Why the US is Losing The Race for the Arctic and What to Do About It

By Josh Caldon

Almost weekly there is another story insinuating that the US is losing the “race for the Arctic.” Those who support the claim that the US is losing this race often highlight that the Arctic ice is melting and that this environmental change is opening up potential trade routes and making natural resources more ripe for exploitation. Others then point out that Russia has increasingly re-militarized the Arctic and that China has also made inroads to establish itself in the region. 

One key point these articles often make is the United States’ relative lack of icebreakers compared to its competitors. What is missing from this conversation, however, is an explanation of why the US has fallen behind its competitors in the Arctic. This article fills in that gap by attempting to explain why the US is behaving as it does. It then argues that paradoxically falling behind in this regional competition may actually improve America’s overall security and international influence when compared to Russia and China.

Geography

The US is relatively fortunate in its geography. It has large coastlines with natural harbors on both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Its rivers largely flow southward to southern ports. It also shares borders with Mexico and Canada, two countries that do not threaten the US in a conventional sense. This geography serves to protect the US from foreign invasion and allows it to readily deploy military forces to foreign locales, without use of the Arctic.

With the advent of intercontinental missiles and strategic bombers, the Arctic became more important to the US militarily during the Cold War. This pushed the US to erect now largely defunct early warning stations across northern Alaska, Greenland, and Canada. More recently, it established incipient missile defense systems in the Arctic to deal with increased threats emanating from Russia, China, and North Korea and improved its ability to monitor the region. However, these systems have never been designed to control the Arctic, but instead to protect America, and its NATO allies, from foreign military threats coming from, or through, the Arctic. This is an important distinction.

Russia does not share America’s fortunate geographic position. Instead, its geographic positioning and acrimonious international relationships have pushed it to “conquer the Arctic.” It has few “warm-water” ports and shares large land borders with many adversarial states. Russia’s only ports that are free from year-round ice are located in Sevastopol (Crimea), Tartus (Syria), and in the Baltic and Barents Seas. Significantly, Russia has recently fought to maintain control over Sevastopol and Tartus, but still faces possible blockades by adversarial forces in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and Baltic Sea. Ukraine’s attempt to join NATO, Finland’s recent accession to the alliance and Sweden’s standing bid to join, along with the West’s attempts to overthrow Russia’s surrogate in Syria, Bashar Assad, have heightened Russia’s longstanding fear in this regard.

As a result, since the disastrous Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and especially during WW I and WW II,* and the Cold War, Russia has militarized the Arctic. This is something that it has taken up with renewed vigor under Vladimir Putin’s regime. Russia’s militarization of the Arctic has especially occurred in two spots. The first one is the ice-free Barents Sea, which Russia has relied on to access the world’s oceans so that it can better protect its territory and international interests from foreign threats, and the second one is under the Arctic ice cap where its nuclear submarines have an icy bastion that protects them from NATO forces.

Economics

The US largely has a free-market economy with strong interest groups that challenge its willingness to expand its commercial footprint in the Arctic. This has overwhelmingly kept it from attempting to control the Arctic like Russia has done and China is increasingly attempting to do. It is important to look at the times when American commercial interests have focused on the Arctic to understand America’s overall lack of interest in this region. The three times the US has been economically drawn to the Arctic were to exploit temporarily scarce resources. This occurred with whale oil and seal skins during the 18th and 19th century, gold at the end of the 19th century, and oil during the mid-twentieth century. These intense periods of economic interest in the Arctic resulted in America’s purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 and the development of Alaska in the decades afterwards. Notably, however, it is expensive and difficult to operate in the Arctic. As Canadian Arctic expert, Michael Byers highlights, even as the Arctic ice slowly melts, the region remains in complete darkness for half of the year and melting ice is dangerously unpredictable. The Arctic is also austere and quite far from the largest population centers of the world. As such, the intermittent economic demands for the region’s natural resources have relatively quickly resulted in substitutes being found for these goods in less austere places.

