Category Archives: Global Analysis

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Catch of the Day: Reflections on the Chinese Seizure of a U.S. Ocean Glider

By Heiko Borchert

On 15 December 2016, China seized an Ocean Glider, an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), used by the U.S. Navy to conduct oceanographic tasks in international waters about 50-100 nautical miles northwest of the Subic Bay port on the Philippines. Available information suggests that the glider had been deployed from USNS Bowditch and was captured by Chinese sailors that came alongside the glider and grabbed it “despite the radioed protest from the Bowditch that it was U.S. property in international waters,” as the Guardian reported. The U.S. has “called upon China to return the UUV immediately.” On 17 December 2016 a spokesman of the Chinese Defense Ministry said China would return the UUV to the “United States in an appropriate manner.”

Initial legal assessments by U.S. scholars like James Kraska and Paul Pedrozo suggest the capture is violating the law of the sea, as the unmanned glider can be defined as a vessel in international maritime law that enjoys U.S. sovereign immunity. China, by contrast, justifies the capture with reference to its national security. According to Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo of the PLA Academy of Military Science, the glider “could have threatened the interests of China’s islands, or China’s ships and submarines. It must have damaged Chinese interest that caused the seizure.”

As this incident evolves and more information will become available, it might be useful to start thinking about some of the more long-term consequences of this UUV seizure. Building on a previous analysis of the impact on UUV in the Asia-Pacific region, I would like to suggest three observations for further consideration:

Unmanned Assets are Attractive Targets that Challenge Strategic Communication

This is not the first time an unmanned asset has been captured. Defense News reported that “an ‘unknown vessel’ grabbed another underwater vehicle operated by a U.S. ship near Vietnamese waters, but the vehicle was recovered.” In 2011, Iran seemed to have downed a RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) by jamming its radar system in order to force the UAV to land in an area it was not supposed to land.

In line with these incidents, the most recent UUV capture reinforces the message that unmanned assets that have been designed with benign operating environments in mind and are attractive targets that can be easily captured or attacked. This is a prime challenge for strategic communications.

Seizing a U.S. UUV during the transition phase of the U.S. administration is a first rate headline grabbing media event, which might explain why it occurred now. It illustrates, as a Chinese scholar quoted by the South China Morning Post said, “the power of the Chinese army.” However, a UUV that hovers at the surface can be more or less easily captured. This time no one shot a picture of the “catch”, but this could be different next time. This might prompt a rethink of the media-related cost-benefit analysis of deploying UUVs in hotspots, which leads to the second thought.

Ready to Catch and Ready to Lose?

Testing the U.S. response certainly was a motive in the UUV capture. As Michael S. Chase et. al. have shown, China closely follows the U.S. use of unmanned assets also in view of justifying its own action and developing its own policies and concepts. The incident underlined China’s growing self-confidence and readiness to seize UUVs. But what about the U.S.?

At first sight, the U.S. response was measured and adequate by prompting China to return the captured asset to comply with international law. ‘We play by the rules, you don’t’ – this was the U.S. message. Apart from the question, if you can deter someone who just broke the rule by reminding him not to do so, there is a more trenchant issue at play.

Unmanned systems are attractive because they are easy pickings, but the emphasis on the need to return the U.S. UUV could undermine this very key advantage. In this case the UUV is treated like a manned asset because the overall message is about norm compliance. However, if you want the other side to hand back a relatively low-cost glider, can you credibly convey the message you would be ready to lose a much more sophisticated Large Displacement UUV?

This is the policy question the new U.S. administration and other governments using unmanned assets will need to work on, because a similar incident could occur in the Arabian Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, or the Baltic Sea.

Catch Me If You Can: Thinking About More Nuanced Counter-Responses

 Emerging powers have had enough time to study the use of unmanned assets in particular by the U.S. Their first line of defense focused around mimicking U.S. practice in order to catch up. The second line of defense evolves around counter-measures. The seizure of the U.S. glider clearly signals that UUVs need to be prepared to fend off counter-measures as well. Thus more nuanced responses will be needed.

