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A Geographical Breakdown of What’s Going on in the World

Global Analysis, Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup Part 13: Herd, defend, distract, attack

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Welcome back to another edition of the weekly roundup, where we disseminate the recent blog posts, journal articles, web articles, books, and podcasts that CIMSEC members have published elsewhere. This week we have topics that range from narco-submarines to swarming tactics in future naval warfare. I am certain the articles presented here will make great weekend reading in case you missed any of them in the past week.

The first article mentioned here is by Armando Heredia, on the US Naval Institute’s website, who analyses the Philippines’ naval buildup.   The buildup under the leadership of President Aquino include, but is not limited to, the acquisition of new helicopters as well as the boost to Philippines’ sealift capability with the donation of two ex-Royal Australian Navy Landing Craft Heavies. It is still unclear, however, when a decision will be made regarding the acquisition of two new multi-role frigates. Even with these ‘new’ platforms, however, the realities of historical challenges to their naval service will need to be considered in order to establishing a credible defence. Armando’s article can be accessed here.

Ex-HMA Ships Brunei and Tarakan are to be gifted to the Philippines Navy with refurbished equipment and upgraded navigation systems.
Ex-HMA Ships Brunei and Tarakan are to be gifted to the Philippines Navy with refurbished equipment and upgraded navigation systems. In this photo the RAN’s final LCHs depart Cairns Naval Base in formation for the final time.

Sri Lanka’s political landscape has significantly shifted with President Maithripala Sirisena’s surprise electoral victory. Sri Lankan politics was dominated by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who strengthened the executive presidency system, placed members of his family in key positions of power, and maintained a loyal political party. In this Q&A, CIMSECian Nilanthi Samaranayake tells us why Sirisena’s victory represents an opportunity for changes in Sri Lanka’s domestic policies, as well as its foreign relationships with China, India, and the United States, which could significantly alter regional political and security dynamics in South Asia.

Narco-submarine moments before interception by the U.S. Coast Guard in August 2007.
Narco-submarine moments before interception by the U.S. Coast Guard in August 2007.

CIMSECian Byron Ramirez recently co-edited a new Foreign Military Studies Office paper titled ‘Narco-Submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used For Drug Smuggling Purposes.’ Maritime drug smuggling accounts for a significant portion of illicit substance transportation and special fabricated vessels are becoming increasingly prevalent in this field. Additionally, the foreword is written by another CIMSECian, James Stavridis, of the Fletcher School. You can access this publication here.

At The National Interest, defence reporter Dave Majumdar continues his series of ‘Top Fives’ with an analysis of the Most Overrated Weapons of War. From the mighty battleship to the next generation of stealth fighters, Dave provides his arguments on why these costly platforms do not provide value-for-money in war. Fanatics and history buffs may not necessarily agree with Dave’s conclusions, but he does make a strong case why it is easy to fall into the trap of purchasing the sexier, but less-useful, option. You can also access Dave’s other National Interest articles here.

A kamikaze attack on USS Enterprise. Swarm attacks were used by the Japanese Imperial forces in the closing stages of World War II to inflict heavy casualties in the Pacific theatre.
A kamikaze attack on USS Enterprise. Swarm attacks were used by the Japanese Imperial forces in the closing stages of World War II to inflict heavy casualties in the Pacific theatre.

Over at Information Dissemination Chris Rawley continues the carrier debate with his view on the future of naval warfare: swarming. Chris has written about this concept previously, and other elements of the US Navy is researching how to employ autonomous and unmanned platforms, in conjunction with manned platforms, to fight and win the battle at sea. History provides examples of how the swarming tactic has been employed at sea. The Japanese kamikaze attacks, for example, had devastating consequences for the sailors who faced them in battle. The tactic can also be adapted to other elements of the Navy and will need to be multi-domain to achieve its goal. Find out more by reading Chris’ article here.

Zachary Keck returns in this edition of the roundup with the following articles. Firstly,  that Russia will be holding Joint Military Drills with North Korea and Cuba. Secondly, the US Navy’s 6th Generation Fighter jets will be slow and unstealthy.  Third,  Ghosts of Imperialism Past: How Colonialism Still Haunts the World Today.  Finally,  how North Korea is practicing to sink US Carriers.

