Capability Analysis

Enhancing Existing Force Structure by Optimizing Maritime Service Specialization

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Alternative Naval Force Structure Topic Week

By Eric Beaty

The factors which color our view of the world have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. That overarching conflict polarized the world’s politics and drove the United States to build a naval force focused on blue-water combat against a peer competitor, but the demise of the Soviet Union left a much more complex world where the United States must be prepared to simultaneously counter myriad threats at multiple levels. There is not a uniform solution to every problem and there is not a uniform fleet for every theater. Luckily, the United States has three maritime services—the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps—with different core competencies covering a broad range of naval missions. Current investments in force structure can be maximized by focusing the maritime services on their preferred missions.

Some missions have historically been assigned according to service and platform, rather than warfare areas, which has led to small, orphaned communities in some services. These communities are too small to have many high-ranking alumni in overall service leadership. The resulting consequences include them being often misunderstood and undervalued, poor funding, poor career opportunities, few if any champions in service leadership, and so on. Even when they are appreciated and funded, niche communities lack economies of scale. Therefore, the way to ensure missions are properly funded and manned is to task an interested party to advocate for them, and each of the maritime services has missions they are most passionate about.

The naval force of the future would see a Navy endorsement of the territorial patrol missions of the Coast Guard and expanding the role of the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team, but there would be no radical course corrections. Instead, naval missions would be assigned to “centers of excellence” within the services to manage the organization, training, and tactics of the joint forces which would execute such missions.

Navy – Combat on the High Seas

The U.S. Navy would manage the missions of blue-water combat: submarine and antisubmarine warfare, carrier aviation, surface warfare, air defense, and sealift. These missions are already clearly within the Navy aegis, so there would be no major change in their execution. By focusing on these core mission sets, and shedding the remainder which the Navy has been unenthusiastic about, the leadership would be refocused on areas where Navy doctrine, tactics, and procurement have been most refined. As such, the platforms of the blue-water Navy would not deviate much from their present and planned configurations.

Coast Guard – Patrolling Offshore

The U.S. Coast Guard would be the mission manager for coastal and offshore patrol operations, for both law enforcement and maritime safety. Under the umbrella of muscular law enforcement, the Coast Guard would manage not only patrols of the American coast, but also patrols off South America and Africa as well. Most of these vessels would be frigates, both U.S. Navy and allied, rather than white-hull Coast Guard cutters, but all would be dedicated to low-intensity constabulary missions. By keeping the peace along much of the world’s coastline, the Coast Guard-led maritime patrol enterprise would free up high-capability vessels to deter peer competitors.

The worldwide maritime patrol enterprise would be led by the United States, with the nonjudgmental aim of maintaining the world’s seaways under the control of accepted and functional governments, because even reticent governments make easier negotiating partners than ungoverned chaos. The simplest way to lead such an enterprise is to help equip and train it, so the United States Navy and Coast Guard would have extensive foreign military sales, partnership programs, and personnel exchange programs with allied maritime nations.

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MAPUTO:: Mozambique (June 11:: 2012) Marine 1st Lt. Joseph McHugh Jr.:: officer-in-charge of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 12.2 Security Team Six speaks with U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Lt. Ricardo Moreno:: who is translating fire team training tactics to Mozambique marine Sub Lt. Jorge A. Julius. Service members assigned to High Speed Vessel Swift (HSV 2) are conducting classroom engagements with local military members for Africa Partnership Station. APS is an international security cooperation initiative:: facilitated by Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa aimed at strengthening global maritime partnerships through training and collaborative activities in order to improve maritime safety and security in Africa. (U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Joe Keiley/Released)

To make such a broad endeavor more practical, the Coast Guard’s offshore cutters, the Navy’s patrol frigates, and allied nations’ warships would need to be common. The principal requirements would be low cost, ease of maintenance, and margins for growth. The basic warship would have a simple power plant, enough systems to operate as a minimalist patrol ship, and substantial space and weight left available for additions. Buyers could add additional fuel tanks and provisions storage, a variety of weapons, helicopter or boat facilities, or a host of other standardized modifications. While these frigates would be too small to add all options to every vessel, they would also be inexpensive enough that customers of modest means could still purchase them, and customers like the United States could purchase lots of them.

Built cheaply and in large numbers, flotillas of these semi-modular ships would patrol for pirates off Africa, drug smugglers in the Gulf of Mexico, or vessels in distress off North America. For patrol locations far from suitable ports, the Navy would reawaken the concept of tender vessels; using replenishment ships to establish at-sea bases to extend the on-station time of frigates and cutters. These tenders would provide fuel, provisions, spare parts, and a base for the flotilla’s command element. By performing lower-threat missions economically, these frigates would free up the destroyers, cruisers, and carriers to concentrate in high-threat theaters, thereby maximizing combat power.

