Notes to the New Administration Week

By Peter Dombrowski

Even citizens who rarely follow naval affairs are likely aware of the troubles the United States Navy has faced over the last decade. The service has suffered scandals from the Fat Leonard affair to the dockside fire that destroyed the Bonhomme Richard. Even worse, there is a growing sense that the USN has been surpassed in numbers of ships and vigor by the PLA Navy. Meanwhile the Houthis have thumbed their noses at American power in the Red Sea, the Navy has expended hundreds of munitions without yet deterring or degrading Houthis capabilities sufficiently to allow commercial shipping to resume at normal levels.

To begin the long voyage back, the new administration must insist that the Navy write a new maritime strategy in the spirit of the famous Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. In the words of former Reagan administration Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, “A critical lesson from the Maritime Strategy is that the Navy must restore credibility with Congress and the public that it knows what kinds of ships, aircraft, and technologies are needed.” And, of course, Congress must ensure that budgets allow current shipbuilding plans are fulfilled.

A new maritime strategy must be far more ambitious than the strategic visions offered by the last several chiefs of naval operations. Since the Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower and Advantage at Sea, the navy’s strategic documents (FRAGOs and NAVPLANS) have been small bore, inwardly focused, and not easily understandable to members of Congress or the America public.

The Trump administration’s civilian naval and defense department leaders must encourage the Navy to develop a compelling service vision by paying attention to the following prerequisites for sound strategy development.

Audience. A new strategy must focus on a handful of core audiences, such as the American people, their elected representatives, and the new president. Recent service documents have tried to address too many potential stakeholders—sailors, Navy families, international partners and rivals, the Department of Defense, and the naval industrial sector. But this dilutes the impact of the documents.

Process. Strategy development should be deliberate, it should be inclusive, and it should not be outsourced to contractors. Like all successful organizations, the Navy should prioritize and own its new maritime strategy.

Enduring. If the Navy makes an effort to meaningfully commit a new strategy, then the strategy must be able to shape the Navy for a decade or more. With the support of the incoming Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations must draw upon the next generations of leaders so that they become plank holders in the new vision. A new CNO should not simply upend the past CNO’s strategic guidance without sufficient reason.

Embedded. The Navy strategy must closely mesh with the new administration’s National Security and National Defense Strategies. Otherwise, it will be dead on arrival and of little value for Navy supporters in Congress or the intermittently attentive public.

Implemented. One grave criticism levied against most Navy strategies since the Reagan era’s Maritime Strategy is that they have had negligible impact on how the Navy actually operates much less how it mans, trains, and equips its forces. A new strategy must be operationalized to direct and accountable implementation.

Tri-service. The U.S. Navy should collaborate with the United States Marine Corps and the United States Coast Guard to write a comprehensive vision for the three sea services.

Truthful. The Navy must honestly confront its evident shortcomings while proposing realistic ways and means to remedy them. The released strategy must be accompanied by classified annexes fully informed by current intelligence assessments, realistic budget projections, and emerging operational concepts.      

No one is naïve enough to believe that a service-level strategy can solve the many problems facing the Navy. But an ambitious new maritime strategy will help the Navy raise more resources, generate positive attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and win appropriate congressional guidance to set the Navy on the right course for the coming decade. If the Navy is to meet the pacing threat posed by the PLA Navy, it must rally public support, galvanize Congress, and convince the world that the United States fully remains the world’s premier naval power.

Peter Dombrowski is the the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics in the Strategic and Operational Research Department of the U.S. Naval War College.

The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Naval War College or any other U.S. government department or agency.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (June 27, 2012) The amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) steams alongside coalition partner ships during a formation sailing event while participating in the War of 1812 Fleet Exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Petty Officer 2nd Class (AW/SW) Gretchen M. Albrecht/RELEASED)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Chris Huff

The AUKUS security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States represents a bold and necessary initiative to counter evolving threats to U.S. security. This agreement strengthens international alliances by expanding the presence of advanced, conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines and improving the U.S. naval submarine industrial base. While a strategic success with long-term benefits, AUKUS has introduced challenges due to increased costs, resource competition, and extended production timelines for Virginia– and Columbia-class submarines. These issues have adversely affected the Navy’s amphibious fleet, undermining the Marine Corps’ ability to maintain readiness and execute its vital global responsibilities.

Pillar I of the AUKUS agreement requires the annual production of one Columbia-class submarine and two Virginia-class submarines, known as the 1+2 workload. This demand has significantly strained the submarine industrial base, exacerbated by a redesign of the Virginia-class submarine that increased production costs. According to the Congressional Research Service, future production timelines for both submarine classes are expected to be longer than initially projected. In response, Congress has allocated additional funding to strengthen the industrial base, demonstrating a strong commitment to defense collaboration with allied nations. This funding aims to meet the increased demand for nuclear-powered submarines, a key element of AUKUS.