As a side note, I recently published an article for an Australian-based organisation called Young Australians in International Affairs for their new ‘Insights’ blog. In it, I analyse the top five defence and national security items to watch closely in 2015. From new submarines to what can be considered an ‘Australianised Department of Homeland Security’, these projects will need to be carefully implemented to ensure that the next few years are not spent correcting avoidable mistakes. Thus, positive outcomes this year will prevent exposing a capability gap or security risk for Australia. My post can be accessed here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis, Global Analysis

Naval Build-Up in the Philippines

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Like many of its regional peers, the Philippines is in the midst of a defense buildup, motivated in no small part by China’s assertive moves in the western Philippine Sea and the resource-rich Spratly islands. 
              
The donation this week of two Balikpapan-class Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) from Australia was the most recent boost to Philippines defense efforts. 
        
The LCH donation is particularly timely, as it complements the upcoming pair of Strategic Sealift Vessels (SSV), being built by PT PAL Indonesia. Based on the Indonesian navy’s successful Makassar-class Landing Platform Dock (LPD), the 8,600-ton amphibious lift ships can transit to remote areas and serve as a mobile base for helicopters and smaller landing craft. As evidenced during Typhoon Haiyan, the dearth of such assets hampered the Philippine government’s aid response to the hardest-hit parts of the country. 
          
As gifts stand, the donation of ex-HMAS Tarakan and Brunei is particularly generous – the Royal Australian Navy will hand them over fully refurbished with new safety and navigation components, plus spare parts packages. Manila is considering purchasing the three remaining LCHs as well. 
       
While the media focus of Manila’s defense acquisitions under the Capability Upgrade Program has been centered on big-ticket items to restore basic conventional force capabilities, there have been other, quieter acquisitions that directly support war-fighting and maritime domain awareness (MDA). 
         
Notably, the service signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2014 with the Philippine National Oil Company to transfer three retired 2,500 ton petroleum tank ships. This acquisition would enable fuel replenishment at sea and increase on-station time for high-endurance assets like the patrol frigates Ramon Alcaraz and Gregorio Del Pilar, both formerly U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters.  
Another low-profile capability is the National Coast Watch Center program—a surveillance system designed to monitor oceanic traffic in the western Philippine Sea.
              
As expected, details of this national intelligence capability are closely held, but much of it is likely based on the successful implementation of the earlier Coast Watch South program. With heavy U.S. assistance, the Philippines created a network of monitoring stations combining radar, maritime surveillance and radio/data networks that provides a real-time strategic and tactical “picture” of oceanic traffic in the Southern Philippines—the so-called Sulawesi Sea Triangle. That area is a hotbed of illicit trafficking by sea and a favored logistical trail for transnational insurgent forces that prowl the region. When completed in 2015, the west-facing Coast Watch chain will monitor the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending 200 nm into the contested Spratly Islands group. In the future, additional monitoring chains will cover the Northern and Eastern facing portions of the country as well. 
           
The most recent, visible and well-publicized modernization program has been the integration of the multipurpose helicopter program with the patrol frigate force. Five Augusta-Westland A109s twin-engine helicopters equipped with forward-looking infrared have been delivered to the fleet to replace long-retired BO-105s. From an operational perspective, the navy has made quick strides to integrating the air asset with ships of the line. The AW109s had a maiden deployment on board Ramon Alcaraz during the Australian multinational military exercise Kakadu 2014, approximately eight months after receiving the first helicopters. 
          
Out of all the projects to restore capabilities, the navy is still awaiting final determination of its premier acquisition – the multi-role frigate. The Philippines wants to buy two units to serve as major and modern combatants of the patrol frigate force. While the negotiations have been stymied by a complex two-phase process, a list of qualified bidders has emerged, including well-known Spanish shipbuilder Navantia and several South Korean firms, among others. A winning bid was to be selected in late 2014, but the acquisition process reportedly has been complicated by efforts to separate the tracks of selecting a ship from the embedded weapon systems. This may have to do with current challenges of the Philippines not being easily cleared for purchases of regional-balance changing weapons, such as a long-range surface-to-surface missile, with which this ship class is normally equipped.  
          
The Armed Forces of the Philippines has benefited under President Benigno Aquino III’s administration. To date, multiple modernization programs have either reached significant acquisition stages or have been completed entirely during his tenure. 
         
