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Asia-Pacific

Call for Articles: North Korea

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By Dmitry Filipoff

Week Dates: May 29-June 2, 2017
Articles Due: May 24, 2017
Article Length: 1000-3000 words 
Submit to: Nextwar@cimsec.org

North Korea’s ongoing ballistic missile development program and nuclear testing has continued unabated despite international sanctions and pressure. A highly-secretive state with thousands of tons of chemical weapons, a populace cut off from the world, and over a million men under arms, North Korea poses a grave challenge for any attempting to shape its behavior or contain its potential collapse.

How could a military contingency unfold and what are its considerations? How does the U.S.-China relationship affect North Korea? How could North Korea resolve its strategic predicament? Submissions can answer these questions and more to help understand and mitigate the threat North Korea poses.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: A flag with a portrait of North Korea’s late leader Kim Il Sung is displayed as soldiers march during a massive military parade at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, Wednesday, April 25, 2007, to mark the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army. (AP Photo/Korean Central News Agency via Korea News Service) 

Asia-Pacific

China: Connected Strategic Themes Across Global Commons Pt. 2

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Are there connected Chinese strategic themes that cut across the contested and interlinked global commons (domains) of maritime, space, and cyberspace? If so, what are they and what could the United States do about them?

By Tuan N. Pham

Part 1 of this two ­part series explored the cross-domain nexus between the maritime, space, and cyberspace global commons by examining the latest Chinese white paper and strategies. Repeated refrains included the Chinese Dream (national rejuvenation); global interests, peace and development, security, and the development of national laws to advance China’s national interests in the three contested battlespaces. Special emphasis was given to the contentious concept of cyberspace sovereignty in support of national security and social stability. With this backdrop, Part 2 will now derive possibly connected strategic themes that cut across the interlinked global commons and discuss how the United States could best respond.   

The Chinese Dream

Chinese Manifest Destiny. Chinese strategists have long called for a comprehensive and enduring set of strategies to better integrate and synchronize the multiple strategic lines of effort in furtherance of national goals (ambitions) and as part of a grand strategy for regional preeminence, and perhaps ultimately global preeminence. China’s dream of national rejuvenation may be the answer to their calling. The prevailing leadership’s sentiment appears now expansionist and revisionist. The time has come for Beijing to finally abandon the long-standing state policy of “hide capabilities and bide time” championed by the iconic former President Deng Xiaoping; right a perceived historical wrong; put behind the painful humiliation of the past; and assume its rightful place on the world stage as a destined global power. China is unquestionably a confident economic juggernaut and rising global power, able to manifest its own national destiny – the Chinese Dream – and dictate increasing power and influence across the contested and interlinked global commons in support of national rejuvenation.     

Global Commons Sovereignty (Economic Prosperity vs National Security). Beijing’s maritime activities are driven by its strategic vision of the ocean as “blue economic space and blue territory” crucial for its national development, security, and status. China seems to regard space and cyberspace very much in the same manner in terms of economic potential (value) and sovereign territory that requires developing and defending respectively. For now, there appears more policy clarity, guidance, and direction for sovereignty in cyberspace, while space sovereignty seems more fluid and may still be evolving policy-wise. Nevertheless, Beijing still needs to balance two competing national priorities – developing the domain economy (economic prosperity) and defending domain rights and interests (national security) – in all three contested and interlinked global commons. Many anticipate the initial emphasis will be on the economy since it is an enduring asymmetric counterbalance to the preeminent United States. The rationale calculus is simple for Beijing. Why would China opt to directly confront a militarily and economically stronger United States now when it can subtly and quietly undermine American preeminence through lasting economic partnerships and enduring political agreements (bilateral preferably and multilateral when necessary)? Beijing can always recalibrate later based on the fluid strategic conditions and confront Washington more directly and forcibly when opportunities arise, or if and when the balance of power shifts more in its favor.     

