to cooperate to our mutual benefit. We are certain to jostle each other though, especially in China’s immediate area as that proud civilization looks to ‘put things right’ after their many difficulties of the last two centuries. As mentioned above, we want to deter everyone in the area from using violence to bring about change, instead encouraging patience while the various nations involved discover mutually acceptable adjustments via discussion.

Playing defense to maintain the world as it is

There are other issues that come with being in a multi-polar world. In the new global circumstances the U.S., and the Navy in particular, need to execute defense, and first things first, keep our ships afloat. Something we have not had to overly concern ourselves with since the demise of the Soviet Union or the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 1940s. Increasingly we will no longer be able to exercise the freedom of the seas and engage in whatever activity we want, whenever we want to. Russia is already building a submarine and long-range bomber force to potentially contest our passage. Others, China in particular, will be able to invest steadily increasing resources in military assets that make sense for their geo-political situation. Investments that mean the U.S Navy may have to fight our way across the North Pacific or North Atlantic before we commence operations at the location of our choice.

Hawaii has to eat

Our geography as a nation includes Hawaii, control of which easily translates into the control of the bulk of the Pacific Ocean. Yet Hawaii is a series of islands, thousands of miles from the mainland with a population of 1.4 million. Again, the change to a multi-polar world means we have to give thought to just how we can ensure the population on the islands can eat when trouble arrives. Russia already has the submarine assets needed to threaten mining or torpedoing ships crossing the North Pacific. Obviously the naval assets based at Pearl Harbor and the West Coast should be able to prevent that. However, we can no longer just take it for granted. The Navy needs to consciously add this to its long list of missions to accomplish.

The same issues apply to Guam, though the much smaller population can be fed by air if necessary, which means the mission is more one of being able to get our needed fuel and ammunition supplies delivered. Once more, the local air and naval forces should be able to ensure it happens. This is an area where the rise in China’s capabilities means we cannot take free passage for granted there either.

Maritime Commons

Protecting the global commons to ensure free passage of American trade was one of the primary reasons the U.S navy was originally built in the 18th Century. The need, a global need in the 21st Century, continues unabated.

Blockade

Occasionally over the years the U.S. has chosen to impose a blockade during a dispute. This is a capability, or more importantly for our relationship with China, a potential capability that we need to maintain. And the world needs to be reminded of on occasion.

Protection

As many others have noted over the last few years, a British citizen in the 19th Century could travel the world secure in the realization that the local government, regardless of whether it got along well with London or not, was not going to antagonize Britain by harming, or allowing to be harmed, the traveling Brit. A benefit that transferred to American citizens as a result of our overwhelming victory in 1945.

Unfortunately, in growing numbers of places in the world this benefit no longer exists due to the inability of many local governments to provide law and order within their borders for anyone, much less wandering Americans. This means that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corp have to face the reality that just as in the ‘olden days’ of the 18th and 19th Centuries, they are on call to provide basic protection to Americans all across the globe.

Rescue

The need for the Navy and Marine Corp to provide rescue service as needed has never gone away. And given the monotonous regularity of severe weather events, civil disturbances and the endless list of troubles that arise, this is certainly not going to change.

AORH uses

The AORH class suggested earlier in this series of articles was quite consciously designed to be capable of taking on some of the responsibilities, new and old, mentioned above. First among these was to be flagship capable, coupled with the resupply abilities and the substantial ASW and special forces capabilities built into the design.

These abilities are capable of being useful undertaking missions beyond the obvious applications in the Gulf, South China Sea and Northeast Asia. In addition, an ice-strengthened version of an AORH is very well suited to leading a small task force of frigates on ASW duty in the Arctic. It can also be used as the centerpiece for an old-fashioned hunter killer group prosecuting submarines or to provide transoceanic convoy protection in either the North Pacific or North Atlantic.