However, as the new paint smell wears off for the navy, the historical challenges that have haunted its past acquisitions and programs loom. It is critical that the next presidential administration continue to support the acquisitions, as well as the services, both politically and fiscally. The navy needs to ensure that internal expertise among the ranks to maintain their newly acquired equipment is present and sustainable. Above all, operating effectively and efficiently at sea continues to be the primary objective. The nation’s seafaring history and ties to the maritime culture give impetus to the current goals of ensuring territorial integrity and establishing a credible defense. Given the relatively rapid pace of modernization, the Philippine navy is well on the road to restoring the capabilities necessary to meet those demands. 
                               
Armando J. Heredia is a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner based in New England, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. He is a regular contributor to the Center for International Maritime Security’s NextWar blog.  
                             
This article can be found here in its original form on the USNI website and was republished by permission.

 

Capability Analysis, Global Analysis

LCS Survivability Debate: By the Numbers

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Both Doyle Hodges and Chuck Hill have recently commented on Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) survivability in light of World War II damage reports, responding to Steven Wills’ opinion piece at USNI News (which he followed up yesterday).  The genesis of their response appears to be Wills’ claim:

“Small warships are historically unsurvivable in combat. They have a shorter floodable length, reduced reserve buoyancy and more likely to be affected by fire and smoke damage than larger combatants.”

Unfortunately, both authors have interpreted the data differently, and some clarification is in order.

In analysis of survivability, it is important to look at three facets as defined by the US Navy:

  • susceptibility, the capability of the ship to avoid and/or defeat an attack;
  • vulnerability, the capability of the ship to withstand initial damage effects and to continue to perform assigned primary missions;
  • recoverability,  the capability of the ship, after initial damage effects, to take emergency action to contain and control damage, prevent loss of a damaged ship, and restore primary mission capabilities.

The data from World War II damage reports, along with an understanding of the US Navy inventory at the time, allows us to calculate a value for overall susceptibility of the various ship types during the war.  The damage reports also allow us to measure the combined vulnerability and recoverability of those ships that reported significant damage.

Hill calculated an overall measure of survivability based on the number of each ship type existing at the beginning of the war, which Hodges correctly notes is an insufficient baseline due to additional production during the war.  By using data from Table I of the damage summary, he overstates the overall risk of loss in each type of ship.  I offer the following so that an accurate baseline can be used to inform future discussions of survivability.

In the area of susceptibility, the damage summary, combined with the available construction data, shows significant variability by ship type and year.   In the table below, total inventory of DD and larger combatants is shown for each year, in aggregate and by class, as well as the total of newly commissioned ships for that year.  The susceptibility is the number of damage reports (including lost) divided by the total number of ships available in that year.  This still overstates susceptibility a bit, since not all new ships were available for the entire year, but it still serves a useful purpose.

Note that the total of damage and loss reports, not ships damaged, is used below.  Thus the CV susceptibility of 125% is not really a mistake, but an artifact of the method.  In 1942, Enterprise filed three war damage reports, Saratoga two, and Yorktown one in addition to the losses of Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp and Hornet.

Year and Type Starting Inventory Newly Commissioned Total
Reports		 Susceptibility
1942 167 102 91 33.8%
BB 17 0 12 70.6%
CA 18 0 16 88.9%
CL 19 9 9 32.1%
CV 7 1 10 125.0%
CVE 5 14 0 0.0%
CVL 0 0 0 0.0%
DD 101 78 44 24.6%
1943 231 186 45 10.8%
BB 15 2 0 0.0%
CA 13 4 2 11.8%
CL 26 7 9 27.3%
CV 4 6 1 10.0%
CVE 19 25 1 2.3%
CVL 0 9 1 11.1%
DD 154 133 31 10.8%
1944 403 133 110 20.5%
BB 17 2 10 52.6%
CA 16 1 3 17.6%
CL 32 11 12 27.9%
CV 10 10 11 55.0%
CVE 43 33 12 15.8%
CVL 9 0 3 0%
DD 276 76 59 22.7%

The outcome of each damaging event recorded in the summary gives us an estimate of the vulnerability and recoverability for each ship type.  Here we see a clear relationship between size and ability to take punishment.  I’ve separated the traditional surface combatants from the carriers for clarity.