Subsequently, the only portions of Alaska that are significantly developed are in the sub-Arctic portion of the state, with the exception of the oil fields of Prudhoe Bay – which also appear to be winding down with the advent of fracking and renewable energy. Increasing environmental concerns (most of Alaska is situated in nationally owned wilderness preserves) and native groups’ claims prohibitively increase the price of resource extraction from most of Arctic Alaska even further. Many Americans believe the region should be left to nature and to indigenous groups. The US also does not have a great need to develop the sea routes in the Arctic to improve its international trade. It has a transnational road and railway system and easy access to maritime trade routes which are connected through the recently enlarged Suez Canal. These circumstances mean that the US has very little motivation to establish sea routes through the largely uninhabited, relatively shallow, and dangerously unpredictable Arctic Ocean. Finally, Russia’s aggression over the last two decades, and increasing pressure from environmentally-based NGOs, have pushed American-based companies even further away from Russia’s Arctic.

All told, since the US has only marginal economic incentives to pursue the Arctic, it has not felt the need to develop harbors, settlements, transport infrastructure, or icebreakers to increase its footprint in the region. As such, it has relatively little capability to “conquer the region,” but also relatively little to defend in the region.

This is not the case for Russia or China. Russia suffers from what Hill and Gaddy call the Siberian Curse. Its geography is not as economically favorable as America’s, which has forced it to turn towards the Arctic to improve its economic circumstances. However, it has also traditionally operated a state-controlled economy that uses slave labor and nationally owned corporations to mask the economic, environmental and demographic costs of operating in the Arctic. Beginning with the czars, and accelerating under Russia’s Soviet dictators, Russia forcibly sent millions of people to develop and “conquer the Arctic.”

This legacy continues today as Putin pushes and subsidizes Russia’s economic ministries and state-controlled corporations to extract more resources from the Arctic and to expand the infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route (with the numerous powerful icebreakers needed to navigate this waterway) to transport these resources to distant markets. Unlike American corporations, Russia’s economic pursuits in the Arctic are not concerned with environmental or indigenous considerations either. Furthermore, Russia’s extreme sacrifices in the Arctic have made developing and controlling it symbolic for its people and leadership. As such, Russia has much more to defend materially and ideationally in the Arctic than the US does. Even with these factors pushing Russia to conquer the Arctic, Russia’s regional ambitions have been challenged by fiscal, demographic, and environmental hurdles. Most recently, the war in Ukraine has forced it to curtail its ambitious Arctic railway and icebreaker projects and to mobilize and sacrifice a significant proportion of its Arctic troops for combat in Ukraine. Additionally, many of its Arctic cities have rapidly de-populated, and the Arctic melt has paradoxically threatened its existing Arctic infrastructure.

Like Russia, China’s companies are largely nationalized and it also does not have the environmental or indigenous concerns in the Arctic that the US does. It has spent the last two decades increasing its manufacturing sector and its international trade ties. This has increased its needs for natural resources and trade routes, resulting in its plans to establish a “Polar Silk Road,” under its greater Belt and Road Initiative, in order to link the Arctic to China’s greater network of international trading posts and manufacturing centers. As Russia has lost access to Western markets and technology over the last two decades, it has increasingly turned towards an eager China to help it build out its Arctic economic footprint. As such, China also has more economic interests to defend in the Arctic than the US does.

What Does This Mean for the US?

The United States is not truly interested in competing for the Arctic. It has relatively less military, economic, or ideational interest in the region when compared to Russia or China. Its strategic plans for the region have become increasingly assertive in reaction to Russia’s and China’s efforts, but lack funding or prioritization. However, this lack of genuine interest carries some benefits for the US when considering the larger geopolitical context of the international system.