Current Political Impasse

As for the likelihood of persuading the current Congress to pay for this the Navy needs to be frank. The additional spending being asked for here are additional dollars for additional capabilities. Beyond some small incremental steps, most of the needed dollars will not fit inside the spending limits in place over the next few years. It is intended as a long term plan, to be funded as a recovering economy allows, with the big ticket items being built starting in the 202os and extending into the late 2030s.

For the economy is slowly growing and just as importantly the deficit is in notable decline. There are multiple reasons for this and there is good reason to believe they will continue to positively impact the deficit. A growing economy, the impact fracking is having on energy production, the beginning of the return of some manufacturing to North America from China due to higher wages there, the fact that Medicare costs are much less onerous than forecast five years ago, Obamacare is not costing nearly as much as feared when it was passed, and ending the Bush-era tax cuts are having a real impact on the actual deficit as well as on the, far larger, feared one.

So the enormous fear factor that was driving the deficit reduction hawks back in 2010/11 is in the process of dissipating, being replaced with some truly old-fashioned value driven politics. It is important to note that the Republic has been down this road before. After both the Revolutionary War and the Civil War Congress chose to slowly bring down an enormous deficit by running small annual surpluses. In essence, some variation of this strategy, regardless of how fiercely you espouse the ‘value’ part of balanced budgets, is what we are going to have to do as we deal with the left over Cold War debt and the enormous additional debt load piled on post 9/11 and due to the Great Recession.

Die Hard Yankee Frugality

Or depending on one’s viewpoint, good old-fashioned small town frugality, skinflints, True Blue small town values defending America from corrupt Big City mentalities, etc. The reader should feel free at this point to insert the variation(s) he hears most often where he lives. This cultural attribute came to the New World with the Pilgrims and remains a vigorous part of American culture. It has not, and will not be, departing from our political discussions. Or budgeting decisions.

So, how should we address those who hold this belief? In my experience, when trying to influence or alter decisions made by those operating from this position, argument and persuasion can work. If. Actually two ifs. Big ones. First a resolution to the revenue versus budget issue forcing hard choices has to be visible to the individual you are working with. And it is they that have to see it; regardless of how obvious it is to you, they are the ones that have to see, understand and agree. Then you need a plan dealing with anticipated results and consequences that you can clearly articulate, including how you will execute the plan, deal with the known potential problems and be convincing about being able to complete the task on time and most importantly, within the agreed upon budget.

Mid-America Teary-Eyed Balanced Budget Goodness

Across much of interior America another strong cultural value, the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget also accompanied some of the earliest English settlers of North America. Over the centuries this value has also been passed on to succeeding generations over family dinner tables, political discussions at the local diner or at the town’s barbershop. The at times teary-eyed value some of it’s current believers place in it can be almost moving to observe by someone who considers it merely another number. Plus, minus or zero each have meaning, yet no particular cultural Goodness.

To the True Believers amongst us it constitutes one of life’s bedrock values though. And it is not departing the American political scene either. Which means it will strongly impact budgeting issues far into the future as well.

However, unlike those professing Yankee Frugality, True Believers are virtually impervious to discussion and argument. Sometimes they will patiently listen to you and your points, still no matter how cogent and persuasive one might be, True Believers, once they start their decision making process, will cycle back and check your argument against various values and beliefs they hold. And if they find your argument in conflict with one of their values, for the purposes of this article, the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget, your suggested plan will be rejected.

Any additional information you might provide tends to ultimately provoke something along the line of this real life quote. “You are just trying to confuse me with facts,” responded one individual a few years ago. Global warming was the topic that day rather than the budget and the end result was, “I have my faith (in the rightness of their belief – not really a conclusion, a belief) and I will not change my position.”

This attribute is very much in play when discussing the current budget situation. Unfortunately it is, in my experience anyway, impervious to analysis and discussion. All those carefully honed arguments and points of persuasion potentially useful when speaking with those convinced of the value of frugality will only be considered by True Believers after the budget is balanced. Maybe.

