By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past week, CIMSEC featured a series of submissions sent in response to our Call for Articles for short notes on what the new U.S. administration can consider to strengthen American naval power, reinforce alliances, and compete effectively against great powers. Authors examined a multitude of issues and offered recommendations for reform. From shipbuilding shortfalls to competing with China, to reinforcing alliances and strengthening logistics, the new administration faces many challenges and opportunities in the maritime domain. 

Below are the authors that featured during this series. We thank them for their contributions.

“Prepare the Navy and Marine Corps for Protracted War against China,” by Walker Mills

“There is no reason the U.S. military should expect a conflict with the PRC to be short, or to be won quickly. Rather, history tells us the opposite. Why would we expect the world’s most populous country and the second-largest economy to back down after only the opening salvo of a war it started, even if the opening round went poorly?”

“Restore Wargaming Focus to the Naval War College,” by Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (ret.)

“The Naval War College was the critical engine that drove the warfighting education of the officer corps that designed, perfected, and fought the fleet that produced victory at sea in World War II. But today, the college has become moribund in terms of its relevance to the emerging warfare environment.”

“U.S. Ground Forces Can Check Chinese Naval Advantage Now,” by Brian Kerg

“While it may take the U.S. years to build a single ship, it can raise, man, and equip ground forces optimized for operations on key maritime terrain at the speed of relevance, raising minimally required forces in under a year. Such forces, once raised, can achieve asymmetric and decisive strategic deterrent effects through permanent deployment to decisive points within the territory of U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and partners such as Taiwan.”

“The Best of Both Worlds: Educating Future Navy Officers,” by Claude Berube

“The Navy should have one commissioning source – the U.S. Naval Academy. But it should be adapted to benefit from other educational programs and experiences domestically.”

“Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea,” by William Martin

“In recent years, China has increased its aggressive activity in this vital maritime lane, to the detriment of U.S. interests, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies must increase force presence along this key maritime terrain to disrupt PLA confidence in freely maneuvering through these waters as they conduct operations counter to U.S. interests.”

“Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall,” by Benjamin Van Horrick

“Linguists will serve as an invaluable link in the killchain during wartime. All available assets from across the coalition must be brought to bear to make sense of the environment, prosecute targets, and support maneuver in all forms. Linguists will minimize friction and the fog of war as coalition members shorten the time between sensing and striking a target – no matter what country the capabilities originate from.”

“ESBs for Intermediate Naval Lift in Support of Expeditionary Operations,” by Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe, USMC

“To increase the capability of the naval expeditionary force to meet the demands across the global maritime commons and in non-permissive maritime environments, the Navy should acquire at least 30 Lewis B Puller (ESB-3)-class Expeditionary Mobile Base ships.”

“A High-Low Naval Portfolio: Maximize Strategic Returns with Balanced Force Design,” by Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine

“To remain both cost-effective and globally engaged, the U.S. Navy needs a balanced mix of high-end capital ships and smaller, more economical vessels, even if the latter are inherently less armed and defended. This tradeoff is not only acceptable but strategically beneficial, given the Navy’s role in day-to-day operations.”

“An Investment in the U.S. Navy is an Investment in Prosperity,” by Sam J. Tandgredi

“The U.S. Navy has a purpose that goes beyond warfighting. It is a critical geo-economic instrument that through global naval dominance helps sustain the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency. An investment in naval dominance is an investment in continued prosperity. Without it our future will be poorer.”

“Refocus on Warfighting To Boost Recruiting and Retention,” by Karl Flynn

“Make America’s youth want to serve by clearly stating our national security imperatives, minimize distractions from core warfighting functions, and eliminate all lowered standards.”

“Reconsider Red Sea Risk: Revealing U.S. Navy Air and Missile Defense Capability to China,” by Clay Robinson

“China’s relatively unfettered access to significant quantities of data on U.S. combat engagements, and their ability to glean the capabilities and limitations of critical U.S. Navy air and missile defense capabilities, may represent a far greater boon for them in the long run.”

“Work with Allies to Strengthen Deterrence against China,” by Michael Tkacik

“It is increasingly clear that China has the advantage in a long war, making the current state of deterrence untenable. Therefore, the U.S. must seek partners to increase the costs of Chinese revisionism and augment U.S. capabilities.”

“Build Containerized Missile Ships for Rapid and Affordable Fleet Growth,” by Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.) and Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret.)