America’s lack of interest in the region has paradoxically pushed the other Arctic states to increase their security ties with the US and to take on more security responsibilities for the region. Similar to World War II, when Iceland and Denmark invited the US to help protect their territory from foreign adversaries, Russia’s aggression pushed Sweden and Finland to formally petition to join the US-dominated NATO. The inclusion of these states into the organization means that half of the Arctic will soon be administered by NATO member states.

Specifically, the Nordic states of Norway, Sweden and Finland have significant capabilities and economic stakes in the region that will make up for America’s relative lack of willingness and ability to contain Russia’s and China’s ambitions in the region. These countries’ capabilities will be further complemented by Denmark and Canada, and the other non-Arctic NATO states that have recently increased their defense spending to deal with Russian aggression. This collective defense in the Arctic will allow the US to better focus on domains like space, cyberspace, the Americas, and the Indo-Pacific, which are more important than the Arctic to America’s most critical national interests.

Economically speaking, the Arctic will likely remain a backwater for market-driven economies for the foreseeable future. The relatively high costs of extracting resources and transporting goods from the Arctic means the region is unlikely to become much more attractive for Western companies, even if the ice continues to retreat (which has slowed in recent years) and icebreakers improve, except in times when specific resources are in sharp demand or when there are long-term bottlenecks in other trade routes. 

The resources that Russia and China extract from the Arctic will contribute to the overall global supply of these resources and decrease their overall price for American consumers. As such, Americans will gain many of the benefits of Russia’s and China’s efforts in the Arctic while Russia and China absorb the costs. In the case of scarce rare-earth minerals that have spiked in demand and are monopolized by China, it appears Sweden may fill this void for the US with its own Arctic resources, even as companies search for substitutes for these critical resources.

Overall, the US should not ignore the Arctic, and it should put to rest the notion that this region is a unique zone of peace in an otherwise quite turbulent world. That being said, Americans should also not deem that losing the “race for the Arctic” will critically threaten America’s larger national interests. By not attempting to compete head-to-head with Russia or China to “conquer” the region, the US has incurred some advantages against these competitors.

As the US has been reminded again in Iraq and Afghanistan, and through its observation of Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, conquering territory comes with significant costs that can weaken the material strength and ideational attractiveness of a country. This, in turn, weakens a country’s ability to secure its most significant national interests. The US should continue to diplomatically, militarily, and economically challenge Russia’s and China’s actions in the Arctic on humanitarian and environmental grounds, but it also should identify that China’s and Russia’s actions in the Arctic come with high economic and soft power costs that may relatively benefit the US. Doing so will allow the US to increase its ability to collectively defend its interests in the Arctic with its allies and to prioritize its attention and resources on domains that are more important to it than the Arctic.

Josh Caldon is an adjunct professor at the Air University where he instructs courses in national security. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Albany and is a veteran of the USAF. The views in this article are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Government, or its subsidiary agencies.

* Interestingly, the US was responsible for a significant portion of Russia’s militarization of the Arctic during World War II and went from supplying friendly Russian forces through the Arctic during WW I to fighting them in the Russian Arctic after the Bolshevik Revolution.

Featured Image: A U.S. Coast Guard ship breaks ice near Nome, Alaska. (Credit: Charly Hengen/USCG)

Sea Control 426 – “Every Ship a SAG” with LT Kyle Cregge

By Andrea Howard

LT Kyle Cregge joins the podcast to discuss his March 2023 article, “Every Ship a SAG,” published by CIMSEC. LT Cregge is a surface warfare officer slated to relieve as the Operations Officer on USS Pickney. The conversation covers his vision of incorporating Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSV) into the fleet, in support of turning every ship into its own Surface Action Group (SAG).