Shaping Law to Support Strategy. Last year, China announced its intent to create new domestic maritime laws in support of its evolving maritime strategy. These developing domestic maritime laws bear watching as a possible harbinger for the other contested and interlinked global commons of space and cyberspace and as an attempt to right a perceived historical wrong. The former is part of a continuing effort to set the terms for international legal disputes that Beijing expects will grow as its domain reach expands; the latter reflects China feeling disadvantaged (and taken advantage of) by a Western-dominated system of international laws established when it was weak as a nation and had little say in its formulation. In general, the broad legal approach makes a lot of legal, political, and military sense from Beijing’s perspective. China wants to set the enabling conditions for its future strategies across the contested and interlinked global commons in terms of implementation and sustainment. Beijing seeks to expand its domain borders through buffer zones. It will buttress and justify with legal underpinnings its growing domain presence and operations and also exert greater control within those buffer zones. China seeks to eventually shape international laws and norms (and develop accompanying domestic laws) to be more equitable and complementary to its national interests.

U.S. Strategic Opportunities

Maintain Preeminence. Just as maritime preeminence is necessary to guarantee the freedom of the seas, so too are space and cyberspace preeminence needed to guarantee the freedoms of space and cyberspace. By committing to preeminence in all three contested and interlinked global commons, the United States will better protect its critical strengths; enhance its deterrence posture by being able to impose larger costs, deny greater benefits, and encourage more restraint, and reverse the growing perception of American decline. Having complementary domain policies and strategies fosters unity of effort, optimizes resource allocation, sends a strong deterrent message to potential adversaries, and reassures allies and partners. To do otherwise invites strategic misalignment and miscommunication and encourages potential competitors like China to further advance their counter-balancing efforts in the maritime, space, and cyberspace global commons.    

Protect the Global Commons. Now is not the time to cede territory in the contested and interlinked global commons of maritime, space, and cyberspace. China pursues very broad, long-term, and synchronized domain policies and strategies, and may view any perceived U.S. force posture reduction as another opportunity to reset the international accepted norms in its favor. Reduction may also increase Beijing’s confidence in its ability to shape and influence Washington’s decisions and encourage China to press the United States for additional domain concessions in return for vague and passing promises of restraint while it quietly and steadily expands and strengthens its positions in the global commons.                               

Dominate the Narrative. To compete with Beijing short of conflict, Washington needs to reframe the narrative that China dominates with accusations of containment. The United States could be more proactive and seize the messaging initiative like it does in the maritime domain. Former Secretary of Defense Carter hit the right resonance notes during the Shangri La Dialogue in June and in the November/December 2016 edition of Foreign Affairs with his gentle reminders to the region of America’s traditional role as the principal underwriter of maritime security, political stability, and economic prosperity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific; warning China not to build a “Great Wall of self-isolation”; and using the catchall concept of “principled security network of alliances and partnerships” to outline a vision that the United States has long sought to describe. The same needs to be done in the contested and interlinked global commons of space and cyberspace. The “balancing” message needs to be reiterated at every opportunity and at the highest level, and synchronized throughout the whole-of-government and with allies and partners. There can be no U.S. policy seams or diplomatic space for Beijing to exploit. In short, acknowledge that both countries have competing visions and encourage China to act as (or become) a more responsible global stakeholder that contributes positively to the international system.

Seize the Initiative. The maritime strategy and accompanying domestic maritime laws are coming, but China has not said when. The same can be largely said in the space and cyberspace global commons. Hence, Washington could privately and publicly ask Beijing now for discussions and briefings on its developing domain strategies and laws; challenge vague or problematic content and context, such as how the security and economic pieces fit together, and inquire how they comport with international law and rule of law, and if they do not, why not. Otherwise, silence concedes the strategic initiative to Beijing and allows it to control the strategic narrative.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, the strategic window of opportunity to shape and influence Beijing’s developing domain strategies may soon close for Washington. To China, U.S. inaction implies tacit acknowledgement and consent to execute its domain strategies and strategic ambitions unhindered and unchallenged. At stake is nothing less than U.S. preeminence in the contested and interlinked global commons of maritime, space, and cyberspace, and ultimately as a global power. For decline is a deliberate choice, not an imposed reality. 

Tuan Pham has extensive experience in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and is published in national security affairs. The views expressed therein are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government.