“There is a solution that is faster and more affordable – purchase used merchant container ships and outfit them with containerized missiles, drones, and other modular capabilities.”

“Balance AUKUS and Amphibious Fleet Readiness,” by Chris Huff

“While a strategic success with long-term benefits, AUKUS has introduced challenges due to increased costs, resource competition, and extended production timelines for Virginia– and Columbia-class submarines. These issues have adversely affected the Navy’s amphibious fleet, undermining the Marine Corps’ ability to maintain readiness and execute its vital global responsibilities.”

“It is Time for a New Maritime Strategy,” by Peter Dombrowski

“An ambitious new maritime strategy will help the Navy raise more resources, generate positive attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and win appropriate congressional guidance to set the Navy on the right course for the coming decade. If the Navy is to meet the pacing threat posed by the PLA Navy, it must rally public support, galvanize Congress, and convince the world that the United States fully remains the world’s premier naval power.”

“Invest in Sustainment Capabilities to Increase Combat Credibility,” by Joseph Mroszczyk

“The new administration must urgently focus its efforts on strengthening the U.S. military’s combat credibility in the Western Pacific through investments in capabilities that enable at-sea and distributed logistics. To deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from aggression against Taiwan, the U.S. military must demonstrate it can effectively sustain combat at great distances and across a distributed force.”

“Rebuild Commercial Maritime Might to Restore U.S. Sea Power,” by Commander Ander S. Heiles, USN

“The administration faces an urgent choice – continue America’s narrow focus on naval power or comprehensively rebuild the commercial capability Mahan identified as essential to national power. By restoring the balance between combat and commercial maritime capabilities, the U.S. can secure its position in the era of great power competition.”

“It is Time for a Real Maritime Strategy: Focus on Shipbuilding, Seafaring, and Sway,” by Christopher Costello

“The United States needs a true, comprehensive maritime strategy. It takes the form of an interconnected effort that recognizes that seapower does not flow from naval power alone and the conditions under which the U.S. developed into a great maritime power have shifted. Readjustment is necessary.”

“It is Time to Build Small Warships,” by Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

“Scholars and engineers at the Naval Postgraduate School have developed a bi-modal fleet concept featuring a mix of small sea denial and large sea control vessels to correct this weakness. The key to implementing this strategy is the LMACC, or Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability.”

“The Specter of Tariffs and the Revival of the U.S. Merchant Marine,” by Ben Massengale

“Imposition of those tariffs could provide a window of opportunity to revive the U.S. Merchant Marine by making foreign vessels less competitive in conducting trade in the U.S. This could be done by granting cargo imported by U.S.-flagged vessels a reduced tariff to not only compensate for the additional cost it takes to operate an American ship, but also making its operations significantly more profitable than its foreign competitors.”

“Develop Strategies to Counter China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” by Roshan Kulatunga

“China’s approach involves a systematic infiltration of various sectors, including technology, academia, media, and even political domains, to gather intelligence and insights into the strategies of possible adversaries. This multifaceted approach allows China to build a nuanced understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions while subtly undermining them.”

“Strengthen America’s Maritime Borders,” by David Ware

“What is concerning today is that the DHS intelligence and enforcement posture for national security purposes, for both large and small vessels, appears to have taken a backseat to focus strictly on immigration concerns. This creates a maritime security opening for adversaries to exploit.”

“Reassess the Navy’s Global Force Posture,” by Francis Crozier

“The Navy must choose its battles more carefully and come to grips with the limited resources it currently has. Repeatedly extending deployments for surface combatants and carriers critical to a war with China will result in long-term consequences for readiness, as exemplified by incidents like the delayed Boxer ARG deployment.”

“Legislate New Fleet Acts for a Generational Investment in Naval Power,” by Jason Lancaster

“A fleet act could provide a more viable mechanism for adjusting the Navy’s force structure and making a generational investment in naval power compared to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, which has lost much of its usefulness.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image:  Ships and submarines participating in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise sail in formation in the waters around the Hawaiian Islands July 27, 2012. (U.S. Navy Photo)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Jason Lancaster

The Navy’s annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan should be replaced with a congressionally-appropriated fleet act. This act would fund the construction of the fleet the nation needs. Over the past 10 years of annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans the fleet has shrank, not grown. U.S. shipbuilders lack the capability to build the required ships because there is little consistency in U.S. warship procurement.