Their faith in the correctness of the uttermost value of balanced budgets can be trumped by another value however. Not by many though, as it ranks high in their pantheon. Historically of course the value to use was the need for defense. Whether national defense from other nations, personal defense against crime or terrorism or preserving orderly and lawful procedures when discussing social issues, over the decades this has proven an effective approach.

Unfortunately the current spending debate has been embroiled in the revolt of a significant number of voters, primarily though not entirely, conservative Republicans, over the blatant abuse of this trump value during the second Bush administration. Vice President Cheney was incorrect when he claimed there were no electoral consequences to running vast deficits. There are, both economic and political, a truth that is not going away.

A significant portion of their political base could, and did for a while, accept the national defense against terrorism argument after 9/11. However subsequent failures to control Federal spending, under a Republican President, Senate and House no less infuriated them. Fury then became something close to horror after the Salomon Brothers debacle unleashed a need for massive federal deficits to restore the economy.

So after years of serious abuse of the national defense trump value, its use with those who fervently believe in the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget has been heavily invalidated. For a significant portion of the American electorate the call for a return to this basic value remains a hot button issue. It is five years on from the revolt that took place in 2010 and the fury and horror seem to have been replaced with a grim resolve to never allow spending to run out of control again. And balance the budget.

This implies, barring a serious political change in the House in a future election year, we may well have to wait for the sanctified day when the Federal government takes in more revenue than it spends before any substantive increases in spending, or allocations for substantial new abilities for the U.S. Navy can be expected.

In all likelihood this means it will not be until sometime in the 2020s before much of what has been suggested in terms of shipbuilding, i.e. the new AORH, CVLN and CARN class ships and large quantities of the associated drones and buoys, can obtain the political support needed for the substantial sums needed.

Count Our Blessings

It is always useful to Count Your Blessings though. The bulk of the resistance in Congress is to additional spending, with no more than the usual amount of Congressional meddling in the details of departmental, including DOD, spending. Just figure out a way to get things done within the dollar amount allotted is a frequently expressed desire by many in the House.

Nor is there any value based or carefully analyzed opposition to new equipment programs from any of the services. So while the suggested ship classes and drones will provoke a fierce defense of spending limits, there is no reason to anticipate Congressional opposition to the new equipment if the Navy develops a coherent plan including them. As suggested above in all probability the big items will not be affordable until sometime in the 2020s, nonetheless if the items are part of a long term acquisition plan it will merely be a question of waiting for funds to become available rather than overcoming fierce opposition to the plans and equipment.

So have a long-term plan in place

This means the U.S. Navy needs to have that forward looking plan in hand, constantly being updated as various improvements in doctrine, sensors and drones are developed. And be ready when additional funds become available, rice bowl pointed upwards as the saying goes. Whether the motivation to Congress is a perceived problem somewhere across the globe, the occasional Congressional compromise over something or other that includes extra funds for some department, a call for ‘shovel ready’ projects when recessions hit, or the slippery processes of logrolling; having a plan in place will allow the extra funds to be applied far more beneficially to the Navy’s, and the countries, benefit than a haphazard purchase of a few more of this and that.

Honor the Premise

In the end though, funding for the U.S. Navy, and all other Federal government departments, is only going to grow as fast as the economy. Which will happen, meaning any plan including the suggestions made in this series of articles will have to be implemented over a period of many years. Into the late 2030s or mid-2040s before the last of nine ship CARN build for instance. The early 2030s for eleven AORHs and the same for a six ship CVLN build are also reasonable build out expectations at this point.

Clearly the time to start to work on such a plan is now.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex-corporate middle manager and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. He is also a long-standing student of navies in general, post-1930 ship construction thinking, design hopes versus actual results and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century.

Enter the SCAGTF: Combined Distributed Maritime Ops

By Nicolas di Leonardo

SURFACE * CYBER * AIR * GROUND * TASK FORCE

 “…The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” –Sun Tzu, The Art of War 

Six Phases of Warfare
Source: JP 3-0

In modern parlance, winning without fighting is accomplished in Phases 0 and 1 of a campaign.  China is seeking to achieve a Phase 0-1 victory in the Pacific through its acquisition / deployment of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) weaponry and economic / military coercion of its peripheral neighbors. When the two are coupled, US operational and diplomatic freedom of maneuver becomes severely constrained, and decisive counter-strategy is required.