Marine Corps – Seizing the Littorals

While the Navy prepares to fight wars on the high seas and the Coast Guard leads patrol efforts in more stable theaters, the Marine Corps would manage naval missions across coastal seas and coastal lands. As the service tasked with crossing from sea to land, the Marine Corps is concerned with anything which could affect or impede an amphibious action, including the obvious amphibious tasks, but should now focus on missions like mine countermeasures and small boat operations. Afloat Marine forces are carried to battle by Navy amphibious assault ships and delivered to the beach by Navy landing craft, so there would remain a substantial Navy influence in certain elements, but the Marines would be the lead advocates for coastal mission capabilities.

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APRA HARBOR, Guam (Sept. 20, 2016) – Marines assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit embark amphibious assault vehicles in the well deck of the Whidbey Island-class amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42) during Valiant Shield 2016. Valiant Shield 16 is a biennial, U.S.-only, field training exercise (FTX) with a focus on integration of joint training among U.S. forces. Germantown, part of the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group with embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, is participating in Valiant Shield in an effort to increase naval integration and joint capabilities in the event of conflict, contingency, or disaster relief. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Raymond D. Diaz III/Released)

Navy destroyers, cruisers, and carrier battle groups would be responsible for clearing a path to the coastal area for the amphibious train, but the amphibious ships and their direct escorts would be responsible for fighting their way to the beach and enabling the landing force to cross it. To defeat small boat threats and provide fire support until the Marine landing force could establish artillery ashore, the amphibious train would be escorted by frigates (based on the common hull introduced above) specialized with the maximum number of naval guns possible. With these frigates, the amphibious force would be able to defeat enemy forces in waters too constricted for the blue-water warships to operate effectively.

Closer to the beach, mines would be the next threat to an amphibious landing. Rather than operate a separate fleet of minesweepers and mine countermeasures support ships, the Marine Corps-centered littoral force would base countermine detachments aboard the same amphibious assault ships carrying the landing force. Assault ships are designed with large well decks, copious storage, and substantial berthing space, making them best-suited to operate divers and unmanned countermine vehicles of all sizes. Furthermore, they have the flight decks to operate the CH-53K King Stallions that would take the airborne minesweeping mission from the Navy’s MH-53E Sea Dragons as these aging helicopters are retired. Saving the Navy the purchase of new mine countermeasures ships would pay off in funding for extra amphibious landing ships and CH-53Ks, a doubly effective reorganization for the amphibious mission.

The Marine Corps would also take overall responsibility for the related riverine mission set. Outside of port security missions (which would fall under Coast Guard leadership), all coastal and riverine boat operations would become part of the permanent Navy-Marine Corps amphibious enterprise. Effective riverine operations include the same elements as amphibious landings—afloat mobility, fire support, and power projection ashore—so consolidation of the riverine and amphibious communities would create a deeper and more diverse base of experience for both missions. Integration with Marine Corps infantry, aviation, and artillery would make the riverine squadrons more effective in combat than they could be alone. Also, increased small-boat landing and raiding capability would increase the Marines’ naval presence and take advantage of their unique maritime capabilities.

The Joint Naval Force in Action

This joint naval force of the future would perform in a very similar fashion to the present-day and historical naval forces, insofar as the various forces have capabilities available. Where the future naval force would excel is in peacetime administration and presence: more efficient management of missions would reduce redundancy and increase the number of forces available when and where they were needed for combat and deterrence. Transitory advantages like technology or brilliant leadership would come and go, but the future naval force would be organized to make the most efficient use of these advantages on the seas to achieve America’s long-term goals.

LT Eric Beaty is an E-2C/D Hawkeye Naval Flight Officer, presently working ashore in D.C. The views express herein are solely those of the author and are presented in a personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 18, 2016) – Cpl. Ryan Dills communicates with other assault amphibious vehicles while traveling from amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) to Royal Australian Navy Canberra class amphibious ship HMAS Canberra (L02).  (U.S. Marine Corps photo by SSgt. Christopher Giannetti/Released)

Current Operations

No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to Inspire Capability Innovation in Today’s Navy

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Alternative Naval Force Structure Topic Week

By Bob Hein

Imagine a day sometime in the near future where tensions between the United States and Russia are high and ships are at sea, ready to strike each other at a moment’s notice if given the word. As his ship glides to the surface of the ocean, the enemy submarine commander raises his periscope and with it the electronic surveillance antennae. It picks up multiple signals of U.S. aircraft in the immediate vicinity. But the commander is not worried. These aircraft, their radar, and their weapons are optimized for attacks against land targets; they won’t see his periscope, and even if they did, they wouldn’t have the weapons to do much about it. As long as he can avoid U.S. ships and submarines, which are spread out and in short supply, he knows he and his comrades have the upper hand in gaining control of the sea. As he leaves the surface, he works unimpeded toward his target, the American aircraft carrier.