Download Sea Control 426 – “Every Ship a SAG” with LT Kyle Cregge

Links

1. “Every Ship a SAG and the LUSV Imperative,” Kyle Cregge, CIMSEC, March 2, 2023.
2. Sea Control 215 – Bluetech: Gateway to the Undersea “Internet of Things,” by Andrea Howard, CIMSEC, December 9, 2020.
3. 
“20 Years of Naval Trends Guarantee a FY23 Shipbuilding Plan Failure,” Matthew Hipple, CIMSEC, May 9, 2022.
4. “The Age of American Naval Dominance is Over,” Jerry Hendrix, The Atlantic, March 13, 2023.

Andrea Howard is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at [email protected].

This episode was edited and produced by Nathan Miller.

Containing the Bomb: An Assessment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

This article is part of a series that will explore the use and legal issues surrounding military zones employed during peace and war to control the entry, exit, and activities of forces operating in these zones. These works build on the previous Maritime Operational Zones Manual published by the predecessor of the Stockton Center for International Law, the International Law Department, of the U.S. Naval War College. A new Maritime Operational Zones Manual is forthcoming.

By LtCol Brent Stricker

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) are an attempt to prohibit the use or deployment of nuclear weapons within a nation’s territory. None of the signatories to these treaties possess nuclear weapons, where NFWZs stand as a pledge not to develop these weapons. The established nuclear powers of the world have similarly pledged to respect some NFWZs.1 It remains to be seen whether such pledges will be observed or dismissed as a simple “scrap of paper.”2

Background

The legality of the use of nuclear weapons is an unsettled issue. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion stating the threat or use of nuclear weapons must be examined under the United Nations Charter Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force and Article 51’s right of self-defense.3 The Court could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which the very survival of the state was at stake.”4

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was an early attempt to limit and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Article 1 of the NPT prohibits Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) from transferring nuclear weapons to a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) or encouraging a NNWS to develop nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the NPT requires states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Since the signing of NPT, the number of NWS has expanded. Two of the newly acknowledged nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, never signed the treaty. North Korea signed and subsequently withdrew. Finally, Israel, a suspected and unacknowledged nuclear power, never signed the treaty.5

The concept of NWFZ predates the NPT with a proposal for a Central European NWFZ by the Soviet Union to the General Assembly in 1956.6 In 1958, Poland proposed the Rapaki Plan, “banning the manufacture, possession, stationing, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and equipment, the proposal called for the prohibition of nuclear attacks against state members in the zone.” The proposal would have included Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany. Such a proposal would have prevented NATO’s use of nuclear weapons and played to the Warsaw Pact’s advantage due to its overwhelming conventional forces arrayed against NATO, causing this proposal to fail.7

A NWFZ is either implemented unilaterally, through a state’s domestic law, or bilaterally through regional agreements to prohibit the possession, use, testing, and/or transit of nuclear weapons within a designated territory.8 A vital part of the viability of NWFZ is buy-in from the NWS. Typically, the NWS will sign negative security assurances to the NWFZ states pledging to respect the NWFZ’s prohibitions.9 The NWS may refuse to issue a negative security assurance due to other concerns. For example, none of the NWS have signed onto the South East Asian proposal due to its impact on freedom of navigation.10 It should be noted that four of the five NWFZs allow the vessels and aircraft of signatory states to transit their territory with nuclear weapons.11

A further potential limitation of NWFZs occurs when a NNWS is in a defensive treaty agreement with an NWS. To illustrate, Australia is a signatory to the South Pacific NWFZ but has stated it will rely on the United States’ nuclear deterrent capability for its defense. Australia also supports the United States by allowing assets to be based in Australia that forms part of the Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (C3I) network the U.S. would use in a nuclear exchange.12

Current Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

There are currently nine NWFZs in existence. Five of these were created by regional agreements. Three of them were created by international treaty but only occur in unpopulated areas: Outer Space, the Moon, and the seabed. The last NWFZ was created unilaterally by Mongolia. NWFZs cover more than two billion people and 111 countries.13

African NWFZ (ANWFZ)

The Treaty of Pelindaba established the African NWFZ. It was opened for signature on April 11, 1996, and came into effect on July 15, 1990.[14] Article 3 of the treaty renounces nuclear weapons, and the signatories pledge “not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere” and “not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device.” Article 4 is a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons on their territory, but it allows individual nations the ability to allow foreign aircraft and ships to visit or exercise innocent passage without reference to whether such aircraft and ships may be armed with nuclear weapons. This thereby creates a loophole allowing nuclear weapons within the NWFZ. The treaty also makes no mention of control or assistance to an NWS in a defensive agreement.

