Tag Archives: China

Book Review: James Bradley’s ‘The China Mirage’

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James Bradley. The China Mirage: the Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia. Little, Brown and Company. 417pp. $35.00.

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The United States has a troubled relationship with China. The confrontations over military budgets and the South China Sea are profound but they are not the first flash-points to develop in the relationship. The details of American involvement in China’s so-called “Century of Humiliation” are not widely known among Americans. In steps James Bradley, author of Flags of our Fathers, with his newest offering: The China Mirage. Bradley offers in the introduction to examine “the American perception of Asia and the gap between perception and reality.” While the book’s direction and intent are admirable, The China Mirage lapses into a mirage of its own, in which every American action in China is driven by economic exploitation, abject naivety, or criminal gullibility.

The China Mirage is organized chronologically and examines American involvement and missteps in East Asia. It begins with detailed treatment of the life of Warren Delano, the grandfather of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who made the family’s fortune by opium smuggling and conveniently described his activities as “the China trade.” It continues in a grand historical arc covering both Roosevelt presidencies, both Sino-Japanese Wars (from 1894-1895 and 1937-1945), the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Zedong, the outbreak of World War II, the Chinese Civil War, the “who lost China” debate in the United States, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. This feat is a tall order for any author and Bradley manages to keep the pace moving throughout his 400-page tome with vignettes from lives of Great People.

While the book is nominally about China, it spends a large portion examining the United States’ relationship with Japan. The long treatment of characters such as Theodore Roosevelt (TR) and Baron Kaneko, Japan’s

A photo of Kitaro Kaneko at his Harvard Graduation
A photo of Kitaro Kaneko at his Harvard Graduation

Harvard-educated diplomat who built a strong relationship with TR, mentions China on the periphery but the reader can clearly see the fruits of Bradley’s research in his earlier book about TR’s presidency, The Imperial Cruise, shining through in this newest text. While the United States’ treatment of Japan was somewhat connected to China, the amount included in The China Mirage was excessive and distracting. At times, the narrative style is frenetic, moving back and forth between China and Japan fast enough to induce whiplash.
Bradley’s style is, at its core, polemic and his words drip with venom. He uses vivid portraits to weave a narrative about the various decision-makers on both sides of the Pacific who drove the hundred-year drama. Lurid details and shortcomings are front-and-center with the author’s voice providing commentary. The Republic of China is referred to as “The Soong-Chiang Syndicate”; American missionaries are called Chiang Kai-Shek’s “favorite sycophants”; Baron Kaneko’s interactions with TR are described as “canoodling.” China’s population is referred to as “Noble Chinese Peasants” to reflect American incorrect assumptions that the Chinese were ignorant and eager to adopt America’s Christian culture. The style is certainly not boring but, as the narrative progresses, it became more of a burden than a boon. The sarcastic use of terms such as “Southern Methodist Chiang” or “foreign devils” became distracting as they were used repeated throughout the entire book, implying that they were not just rhetorical flourishes but an opportunity for the author to express his disdain for many of the players involved.

In an ironic twist, The China Mirage ends up crafting caricatures which cleve as much to a fantasy as the American vision of the Noble Chinese Peasant which Bradley derides throughout the entire book. Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt appear as bumbling fools who were taken in respectively by the Japanese or Chiang Kai-Shek. The reader is treated to vivid, often unnecessary, digressions into the men’s Harvard connections and material opulence. FDR is essentially a

FDR sits between Chiang Kei Shek and Winston Churchill at the Cairo Conference.
FDR sits between Chiang Kei Shek and Winston Churchill at the Cairo Conference.

tottering fool who lives large off opium money while being seduced by bureaucratic charlatans and bamboozled by colorful maps. These analyses both ignore the savviness of both of these men in their Presidential roles as well as the fact that one person, even a President, is unable to successfully implement policy without buy-in from others in the policy-making world. The book’s implied belief that these men’s personal failings single-handedly lead to policy-blunders is overstated.