Annual budget changes destroy consistency in the annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. The table below displays the ever-shrinking fleet. The fleet in fiscal year (FY) 27 and 44 are highlighted. FY44 was used instead of FY49 for consistency throughout the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans.

During the late 19^th century and early 20^th century, the United States, Imperial Germany, and Austria–Hungary used fleet acts to fund desired force designs. Congress funded the Two-Ocean Navy Act in 1940 to expand the fleet by more than 70 percent. One would think that the imperial governments of Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary would only have to persuade their Kaiser, but both nations’ Chiefs of Navy had to have their shipbuilding plans approved by their respective parliaments.

The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 provides a framework for a similar congressional act. In 1940, Congress authorized:

(a) Capital ships, 385,000 tons
(b) Aircraft carriers, 200,000 tons
(c) Cruisers, 420,000 thousand tons
(d) Destroyers, 250,000 tons
(e) Submarines, 70,000 tons

This act provided significant funding for ships, munitions, and shipyard expansions. It would help give the Navy a running start on wartime expansion by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor more than a year later.

In Imperial Germany, Admiral Tirpitz proposed a fleet act that requested a Navy of a certain size. This plan assumed a replacement ship for each battleship after it reached 25 years of service life. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were passed in 1898, 1900, 1908, and 1912. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were based principally on assessments of the UK Royal Navy’s strength and requirements to defend overseas colonies.

Austria-Hungary had a similar system. After Italy began building battleships, Admiral Montecuccoli’s initial fleet plan was denied due to domestic politics. Admiral Montecuccoli eventually persuaded a shipyard to produce the first two ships. He secured a personal loan of 32 million Austrian Crowns to begin construction on the Viribis Unitis and Tegethoff while promising the government would procure the ships the following year.

The Austro-Hungarian Navy dealt with partisan politics. Montecuccoli was an expert at balancing political factions to accomplish his fleet plan. Czech delegates publicly voted against the Navy bill for partisan reasons, but privately supported it. The Czech company Skoda Works produced steel armor and battleship guns, offering well-paying jobs for Bohemia and Moravia, but the central government was antagonistic toward Czech independence.

Today, we have witnessed the Navy attempt to back out of block buys designed to reduce cost because annual DoD budgets did not support additional ships for the navy. A fleet act would provide the steady demand signal for ships that would enable companies to invest in required materials to sustain affordable shipbuilding for the long term.

It took decades for the Navy to reach this state. It will take steady and consistent funding to return the Navy to its desired size. A fleet act could provide a more viable mechanism for adjusting the Navy’s force structure and making a generational investment in naval power compared to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, which has lost much of its usefulness.

Commander Jason Lancaster, USN, is a student at the National War College. He has served at sea in destroyers, amphibious ships, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: 1994 – A view of various ships under construction at the Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard, Pascagoula, Mississippi. Front to back are the guided missile cruiser Port Royal (CG-73), the guided missile destroyer Stout (DDG-55) and the guided missile destroyer Mitscher (DDG-57). Inboard of Stout is the guided missile destroyer Ramage (DDG-61) and inboard of Mitscher is the guided missile destroyer Russell (DDG-59). (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Francis Crozier

Time and time again the Navy seems to have to reckon with three irreconcilable questions:

1. What does the Navy want to do with its global reach?
2. What legitimate global interests does the Navy have?
3. Does the Navy have the logistical capability to stay in proximity to those interests?

Issues like these have stood out during Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led effort to protect international shipping passing through the Red Sea. Two issues in particular stand out, with the first being the problems faced by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the second being the regular retasking and deployment extensions of warships.

The MSC backbone for fleet replenishment is often understaffed and underfunded, with few oilers in the 5^th fleet area of responsibility. USNS Alan Shepard and USNS Big Horn were taken out of action after running aground in May and September of last year, leaving only USNS Amelia Earhart to replenish coalition and U.S. warships.

The Navy is fortunate to have the ability to contract private oilers on short notice that are U.S.-Navy certified and capable of refueling warships at sea. But this service comes at triple the cost of contracting MSC oilers and cannot always be relied upon if a large naval conflict were to kick off. The MSC also cannot support a global Navy with global reach if it is actively sidelining vessels to ensure proper manning to those ships it deems critical to sustain operations. Contracting private oilers is a stop-gap and not a permanent solution.

