CFAR 2015 Voting Now Open

Voting is now open to the public on the nominated CIMSEC articles listed below! The authors of the top vote-getters will be invited to deliver short remarks on their topics and engage in a general dialogue with the audience as part of the first annual CIMSEC Forum for Authors and Readers (CFAR) on 26 February in Washington, DC. Top vote-getters unable to attend CFAR will be invited to follow up their work on the NextWar blog. Voting will run through 05 February, 2015.

Criteria: All members of the general public are encouraged to vote (once) for up to 6 articles and attend CFAR. Several nominations were disqualified for failing to meet eligibility criteria.

Congrats to the Nominees!

Article Author
A2/AD Since ’73 Mark Munson
Air-Sea Battle in Orbit Matthew Hallex
American Strategy in the 21st Century: Maritime Power and China Jake Bebber
Camouflage: You Ain’t Screen Nothin’ Yet James Drennan
Developing a Strategic Cadre in the Information Dominance Corps Jake Bebber
Leading Where? A Reflection on Saltwater Leadership Erik Sand
Learning Curve: Iranian Asymmetrical Warfare and Millennium Challenge 2002 Brett Davis
Lebanese Hezbollah and Hybrid Naval Warfare Chris Rawley
Nordic NATO Nominees Viribus Unitis
Remote Aviation Technology – What are We Actually Talking About? Dave Blair
Remember War: Prophet Makarov Ignored in his Native Land Claude Berube
Seizing the Asuw Initiative Michael Glynn
Strategic Architectures Jeremy Renken
Surface Warfare: Taking the Offensive Thomas Rowden
Terrorists, Tyrants, and Tobacco: How the Illicit Cigarette Trade Fuels Instability in the Middle East Chris Rawley
The Evolution of Air-Sea Battle Harry Kazianis
The LCS and SSC Survivability Dilemma Steven Wills
The Paradox of Admiral Gorshkov Jessica Huckabey
Understanding Australia’s Submarine Choice Ben Collopy
West Africa: More Dangerous Pirates, Less Adequete Security James Bridger

Vote Here

Reserve Your Free Spot at #CFAR15 Here Today!

LCS Survivability Debate: What the Data Doesn’t Tell Us

“Facts are meaningless.  You can use facts to prove anything that’s even remotely true. Facts, schmacts.”  

-Homer Simpson, from Lisa the Skeptic

100617-N-1200S-914Both Steven Wills in his USNI Blog opinion piece and Chuck Hill in his response trot out some interesting numbers in support of diametrically opposed positions on the survivability of LCS.  According to Wills, the US Navy lost ships under 3400 tons at a much higher rate than larger vessels in WWII.  Hill looks at the numbers and comes to the opposite conclusion.  The debate reminds me of the recent statistical dustup over the Patriots’ propensity to fumble that has accompanied Deflategate.  And the numbers are just about as meaningful.

Wills asserts that the US Navy lost 71 destroyers and 11 destroyer escorts in WWII.  Hill makes that number to be 58 destroyers and 9 destroyer escorts.  From what I can tell, they’re both wrong.  Using the summary report for ship losses to enemy action from 17 October 1941-7 December 1944, the US Navy lost 134 destroyers and 16 destroyer escorts through December 1944.  I could not easily find numbers from December 1944 through the war’s end, but the fact that these figures do not include losses from the Battle of Okinawa suggest that the actual number of destroyer losses for the whole war was closer to 150.  Over the period of the report, the US Navy also lost 51 cruisers (CA and CL), 22 battleships, and 39 aircraft carriers (combining CV, CVL, and CVE losses).   

After citing the number of losses, Hill uses the fate of vessels in commission at the start of the war to extrapolate survivability statistics for all vessels.  Statistically, this is highly suspect.  As Hill points out, the US fleet at the start of the war included just 233 major surface combatants.  But between 1941 and 1945, the US built over 1,300 more major surface combatants, including 349 DD’s and 498 DE’s.  Those ships in commission at the start of the war are a non-random sample, since they would tend to be older, slower, and less likely to incorporate new weapons, sensors, and other technologies that could affect survivability, unless backfitted during the war.  The US had no DE’s in commission at the start of the war, further skewing the sample.  