First, more thought needs to be given to when and where to deploy UUV in a non-benign naval environment. The current incident clearly shows that the tactical and strategic benefits of UUVs can quickly turn into a strategic liability if other actors are not willing to back down on their own policy line.Second, this incident should accelerate the development of swarms of Extra Small UUV (XSUUV) that would be radically smaller than current gliders and more difficult to track and trace.

Third, the XSUUV swarm could also help deconflict the policy dilemma. XSUUVs would hardly qualify as vessels enjoying sovereign immunity. Other forms of countering XSUUV notwithstanding, the risk of losing them would be much lower, which could make it far less attractive to catch them.

Fourth, self-protection will become more important in particular for more sophisticated UUVs that execute different missions at the same time. However, solutions should keep the above policy dilemma in mind: if measures to protect the UUV from adversarial interference become too demanding and thus might outstrip the benefits of using UUV, something is probably wrong about the operational concept guiding the respective UUV use.

Dr Heiko Borchert runs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affairs consultancy.

Featured Image: A Littoral Battlespace Sensing, LBS, glider (U.S. Navy)

China Seizes U.S. Navy Underwater Drone

By Armando J. Heredia

Grpahic by CIMSEC Member Louis MV

On December 15th 2016, the Chinese Navy seized an American unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) operating in international waters off the Western coast of the Philippines. The USNS Bowditch, an unarmed T-AGS class hydro-graphic survey ship, was being shadowed by a People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) salvage vessel identified as a Dalang-III class (ASR-510).

The UUV had surfaced as part of a pre-programmed instruction, and sent  a radio signal marking it’s position for pick-up. As the Bowditch was preparing to recover the drone from the water, a small boat crew from the Dalang III raced in and plucked the unmanned vessel. The incident occurred approximately 50 nautical miles northwest of Subic, Luzon.

While the exact type of drone is unknown, there have been several instances of U.S. Navy Slocum Gliders snagged in local fishermens’ nets or washed ashore on beaches in the Philippines. This type of drone is not weaponized, and is used to collect a variety of environmental readings such as water temperature and salinity, to improve forecasting accuracy of extreme weather such as typhoons. The UUV uses wave movement to propel itself without any on-board engines, with an endurance time of months. The Department of Defense estimates the seized drone’s value to be around $150,000.

The crew of the Bowditch immediately contacted the PLAN vessel on bridge-to-bridge radio asking for the return of the drone. The PLAN vessel reportedly acknowledged the message, but then stopped responding and sailed away with the UUV. On Friday the 16th, the U.S. State Department issued a formal protest, or demarche, with the Chinese Department of Foreign Affairs, demanding an immediate return of the drone. At the time of this article’s publication, the Chinese government has not responded.

Purpose

Motivations behind the seizure are unclear, but tensions between the two nations have recently increased over President-Elect Donald Trump’s conversation with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in what Beijing considers a blatant disregard of the standing One-China Policy. It could also have been a quick riposte to undermine Head of Pacific Command U.S. Navy Admiral Harry Harris’ recent comments that the US is “ready to confront [China] when we must.”

Notably, the Philippines has chosen to remain silent over the incident. While traditionally a U.S. ally, the election of President Rodrigo Duterte has brought a deterioration of relations between Manila and Washington. Thanks in no small part to Duterte’s bloody prosecution of an Anti-Drug war punctuated by high civilian casualties and accusations of extra-judicial killings, a large multi-million dollar U.S aid package was just withdrawn this week – prompting the volatile President to threaten abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement. The Philippine Department of National Defense indicates they had no idea that the incident was ongoing; highlighting the enormous capability gap the Philippines has regarding Maritime Domain Awareness. The Philippine government became aware via communications from the U.S. State Department to their embassy in Washington D.C.