Type Damage Reports Loss Reports Total Probability of Loss | Given Damage
BB 20 2 22 9.1%
CA 15 6 21 28.6%
CL 27 3 30 10.0%
DD 87 47 134 35.1%
DE 9 7 16 43.8%
CV 18 4 22 18.2%
CVL 3 1 4 25.0%
CVE 9 4 13 30.8%

At the surface, there appears to be a disparity between CA and CL loss rates.   However, this is most likely a function of displacement rather than ship type, as all six of the CAs lost through 1944 were Treaty Cruisers of less than 10,000 tons.

In reviewing these data as it relates to LCS survivability, I think we have to be somewhat cautious.  The general trend, showing that smaller ships are generally more vulnerable to (or less recoverable from) significant damage, confirms Wills in part.  While smaller warships are indeed, less survivable, they are not unsurvivable.  Because of their large numbers and lesser value as a target, the small destroyers were damaged less frequently than the larger surface combatants.  They relied more heavily than their capital ship brothers on the susceptibility leg of the survivability triangle.  Damaging events that were survivable by bigger ships were often fatal to the destroyers, because the bigger ships were more resilient and possessed a deeper capability for damage control.

The same will be true in the US Navy fleet of the 2020s, where Arleigh Burke destroyers will be much more capable of taking a hit than Littoral Combat Ships.  No modern ship, and especially no small ship, will survive as an effective combatant in the event of a major damaging event, like a torpedo, mine, or cruise missile attack.  Even though the ship might not be a total loss, it will be out of action for significant period of time after that event.  Look no further than USS Chancellorsville if you believe otherwise.

Ken Adams is a former US Navy Surface Warfare Officer with experience in amphibious ships and staffs, a battleship tour in USS Iowa, and as a tactics instructor for the Royal Saudi Navy. He is currently an operations analyst for a large defense contractor, for whom he is not authorized to speak.

Global Analysis, Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup Part 12

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Welcome back to another edition of the Member roundup, where we provide the wider community an opportunity to examine some of the works produced by CIMSECians that have featured elsewhere. Being a professional also involves in discussing the future of one’s chosen field. Topics that feature regularly in this series include analysis of geopolitical trends and  military technology. This week, however, we have several contributions that discuss issues faced when writing about the future of one’s own organization or service.

CIMSECians Roger Misso and Chris O’Keefe write, in Proceedings, about the challenges for junior officers to share their thoughts in writing about the future of the Naval service. It is clear that this is not a new problem and the authors refer to historical examples of how their predecessors handled the problem. Misso and Keefe present their views on the issue but argue, most importantly, that all levels should be able to write on all topics, whether it be the mundane or the controversial, without fear of it affecting their careers.

For further information on this topic I recommend starting with James Fallows’ recent roundup of articles by military reformers. Misso and O’Keefe’s article is one of those mentioned in the post, as well as several other CIMSECians  You can access the article over at The Atlantic. Additionally, our very own Matthew Hipple, provides his own riposte to Fallows’ writings on the matter. Without wallowing in the problems, he provides practical suggestions for any JO who believes they have something constructive to say. You can access Matthew’s response here.

James Stavridis, of the Fletcher School, writes about the geopolitical changes occurring in Europe and the need for the United States not to neglect that part of the world. The economic situation, declining military power in European States, and a resurgence of Russia are all areas of concerns when viewed individually. As a whole, however, they all present strategic challenges for the United States if it fails to assist its European friends. You can access his article here.

A hot topic amongst analysts and students of strategic studies is the state of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. It is becoming increasingly expensive to sustain the ageing warheads and the delivery platforms and experts are debating the best way forward. Over at The Daily Beast Dave Majumdar reports that the Pentagon will spend upwards of $300 billion to update current nuclear capability, as well as acquiring new delivery methods and even a new ICBM. You can access his article here.

Chuck Hill returns this week with several updates and you can access them over on Chuck’s blog. One of his latest posts provides a look into Small Warship Survivability, and examines historical examples of surface combatant losses. This article is a must-read for anyone interested in the LCS survivability debate.

For a wider reading list this weekend, we suggest checking out Natalie Sambhi’s roundup on The Strategist blog. For those who are unfamiliar, it is Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s official blog. You can access Natalie’s posts here.

Finally, over at The National Interest Zachary Keck continues to push out update after update on all things military and foreign affairs. Articles include a possible submarine deal between India and Japan, and how low oil prices could make Russia more unpredictable. You can access all of his latest articles here.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.