On the other hand, Bradley lionizes Mao Zedong as a people’s champion who was a better choice than Chiang Kai-Shek to lead China. Mao is portrayed as the key character in anti-Japanese resistance during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), exhorting the corrupt Chiang to “show some spine.” The problem with this assertion is that, unlike Bradley claims, Mao’s forces were barely ever involved in fighting against the Japanese. A vivid portrait is painted of Mao’s seemingly saintly activities in his Yan’an enclave in the 1930s without any mention of the thousands of Communists who were purged during those years to cement his hold on power. One could assume that this omission was mere oversight were not for the fact that, in a preceding chapter, Chiang Kai-Shek’s execution of a few journalists was given top-billing in the narrative. The reader gets the impression that the book has a purposeful slant and bias.

There are other conclusions which might cause some arched eyebrows. The decades-long recognition of Taiwan as the seat of the Chinese government is portrayed as a singular act of American arrogance and ignorance, yet non-recognition was the exactly same policy used by the United States with the German annexation of Austria in 1938 and the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940. A condemnation of the FDR Administration’s Lend-Lease policy, derided as an “attractive fiction that, after their wars were over, England, Russia, and China would return the materials the U.S. lent to them,” misses the fact that many of those materials were returned, even by the Soviet Union during the early stages of the Cold War. These attacks indicate that the objective of the narrative is to find any and every way to undermine the people whom the author does not like rather than focusing on the book’s main purpose: analyzing the United States’ relationship with China.

While the style and content might at times be suspect, Bradley does a valuable service by introducing historical issues which are not in the American mainstream: the sad legacy of the Exclusion Act and anti-Chinese violence in mid-19th century America; the lingering distrust in China of outsiders who preach a noble message but are perceived to act in their self-interest; the role the United States oil embargo played in the outbreak of war with Japan; the opportunity, though overstated and oversimplified, for the United States to broker an agreement with Mao before the Chinese Civil War formally began; the abominable treatment of people with China experience in the State Department during the early days of McCarthyism. These are important topics that should be more widely known so that the average American can have a more nuanced understanding how the Chinese people, rather than just the Chinese government, will react to American policy.
American policymakers will need to get the US-China relationship right if they want to successfully navigate a turbulent 21st Century. To achieve this, they will need to shelve preconceived notions of what China is and view on-the-ground facts rather than projecting their own culture and worldview. The China Mirage can be a jumping-off point for the uninitiated but recognize that, just like other historical narratives about China, it has its own shortcomings.

Matthew Merighi is CIMSEC’s Directors of Publications. He is also a Master of Arts candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy studying Pacific Asia and International Security.

September Member Round-Up Part One

 Welcome to Part One of the September 2015 Member Round-up, covering the first two weeks of the month. CIMSEC members examined several international maritime security issues, including Russian blue water operations, European maritime security threats, the PLA-N maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacific and aspects of the U.S. military defense procurement program.

The first part of the September Round-up begins with Alex Calvo for The Jamestown Foundation, where he discuses Russia’s naval presence in Spain’s African exclave of Ceuta. Mr. Calvo describes the strategic importance of Ceuta as a launching point for Russian surface fleet operations throughout the Mediterranean Sea region. Additionally, a geopolitical assessment is provided regarding the unique relationship between Spain and Russia in a period of high tensions between Russia and NATO over Ukraine.

Continuing on European maritime security issues, Chuck Hill, for his Coast Guard Blog, discusses the development of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) in France and in the Netherlands. Mr. Hill identifies the development of OPVs in France as a response to the government attempting to increase their enforcement capabilities of EEZ territory. Regarding the Netherlands, Mr. Hill describes the specifications of future OPVs with emphasis on the deployment of ‘hull vane’ technologies to increase OPV mobility, stability and range.

Entering the Asia-Pacific region, Ankit Panda, for The Diplomat, analyzes aspects of innocent passage and the movement of U.S. warships near the newly constructed Chinese islands in the South China Sea. With tensions increasing in the region, Mr. Panda explains that continued cooperation between India and Vietnam could enhance the strategic security relationship between the two countries allowing for a more effective approach to confronting China.