Coupled with Duterte’s increasingly close orbit of China following last month’s visit to Beijing, the United States could potentially find itself without bases that would ease the mission of maintaining a robust presence in the South China Sea. Recent analysis shows China has expanded militarization of their Spratly Island outposts by placing what appear to be defensive anti-aircraft and close-in weapon systems on Hughes and Gaven reefs, while fortifications have sprouted on Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs; the latter group are in close proximity to other claimant outposts in the region.

Taken together, China appears to be using it’s famous “Salami-slicing” techniques to slowly ratchet up its presence and capabilities within the region without crossing any significant “bright lines” leading to a military confrontation. The UUV seizure is consistent with opportunistic interference of U. .Navy operations while striking propoganda points with regional states. Notably, the unresponsiveness of Philippines to an international incident within their EEZ tells a tale that the U.S. cannot count upon its traditional ally going forward to assist in the presence mission.

Armando J. Heredia is a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries.  The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Featured Image: Slocum Ocean Glider. (University of South Florida)

Russia Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC hosted articles focusing on Russia. Authors analyzed Russia’s strategic thinking vis a vis NATO, its shipbuilding ambitions, historic maritime objectives, and its recent political history. The topic week’s Call for Articles may be read here. We thank our contributors for their excellent submissions.

Russia’s Self-Inflicted Security Dilemma by Corentin Laguerre

“Despite its original objective to counter the USSR, little in NATO policy or strategy can be seen as directly threatening Russia. In regards to the Ukrainian conflict and to the increasing tension between NATO and Russia, in order to avoid further escalation or a ‘New Cold War,’ it is necessary to understand why Russia’s hostility toward NATO has increased since the 90s.”

The Ambitions and Challenges of Russia’s Naval Modernization Program by Steve Micallef

“Since 2011 Russia has been implementing its own naval modernization program. This comes after a period of neglect the as Russia Federal Navy (Russian Navy) is looking to build as many as a 100 new warships by 2020.”

The Tsarist Presidency by Steven Swingler

“Officially, the country is a constitutional presidential federal state patterned off of the U.S. More cynical analysts and commentators will say that Russia is a dictatorship. In reality, the political system in Russia represents that of a Prussian constitutional system with the president serving the role of monarch and chancellor.”

The Mediterranean: Driving Russia’s Strategic Decisions Since 1676 by Jason Chuma

“These assessments of Russian involvement in Ukraine and Syria are at least partially correct, but there is one common thread they both share which Russia has been fighting for since the first Russo-Turkish war in 1676. Tartus in Syria and Sevastopol in Crimea are warm water ports which provide direct Russian access to the Mediterranean or access via the Black Sea and the Dardanelles.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org

Featured Image: Russian army soldiers drive their tanks along the Red Square during a general rehearsal for the Victory Day military parade which will take place at Moscow’s Red Square on May 9 to celebrate 70 years after the victory in WWII, in Moscow, Russia, Thursday, May 7, 2015. (AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev)

The Mediterranean: Driving Russia’s Strategic Decisions Since 1676

Russia Topic Week

By Jason Chuma

Introduction

The two major military actions conducted by Russia in the past two years are operations in eastern Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and interventions in the Syrian civil war on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad starting in September 2015. These two interventions are normally discussed separately with separate strategic bases. Many view Russian operations in Ukraine to be in response to a perceived threat from NATO expansion eastward with the inclusion of former USSR member states or Soviet Bloc countries in 1999, 2004, and 2009. Intervention in Syria can be seen as a means of asserting great power influence in the Middle East, a region where the United States and the West is withdrawing influence.

These assessments of Russian involvement in Ukraine and Syria are at least partially correct, but there is one common thread they both share which Russia has been fighting for since the first Russo-Turkish war in 1676. Tartus in Syria and Sevastopol in Crimea are warm water ports which provide direct Russian access to the Mediterranean or access via the Black Sea and the Dardanelles.