Featured Image: The Tianhe-2 Chinese supercomputer at the National University of Defense Technology in Changsha. (Zhao Zilong/Imaginechina, via Associated Press)

South America

The Unfriendly Scramble for Everywhere: Investment’s Role in Foreign Policy

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NAFAC Week 

By Phillip Bass

Because wars between great powers are no longer frequent, many great powers use indirect action and soft power to push foreign policy objectives.1 Joseph S. Nye Jr. describes soft power as the ability of a state to persuade another state to do what it wants without force or coercion. Soft power can come in the form of diplomatic pressure, trade relations, investment, and loans.2 The People’s Republic of China has been using soft power in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America (LA) to fulfill foreign policy objectives. Chinese soft power in LA is a potential challenge to the United States’ hemispheric dominance.3 The Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary showed the United States was willing to use hard power to keep great powers out of LA.4 The United States’ dominance could be challenged if Chinese investment influences LA foreign policy.5 China has used soft power to pursue its foreign policy objectives in LA to delegitimize the Republic of China (Taiwan), access LA raw resources, and provide an alternative to American investment. These moves have made China vulnerable to events in Latin America. Investment changes a state’s foreign policy if the state is the investor, or if invested states have more to gain than by pursuing an alternative avenue.

Chinese investment in LA has increased from $15 billion in 2000 to $268.7 billion in 2013.6 China has invested $116.4 billion into Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador from 2007 to 2016.7 China gave Venezuela $60 billion worth of loans to help the country prior through 2015.8 China formed the China-CELAC Forum to promote economic relations between China and LA.9 At its first meeting in January 2015, Chinese President, Xi Jinping pledged China would invest $500 billion into LA by 2019.10 China has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica.11 China is one of the top five export destinations for Argentina, Cuba, and Peru. Additionally, China is Brazil and Chile’s largest trading partner. China is also one of the top five importers for Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay.12  With Chinese interests investing large amounts of funds and trade into LA, it is important to see if investment changes states’ foreign policy.

Chinese soft power has put pressure on Central American states to not recognize Taiwan in favor of stronger relations to China. Twelve of the twenty-one countries that recognize Taiwan are in LA.13 After Costa Rica switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2007, China and Costa Rica began negotiations for a free trade agreement in 2008 and the free trade agreement launched in 2011.14 In ten years, China has grown to deliver 12.6 percent of Costa Rica’s imports.15 When China-CELAC was launched, Costa Rica was asked to serve as the first chair of the Forum.16 Not every Chinese initiative has worked as well as its endeavors with Costa Rica; setbacks on the development of the $50 billion Nicaraguan Canal have disturbed bilateral relations between China and Nicaragua, where setbacks have delayed the development project from its late 2016 start date.17 In January 2017, Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega and Taiwan’s President Tasi Ing-wen had meetings to promote bilateral relations. Afterward, Ortega vowed to expand Taiwan’s international presence.18

Investment from China in LA focuses on the extraction of raw resources. Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador are the top three destinations for Chinese investment in LA. Twenty-eight of the thirty-two projects from the Chinese Development Bank in Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador are energy deals.19 High volumes of Chinese investment into raw resources is consistent across LA. Four-fifths of all Chinese investment in LA have been in resource extraction, with 70 percent of investment into oil and gas.20 Chinese shares of LA exports increased from 2 percent in 1993 to 9 percent in 2013.21 While China’s manufacturing imports from LA remain at 2 percent since 2003, their share of extraction and agriculture sectors has increased to 15 percent each.22 LA exports to China have also changed. From 1999-2003, oil and gas extraction consisted of 25 percent of LA exports to China. By 2013, oil and gas extraction consisted of 56 percent of LA exports to China.23

Chinese loans and investment in LA suggest they are using soft power to support countries wanting an alternative to American investment. While Brazil is less resistant to the United States’ presence in LA, Ecuador and Venezuela are both members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). ALBA seeks to promote the self-determination of LA states against United States’ investment. ALBA derailed the Free Trade Area of the Americas.24 Chinese investment in ALBA members suggests that Chinese investment finances countries wanting an alternative to the United States’ investment. China has invested $62.2 billion into development projects in Venezuela; almost 48 percent of total investment in LA.25 Venezuela also accepted $60 billion dollars in loans from China prior to the current economic crisis.26 Ecuador has borrowed upward of $11 billion from China between 2008 and 2014, covering 61 percent of Ecuadorian government spending.27 While China is not directly challenging American soft power in LA, Chinese investment supports governments that desire an alternative to the United States’ dominance.