In a separate article, Mr. Panda explains that Vietnam has independently begun to increase its maritime capabilities by approving Coast Guard vessels to deploy major weapon systems. This will allow the Vietnamese CG to be more active in the nation’s maritime security objectives and will significantly increase the effectiveness of EEZ enforcement. Mr. Panda also provided a description of three major Chinese missile systems that pose significant regional and global threats to military adversaries. The Df-16 SRBM, the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile and the DF-41 ICBM are components of China’s missile force that greatly contribute to the country’s access denial strategy and global military influence.

Harry Kazianis, for The National Interest, shares an analysis on the U.S. Navy’s plan to modernize the Aegis Combat System’s hardware and software. The technological improvements being added will provide increased effectiveness for the Aegis system to conduct its integrated air and missile defense operations. Also for The National Interest, Mr. Kazianis discusses China’s new DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile as well as the characteristics of a conflict between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea.

Bryan McGrath for The War on the Rocks, concludes the Round-up with discussing aspects of the U.S. Navy’s procurement strategy. He provides a detailed examination on the number of ships required by the U.S. Navy to meet the current security threats facing the United States as well as to sustain the requirements of the maritime objectives of the navy itself. Mr. McGrath explains that the current and projected size of the U.S. Naval fleet, 273 and 308 respectively, is too small to remain effective in multiple regions. He references the U.S. Navy’s 346-ship fleet from the Clinton-era as an appropriate number for managing the current maritime environment and providing sufficient influence in all U.S. theatres of operation.    

Members of CIMSEC were also active elsewhere so far in September:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to me, the Director of Member Publicity, at dmp@cimsec.org to make sure we include them in our next round-up.

Aiding India’s Next-Generation Aircraft Carrier: A Review

By Peter Marino

As global power shifts both to Asia and within Asia, strategic realignments between states are picking up pace. The US-India relationship is one such partnership that is receiving increased reassessment from specialists in both capitals. In his recent paper, Making Waves, Carnegie Endowment scholar Ashley Tellis weighs in on the topic, suggesting an expansion and deepening of the security relationship through a close collaboration on the design and construction of India’s next aircraft carrier class, the Vishal. I took a brief look at the paper and examined its stated and implicit conclusions.

Peter Marino holds an MSc in Global Politics from The London School of Economics and is a graduate of Norwich University. He lived in Shanghai from 2003 to 2008 and served as head of China development for London-based Aurigon, Ltd. He founded and sold Quaternion, a political risk startup, and is currently establishing a new Think Tank for International Affairs aimed at promoting engagement with the “Millennial Generation.” He also produces Globalogues, a video blog with commentary on global politics and economics. The views expressed in this article are his own.

10 Things You May Have Missed in DoD’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy

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This post originally appeared on Navy Grade 36 Bureaucrat. It can be found in its original form here.

At first glance, the recently released Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy looks like a rehash of a lot of old points about the US’ position on Pacific matters.  But upon closer examination, there is a key shift in language that those of us who watch the region will take note of.  Here are ten things you might have missed:

1. It calls out the Senate directly on UNCLOS, but doesn’t address ISA.

Normally DoD publications don’t delve too much into policy matters with Congress.  But it’s hard to say that about this statement:

“This is why the United States operates consistent with – even though the U.S. Senate has yet to provide its advice and consent – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”

UNCLOS was originally opposed due to the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which does such un-American things like taxing sea bed mining for distribution to other countries and mandating technology transfer.  The military normally focuses on the navigation portion of UNCLOS, which it has abided by since the Regan era.  The problem comes when the US is encouraging nations to use UNCLOS while not actually having ratified the treaty.  There isn’t an easy solution, short of removing the ISA from UNCLOS, but expect to see UNCLOS ratification cries in the near future.

2. It calls out everyone on the South China Sea.

 It’s not just China.  Every claimant in the South China Seas has issues.  This document clearly spells that out, taking away a talking point from the PRC that the US is overlooking the other countries to focus on China.  But it pulls no punches on China, going after the “so-called Nine-Dash Line” as an excessive claim.