Historically, the US has attempted to counter each of China’s weapon systems / diplomatic moves individually without attacking its overall strategy.  When new Chinese weapons systems are deployed, new American countermeasures are fielded.  When China builds new islands where disputed sandbars and reefs once existed, the US flies freedom of navigation sorties overhead.  When individual South East Asian countries are coerced by China to abandon multilateral UNCLOS negotiations and sign bilateral agreements, the US reaffirms support of multilateralism.  The American strategy demonstrates

Source: InformationDissemination.net
Source: InformationDissemination.net

resolve and intent, but does little to shape the environment, and deter the near peer competitorIt plays like a precipitated withdraw and ceding of the South China Sea to China—a stunning admission that there is seemingly little that the US can do when faced with the Chinese dominated political-economic landscape on one hand and a potential naval – air war of attrition on the other. 

The potential Chinese A2AD environment is particularly daunting for the US Pacific Fleet.  Chinese forces could elect to deploy their anti-surface / land attack ballistic and cruise missiles to keep American carriers outside of the 9-Dash Line; disable reconnaissance satellites; jam communications necessary for secure / centralized command & control; threaten to overwhelm remaining forces with vast numbers of aircraft while using the majority of their ships and submarines to counter the US asymmetric advantage in undersea warfare. By asymmetrically threatening American Navy “kill chains”, and especially by holding its naval center of gravity—the CVNs—at risk, the Chinese can effectively turn the American critical strength into a critical vulnerability.  The US cannot afford to lose even one CVN and thus when confronted with the threat of a paralyzing strike against its Pacific CVNs followed by an attrition war, it is prudent to assume that the US would not risk the losses and would exit the battlespace. A potential de-facto Chinese victory in Phases 0-2 could thus be achieved without a decisive Mahanian sea battle–just a credible threat.

Solution sets to countering Chinese A2AD Phase O-2 victory are under development from multiple sources—US  Naval Surface Forces (Distributed Lethality); Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Distributed STOVL [F-35B] Operations); US Marine Corps Advanced Studies Program (Engagement Pull).  All have one thing in common: strategic distribution of mobile offensive power to hold China’s freedom of maneuver in the South China Sea at risk, and inhibit their sea control over key sea lines of communication (SLOC). These solution sets represent a significant evolution in the strategic thought surrounding the US pivot to the Pacific:  attacking China’s strategy vs countering its individual asymmetric capabilities.

In Distributed Maritime Operations: Back to the Future, Dr. Benjamin Jensen states that

“…integrating land and naval forces as a ‘fleet in being’ denying adversary sea control is at the core of the emerging distributed maritime operations paradigm.” 

The defining of the pieces parts and the organizational construct of this paradigm is at the heart of the matter.  General Al Gray, USMC (ret) and Lt. General George Flynn, USMC (ret) recently presented at the Potomac Institute their thoughts on Sea Control and Power Projection within the context of The Single Naval Battle.  In their vision, the forces would include:

To this list I would add tactical level cyber capabilities.

Forces engaged in these missions will likely operate in near proximity to each other and in joint / combined operations, as the American, Australian, New Zealand and British sea, air and land forces of Guadalcanal did.  They will be required to pose sufficient threat to Chinese forces without significant reinforcement due to anticipated Chinese A2AD.  The inter-complexity of their likely combined Sea, Cyber, Air, Ground operations dictates that their task force command and control should not be ad-hoc, but must be defined well in advance to allow for the emergence, experimentation and exercising of command knowledge, skills, abilities and tactics / doctrine. US and allied lack of exercising joint/ combined, multi-domain operations prior to Guadalcanal led to tactics and command and control (C2) doctrine being written in blood.  This lack of foresight should not be repeated.