At the same time, hundreds of miles away, a U.S. submarine commander is moving toward the enemy’s surface action group. He knows if he can get close enough and sink these ships, he can help ensure control of the sea for the rest of the force. Suddenly, the sound of weapons dropped from enemy helicopters fills the ship. He runs deep and aggressively, maneuvering to negate the threat. But in doing so, he loses contact with the group. And without an ability to shoot the helicopter, he misses an opportunity to take down an archer, who will now be able to shoot future arrows at him and his compatriots.

160324-N-QY430-523 ATLANTIC OCEAN (March 24, 2016) The Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Helena (SSN 725) transits the Atlantic Ocean with the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), the flagship of the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. Ike is underway conducting a Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) with the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group in preparation for a future deployment. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Rafael Martie/Released)
ATLANTIC OCEAN (March 24, 2016) The Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Helena (SSN 725) transits the Atlantic Ocean with the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), the flagship of the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Rafael Martie/Released)

Ten years ago, this scenario would have been a work of pure fiction, unimaginable to most national security experts and military leaders. But today, the rapid spread of technology, the rise of near peer competitors, and the proliferation of advanced weapons make this scenario more plausible than ever. If the Navy is to counter the above scenario, it must start emphasizing sea control while retaining power projection capability. That change will require the Navy to accelerate its approach to this mission set, both in strategic terms of shifting mental focus and in more tactical terms of rapid repurposing of current platforms and payloads. While the Navy works to determine its future force structure, it must innovate beyond the traditional roles that ships and aircraft currently play. Designing and building new naval platforms takes time we don’t have, and there is still abundant opportunity to make the most of existing force structure. Fortunately for the Navy, histories of previous wars are a good guide for future action. World War II is an excellent model in particular, but the Navy must first recognize the historical context of its current predicament.

Bringing the Navy Back to the Sea

Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote extensively on how nations throughout history have used control of the seas to spread national power by ensuring freedom of trade and access. Over the course of the last century, the Navy’s primary focus of force application has shifted from sea control to power projection.

Arguably, the battle for control of the seas culminated in WWII, when massive navy-on-navy engagements raged in enormous clashes such as the Battles of the Atlantic, Midway, and Leyte Gulf. Navy strike groups were challenged by Axis Powers throughout the world’s oceans.

160920-N-NT265-725 PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 23, 2016) USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) lead a formation of Carrier Strike Group Five and Expeditionary Strike Group Seven ships including, USS Momsen (DDG 92), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Stethem (DDG 63), USS Benfold (DDG 65), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Barry (DDG 52), USS Green Bay (LPD 20), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), as wells as USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193) during a photo exercise to signify the completion of Valiant Shield 2016. Valiant Shield is a biennial, U.S. only, field-training exercise with a focus on integration of joint training among U.S. forces. This is the sixth exercise in the Valiant Shield series that began in 2006. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Christian Senyk/Released)
PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 23, 2016) USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) lead a formation of Carrier Strike Group Five and Expeditionary Strike Group Seven ships including, USS Momsen (DDG 92), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Stethem (DDG 63), USS Benfold (DDG 65), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Barry (DDG 52), USS Green Bay (LPD 20), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), as wells as USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193) during a photo exercise to signify the completion of Valiant Shield 2016. Valiant Shield is a biennial, U.S. only, field-training exercise with a focus on integration of joint training among U.S. forces. This is the sixth exercise in the Valiant Shield series that began in 2006. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Christian Senyk/Released)

Following WWII, the U.S. had a massive navy and no real threat to its control of the oceans. The Navy and the nation were now unsure of the Navy’s role in this new world. The Navy received assistance from a 27-year-old theorist, Samuel Huntington. Writing in 1954, he had a clear vision for how the Navy should evolve in the second half of the 20th century: “Its purpose is not to acquire command of the sea, but rather to utilize its command of the sea to achieve supremacy of the land.” The Navy began shifting its focus to power projection, refining amphibious warfare techniques, developing a long range land attack missile, and building generations of air wings capable of delivering ordnance ashore. Even so, as the Cold War intensified and the Soviet Navy grew throughout the 50’s and 60’s, this focus ashore was balanced by the continuing requirement of maintaining control afloat.

Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Navy, the U.S. Navy’s focus on sea control diminished and the pendulum swung squarely over to power projection. Anti-surface missiles were removed from ships, Trident missile submarines were converted to fire Tomahawks, and the carrier’s S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft were stripped of much of their anti-submarine warfare gear and were later retired. Major force structure investments were made in ships geared towards littoral power projection such as the LCS and Zumwalt-class destroyer. Generations of Sailors during the Cold War were trained to achieve sea control – it was part of their DNA. When the Cold War ended, and with it the Soviet Navy, that DNA withered away.

As Bob Dylan tells us, once again, the times they are a changin’. The world is returning to a period of great power competition, and other nations’ desire to influence the world stage is forcing the Navy to rethink its focus. In the coming decades, the U.S. Navy may not have its current luxury of safely traversing the world’s oceans and projecting power. The rise of foreign capability could threaten carrier strike groups when they leave their harbors. The Navy must expand its focus from the last 25 years of projecting power, and strengthen its historic mission of sea control.