Second, Operation Prosperity Guardian required repeated retasking of critical assets from theaters where arguably the U.S. has greater strategic interests. In order to allow the Eisenhower CSG to return to Norfolk, covering the Red Sea required retasking the Theodore Roosevelt CSG from her deployment to the 7^th Fleet area of responsibility. The Abraham Lincoln CSG was also retasked to the Middle East before they even entered the 7^th fleet AOR. These decisions left no operating CSG in the 7^th fleet for the first time since 2001, despite repeated Navy and administration pronouncements of China being the number one national security threat.

The Navy must choose its battles more carefully and come to grips with the limited resources it currently has. Repeatedly extending deployments for surface combatants and carriers critical to a war with China will result in long-term consequences for readiness, as exemplified by incidents like the delayed Boxer ARG deployment. The new administration should make a comprehensive reassessment of global force posture and consider optimizing the Navy’s presence against China, especially with the Navy focused on a potential conflict in 2027.

Francis Crozier is a pseudonym for a sailor who holds a Bachelors Degree in World Politics focusing on Russian Affairs and Economic Development from the Ohio State University. He currently serves as a Petty Officer Second Class on board a U.S. destroyer.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Mitchell Parcell, a V-22 tiltrotor crew chief assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and a native of Montana, observes the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) in the Luzon Strait Oct. 8, 2024. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Amelia Kang)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By David Ware

As a retired U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Customs and Border Protection Supervisor in Hawaii, I have done warrantless border searches of yachts and fishing vessels as well as large commercial vessels. We apprehended many violators with arrest warrants from all over the United States. Seizures of weapons, including an AK-47, were made. Illegal drugs were often encountered. Illegal immigrants were taken into custody.

Intelligence and enforcement must go hand-in-hand. Many of these small boats simply pop over the horizon without notice or warning. Customs, Coast Guard, and the state of Hawaii cooperated to ensure a seamless approach. That was 30 years ago. In 2003, everything changed with the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In the aftermath of 9/11, Customs and Immigration inspections were combined into CBP, and their respective investigations were combined into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)/Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). This was a mistake because Customs’ role in border security was subjugated to strictly admissibility and immigration issues. We became part of DHS, a government entity still trying to define its mission today in 2025.

The United States has an enormous coastline, including the Pacific, the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and also the Great Lakes which we share with Canada. For political reasons, enforcement across the Great Lakes, including at the Port of Buffalo, NY, was curtailed several decades ago. But after 9/11, Customs reinforced the northern border before the southern border because it was considered more of a threat for terrorist penetration. There was also intelligence after the 9/11 attacks that suggested Al-Qaeda would put a weapon of mass destruction in a cargo container on a vessel, possibly coming across the Pacific from China or Japan, potentially into or via Hawaii.

What is concerning today is that the DHS intelligence and enforcement posture for national security purposes, for both large and small vessels, appears to have taken a backseat to focus strictly on immigration concerns. This creates a maritime security opening for adversaries to exploit.

Maritime security extends far beyond the continental United States. While illegal vessels come up from Mexico and Latin America on both the east and west coasts, the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia seek to dominate and control the high seas in strategic waters near U.S. allies and territories. It is not just PLA Navy warships that threaten America, it is China’s comprehensive maritime power and gray zone strategy, which includes a substantial coast guard and paramilitary element for which we have no commensurate response. Consider Chinese vessels approaching the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands without a visa, or illegally entering Guam on boats. Both are U.S. territories of strategic value. Chinese coast guard vessels and maritime militia are also on the frontlines of encroaching upon U.S. partners and allies in day-to-day operations, and could serve many wartime roles as well.

The new administration should focus on maritime security, both at home and abroad, because it has long been neglected. The number one threat to maritime security is China. Unguarded seacoasts are America’s greatest vulnerability.

David Ware is a retired federal officer with 42 years of combined military and civilian federal service. He served in the U.S. Air Force, with service in the Philippines and Okinawa during the Vietnam War era. He has extensive experience dealing directly with Pacific nations and territories in Project Cook and the Customs Asia-Pacific Enforcement Reporting System (CAPERS). He is a retired U.S. Customs and Border Protection supervisor and analyst.

Featured Image: A Coast Guard Cutter Diligence pursuit team interdicts a “go-fast” boat suspected of smuggling illegal drugs (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Cutter Diligence/Released)