A SCAGTF construct allows for the US to shape the environment with its allies, deter the [Chinese], and if necessary to seize the initiative, buying time for the massing of forces to dominate the battlespace.  The SCAGTF is one way to integrate the great ideas of our best strategists on distributed maritime operations into a single, flexible organizational structure that is capable of mobile, simultaneous combined / joint multi-domain operations in all phases of warfare.  Such a force could aid the US in reversing its Pacific fortunes, in reinforcing multilateral peace and security for the region, and ultimately in realizing Sun Tzu’s bloodless victory.

Nicolas di Leonardo is a graduate student of the US Naval War College.  The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the War College or the United States Navy.

July Member Round-Up

Welcome to the July 2015 Member Round-Up. Our members have had a very productive month discussing three major security topics; the rise of China, the Iranian Nuclear Deal, and the fight against ISIS. A few of the articles are shared here for some light reading over your Labor Day Weekend. If you are a CIMSEC Member and want your own maritime security-related work included in this or upcoming round-ups be sure to contact our Director of Member Publicity at dmp@cimsec.org.

Henry Holst begins our round up discussing the PLA/N’s options for submarine activity in the Taiwan Strait. His article in USNI News states that the Taiwan situation remains the driving force behind the Chinese military buildup. Holst goes into depth discussing the capabilities of the Yuan Type-39A class SSK in a standoff between China and Taiwan/US forces. This article is a must read for all who are interested in the recent developments of the Chinese submarine service.

CIMSEC’s founder, Scott Cheney-Peters, meanwhile discussed the nuances of potential joint aerial patrols in the South China Sea with CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) and joined fellow CIMSECian Ankit Panda from The Diplomat for a podcast discussion of India’s evolving approach to maritime security in East Asia.   Also at AMTI, Ben Purser co-authored a piece on China’s airfield construction of Fiery Cross Reef. AMTI’s director, Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper joined others testifying before a Congressional committee on America’s security role in the South China Sea.

Zachary Keck, of The National Interest, provides the next piece. July was an especially intense month for Mr. Keck, as he wrote 25 articles in July alone. Staying in East and Southeast Asia, Mr. Keck writes that just as China has done in the South China Sea, the PRC could build artificial islands nearer to India as well. His concern is due to a constitutional amendment in Maldives that was passed in late July. This amendment allows for foreign ownership of Maldives territory.  China has rebuffed these concerns and says that they are committed to supporting “the Maldives’ efforts to maintain its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.” This piece will be of interest for those that are keeping tabs on Chinese expansionist tendencies.

Moving on from the Chinese situation and the South China Sea, Shawn VanDiver takes us to the Iranian Plateau and the Persian Gulf to discuss the Iranian nuclear deal now before Congress. He penned two articles last month describing the advantages of the deal. His first article, in Task & Purpose, describes his support for the P5+1 Talks With Iran in Geneva, Switzerlanddeal as a 12 year veteran of the United States Navy. He describes his apprehension and the sense of foreboding transiting the Strait of Hormuz at the sights of a .50 caliber machine gun. The next day his second article on the Iran deal came out in the Huffington Post. This article was slightly different as he focuses more on the stated positions of the then current crop of GOP presidential contenders and Senators. He states that the deal is a new beginning. Well worth the read if you are at all hesitating on the importance of this crucial deal.

For the last mention in our member round up, Admiral James Stavridis spent time last month discussing the role of Turkey in the current fight against ISIS. As former Supreme Commander of NATO forces, Admiral Stavridis is uniquely qualified to render judgement on the role of a critical NATO member in the region, the only one directly affected by ISIS fighters. He was interviewed on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos.  In the same vein, he penned an article in Foreign Policy discussing the importance of NATO use of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey on the Mediterranean Coast.  This base is seen as critical to the effort against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

CIMSECians were busy elsewhere too:

That is all for July. Stay tuned to CIMSEC for all your maritime security needs.

“A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.”

President Theodore Roosevelt, 2 December 1902

The views expressed above are those of the author’s.