Make the Old New Again

When trying to convert this shift in focus to the platforms that will execute sea control, it is time to heed the old dictum, “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” Just as the Navy had to do in WWII, it is time to focus on repurposing platforms it already has rather than relying on new platforms.

Looking back to its height of sea control capability, the Battle of Midway in WWII, carrier air wings (at the time known as carrier air groups) consisted of about 72 aircraft, one squadron each of dive bombers, fighters, torpedo bombers, and scout planes (which could also carry bombs). Compare that with today’s air wing. While the number of aircraft is about the same, its composition has changed dramatically, with four fighter/attack squadrons, one electronic attack squadron, one command and control squadron, and two helicopter squadrons. The biggest difference is the shift in focus of the air wing from fighting other navies for control of the seas to a focus on delivering power ashore.

At over 40 years old, the USS Nimitz is the oldest carrier in the U.S. inventory. The reason she has survived is due to upgrades to her air wing. There is debate currently over whether the Nimitz, and follow on carriers are still valid in a world of anti-access and area denial. This debate centers on the Navy’s role in power projection but speaks little to its return to sea control. While the carriers are still the best platform for delivering power without the need for foreign basing permissions, adding an anti-submarine and anti-surface role to its newest fighters is necessary. Similar to efforts by the surface warfare community to modify the SM-6 anti-air missile for strikes against ships, the Navy should modify those ASW and ASUW weapons currently used by the MH-60R helicopter for use by its fighter-attack jets. Just as in WWII, not all aircraft would be configured for surface or subsurface missions, but providing that latent capability will certainly ensure enemy ships and subs will think twice when they see the radar signature of a U.S. fighter.

Submarines are very effective at what they do – sinking other submarines and attacking surface ships – but many potential adversaries have fleets of helicopters designed to hunt them. Simply giving subs a basic anti-air warfare capability against these platforms would certainly give adversaries cause for concern. This system already exists in the German Navy. The Interactive Defense and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS) is currently being built for the German Type 212 submarine. With a 12-mile range, it will certainly make helicopters think twice as they drop their buoy search patterns. Submarine attacks against aircraft are not a new concept. In WWII, 120 Allied aircraft were shot down by German U-Boats.

Model of IDAS at the ILA 2006 (Wikimedia Commons)
Model of IDAS at the ILA 2006 (Wikimedia Commons)

Military Sealift Command (MSC) is experiencing great success in expanding the role of its fleet, and has been a leader in creatively repurposing existing platforms. MSC has added intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities to platforms such as the Expeditionary Fast Transport (formerly Joint High Speed Vessel) and the dry-cargo/ammunition ships (T-AKE). Marine Forces Pacific has experimented with the T-AKE extensively, using the ship for low-end operations, and even as a potential command and control platform. The MSC has shown there is a lot of opportunity in our current fleet. We just have to be creative.

Conclusion

As the challenges on the world’s oceans continue to rise, the challenge of sea control rises with them. With rapid repurposing of various platforms and payloads, the Navy can quickly adapt and overcome if and when required to fight and win this nation’s wars. By looking back at history, sometimes we can find the tools for the future.

Captain Robert N. Hein is a career Surface Warfare Officer. He previously commanded the U.S.S Gettysburg (CG-64) and the U.S.S Nitze (DDG-94). You can follow him on Twitter @the_sailor_dog. The views and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: A U.S. Navy Lockheed S-3A Viking aircraft (BuNo 159755) assigned to anti-submarine squadron VS-32Maulers on the aircraft carrier USS America (CV-66), on 6 May 1982. (W. M. Welch, USN)

Capability Analysis

Proposing A Modern High Speed Transport – The Long Range Patrol Vessel

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Alternative Naval Force Structure Week

By Tom Meyer

 The U.S. Navy achieved extraordinary success in the 20th century – playing key roles in winning WWII and the Cold War. The U.S. Navy earned these accomplishments with forces structured around an exceptional fleet of technologically superior ships and aircraft. The U.S. Navy’s “ships of the line” during this era represented the height of our technological and industrial capabilities – and no expense was spared to create, construct, and operate this world-leading fleet.

As the United States and the U.S. Navy move into the 21st century, the United States faces the duel challenge of engaging in a “long war” against Islamofacism and meeting the threat of emerging “peer competitors” in a period of economic and fiscal constraints. Meeting these dichotomous challenges requires a fundamental rethink of the nature of naval forces and their roles. Is the U.S. Navy moving from an era of exceptional “ships of the line” – including LHA’s & LPD’s, FFG’s, CG’s, DDG’s, SSN’s and CVN’s – to one filled with USV’s, UAV’s, LCS’s, CV’s, SSK’s and perhaps something new – Long Range Patrol Vessels (LRPV’s)? But what exactly is an LRPV? 