A map of participating and non-participating nations in the ANWFZ. Green: Signed and Ratified. Yellow: Signed not Ratified. Grey: Not signatories. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

There are three protocols to the treaty for other nations to sign. Protocol I calls for the 5 acknowledged NWS to pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against signatories or on territory within the African NWFZ. Protocol II is a nuclear weapons test ban. Protocol III is open for Spain and France to sign onto, pledging to the Treaty on behalf of their dependent territories within the African NWFZ. The five acknowledged NWS have signed Protocols I and II.

The United States made a cautionary reservation when signing onto the Protocols by “reserve[ing] the right to respond with all options implying possible use of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the zone.”15 These Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Reservations mean the United States may still use nuclear weapons in the African NWFZ.

South Pacific NWFZ (SPNFZ)

The Treaty of Rarotonga established the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. It was signed on August 6, 1985, and came into effect on December 11, 1985. All five acknowledged NWS have signed onto its Protocols. Annex 1 to the treaty describes the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, which includes both territorial land, waters, and the high seas. Article 3 of the treaty pledges signatories “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone” and “not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device.” Article 5 prohibits stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of signatory states. Article 5 also includes a loophole allowing signatory states to allow visits and transit by foreign aircraft and ships that may be armed with nuclear weapons. Article 7 includes a prohibition on dumping radioactive matter within the SPNFZ.”16

A second loophole appears in Article 3(c) of the treaty. There is no prohibition on the research of nuclear weapons. This leaves signatories the option to research nuclear weapons. The most likely being Australia if it needs to rapidly develop such weapons for nuclear deterrence.17

A map of the participating nations of the SPNFZ. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

Australia poses a unique challenge to the SPNFZ due to its defensive alliance with the United States. The Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) was signed in 1951, joining the three nations in a collective security arrangement.18 New Zealand banned nuclear-powered vessels in 1984 and later created its own nuclear-free zone with the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. In response, the Reagan Administration suspended New Zealand’s obligations under the ANZUS Treaty.19 Australia remains a party.

Australia has publicly stated in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper it would rely on the deterrence power of the United States’ nuclear weapons.20 Australia also hosts US military installations that are vital to worldwide command and control.21 Undoubtedly, these facilities would be part of the Communication, Command, Control, and Intelligence (C3I) the United States would rely on during a nuclear crisis. Australia is in a dilemma then of being a party to the SPNFZ and an ally of an NWS poised to potentially assist in a nuclear attack. The treaty does not address this issue of C3I by a signatory state, with Article 3(c) only prohibiting the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons.22 Australia’s decision to cancel an order of French diesel-electric submarines and order nuclear-powered submarines from the United States does not violate SPNFZ. These submarines will only be nuclear-powered, and will not house nuclear weapons.

Southeast Asian NWFZ (SEANWFZ)

The Bangkok Treaty established the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The treaty was signed on December 15, 1995, and went into effect on March 28, 1997. The ten members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed not to “develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; test or use nuclear weapons.”23 The Treaty also prohibited control, stationing, or testing of nuclear weapons in the SEANWFZ.24 The Bangkok Treaty thus closed the visit, transit, research, and control loopholes for vessels and aircraft with nuclear weapons. Finally, the Bangkok Treaty prohibited dumping or discharging into the atmosphere of radioactive material or waste.25 

A map of the participating nations of the SEANWFZ. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

