Members’ Roundup Part 12

Welcome back to another edition of the Member roundup, where we provide the wider community an opportunity to examine some of the works produced by CIMSECians that have featured elsewhere. Being a professional also involves in discussing the future of one’s chosen field. Topics that feature regularly in this series include analysis of geopolitical trends and  military technology. This week, however, we have several contributions that discuss issues faced when writing about the future of one’s own organization or service.

CIMSECians Roger Misso and Chris O’Keefe write, in Proceedings, about the challenges for junior officers to share their thoughts in writing about the future of the Naval service. It is clear that this is not a new problem and the authors refer to historical examples of how their predecessors handled the problem. Misso and Keefe present their views on the issue but argue, most importantly, that all levels should be able to write on all topics, whether it be the mundane or the controversial, without fear of it affecting their careers.

For further information on this topic I recommend starting with James Fallows’ recent roundup of articles by military reformers. Misso and O’Keefe’s article is one of those mentioned in the post, as well as several other CIMSECians  You can access the article over at The Atlantic. Additionally, our very own Matthew Hipple, provides his own riposte to Fallows’ writings on the matter. Without wallowing in the problems, he provides practical suggestions for any JO who believes they have something constructive to say. You can access Matthew’s response here.

James Stavridis, of the Fletcher School, writes about the geopolitical changes occurring in Europe and the need for the United States not to neglect that part of the world. The economic situation, declining military power in European States, and a resurgence of Russia are all areas of concerns when viewed individually. As a whole, however, they all present strategic challenges for the United States if it fails to assist its European friends. You can access his article here.

A hot topic amongst analysts and students of strategic studies is the state of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. It is becoming increasingly expensive to sustain the ageing warheads and the delivery platforms and experts are debating the best way forward. Over at The Daily Beast Dave Majumdar reports that the Pentagon will spend upwards of $300 billion to update current nuclear capability, as well as acquiring new delivery methods and even a new ICBM. You can access his article here.

Chuck Hill returns this week with several updates and you can access them over on Chuck’s blog. One of his latest posts provides a look into Small Warship Survivability, and examines historical examples of surface combatant losses. This article is a must-read for anyone interested in the LCS survivability debate.

For a wider reading list this weekend, we suggest checking out Natalie Sambhi’s roundup on The Strategist blog. For those who are unfamiliar, it is Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s official blog. You can access Natalie’s posts here.

Finally, over at The National Interest Zachary Keck continues to push out update after update on all things military and foreign affairs. Articles include a possible submarine deal between India and Japan, and how low oil prices could make Russia more unpredictable. You can access all of his latest articles here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].

The LCS Survivability Debate

There has been a lot of discussion lately about the survivability of the LCS and smaller combatants in general. A recent US Naval Institute News opinion piece contends,

“Small warships are historically unsurvivable in combat. They have a shorter floodable length, reduced reserve buoyancy and are more likely to be affected by fire and smoke damage than larger combatants. In both World Wars, losses in ships below 3000 tons in displacement far exceeded those of larger vessels.

“In World War II, for example, the U.S. lost a total of 71 destroyers and 11 destroyer escorts — all under 3400 tons displacement and less than 400 feet in length.

“By comparison, only 23 larger ships were lost. Part of that figure is undoubtedly due to their operational employment, but in simple terms of engineering and physics, larger ships are inherently more survivable than their smaller counterparts.”

In the Coast Guard we once had a saying, “In our obscurity is our security.” I think that should be kept in mind when we consider the survivability of small surface combatants. No, they cannot take as much damage as major surface combatants, but the enemy gets a vote, and he will be less “excited” by the presence of smaller vessels, while he will normally choose to put more effort into destroying larger, more threatening ships. As in land warfare, tanks are more survivable than infantrymen, but they don’t necessarily last longer.

To look at how this factor might influence survivability, I looked at how many of the ships that were in commission at the beginning of World War II were sunk as a result of enemy action. My source is the Summary of War Damage to U.S. Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, and Destroyer Escorts which is accessible here. The figures there do not correspond to those quoted above, rather they report 58 destroyers and 9 destroyer escorts sunk, along with 26 larger surface combatants, all listed by name. (The USNI post may have included constructive losses that were not actually sunk or losses to other than enemy action, and does not include the three battleships salvaged although they were out of action most of the war.)