The LRPV represents the 21st century version of the WWII APD – High Speed Transports. To better understand the 21st century LRPV, let’s take a look at the history and capabilities of the 20th century APDs.

Historical Connections

During WWII and the Korean War, Crosley-class APDs based on the Rudderrow class of destroyer escorts were pressed into a variety of roles and performed missions including amphibious assault, UDT operations and raids, ASW, long-range patrolling, and search and rescue– i.e. rescue of USS Indianapolis survivors.

During the Evacuation of Hungnam, 24 December 1950, USS Begor (APD-127) stands offshore, ready to embark the last UN landing craft, as demolition charges wreck Hungnam's port facilities. (U.S. National Archives)
During the Evacuation of Hungnam, 24 December 1950, USS Begor (APD-127) stands offshore, ready to embark the last UN landing craft, as demolition charges wreck Hungnam’s port facilities. (U.S. National Archives)

The ability to successfully complete these various missions resulted from the inherently flexible design of the APDs. To begin with, the designers of the Crosley class APD’s provided these ships with a strong organic armament, including one 5″/38 dual purpose gun mount, three twin 40 mm gun mounts, six single 20 mm gun mounts, and two depth charge tracks. The Crosley class APD’s were equipped to carry and support 12 officers and 150 enlisted men. Furthermore, the Crosley’s were equipped with 4 LCVPs to convey troops and equipment ashore.

Finally, the Crosley APD’s could carry a combination of the following material on board:

  • 6 x 1/4 ton trucks
  • 2 x 1 ton trucks
  • 4 x ammunition carts
  • 4 x pack howitzers
  • 6,000 cubic feet ammunition
  • 3,500 cubic feet general cargo
  • 1,000 cubic feet gasoline

The capabilities and flexibility of the APD’s are the inspiration for a new line of vessels – the Long Range Patrol Vessels (LRPVs).

The LRPV Concept

The modern LRPV would build upon and update the concept of High Speed Transport for the 21st century. The LRPV would combine new technologies, capabilities, and processes to create regionally-focused LRPV surface action groups (SAGs) supporting U.S. national and U.S. Navy strategic goals and objectives.

The modern LRPV would operate as a member of a two ship LRPV sag. The SAG would leverage recent innovative work by the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory to design, create, and test a new Combat Landing Team organizational model – COLT.

The COLT organizational model creates a unique USMC amphibious landing team consisting of three infantry platoons, one weapons platoon, an enhanced scout section, and an enhanced command element.

The specific Concept of Operations (ConOps) would be two LRPVs operating together while jointly carrying one USMC COLT (or U.S. Army equivalent) and their organic vehicles while conducting extended patrols in specific geographic areas (i.e. South America, Africa or SE Asia). These patrols would provide the opportunity for these LRPVs to operate in close, sustained partnerships with local maritime forces by conducting numerous extended joint operations, exercises, and security cooperation engagements.

To meet the challenges emerging in the 21st century, LRPV SAGs would focus on specific geographic regions including South America, Africa, SE Asia, and the Middle East. Forward presence could be enhanced by conducting crew swaps in forward operating locations, including Guam, Japan, Singapore, Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Naples, Guantanamo Bay, and other locations yet to be identified.

Through the use of long-term forward deployments, regionally-based crew-swapping, and the strong organic capabilities of the LRPVs, the specific numeric requirements for the LRPV construction program could be limited to 30-34 individual ships to support regional LRPV squadrons. The number of ships required to support the program is based on a projected need to support at least 4 regionally-focused LRPV SAGs plus their training and maintenance requirements. In addition to carrying a USMC COLT or U.S. Army equivalent formation, the LRPV SAGs could carry a composite unit tailored to suit patrol-specific planned interactions with local national military forces. 

For example, the afloat forces for a LRPV SAG deployment to multiple countries over a 6-8 month period within the SOUTHCOM AOR could consist of:

  • 2 platoons of U.S. Army Infantry (plus their Stryker vehicles)
  • 2 platoons of U.S. Army Engineers (and their heavy equipment)
  • A contingent of U.S. Army Medical personnel
  • An air contingent of 3-4 UH-60’s plus UAV’s drawn from U.S. Army Aviation

An anti-piracy patrol off of East Africa could see the LRPV Squadron deploy with:

In addition to carrying out these types of long-duration, presence missions, the flexibility of the LRPV design would enable additional missions to be undertaken, including: short term “summer cruises” to support training missions, rapid response to humanitarian crisis, sanctions/blockade enforcement, convoy escort, and search and rescue.

LRPVs would not be amphibious warfare ships per se but are intended to sustain long-range, forward presence patrols supporting U.S. national interests. However, when necessary, LRPV SAGs could conduct counter-terrorism or counter-proliferation raids at the direction of the NCA or could support an ESG by providing additional raiding or striking capabilities during a crisis – thereby increasing the level of difficulty confronting an adversary of the United States. By combining the right mix of technology, capabilities, organizational structures and sound processes, the LRPV would support key U.S. national interests and provide a visible expression to the concept of a “1000 ship navy” previously expressed by the U.S. Navy and the OSD.