However, these efforts have inadvertently impacted amphibious ship readiness, jeopardizing the Marine Corps’ ability to provide critical mobility and deploy as a lethal, rapid-response force. Since the enactment of AUKUS, multiple Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments have been delayed, creating operational gaps and reducing the forward presence of Marine forces. These delays are largely due to the prolonged maintenance required to repair amphibious ships, which have suffered years of neglect while supporting continuous deployments during the War on Terror. The costs of these repairs have steadily increased, and competition for financial resources within the Navy remains intense.

Meanwhile, commitments to allied nations have prioritized the Virginia-class submarine, diverting and ensuring resources necessary for its construction are available. The Virginia-class program has experienced significant cost overruns, amounting to $967 million under the 2024 budget request and $4.644 billion under the 2025 request through 2028, reflecting a staggering 385 percent year-over-year increase. The Congressional Budget Office also included $3.48 billion in the administration’s 2025 request for an anomaly in the fiscal year 2025 continuing resolution specific to Virginia-class production. To address these financial shortfalls, the Navy has reallocated funds within its budget to meet the requirements of its highest-priority vessels, including at the expense of the amphibious fleet. Projections from the Congressional Budget Office indicate that cost overruns for the Virginia class submarine will increase by an additional $849 million through 2029.

The focus on high-priority submarines and the resulting reallocation of funds have severely impacted the readiness of the amphibious fleet. The maintenance backlog and diminished funding for amphibious ships pose significant risks to strategic deterrence and limit the Marine Corps’ ability to respond to global crises. These challenges underscore the urgent need for increased funding to sustain current readiness and support the future acquisition of amphibious ships.

The Government Accountability Office stated in a December 2024 report to the House Committee on Armed Services that the Navy is likely to face difficulties meeting the statutory requirements to have at least 31 amphibious ships in the future given the age of many ships and other factors. Additional funding in the fiscal years 2026 and 2027 National Defense Authorization Acts, beyond the existing budget, is essential to address these challenges.

The increased funding would facilitate the procurement of new amphibious ships and expand industrial capacity for maintaining existing amphibious vessels, including service life extension requirements. The president’s endorsement of the Navy’s 381-ship goal is an important step that could formalize this target into policy, aligning with the requirements outlined in 10 U.S.C. 8062(b). Such support would enable the acquisition of additional amphibious ships and sustainment of the fleet, ensuring the Marine Corps can provide persistent global deterrence and remain ready to execute any mission.

Prioritizing funding to enhance current amphibious ship readiness is critical. Strengthening these capabilities ensures the Marine Corps can fulfill its role as the nation’s expeditionary force, prepared to deter aggression, respond to crises, and execute strategic objectives. By balancing the demands of AUKUS with the needs of the amphibious fleet, the United States can maintain a versatile and resilient naval force capable of meeting today’s challenges and tomorrow’s uncertainties.

Chris “Rocket” Huff is a Major in the United States Marine Corps.

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or positions of the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: NORFOLK, Va. The San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock USS New York (LPD 21) arrived at Naval Station Norfolk, Nov. 22, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.) and Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret.)

There has long been public angst in DC about the number of ships in the U. S. Navy, which is projected to decline to 283 in 2027. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the number of ships will slowly begin to increase in 2028 and reach 381 manned ships and 134 unmanned ships by 2045. Today, the PLA Navy has 370 ships and is building at a higher rate than the United States.

The new administration should understand that the number of ships is the wrong metric. The metric to instead focus on is the number of missiles the Navy possesses and how they are deployed across the fleet via platforms. In a high-end war at sea, offensive firepower would be mostly delivered by missiles, and most of those missiles are likely to be launched by surface ships. Yes, the Navy’s aircraft carriers and their embarked aircraft can carry missiles as well, but the number of missiles per aircraft is small and aircraft range is limited, potentially putting them beyond striking distance of important PRC targets. The surface fleet features thousands of vertical launch cells that can generate missile salvos much faster than the sortie generation rates of aircraft carriers and airfields.

This means the U. S. Navy needs more missiles and they should be deployed in a larger number of widely distributed ships to complicate the PRC’s targeting. But today it takes approximately nine years to build a flight III guided missile destroyer at a cost of about $2.5B.¹ Comparable figures for a Constellation-class guided missile frigate are seven years and about $1.4B.² Staying the course on current surface warship acquisition will not grow the missile capacity of the fleet at a speed and scale that makes a major difference by the end of this decade.