If we look only at the US fleet at the beginning of the war, it included 233 major surface combatants of which 46 or 19.7% were sunk by enemy action during the course of the war. If we break it down by class it looks like this:

Type: Number in Commission, Dec. 7, 1941/Number sunk/% lost to enemy action
Aircraft Carriers (CV): 7/4/57.1%
Escort Carrier (CVE): 1/0/0%
Battleships (BB): 17/5/29.4% (of the 5 sunk, all were at Pearl Harbor, 3 were salvaged)
Heavy Cruisers (CA): 18/7/38.9%
Light Cruisers (CL): 19/1/5.3%
Destroyers (DD): 171/29/17%

(There were no Destroyer Escorts in commission at the beginning of the war.)

If we lump  all the cruisers together, 8 of 37 were lost or 21.6%

If we lump the lone escort carrier together with the fleet carriers then four of eight were sunk or 50%

Additionally three destroyers were lost to weather in a hurricane. They were not ballasted properly, because of the exigencies of impending combat operations.

Clearly, at least looking at the World War II experience, the US Navy did not lose a higher percentage of smaller ships. If anything it appears the opposite is true. A smaller percentage of smaller ships were lost (17% vs 27.4%). More small ships were lost simply because there were many more of them. Undoubtedly some of the DDs and DEs that were sunk, would have survived the damage they received, if they had been bigger, but presumably there would also have been fewer of them. If the decision criteria were an equal chance of being sunk, then probably taking greater risk with smaller ships is both reasonable and unavoidable.

I will note that the probability of personnel loss on small ships is probably higher because they are more likely to sink quickly and catastrophically, while larger ships are more likely to sink slowly.

USS_Newcomb_Damage_1945

Photo: USS Newcomb DD 586 was hit by as many as five kamikaze on 6 April 1945 as she was screening for the cruiser USS St. Louis off Okinawa. She survived but was not repaired.

 

 

 

I will add a bit of anecdotal evidence. As part of Operation Overlord, the Normandy Invasion, 60 US Coast Guard 83 foot patrol boats were assigned to rescue those unlucky enough to find themselves in the water or sinking. 30 went to the American beachheads and 30 went to the British and Canadian beachheads. Being wooden hulled and gasoline powered, they certainly would not have been considered “survivable.”

USCG 83 ft patrol boat, probably June 1944. Photographer unknown.

Apparently they were in the thick of it, because they rescued 1438 men from the water and sinking craft. In spite of all the fire from shore, not a single boat was sunk and not a single crewmen was killed. Apparently the German gunners were too busy with the landing craft hitting the beach and the warships that were shelling them. They simply were not a priority target.

 

This article can be found in its original form at Chuck Hill’s CG Blog.

To Safeguard the Seas

The United States Navy is the most preeminent naval force in the world.  Following Alfred Mahan dictum that “a truly powerful nation must have thriving international trade, a merchant fleet to carry these goods and a strong navy to protect its sea lanes,” the U.S. Navy has provided stability, tranquility and maintained the global order since the end of World War II.   However, in this age of austerity, the ability of our aging fleet to secure our interests, protect our allies and confront our adversaries is being sorely tested.

As we paused in remembrance of the 73rd anniversary of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by the Imperial forces of Japan, we again see a rising power in Asia bent on changing the status quo, increasing pressure on our allies and challenging America’s preeminence in the Pacific.

China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea over the past few years is significant as it “directly challenges America’s position as the primary maritime power in Asia and as the guardian of the old regional order,” said Hugh White.  As Ronald O’Rouke, specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service testified before Congress, he expects China “to continue putting pressure on its neighbors’ short of war in the East China and South China Seas to get its way in the region.”

It is clear our Navy is facing ever-increasing operational challenges, including not only air and sub-surface threats but also supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (both anti-ship and surface to surface).   Individually, these threats are difficult enough to combat, however, when encountered simultaneously; these threats severely challenge the current capabilities of our Navy.  With a rapidly expanding Chinese Navy, coupled with the increased pace of Russia’s ship building efforts, the pressure to do more with less compels us to develop new technologies to maintain the advantage if or when confrontations occur.

For the last 70 years, radar has played a key role in maintaining technological superiority over our adversaries.  Over the last decade, however, our radar capabilities have proved to be increasingly incapable of addressing existing and emerging threats.  This, in turn, directly impacts the Navy’s ability to assure maritime security and freedom of the seas.

Fortunately, the Pentagon has taken positive steps to rectify the situation by making investments in the next generation of radars.  The Air and Missile Defense S-Band Radar (AMDR) is an excellent example of advanced radar technology that will fill critical capability gaps and ensure our sailors can meet the ever changing demands of today’s global threat environment.