Ship Characteristics

What specific attributes and capabilities would a LRPV have? Here are some key characteristics:

Weight: 7,000-9,000 tons

Length: 450-500ft

Beam: 50-60ft

Draft: 10-16ft

Propulsion: CODAG (minimum 4 LM-2500s or 2 LM-6000s) plus 2 diesel engines – some thought should be given to alternate propulsion systems (i.e. Podded Electric propulsion?) – commercial standards perhaps?

Speed: Max 28 knots (stretch 32 knots) – cruise speed – 14-16 knots (stretch 18-20 knots)

Range: 10,000 NM – Stretch 12,000 at cruising speed

Combat Systems: Aegis SPY-1F(V), (proposed for export-version of LCS) or even the SPY-5 proposed for lighter warships; 2 illuminators (1 fore & 1 aft); CEC-enabled; open architecture networks & C3I systems allow “plug & play” of new weapons and sensors.

ESM/ECM: SQS-32V or newer version

Sonar: Bow-mounted sonar standard; Towed Array – optional

Communications: High-bandwidth satellite communications

Crew: 

  • 140-180 (190 is acceptable)
  • Additional berthing (permanently installed): 120 Marine (1/2 of USMC COLT insert link)
  • Additional crew considerations: SOF, humanitarian personnel, noncombatant evacuation, search and rescue.

Weapons

Guns:

Missiles:

Use of VLS enables the introduction of new missiles over the life of the LRPV.

ASW Torpedoes: 

Aircraft:

  • Landing Spots: Operation of 2 helicopters simultaneously (4 would be a stretch goal)
  • Hangar Space: 4 medium helicopters (SH-60’s specifically 2 SH-60R & 2 SH-60S). Ability to provide hangar space for 3 SH-60 size helicopters plus 2 additional Fire Scouts would be a stretch goal

Flex Deck: 

  • Square Footage: 16,800 Sq Feet per ship
  • Weight Capacity: Reinforced to support up to M1A2 tank (Up to 70 Tons)

Suggested vehicle load across two LRPVs could include a reinforced Light Armored Reconnaissance Platoon (or comparable U.S. Army Stryker unit):

  • 8 LAV-25’s/M-1126 Strykers 
  • 2 LAV/R or M-1132,
  • 2 LAV-C or M-1130, 2 LAV/M or M-1129 
  • 2 LAV(TOW Launcher) or 2 M-1134 Stryker Anti-Tank Guide Missile Vehicle
  • 14 Humvees
  • 14 10 5-7 Ton FMTV’s including 2-3 Tankers
  • 3 155MM Towed Artillery Guns plus Movers (Stretch)
  • 6 Additional 40’ Containers – Supplies & Training Simulators

Notes on Flex Deck:

  • Flight deck access would be ideal with either ramp or elevator (Ramp is preferred due to simplicity)
  • Ability to load LCM or LCVP via 30 ton crane is required
  • Ro/Ro capability is required (via a ramp or a mexeflote style ramp at stern and ramp to port or starboard) – with 100 ton carrying capacity
  • Flex deck must support the installation of habitability containers to support additional troops or temporary medical facilities
  • Flex deck must provide electrical and communication network interfaces across entire flex deck floor space – both high-speed direct connectivity and wireless connection

Small boat capabilities:

  • 2 x LCM-6s – LCM would be able to carry 25 tonnes (30 tonnes stretch goal) – this will enable carriage of LAVs or Strykers
  • 2 x LCVPs or 2 x DOCKSTAVARVET AB CB90Hs – Carried in separate davits from LCM-6s

Note: The LCVPs must be capable of carrying Uparmored Humvees, an example of a possible LCVP which could be used is the Royal Navy LCVP Mk5. The Mk5 is 15.5 meters long and 4.4 meters wide and capable of carrying a company of 30 fully equipped troops or vehicles such as: BV206, JCB410, ATV’s and towed artillery. The Mk5 can travel up to 25 knots and has a range of over 210 nautical miles. 

Note: LCM davits must be flexible enough to support LCVPs, RHIBs, CB 90Hs, CSSCs or USCG small craft. LCVP davits must be flexible enough to accommodate RIB’s, CH 90Hs, CSSCs or USCG small craft.

  • 2 x RHIBs – Standard ship’s complement – separate from landing craft listed above.

Additional  capabilities:

  • Excess fresh water production capacity
  • Strong organic, on-board medical facilities
  • Excess toilet and showering facilities to support combined baseline ship complement, USMC/U.S. Army/other additional complement plus additional personnel house in habability containers on flex deck
  • Onboard synthetic training facilities for COLT team members including infantry & tankers (Perhaps 2×20 or 40 foot containers configured to provide simulation facilities on Flex Deck)

With a lifelong interest in aviation, naval and all manner of military affairs, Tom graduated from Florida State University with BA in Political Science & International Relations plus a MS in Political Science.  He spent over a decade with Top 3 US Airline working in Ops, Technology, the Low Cost Carrier unit and Employee Relations. Tom has now worked almost 10 years for a major Telecommunications company in various roles.  Home is Atlanta, GA. You can follow Tom on Twitter at @tkmeyer0524.