The SEANWFZ is striking due to the size of the zone defined in the treaty. The zone is expanded to include the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones of the signatory nations.26 The Zone embraces an area of strategic importance to maritime shipping. The treaty would prevent the 5 NWS from transporting nuclear weapons through this zone. This is likely why no NWS has signed onto the treaty’s protocols and provides a negative security assurance to the ASEAN signatories.27 

Central Asian NWFZ (CANWFZ)

The Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone was created by the Treaty of Semipalatinsk. The treaty was signed on September 8, 2006, and went into effect on Mar 21, 2009. The CANWFZ is defined as the land, internal waters, and airspace of the signatories.28 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, all former Soviet Republics, agreed to prohibit research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, or control over any nuclear weapon. The treaty also prohibited the location of such weapons in the zone. The treaty closed the control loophole for aircraft and vessels harboring nuclear weapons while transiting through the zone. Article 4 of the treaty allows the individual states to determine how to handle passage and transit by foreign ships, aircraft, and ground transportation, thus leaving loopholes open. The five acknowledged NWS have signed onto the Protocols of the treaty.

A map of the participating nations of the CANWFZ. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have a similar problem to Australia noted above. They are members of the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, which includes the Russian Federation, one of the five acknowledged NWS. Article 4 of the treaty requires the Member States to provide all assistance, including military assistance, if one member is attacked.29 It remains to be seen how this will affect the CANWFZ.

Mongolian NWFZ

The Mongolian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is unique as a unilateral action by domestic law similar to the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone noted above. Mongolia made this declaration in 1992 and called for a regional NWFZ.30 This seemed improbable as Mongolia is surrounded by the Russian and Chinese NWS. The Mongolian NWFZ was recognized with UN General Assembly Resolution 53/77 D.31

Mongolia’s history makes its NWFZ unique, considering it was caught between the two struggling NWS for most of its existence. Emerging as an independent nation within the Soviet sphere of influence after centuries of involvement with Imperial China, Mongolia continued as part of the struggle between the Sino-Soviet split.32 Russia and China signed negative security assurances with Mongolia in 1993 and 1994, respectively. The other acknowledged NWS has agreed to respect Mongolia’s NWFZ.33

Latin American and the Caribbean NWFZ

The Treaty of Tlatelolco created the Latin American NWFZ. It was signed on February 1967 and went into effect on April 25, 1969. Article 1 of the treaty prohibits “the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition, by any means, of any nuclear weapon [signatory states] by order of third parties or in any other way,” and “the receipt, storage, installation, location or any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by [signatory states], by mandate to third parties or in any other way.” The NWFZ is defined in Article 4 of the treaty in a manner similar to the 1939 Panama Declaration expanding the zone into international waters.34 Article 18 makes one exception for the peaceful use of nuclear explosions. All five acknowledged NWS have signed Additional Protocol II of the treaty respecting the NWFZ with the United States stating a reservation on the right to transit of nuclear weapons through the zone.35

A map of the participating nations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

The Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ has a similar problem shared by Australia and the CANWFZ due to the mutual defense obligations imposed by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This treaty was signed in 1947 by all of the states in North and South America, including the nuclear-armed United States. While it may be in decline with the withdrawal of member states and attempts to replace this treaty with sub-regional treaties, it remains valid international law.

Antarctica, the Moon, and Seabed NWFZ

It is interesting to note that the first NWFZs were created in places that humans normally do not inhabit: Antarctica, Outer Space, and the deep seabed. Article V of the Antarctic Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions or the dumping of radioactive material on the continent. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies. This prohibition also prohibits the militarization of celestial bodies. The Outer Space Treaty does not address military activities in orbit, though. Article I of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction including structures to test, launch, or store such devices on the deep seabed.

It has been speculated that support for these NWFZs by the five acknowledged NWS was to limit the area to deploy nuclear weapons and the increased pressure on the arms race this would impose.36 The strategic value of making Antarctica off-limits for nuclear weapons seems to belie this argument since all NWS, acknowledged or not, are located in the Northern Hemisphere. The future possibilities for weaponizing outer space may render the Space NWFZ irrelevant.