Warring for Maritime Access

Even before Peter the Great, access to the sea – and especially ports which are ice-free year round – have driven Russian strategic decisions. Russia fought twelve wars between 1676 and 1878, primarily against Turkey, to establish unrestricted access to the Black Sea and attempt to establish direct access to the eastern Mediterranean, enabling easy trade routes with southern Europe.

By 1812, Russia had secured access to the Black Sea, but direct access to the Mediterranean was still elusive. This was significant because transit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean requires the use of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits, which was, and still is, under Turkish control.

Probably the closest Russia came to having unrestricted access from the mainland to the Mediterranean was during World War I. In the Constantinople Agreement, the United Kingdom and France agreed to give Russia control of Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits in the event of a victory by the Entente. The October 1917 revolution and subsequent Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which ended hostilities between Russia and the Central Powers removed them from the Entente and any hope of the Constantinople Agreement coming to fruition.

Russia's nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky navy sailors at Syria's Mediterranean port of Tartus. © Grigoriy Sisoev / Sputnik
Russia’s nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky navy sailors at Syria’s Mediterranean port of Tartus. (Grigoriy Sisoev/Sputnik)

Similar to the U.S. 6th Fleet, the Soviet Union maintained a sustained presence in the Mediterranean via the 5th Operational Squadron. A small continuous Russian presence in the Mediterranean has been made possible through an alliance with Syria. Russia has maintained a naval presence in Tartus, Syria, since 1971, and managed to maintain that presence following the fall of the Soviet Union due to a deal that absolved Syria’s debts to the Soviet Union.

This naval presence in Tartus is extremely important to Russia because though multiple NATO members have direct access to the Mediterranean, Russia does not share this luxury. She is dependent on Turkey, a NATO member, for the use of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to access the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. Maintaining a friendly regime in power through President Bashar al-Assad is key to maintaining a continuous Russian presence in the Mediterranean.

Sevastapol

The naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea was founded in 1783 by the Russian Empire. It was transferred to Ukraine, which was part of the Soviet Union, in 1978. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia set up a 20-year lease with Ukraine to maintain the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. Sevastopol and Crimea are of key strategic value to Russia. It served as a staging ground for blockades and amphibious landings during Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008. Russia chose to annex Crimea in 2014 and ensure uninhibited access to the naval base at Sevastopol. By contrast, Russia did not annex Abkhazia or South Ossetia, two Georgian republics allied with Russia but not containing Russian naval bases.

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A map depicting Sevastopol, the Dardanelles Straits, and the Eastern Mediterranean. (ogj.com)

Sevastopol and Tartus are key strategic bases for Russia. Russia, as a predominately continental power, has always had the challenge of not having great coastal access, particularly in the Mediterranean. The ability to operate beyond its own coastal waters is enshrined in Russia’s maritime strategy, Maritime Doctrine for the Russian Federation 2020. The strategy describes “naval presence of the Russian Federation in the oceans…display[ing] the flag and military forces,” and “in the Mediterranean Sea…sufficient naval presence of the Russian Federation in the region.”

Conclusion

Even if securing naval bases is not Russia’s only motivation in Crimea and Syria, it must at least be part of its strategic calculus. Russia has clearly demonstrated that restoring a strong naval presence is a national priority, and the Mediterranean has been a key maritime hub for western civilization for all of written history. Ensuring continued access to the Mediterranean for the Russian Navy must be at the forefront of any strategic thinking in the region.

LT Jason H. Chuma is a U.S. Navy submarine officer currently serving as Navigator and Operations Officer onboard USS SPRINGFIELD (SSN 761). He is a graduate of the Citadel, holds a master’s degree from Old Dominion University, and has completed the Intermediate Command and Staff Course from the U.S. Naval War College. He can be followed on Twitter @Jason_Chuma.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Featured Image: Warships of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet (Stringer / Reuters)