Featured Image: USS Crosley (APD-87) at anchor (Navsource)

Capability Analysis

Unmanned-Centric Force Structure

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Alternative Naval Force Structure Week

By Javier Gonzalez 

The U.S. Navy is currently working on a new Fleet Structure Assessment, the results of which will eventually help inform the long-term force structure goals of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. This ongoing analysis was generated due to the realization that some of the assumptions used to develop the current goal of 308 ships have changed significantly since its proposal in 2014. The Russian resurgence and China’s rapid military buildup defied expectations, and a review of the Navy’s force structure was absolutely warranted. The conundrum and implied assumption, with this or similar future force structure analyses, is that the Navy must have at least a vague understanding of an uncertain future. However, there is a better way to build a superior and more capable fleet—by continuing to build manned ships based on current and available capabilities while also fully embracing optionality (aka flexibility and adaptability) in unmanned systems. Additionally, and perhaps the better argument, is that a new, unmanned-centric fleet can be more affordable while maintaining its relevance over the expected service life.

Optionality

A relevant fleet is one that is robust, flexible, and adaptable—one that embraces optionality to anticipate uncertain and changing requirements. The author Nassim Taleb describes optionality as “the property of asymmetric upside with correspondingly limited downside.” The implication here is to clearly identify which options will provide the best ability to achieve this “asymmetric upside.” Systems such as the vertical launch system provide a certain degree of flexibility by allowing for the rapid fielding of any weapons that fit inside a missile. In addition, the concepts of modularity (Littoral Combat Ship program), modular hulls, containers interfaces, flexible infrastructures, and electronic modular enclosures are other examples of the Navy’s explicit efforts to add flexibility and adaptability into the fleet. The upsides of adding flexibility are self-evident—by having options added early in the design process, the Navy can quickly and affordably react to new geo-political situations and adjust to technological innovations. However, adding optionality is not an easy proposition, especially because today’s capabilities fielding process values optimization, affordability, and a discernable return on investment over adaptability and flexibility.

Optimization is contrary to optionality, but it is a main factor in today’s ship design. For instance, space optimization is intuitive—the better optimized a space, given today’s capabilities, the smaller the ship needs to be and, consequently, the more affordable it should be. However, this approach infers a level of certainty and inflexibility to change, contrary to optionality. The reality is that optimization is at times necessary on a manned warship. However, new unmanned system designs can provide a canvas to shift this focus to one that values optionality and takes advantage of uncertainty. The suggestion is to make the long-term investment on the unmanned “bus,” not the capabilities. These new unmanned buses must be designed to maximize power generation, cooling, and space availability. The design also needs a robust command and control system to enable the employment of multiple unmanned systems in a cooperative environment.

Affordable Fleet

The affordability of the fleet is not simply a function of budget availability. In 2014, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, testified to Congress that the Navy needed a 450 ship fleet to meet the global demands by the Combatant Commanders. This 450 ship number is likely better equipped to meet future Combatant Commanders’ needs than the current proposal of a 308 ship Navy. At a minimum, a 450 ship Navy provides more options to fulfill future requirements. However, the current and expected future fiscal environment suggests that building more ships is not an option unless a radical change occurs. Also, the enemy has a crucial vote on the affordability of the fleet. The fall of the USRR can be traced back to the U.S. strategy, in the 1970s and 1980s, to impose great costs on the Soviets by making investments to render their warfighting systems obsolete. This obsolescence created an incentive for the Soviets to make costly investments in an attempt to match the technology introductions by the United States. This strategy’s success was achieved in great part due to the apparent U.S. technological advantage over the Soviets. Today, the United States finds itself in a similar predicament as the Soviets in the Cold War, where technology is leaping in new and unexpected ways and China, in particular, is fielding systems that make many U.S. systems obsolete. The rapid fielding of “game changing” technology by China, such as the first quantum communications satellite or the DF-21D missile, results in a predictable reaction by the DoD to invest in more capable and expensive advancements to counter their efforts. If the Soviets are any indication of the dangers of this strategy, especially if the United States acknowledges that the technological edge over near competitors in the 20th century will no longer be assured, then the United States needs to shift its competitive model to one flexible enough to rapidly and affordably adjust to unforeseen challenges.