The numbers in the two reports point out some of the challenges with getting accurate data: since the US had no DE’s in commission at the start of the war, all 16 DE losses should come from those commissioned 1941-1945.  But only 9 are annotated as “sunk” in the shipbuilding report.  Similarly, 32 of the 349 DD’s commissioned during the war are listed as “sunk,” which when added to Hill’s figure of 29 destroyers in commission at the start of the war that were sunk comes nowhere close to the figure of 134 destroyers lost (nor even to Wills’ figure of 71, although it is over Hill’s figure of 58).  But it doesn’t matter.

falklands warThe most significant figure in the WWII ship loss data is zero.  That’s the number of ships lost to anti-ship cruise missiles.  While it’s tempting to try to draw equivalencies between threats in WWII and threats today, the simple fact is that war at sea looks different today than it did then.  The Falklands campaign, in which the Royal Navy lost two ships (a 5,000 ton destroyer and a 15,000 ton logistic ship) to Exocet missiles, and another five vessels (one LCU, two Type 21 frigates of 3,290 tons, a destroyer of 5,000 tons, and an auxiliary of 6,000 tons) to aerial bombs, may provide a more relevant frame of reference.  British ship losses in the Falkland campaign totaled two of 15 frigates and two of 12 destroyers or larger.  While these numbers are helpful, it’s worth remembering the facts behind the data: the RN were limited in their mobility by the need to protect the landing force; the Argentinians were operating at the outer limits of their range, limiting the duration of engagements.  And with such a small sample, it’s risky to draw too-strong conclusions.  

The most significant contributor to ship survivability is not getting hit.  Hill argues that LCS will not be a priority target due to its small size and relative unimportance.  Such an argument depends on the presence of perceived higher-value targets to draw fire.  But the whole nature of the A2/AD problem is that it creates too much risk to put high-value targets under the threat umbrella.  If LCS is the only surface platform we’ve got in the fight, it will be the platform that the adversary targets.  (Worse, if LCS is heavily dependent on the proximity of vulnerable combat logistics force ships to stay in the fight, an adversary may not need to target LCS at all, choosing instead to sink the oilers, rendering LCS immobile and irrelevant.)

The debate about LCS survivability is important, especially as we look to up-arm the ships and give them more offensive punch.  And, given the program’s history of overly-optimistic estimates of cost and capability, I understand why analysts would prefer to “go to the data,” rather than relying on assurances of improved survivability and defensive capability.  But unfortunately, we don’t have access to survivability data in an unclassified debate.  In the absence of the models and simulations that have been run on LCS versus modern threats, looking for examples from the past of different ship types versus different threats only clouds the picture.  In short, going back to World War II data to try to prove a point about the survivability of large ships versus small ships in modern combat is about as relevant as pointing out that USS Constitution, a ship of only 1,500 tons, was so survivable that she earned the name, “Old Ironsides.”  

Doyle Hodges is a retired Surface Warfare Officer currently pursuing PhD studies at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

Members’ Roundup Part 12

Welcome back to another edition of the Member roundup, where we provide the wider community an opportunity to examine some of the works produced by CIMSECians that have featured elsewhere. Being a professional also involves in discussing the future of one’s chosen field. Topics that feature regularly in this series include analysis of geopolitical trends and  military technology. This week, however, we have several contributions that discuss issues faced when writing about the future of one’s own organization or service.

CIMSECians Roger Misso and Chris O’Keefe write, in Proceedings, about the challenges for junior officers to share their thoughts in writing about the future of the Naval service. It is clear that this is not a new problem and the authors refer to historical examples of how their predecessors handled the problem. Misso and Keefe present their views on the issue but argue, most importantly, that all levels should be able to write on all topics, whether it be the mundane or the controversial, without fear of it affecting their careers.

For further information on this topic I recommend starting with James Fallows’ recent roundup of articles by military reformers. Misso and O’Keefe’s article is one of those mentioned in the post, as well as several other CIMSECians  You can access the article over at The Atlantic. Additionally, our very own Matthew Hipple, provides his own riposte to Fallows’ writings on the matter. Without wallowing in the problems, he provides practical suggestions for any JO who believes they have something constructive to say. You can access Matthew’s response here.

James Stavridis, of the Fletcher School, writes about the geopolitical changes occurring in Europe and the need for the United States not to neglect that part of the world. The economic situation, declining military power in European States, and a resurgence of Russia are all areas of concerns when viewed individually. As a whole, however, they all present strategic challenges for the United States if it fails to assist its European friends. You can access his article here.

A hot topic amongst analysts and students of strategic studies is the state of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. It is becoming increasingly expensive to sustain the ageing warheads and the delivery platforms and experts are debating the best way forward. Over at The Daily Beast Dave Majumdar reports that the Pentagon will spend upwards of $300 billion to update current nuclear capability, as well as acquiring new delivery methods and even a new ICBM. You can access his article here.

Chuck Hill returns this week with several updates and you can access them over on Chuck’s blog. One of his latest posts provides a look into Small Warship Survivability, and examines historical examples of surface combatant losses. This article is a must-read for anyone interested in the LCS survivability debate.

For a wider reading list this weekend, we suggest checking out Natalie Sambhi’s roundup on The Strategist blog. For those who are unfamiliar, it is Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s official blog. You can access Natalie’s posts here.