2017 United Nations Nuclear Prohibition Treaty

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could create the largest NWFZ in the world. It was proposed on 23 December 2016 with UN General Assembly Resolution 71/258. It was open for signature on September 20, 2017, and in effect on January 22, 2021.37 The NWS acknowledged and unacknowledged, do not support the treaty.38

Under Article 1 of the treaty: “Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;

(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;

(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

(g) Allow any stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.”

A stated reason for the treaty is the failure of the promises under NPT for the acknowledged NWS to eliminate nuclear weapons. Regional NWFZs, as discussed in this chapter, have increased the area on Earth for nuclear weapons, but as noted above, these are all reliant on Negative Security Assurances by NWS.39 As noted above, many NWS refuse to provide such assurances when transit rights are impacted. It is also unclear how useful a NWFZ agreement will be when one of its signatories is involved in a collective defense agreement with a NWS if an armed conflict occurs. It seems unlikely that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will be supported by the NWS anytime soon.40

LtCol Brent Stricker, U.S. Marine Corps serves as the Director for Expeditionary Operations and as a military professor of international law at the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, the Naval War College, or the Department of Defense.

References

[1] See the Southeast Asian NWFZ where no NWS has granted a negative security assurance due to its prohibition on transit of nuclear weapons through the zone.

[2] “Scrap of paper” was allegedly the phrase used by German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, on 4 August 1914 to justify ignoring the 1839 Treaty of London guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Germany was caught in a two-front war for national survival, and its war plans called for sending military forces in and across Belgium. T. G. Otte (2007) A “German Paperchase”: The “Scrap of Paper” Controversy and the Problem of Myth and Memory in International History, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18:1, 53-87, 55.

[3] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996) ICJ, 35 ILM 809 & 1343 (1996), Para. 105(2)(C).

[4] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996) ICJ, 35 ILM 809 & 1343 (1996), Para. 105(2)(E).

[5] Paul J. Magnarella, “Attempts to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Creation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones” PEACE & CHANGE, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 2008 507-521, 510.

[6] Gawdat Bahgat, A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East – A Pipe Dream?, The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 36, Number 3, Fall 2011 360-383, 364.

[7] Bahgat at 364.

[8] Magnarella at 511; Bahgat at 362.

[9] Bahgat at 363.

[10] Bahgat at 363.

[11] Elizabeth Mendenhall, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Contemporary Arms Control” STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY WINTER 2020 122-151, 131.

[12] Michael Hamel-Green (2018) The implications of the 2017 UN Nuclear Prohibition Treaty for existing and proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones, Global Change, Peace & Security, 30:2, 209-232, 221.

[13] Bahgat at 365.

[14] Bahgat at 365-66.

[15] Bahgat at 363.

[16] Hamel- Green at 218.

[17] Hamel-Green at 222.

[18] ANZUS Treaty, Article V; Richard Baker, “ANZUS On Two Legs?” Far Eastern economic review, 1989-05-25, Vol.144 (21), p.30.

[19] Richard Baker, “ANZUS On Two Legs?” Far Eastern economic review, 1989-05-25, Vol.144 (21), p.30.

[20] Hamel-Green at 218.

[21] Hamel-Green at 219.

[22] Hamel-Green at 221.

[23] Bangkok Treaty Article 3.

[24] Bangkok Treaty Article 3.

[25] Bangkok Treaty, Article 3.

[26] Bangkok Treaty Article 2.

[27] Marangella at 515; Hamel-Green at 212.

[28] Treaty of Semipalatinsk Article 2.

[29] Collective Security Treaty Organization http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm

[30] Marangella at 512.

[31] UN General Assembly Resolution 53/77 D (1998)

[32] Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan (2005) MONGOLIA, The Nonproliferation Review, 12:1, 153-162, 156.