Sea Hunter, an entirely new class of unmanned ocean-going vessel gets underway on the Williammette River following a christening ceremony in Portland, Oregon. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)
Sea Hunter, an entirely new class of unmanned ocean-going vessel gets underway on the Williammette River following a christening ceremony in Portland, Oregon. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)

 Additionaly, long-term shipbuilding is inherently expensive and dependent on current and mature capabilities. Trying to build a ship with immature technologies can result in unnaceptable acquisition blunders. For instance, the Navy’s next-generation nuclear carrier, CVN-78 Gerard P. Ford, has resulted in massive cost overruns due in great part to the risk incurred in trying to include new and immature technologies into the shipbuilding plan. An unmanned-centric fleet provides the flexibility to value building manned ships based on current and available capabilities while also fully embracing optionality in unmanned systems. An added benefit of having optionality combined with unmanned systems is that it allows for prospective capabilities to be more rapidly prototyped while offering a robust means for experimentation both for technology and future concept of operations development. Unmanned systems could function similarly to a smartphone and its many applications. The benefit of this approach is that it provides an environment with stressors that will allow new technology to fail early and facilitate rapid change, evolution, and dramatically quicken the research and capabilities fielding cycles. The next Fleet Structure Assessment should also embrace optionality by finding the optimal mix of manned and unmanned vessels that will yield an asymmetric upside.

Unmanned-Centric

An unmanned-centric force structure will be dramatically different than today’s Navy, and it will require a departure from the 450 ship manned Navy ideal or the current 308 ship goal. The right mix of manned versus unmanned systems can be derived from a concept of operations that promotes judicious force structure discussions. The basis of this new concept is a fleet with more unmanned systems than manned systems where these platforms are fully integrated. For instance, instead of having a Surface Action Group (SAG) comprised of three manned ships, new SAGs could be comprised of a manned ship and at least two unmanned surface vehicles. Incorporating vehicles like DARPA’s ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel or General Dynamics’ Fleet-class unmanned surface vessel could add capabilities that will immediately increase lethality and adaptability. In the amphibious realm, the Navy could leverage unmanned platforms as resupply distribution systems for Marines on the beach. This could be of particular importance in a contested environment while supporting multiple fronts in an archipelago-like scenario. Further in the future, instead of having eleven 100,000-ton aircraft carriers, a mix of eight traditional carriers with eight to ten smaller (~40,000 ton) all-unmanned combat air vehicle carriers will provide the flexibility and presence that all Combatant Commanders are desperately seeking.

Presence is about having the right capability, in the right place, at the right time. To accomplish this the Navy will essentially need more assets. A plausible solution could be a force structure where the main employment of unmanned systems will be around unmanned-centric Surface Action Groups as the smallest force package to fulfill theater needs. The current 308 ship Navy plan is structured as follows:

CVNLSCSSCSSNSSGNSSBNAWSCLFSuptTotal
11885248012342934308

CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large Surface Combatants, SSC – Small Surface Combatants, SSN – Fast attack submarines, SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS – Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – Combat Logistic Force, Supt – Support vessels.

A future force structure could start with trading large and small surface combatants for a new fleet of Unmanned Vessels. The affordability comes from the added presence afforded by the nature of an unmanned autonomous system and the need for fewer personnel to support their operations. The added capability comes from the introduction of 19 capable Surface Action Groups comprised of a manned ship with two unmanned vessels as depicted below and further explained in table I:

CVNLSCSSCUSVSSNSSBNAWSCLFSuptTotal
118450384812342934340

CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large Surface Combatants, SSC – Small Surface Combatants, USV – Unmanned Surface Vessel, SSN – Fast attack submarines, SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS – Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – Combat Logistic Force, Supt – Support vessels.

screenshot_11– Rule of thumb used: 3 ships at home for every one deployed (for repairs, maintenance, training, and other requirements).
-Out of the 140 surface combatants (large and small) proposed in current 308 ship plan, 35 could be deployed at any time (based on rule of thumb).  Assuming 4 carriers deployed with an escort composition of three manned surface combatants per deployed carrier – the Navy could have 23 manned surface combatants available for tasking.
-Based on GAO yearly operational costs of a DDG ($70k per day) and assumed cost of DARPA’s ACTUV  ($15-20k per day) then one DDG is equivalent to 12 USVs (no personnel = affordability). Force structure was determined by trading 4 DDGs to provide 38 USVs. Four less DDGs = 19 very capable Surface Action Groups (a manned ship and two unmanned vessels).

Conclusion

The most important attributes for future force structures are relevance and affordability. This goal can be achieved by pivoting from the traditional to place the emphasis on developing unmanned capable buses that can accommodate all current technologies and have the capacity to flex and adapt to future technologies. Optionality to ship-building and unmanned systems integration can provide the flexibility and adaptability the Navy requires to remain relevant in an uncertain future. The result is a force structure that is more capable and conceptually more affordable. All great plans start with the end in mind – the upcoming Fleet Structure Assessment needs to showcase what the end of the Navy’s 30-year vision looks like. The suggestion is an unmanned-centric, man-led fleet.

Commander Javier Gonzalez is a Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and a career Surface Warfare Officer. These are his personal views and do not reflect those of John Hopkins University or the Department of the Navy.

Featured Image: An artist’s concept of ACTUV (DARPA)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.