Chinese investment and desire for LA raw resources has influenced China’s foreign policy. Prior to investing into LA, China would not be involved in crises in LA, but became involved in LA domestic crises in recent years. As Venezuela’s economy continues to spiral downward, the Chinese government invited economists and opposition lawmakers from Venezuela to Beijing throughout 2016. Officials discussed the $20 billion Venezuela owes China for loans and the possibility of a transitional government to bring stability to Venezuela.28 Ultimately, China decided to invest $2.2 billion to gain more share of the Venezuelan oil economy, from 500,000 barrels a day to 800,000 barrels a day in January 2017.29 Whether for good or bad, China’s foreign policy must now react to developments in LA to protect economic interests and imports of raw resources from LA.

Chinese investment in LA shows that investment changes a state’s foreign policy if they are the investor, or if the invested state has more to gain than an alternative. China is using soft power in LA to delegitimize Taiwan, have access to new raw resources, and to provide an alternative to U.S. dominance. Some of these efforts have led to positive results for China, but there have been setbacks for China. The more China invests into these objectives in LA, the more LA crises will affect Chinese foreign policy. If this relationship is beneficial for LA countries, they will also commit more to bilateral relations with China.

Phillip Bass is a junior studying International Relations at the University of Central Florida. Phillip is the Vice President of the International Relations Club, an organization that promotes academic and professional development of international relations students. Phillip is primarily interested in European studies.  Phillip is interested in moving into policy making fields or graduate school after his undergrad.

References

1. Kissinger, Henry A. 2012. “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2 44-55.

2. Nye, Joseph. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.

3. Kissinger. 48.

4. Coatsworth, John H. 2017. United States Interventions. March 20. http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/united-states-interventions

5. Committee on Foreign Affairs: House of Representatives. 2015. “China’s Advance in Latin America and the Caribbean.” 2.

6. Committee on Foreign Affairs: House of Representatives. 2.

7. “The Dialogue”. 2016. China-Latin America Finance Database. March 25. http://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/.

8. Vyas, Kejal. 2016. China Rethinks Its Alliance With Reeling Venezuela. September 11. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rethinks-its-alliance-with-reeling-venezuela-1473628506?mg=id-wsj.

9. China-CELAC Forum. 2014. About the Forum. Accessed March 27, 2017. http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/.

10. Jinping, Xi H.E. 2015. “Jointly Write a New Chapter in the Partnership of Comprehensive Cooperation Between China and Latin America and the Caribbean.” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. January 8. http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t1227730.htm.

11. Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 2015. November 18. http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml.

12. United Nations. UNcomtrade Analytics. Accessed March 27, 2017. https://comtrade.un.org/labs/data-explorer/.

13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of China. 2017. Diplomatic Allies. March 24. http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=DF6F8F246049F8D6&sms=A76B7230ADF29736.

14. Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 2015. November 18. http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml.

15. World Trade Organization. 2017. Costa Rica. March 20. http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/CR_e.htm.

16. China-CELAC Forum. 2014. About the Forum. Accessed March 27, 2017. http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/.

17. Watts, Jonathan. 2016. Nicaragua canal: in a sleepy Pacific port, something stirs. November 24. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/nicaragua-canal-interoceanic-preparations.

18. Pretel, Enrique Andres. 2017. Nicaragua pledges to fight for Taiwan recognition on global stage. January 11. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-usa-nicaragua-idUSKBN14V03Z?il=0.

19. The Dialogue. 2016. China-Latin America Finance Database. March 25. http://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/.

20. Gallagher, Kevin P, Lopez Andres, Rebecca Ray, and Cynthia Sanborn. 2015. “China in Latin America: Lessons for South-South Cooperation and Sustainable Development.” Global Economic Governance Initiative 6.

21. Gallagher et al. 5.

22. Gallagher et al. 5.

23. Gallagher et al. 5.

24. ALBA. 2017. What is the ALBA? March 25. https://albainfo.org/what-is-the-alba/.

25. “The Dialogue”.