Designed to replace the ageing Aegis combat system currently employed in the fleet the AMDR is constructed as a self-contained radar that is scalable for any platform for any mission, with the ability to exponentially increase radar sensitivity.  Not only will the AMDR more accurately detect missile threats, but it will also help ships run more efficiently.  This new system reduces space, weight, power, and cooling demands of naval vessels, thereby maximizing the service life of the ships that incorporate this new technology.   These long-term cost savings make AMDR a wise use of limited taxpayer dollars in today’s austere budget environment.

With the ability to confront multiple threats simultaneously — even in the presence of heavy land, sea, and rain clutter — the technological advancement of the AMDR is truly remarkable. Scheduled to begin installation on the Arleigh Burke class destroyers’ starting in 2016 the AMDR is the technologically advanced, low-risk, cost-effective radar solution to combat today and tomorrow’s threats.

Tasked with the daunting challenge of maintaining freedom of the seas, deterring international aggression, and playing pivotal roles in times of war the U.S. Navy has earned naval supremacy, not only because of the skill of our sailors, but also because it has invested great effort and money to provide the finest technology in modern warfare.  This trend must continue with essential defense programs so that we may stay one step ahead of evolving threats.  Doing so will protect our national interests and ensure the safety of our sailors and war fighters. John F. Kennedy said it best, “Control of the seas means security. Control of the seas means peace. Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the sea if it is to protect our security.”

Commander Feldkamp is a retired Naval Electronic Counter-Measure Officer (ECMO).  He flew combat missions in Desert Storm off the U.S.S. Midway and served as the international outreach officer for the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office and the Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness in Washington, D.C. He currently is an adjunct professor teaching the theories and politics of terrorism at George Mason University.

Innovation Collaboration in Sunny San Diego

logoOn January 28th, the Athena Project and the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Command Pacific (SSC PAC) [ed. Who doesn’t love nested acronyms?] will host the first-ever athenaTHINK event.  The day will include a design-thinking workshop to encourage collaboration between Sailors and scientists and teach structured brainstorming tools.  Open to all Sailors, you can sign up here. Over at our Athena Project site, Dr. Benjamin Migliori, a Navy researcher at SSC PAC, has more on the event:

Last year, we hosted warfighters from the USS Benfold at SSC PAC to foster better innovation, more inspired projects, and a better interface between Sailors and Scientists.  [Thursday], we’ll be doing that again.  Our purpose is to give warfighters and technologists a chance to work together in a design-thinking framework, and to open up the possibility of meaningful collaboration.

We’ll be giving Sailors an opportunity to see some of the bleeding edge work that we do here at SSC PAC, and giving the scientists a chance to hear real concerns from actual warfighters, rather than simply reading about them in briefs and training manuals.  We’ll be introducing the ideas of design-thinking for military applications, and showing that the civilian entrepreneurs don’t get to have all the fun.  We’ll be competing for a best project award – which could turn into much more and be the seed for a new initiative.

The Athena Project is an innovation-fueled initiative focused on providing a platform for Sailors to connect their great ideas with the scientists, engineers and academics that can help turn their visions into reality. Founded aboard USS BENFOLD (DDG 65) in early 2013, The Athena Project has hosted six Waterfront events in the San Diego area, as well as events in the Hampton Roads area and the Pacific Northwest. The basic premise is simple: Idea generation.  Sailors take a day off from their traditional duties to develop ideas to make the Navy or their command better – to scratch the creative itch and make solutions to their everyday challenges.

athenanw2On pitch day, Sailors are given have five minutes to present their concepts to an audience of their peers as well as innovation leaders in industry, government and academia. Following each presentation and question-and-answer session, the crowd votes on projects based on idea quality, actionability and presentation. At the end, the Admiral Sims Award for Intellectual Courage is presented to the highest score and the winner is granted command backing for a small functional team to develop their idea over the next quarter.  Previous winners have ranged anywhere from high-tech creative systems to low-tech solutions to common problems to innovative programs to make the Navy better.

The environment is casual and open, and sometimes takes the feeling of Shark Tank-meets-TED Talks, focused on building the creative confidence of the Fleet’s leaders of tomorrow. The vision of the project has always been to build a generation of Sailors that think differently, solve problems in unique ways and have the intellectual courage to stand up and do something about it.

As for the next pitch event, Waterfront Athena Seven? Well, that’ll be coming to a venue in San Diego in Late February. If you’re interested in presenting your big idea, connect with The Athena Project on Facebook or Twitter (@AthenaNavy) or just send an e-mail to [email protected]. If you’re interested in bringing an Athena Project event to your area, connect with the team!

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.