There is a solution that is faster and more affordable – purchase used merchant container ships and outfit them with containerized missiles, drones, and other modular capabilities. They could be deployed in less than two years and the net acquisition cost could be $130 to $140 million dollars each. This can amount to ten missile merchants with 400 missiles for the price of one frigate. These ships can affordably increase the number of missiles at sea at a much more affordable rate compared to conventional warships, while spreading this firepower across a greater number of less exquisite platforms to complicate PRC targeting. Armed merchant ships deserve close consideration by the new administration for their many untapped advantages.

Captain R. Robinson “Robby” Harris commanded USS Conolly (DD-979) and Destroyer Squadron 32. Ashore he served as Executive Director of the CNO Executive Panel. He was a CNO Fellow in CNO Strategic Studies Group XII.

Dr. T. X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University. He served 30 years in the Marine Corps.

References

1. Email from Congressional Budget Office senior analyst Dr. Eric Labs, January 14, 2025.

2. Ibid.

Featured Image: Container feeder Charo B sailing from Cádiz, November 2021. (Photo via Wikimedia commons)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Michael Tkacik

War between the United States and China would be devastating for both states and the world. Such a conflict could include a nuclear exchange and the likelihood of that exchange spiraling out of control is high. Avoiding war between the U.S. and China must be the highest priority of the incoming administration.

China is a rising, revisionist great power, while the U.S. is a declining, status quo great power. In such a situation, variables lean toward war. To avoid war, the costs must clearly outweigh the benefits for the revisionist state – China – and foster deterrence.

Unfortunately, because the U.S. has denuded itself of manufacturing, internal balancing has reduced impact on China. But external balancing – cooperating or allying with like-minded states – may impact China’s cost-benefit calculation. In the Indo-Pacific, this means cooperating with states that have deterrent-inducing characteristics. These characteristics include industrial capacity, operational benefits, strategic depth, and countervailing strengths.

Because China has such a massive manufacturing advantage, it would probably win a long conventional war with the United States. As the U.S. out-manufactured past opponents in the 20^th century, so too China could replace lost military capacity more quickly and in far greater amounts than the U.S. could. It has been widely noted that the Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China’s shipbuilding capacity is 232 times greater than America’s. China’s overall manufacturing capacity is 31 percent of global output while the U.S. accounts for only 16 percent.

The U.S. must bolster manufacturing capacity by cooperating with like-minded states. Regional allies Japan and South Korea both have significant manufacturing capacity and some of it in key areas such as shipbuilding. The U.S. should begin using that capacity for maintenance work and eventually for production of certain U.S. assets. Formal agreements on cooperative manufacturing should be reached with both countries.

Not all states have the advanced manufacturing capacity necessary for a long war, but some states bring operational advantage. The Philippines spreads across the first island chain and provides ample room for dispersing forces, especially land-based missiles that can help to deter Chinese aggression. Pacific Island nations such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia provide depth for dispersion and logistical support. The U.S. should work to improve ties across the first and second island chains and improve capacity to support military operations.

Australia and New Zealand provide geostrategic depth as well as shared political ideals. Here, cooperation takes the form of AUKUS and the Quad, though neither organization includes New Zealand. The Five Eyes is a beginning, but New Zealand should be more deeply integrated into the U.S. deterrent strategy, perhaps by offering a role in AUKUS, the Quad, or a third organization similar to ANZUS.

Another way to deter China is to raise the possibility of war on multiple fronts with multiple states. In this regard, both India and Vietnam have long-standing differences with China that have led to war in the past. Cooperation must be heightened with these states. Formal statements supporting the status quo would be a start. Increased military aid to each state makes them more able to resist Chinese aggression. Though it is not currently foreseeable that either India or Vietnam would directly assist the U.S. in a war with China, the process of creating incentives for greater cooperation now could one day lead to a reasonable expectation of assistance during war. This, in turn, would help deter Chinese revisionism.

It is increasingly clear that China has the advantage in a long war, making the current state of deterrence untenable. Therefore, the U.S. must seek partners to increase the costs of Chinese revisionism and augment U.S. capabilities.

Michael Tkacik ([email protected]) holds a PhD from the University of Maryland and a JD from Duke University. He has published articles in a variety of journals. Tkacik’s current research interests include the implications of China’s rise, China’s behavior in the South China Sea, and nuclear weapons policy across Asia. He is a professor of government and director of the School of Honors at Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Matt Shibata teaches a Philippine Marine proper weapon handling techniques during Air Assault Support Exercise 2015-2 at Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Philippines, July 15, 2015. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tyler S. Giguere/Released)