26. Vyas, Kejal. 2016. China Rethinks Its Alliance With Reeling Venezuela. September 11. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rethinks-its-alliance-with-reeling-venezuela-1473628506?mg=id-wsj.

27. Kuo, Lily. 2014. Ecuador’s unhealthy dependence on China is about to get $1.5 billion worse. August 27. https://qz.com/256925/ecuadors-unhealthy-dependence-on-china-is-about-to-get-1-5-billion-worse/.

28. Vyas. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rethinks-its-alliance-with-reeling-venezuela-1473628506?mg=id-wsj.

29. Vyas. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rethinks-its-alliance-with-reeling-venezuela-1473628506?mg=id-wsj.

Featured image: Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Brazil’s President Michel Temer during their meeting at the West lake State Guest House in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China, September 2, 2016 (Minor Iwasaki/Reuters).

Asia-Pacific

The Beijing Consensus: A Threat of our own Creation

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NAFAC Week

By Jhana Gottlieb

Over the past 40 years, Beijing’s domestic policies have successfully transformed China from an impoverished nation into a world superpower; yet, they did so without a basic tenant of Western development theory—democracy.1 In 2004, China’s startling growth led Joshua Ramo to coin the term “Beijing Consensus.”2 This moniker nods to the “Washington Consensus,” the set of political and economic development prescriptions issued by Washington technocrats to Latin American countries in the late 1980s in an attempt to spur regional development. To some Western academics and politicians, the Beijing Consensus poses a threat to the United States’ soft power, particularly within developing nations. Yet to what extent does the Beijing Consensus truly represent an international ideological danger? Contrary to the beliefs of Western alarmists, the Beijing Consensus’ power derives mostly from its definition as an alternative to Western neoliberalism, not from any ideological strength of its own. In emphasizing the dichotomy between the Washington and Beijing Consensuses, Western observers thereby only further extend China’s ideational power.

The overarching argument for China’s ideological threat contends that China’s successful growth has provided an attractive alternative development model founded on authoritarianism, which lacks fundamental Western values such as universal human rights or democratic institutions. This model, when combined with China’s increasing political and economic expansion into developing regions, is slowly replacing the West’s soft power across vast territories, particularly Africa and Latin America. In his book, The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in our Time, Stefan Halper argues that the “net effect of these developments is to reduce Western and particularly American influence on the global stage—along both economic and ideational axes.”3 Furthermore, this threat supersedes all others, for it “will have a vastly greater impact than will the tactical military and economic ‘China threats’ concerning Washington today.”4 Essentially, the U.S.’s grip on global soft power dynamics is weakening as a result of an ongoing battle between dominant ideologies.

While initially compelling, Halper’s argument ultimately falls short in its most basic assumption—that China and the U.S. truly represent two intrinsically antithetical ideologies. Since its initial release in the 1980s, the “Washington Consensus” has come to more generally to represent a cohesive development model in which democratic institutions and neoliberal economics mutually reinforce each other. It rests upon a strong ideological foundation dating back to Adam Smith’s political economy model in the Wealth of Nations. The Beijing Consensus lacks a comparable historical foundation and cohesive political economic definition. It is often referred to as state capitalism, implying some sort of state-controlled economic liberalization; beyond this general understanding, its specifics remain rather vague. In fact, its defining tenant lies within this ambiguity. Shaun Breslin, a leading expert on China’s political economy, explains that “not being identified as the promoter of any specific normative position is in itself a normative position.”5 Rather than representing a concrete political economic model, the Beijing Consensus “is simply concerned with doing what works in the long term, and is not driven by any plan.”6 Therefore, in comparing the two, the Washington Consensus is the specific combination of democratic institutions and free market economics, while the Beijing Consensus seems to be most any other combination of political and economic factors that foster development.