3. It spells out why the Senkakus became a problem.

Most people view the Senkakus as a bunch of rocks that China and Japan hold in dispute.  Very few know that the Japanese government bought them in order to prevent the Governor of Tokyo from buying them.  This was actually an attempt to prevent a clash with China, since the Governor was rightwing and would likely have stoked the issue.  This narrative has been lost to China’s narrative about how Japan “changed the status quo,” so it’s good to see it spelled out here.

4. It puts India as a model for dispute resolution. 

Comparing the India/Bangladesh maritime dispute resolution to what is occurring in the South China Sea is no accident.  This document clearly spells out US support to India, likely in an attempt to spur continued Indian investment in their “Look East” strategy.

5. It denies territorial sea around reclaimed islands.

This is big. 

“At least some of these features were not naturally formed areas of land that were above water at  high  tide and, thus, under international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea  Convention, cannot generate any maritime zones (e.g., territorial seas or exclusive economic zones).  Artificial islands built on such features could, at most, generate 500-meter safety zones, which must be established in  conformity with requirements specified in the Law of the Sea Convention.”

This is a clear US denial of any Chinese territorial claim of these features.  This has been implied before, but not ever strongly stated. On that same note…

6. Freedom of Navigation (FON) is coming to you.

One paragraph in particular tells us to expect more FON operations:

“Over the past two years, the Department has undertaken an effort to reinvigorate our Freedom of Navigation program, in concert with the Department of State, to ensure that we regularly and consistently challenge excessive maritime claims.”

Coming on the heels of stating that PRC reclaimed land is an excessive claim, this is a really good sign, although realize that future FON operations will likely include challenges to all claimants (and make diplomatic efforts interesting).

7. It accuses China of changing the status quo.

If you sit on a beach, you’ll watch the waves crash against rocks.  The seawater slowly erodes the rocks until they split open at seams you couldn’t have seen before.  This is analogous to China’s strategy in the East and South China Seas.  They have slowly worn away at seams around every other claimant, always claiming to “maintain the status quo” when in reality they are waiting for the other claimant to make the first move, then instantly cry that they are the victim.  Scarborough Reef is a classic example, yet the media has essentially ignored the issue.  Luckily, this document calls it out, stating “China is unilaterally altering the physical status quo in the region.”

8. It calls out A2/AD and how we would stop any short war.

It gives vague language to DoD efforts to combat A2/AD, but it does say that it’s happening, with “robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and additive manufacturing.”  It also later mentions that we’ll be dispersing around the Pacific, into more Japanese bases and places like Australia.  This complicates PRC targeting.  Will the PRC risk war with the US if we have units spread out everywhere?  They don’t have enough missiles to hit everything, and striking into a country like Australia means that any sort of “short, sharp war” on their part quickly expands…something that will cause a lot of angst on their end. 

9. It calls out information sharing with allies.

“This is why DoD is working closely with partners in the Asia-Pacific region to encourage greater information sharing and the establishment of a regional maritime domain awareness network that could provide a common operating picture and real-time dissemination of data.”

I’ve long argued that sharing data with allies is too hard.  At the CJOS-COE we worked hard to make Carrier Strike Groups use networks that supported integrating ships from non-“Five Eyes” countries, like Germany and Norway.  We proved that successfully, and in the Pacific we’ve integrated South Korean and Japanese ships before.  But what about Malaysia? Indonesia?  Brunei?  We get some play at RIMPAC, but not enough.  The disaster that was ABDA in World War 2 wasn’t that long ago.  We need to get friendly nation integration right before any shooting starts.

10. It’s got great graphics.

From the scale model of Fiery Cross Reef reclamation to a very nice and detailed map of South China Sea features, this is one of the few documents that uses more than just pretty pictures of military equipment.  Well done to the authors who picked quality illustrations to help drive their points home…almost as good as my choice of memes 🙂

Ryan Haag is the Hawaii CIMSEC President and an Information Warfare Officer navigating the uncharted waters of the Information Dominance Corps. He can be reached through his blog at The Navy’s Grade 36 Bureaucrat.