Finally, over at The National Interest Zachary Keck continues to push out update after update on all things military and foreign affairs. Articles include a possible submarine deal between India and Japan, and how low oil prices could make Russia more unpredictable. You can access all of his latest articles here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].

The LCS Survivability Debate

There has been a lot of discussion lately about the survivability of the LCS and smaller combatants in general. A recent US Naval Institute News opinion piece contends,

“Small warships are historically unsurvivable in combat. They have a shorter floodable length, reduced reserve buoyancy and are more likely to be affected by fire and smoke damage than larger combatants. In both World Wars, losses in ships below 3000 tons in displacement far exceeded those of larger vessels.

“In World War II, for example, the U.S. lost a total of 71 destroyers and 11 destroyer escorts — all under 3400 tons displacement and less than 400 feet in length.

“By comparison, only 23 larger ships were lost. Part of that figure is undoubtedly due to their operational employment, but in simple terms of engineering and physics, larger ships are inherently more survivable than their smaller counterparts.”

In the Coast Guard we once had a saying, “In our obscurity is our security.” I think that should be kept in mind when we consider the survivability of small surface combatants. No, they cannot take as much damage as major surface combatants, but the enemy gets a vote, and he will be less “excited” by the presence of smaller vessels, while he will normally choose to put more effort into destroying larger, more threatening ships. As in land warfare, tanks are more survivable than infantrymen, but they don’t necessarily last longer.

To look at how this factor might influence survivability, I looked at how many of the ships that were in commission at the beginning of World War II were sunk as a result of enemy action. My source is the Summary of War Damage to U.S. Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, and Destroyer Escorts which is accessible here. The figures there do not correspond to those quoted above, rather they report 58 destroyers and 9 destroyer escorts sunk, along with 26 larger surface combatants, all listed by name. (The USNI post may have included constructive losses that were not actually sunk or losses to other than enemy action, and does not include the three battleships salvaged although they were out of action most of the war.)

If we look only at the US fleet at the beginning of the war, it included 233 major surface combatants of which 46 or 19.7% were sunk by enemy action during the course of the war. If we break it down by class it looks like this:

Type: Number in Commission, Dec. 7, 1941/Number sunk/% lost to enemy action
Aircraft Carriers (CV): 7/4/57.1%
Escort Carrier (CVE): 1/0/0%
Battleships (BB): 17/5/29.4% (of the 5 sunk, all were at Pearl Harbor, 3 were salvaged)
Heavy Cruisers (CA): 18/7/38.9%
Light Cruisers (CL): 19/1/5.3%
Destroyers (DD): 171/29/17%

(There were no Destroyer Escorts in commission at the beginning of the war.)

If we lump  all the cruisers together, 8 of 37 were lost or 21.6%

If we lump the lone escort carrier together with the fleet carriers then four of eight were sunk or 50%

Additionally three destroyers were lost to weather in a hurricane. They were not ballasted properly, because of the exigencies of impending combat operations.

Clearly, at least looking at the World War II experience, the US Navy did not lose a higher percentage of smaller ships. If anything it appears the opposite is true. A smaller percentage of smaller ships were lost (17% vs 27.4%). More small ships were lost simply because there were many more of them. Undoubtedly some of the DDs and DEs that were sunk, would have survived the damage they received, if they had been bigger, but presumably there would also have been fewer of them. If the decision criteria were an equal chance of being sunk, then probably taking greater risk with smaller ships is both reasonable and unavoidable.

I will note that the probability of personnel loss on small ships is probably higher because they are more likely to sink quickly and catastrophically, while larger ships are more likely to sink slowly.

USS_Newcomb_Damage_1945

Photo: USS Newcomb DD 586 was hit by as many as five kamikaze on 6 April 1945 as she was screening for the cruiser USS St. Louis off Okinawa. She survived but was not repaired.

 

 

 

I will add a bit of anecdotal evidence. As part of Operation Overlord, the Normandy Invasion, 60 US Coast Guard 83 foot patrol boats were assigned to rescue those unlucky enough to find themselves in the water or sinking. 30 went to the American beachheads and 30 went to the British and Canadian beachheads. Being wooden hulled and gasoline powered, they certainly would not have been considered “survivable.”

USCG 83 ft patrol boat, probably June 1944. Photographer unknown.

Apparently they were in the thick of it, because they rescued 1438 men from the water and sinking craft. In spite of all the fire from shore, not a single boat was sunk and not a single crewmen was killed. Apparently the German gunners were too busy with the landing craft hitting the beach and the warships that were shelling them. They simply were not a priority target.

 

This article can be found in its original form at Chuck Hill’s CG Blog.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.