In reality, upon closer analysis of China’s path to economic growth, it is startlingly similar to Western neoliberalism. Scott Kennedy finds that China actually followed eight of the ten mandates of the Washington Consensus during its Opening and Reform period.7 Economically, the two are quite similar; it is only upon including political ideology that they truly diverge. While the Washington Consensus is firmly based in democracy, Breslin argues that, “for most observers, it is this experimentation and non-ideological commitment to doing whatever it takes to promote growth while maintaining political stability that is the defining hallmark of the Chinese mode of governance.”8 Therefore, the Beijing Consensus is not its own political economic system. Rather, it is a model of political stability and economic growth by some combination other than the Washington Consensus’ unique pairing of democracy and free market capitalism. Thus, the Beijing Consensus derives its strength by being defined as everything outside the Washington Consensus, not its own ideational foundation.

However this definition is the very reason that the Beijing Consensus does not necessarily need a strong ideational basis. “The China model isn’t important for others because of the specifics of what has happened in China; rather, it is important for establishing what can be done if other countries do what is best for themselves based on their own concrete circumstances and not simply what they are told to do by others.”9 Not telling others what to do is highly antithetical to the Washington Consensus, which was forcibly imposed upon Latin American countries. The Beijing Consensus’ ideational power therefore lies in its respect for autonomy and individualized growth, a power that is enabled by its continual comparison to the Washington Consensus.

Definition by comparison further strengthens the Beijing Consensus in light of the 2008 economic crash. “Before the 2008 financial crisis, the Beijing Consensus was an interesting idea that animated discussions at academic seminars and conferences, mostly in Western countries. This is no longer the case.”10 Free market failure naturally strengthened the ideational weight of all other models, including the Beijing Consensus.

Ironically, the Beijing Consensus now represents a form of Chinese soft power, but was originally propagated by Western theorists. Breslin argues that the Beijing Consensus is a, “speech act—talking of it, and defining it in a specific way, makes it real and gives it real power.”11 Therefore, Western insistence on this dichotomy is not only the source of the Beijing Consensus’ ideational strength, but also leads to the expansion of its power.

In reality, China’s development shares many similarities with the Western model. It is only through Western theorists highlighting the differences and compiling them into an intellectual concept that China has developed as an ideological competitor. Continual emphasis on these differences is the source of its strength, as the Beijing Consensus has no ideology of its own upon which to rest. If the West wishes to limit China’s ideational power, it must cease propagating an ideological dichotomy and instead emphasize the similarities China shares with the West. As of now, the Beijing Consensus is an ideational threat of our own creation, and will be so as long as we continue to define it by what it is not.

Jhana Gottlieb is a senior IPE major at Colorado College. She is passionate about conflict resolution, and plans to pursue international mediation post-graduation. On campus, Jhana is a member of the John Quincy Adams society on American foreign policy, a peer tutor at the CC writing center, and a student assistant in the Political Science Department. In her free time, she loves to travel and ballroom dance, as well as explore Colorado’s exquisite natural world through backpacking, skiing, and rock climbing.

Bibliography

Breslin, Shaun. “The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of governance?” The Royal Institute of International Affairs 87:6 (2011): 1323-1343. Accessed March 3, 2016.

Halper, Stefan. The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in our Time. New York: Basic Books, 2010.

Huang, Yasheng. “Rethinking the Beijing Consensus.” Asia Policy 11 (2011): 1-26. Accessed March 2, 2016.

Kennedy, Scott. “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus.” Journal of Contemporary China 19.65 (2010): 461-477. Accessed March 3, 2016.

References

1. This paper was adapted from an earlier written assignment, composed for the class “Topics in Politics: China and World,” taken in March 2016.

2. Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” Journal of Contemporary China 19.65 (2010): 462, accessed March 3, 2016.

3. Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: Legitimizing Authoritarianism in our Time (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 3.

4. Ibid.

5. Shaun Breslin, “The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of governance?” The Royal Institute of International Affairs 87:6 (2011): 1338, accessed March 3, 2016.

6. Ibid., 1382.

7. Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” 470.

8. Breslin, “The ‘China model’ and the global crisis,” 1328.

9. Ibid., 1338.

10. Yasheng Huang, “Rethinking the Beijing Consensus,” Asia Policy 11 (2011): 4, accessed March 2, 2016.

11. Breslin, “The ‘China model’ and the global crisis,” 1324.

Featured Image: A paramilitary police officer in plain-clothes holding an umbrella keeps watch on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, August 27, 2015. (Reuters/Jason Lee)