[33] Jargalsaikhan at 156.

[34] Article 4, Treaty of Tlateloco.

[35] Hamel-Green at 217.

[36] Mendenhal at 124-25.; See Doore at 7-8 for a discussion of the proposed demilitarization of the deep seabed and draft treaties submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in 1969 by the Soviet Union and the United States with the Soviets advocating for denuclearization and the U.S. advocating for banning weapons of mass destruction. Article 1 of the Seabed Treaty is a combination of both positions.

[37] As of this writing, 56 member nations have signed the treaty. https://treaties.unoda.org/t/tpnw

[38] Hamel-Green at 209-10.

[39] Hamel-Green at 210-12.

[40] “‘We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore, there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.” United States Mission to the United Nations, Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons, New York City, July 7, 2017 Hamel-Green at 214 (https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-press-statement-from-the-permanent-representatives-to-the-united-nations-of-the-united-states-united-kingdom-and-france-following-the-adoption/).

Featured Image: The “Baker” explosion, part of Operation Crossroads, a nuclear weapon test by the United States military at Bikini Atoll, Micronesia, on 25 July 1946. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Flotilla SITREP: Cross-Community Anti-Submarine Warfare and Bombers for Maritime Strike

By Dmitry Filipoff

This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will be focusing on anti-submarine warfare and the role of bombers in naval force structure and concepts of operation. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive the invites to our upcoming off-the-record April discussions. The full listings for these upcoming discussions are featured down below.

Last month the Flotilla held sessions on systemic naval cyber compromise and contested-network warfighting. These discussions yielded many candid insights and shed light on critical warfighting challenges, while helping connect the participating navalists. 

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

Upcoming April Sessions
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Anti-Submarine Warfare and Cross-Community Integration

ASW is a mission many Navy communities have a stake in. But how well do the communities come together to jointly pursue capabilities and develop tactics and doctrine? How has the immediate post Cold War-era affected the Navy’s ability to regenerate ASW capability for renewed great power competition? Join us to discuss these questions as we consider how the Navy’s communities can better pursue ASW together.

Read Ahead: “ASW: Will We Ever Learn?” by Vice Admiral James R. Fitzgerald and Rear Admiral Richard F. Pittenger, U.S. Navy (Retired)
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Bombers for Maritime Strike

Bombers have featured prominently in naval force structure and anti-ship doctrine for decades, but mostly for other great powers besides the U.S. How can bombers and Air Force assets be leveraged in maritime missions and complement U.S. naval concepts of operation? What can be done to deepen the interservice ties that would help realize the potential of these aircraft? Join us to discuss these questions and more. 

Read Ahead: Maritime Strike,” by Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula USAF (Ret.)

The B-21’s possible future role in maritime strike,” by Ben Ho Wan Beng
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Completed March Sessions
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The Threat of Systemic Naval Cyber Compromise

 

Cyber threats are pervasive yet underappreciated. As great powers compete, they can leverage their cyber capabilities to undermine opposing militaries in peacetime, and set the stage for wartime compromise. How can navies grow their awareness of how deeply competitors have penetrated into their systems? What may be the ramifications of pre-positioned cyber capabilities being activated in wartime? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the potential for systemic naval cyber compromise.

Read Ahead: Paralyzed at the Pier: Schrödinger’s Fleet and Systemic Naval Cyber Compromise,” by Tyson Meadors
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Network-Contested Warfighting

 

Modern military forces rely heavily on networks to function. But are these forces doing enough to prepare for when the network is a contested battlespace? Are militaries challenging their own network in simulated crucibles, wargaming, and other venues to ensure warfighters can operate in spite of contested networks? Join us to discuss network-contested warfighting and its implications for force employment and force development. 

Read Ahead: Fighting When the Network Dies,” by Capt. Sam Tangredi (ret.)
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at [email protected].

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.