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Analyzing Specific Naval and Maritime Platforms

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

The Republic of Korea Navy: Blue-Water Bound?

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By Paul Pryce

Defence Reform Plan 2020 (DRP2020), originally set out in 2005 by the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Ministry of Defence, presents an ambitious vision for future military capabilities. For the Army, this will mean personnel reductions – specifically a total drop in troop strength from 690,000 in 2005 to 500,000 by the end of 2020 – in an effort to promote a more modern, professional force. For the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), meanwhile, this has meant a shift in the focus of procurement projects so as to attain the status and prestige of a ‘blue-water navy’. In other words, the ROKN will seek expeditionary capabilities, operating across the deep waters of the open oceans, rather than concentrating on its traditional role of securing South Korean littorals against intrusion by the military forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or foreign fishing vessels.

But is such a shift from a green-water navy to blue-water possible? Furthermore, is it desirable, given the ROK’s strategic situation? To understand the evolution of this still relatively young navy, it is worthwhile consulting a resource compiled by another regional partner. Particularly valuable insights can be found in a paper produced for the US Naval War College in 2010, entitled “The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy: A Japanese Perspective,” by (retired) Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, who formerly served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force and interacted considerably with his ROKN counterparts from 1997 onward. VADM Koda briefly charts Korean naval history, starting from actions of Yi Sun-shin at the Battle of Myeongnyang in 1597 that thwarted a Japanese invasion, but his accounts of force modernization and expansion efforts by the ROKN since the 1990’s are the most detailed sections of the paper and will be of most interest for readers wanting to know what role the ROKN might play in the increasingly complex security order of the 21st century Asia-Pacific.

VADM Koda highlights two concerning capability gaps faced by the present-day ROKN: anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine countermeasures (MCM). On the first point, although the ROKN maintains a robust force of fast patrol craft to counter clandestine intrusions by North Korea, “the ASW posture of the ROKN still remains questionable today, in relation to the perceived threat of North Korean submarines and the geopolitical nature of the country.” Despite evidence suggesting that the Pohang-class corvette ROKS Cheonan was sunk in March 2010 by a torpedo launched by a North Korean submarine, there have been no compelling efforts by the ROKN to shore up its ASW capabilities. Perhaps the only saving grace for ROKN ASW has been, according to VADM Koda, the acquisition of three ASW-capable Gwanggaeto the Great-class destroyers in 1998-2000 and a small fleet of Westland Lynx helicopters. Though the ROKN is not without its own submarines – specifically four Sohn Won-yil diesel-electric submarines and nine Chang Bogo-class diesel-electric submarines – these are geared toward anti-surface warfare (ASUW).

The ROKN’s MCM capability has also been diminished by the decommissioning of coastal minesweepers donated by the United States following the Korean War. At the time of VADM Koda’s writing, the ROKN minesweeper fleet consisted of only three Yangyang-class coastal minesweepers and six Swallow-class coastal minehunters, which he deemed “not yet sufficient for the current security and military situation around the peninsula”. However, the ROKN seems to have recognized this vulnerability to the DPRK’s own doctrine of asymmetric warfare; in 2015, the ROKN launched the first vessel of the Nampo-class, a domestically built minelayer, and plans are in place to produce several new minesweepers based on the design of the Yangyang-class in the coming years. Even so, the ROKN could not solely carry out an MCM role in a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula – VADM Koda identifies the Tsushima Strait as vital to the logistics of any multilateral response to North Korean or Chinese aggression against the South. Unfortunately, no formal agreement currently exists between the Japanese and ROK authorities about conducting combined military operations, which would be crucial to ensuring a clear division of labour on MCM, with the ROKN securing the western end of the Tsushima Strait and the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) locking down the eastern channel. This stems from several ongoing political disputes between Japan and the ROK, including the status of Tsushima Island (known as Daemado Island in the ROK). The dispute over the island has persisted since 1948 and shows little sign of reaching a final resolution.

Korean Ship sails in formation at the end of Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2006. U.S. Navy photo.
Korean Ship sails in formation at the end of Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2006.

The ROKN has demonstrably obtained blue-water capabilities. As the paper notes, ROK President Lee Myung-Bak approved the establishment in 2009 of the Cheonghae Anti-Piracy Unit and its deployment to the Gulf of Aden in support of Combined Task Force 151. A few months later, the ROK joined the Proliferation Security Initiative. New, domestically built surface combatants, such as the Sejong the Great-class destroyers and Incheon-class frigates, possess impressive capabilities and the capacity to project South Korean power beyond the country’s coastal waters. The ROKN has also succeeded in expanding its amphibious capabilities, particularly through the commissioning of its first Dokdo-class amphibious assault ship in 2007 and the replacement in 2014 of aging US-transferred landing ships with the new Cheon Wang Bong-class. VADM Koda interprets this interest in amphibious capabilities as a reaction to the “bitter experience” obtained when the ROKN “found itself unable to participate sufficiently in the multinational relief operations on northern Sumatra, in Indonesia, after the earthquake and tsunami in December 2004”.

In short, while the paper cites ample evidence to believe the ROKN is on course to become a blue-water navy (and perhaps already has), the country’s policymakers and defence planners should pay more thought toward the objectives they wish their maritime forces to fulfill. Boasting the blue-water label and participating actively in humanitarian operations abroad may benefit national prestige, but North Korea remains a paramount security threat. It is clear that the ROKAF assesses its own capabilities as so vastly superior to their DPRK opponents that another attempted invasion of the South would be impossible, and this can be seen in the ROKN’s focus on the quality of landing craft over quantity. But the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan demonstrates that the ROKN ignores ASW and MCM capabilities at the peril of its brave sailors.

Paul Pryce is Political Advisor to the Consul General of Japan in Calgary and a long-time member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). He has previously written as the Senior Research Fellow for the Atlantic Council of Canada’s Maritime Nation Program.

Capability Analysis

A Century On: The Littoral Mine Warfare Challenge

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Title Photo: An Officer’s Sketches of the Attack on the Narrows on  March 18, 1915 – the Allies’ fleet of 16 battleships attempt to force their way through the Dardanelles; by the end of the day, a quarter of them would be put out of service due to mines and shorefire.

Littoral Arena Topic Week

By Timothy Choi

Within 21st century discussions of littoral warfare challenges, the concept of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) is often used as a homogenous term. This has led to an overwhelming emphasis on the development and acquisition of high-tech weaponry such as anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles that aim to hold a fleet at risk as far from shore as possible. Yet, this is representative of only the first half of the A2/AD concept. Should a fleet successfully defeat anti-access threats, it would have to still deal with the area-denial challenge within the littoral operational area. Here, one particular weapons system has remained understudied, but no less lethal: sea mines. With some 70% of US Navy ship casualties since the end of the Second World War caused by mines, any discussion of littoral warfare must include these incredibly cost-effective weapons. The disproportionate impact of sea mines in an area-denial role is perhaps best illustrated in the First World War’s Dardanelles campaign, which provide many lessons that continue to apply today in such potential littoral areas of operation as the Strait of Hormuz.

Mines and the Dardanelles

The Gallipoli land campaign is often mentioned in historical overviews of the First World War as an isolated event that began and ended on land. Although most histories succeed in noting that Gallipoli was intended to reopen traffic to southern Russia via the Turkish Straits, only dedicated study of the campaign actually explains its operational necessity: to enable Allied battleships to pass safely through the Dardanelles and bring their guns to within range of Constantinople, thereby bringing about the Ottomans’ surrender. The land campaign was thus supposed to be a supportive operation to the original naval-centric strategy and was to be concluded once Allied minesweepers could conduct sweeping operations in peace, allowing the battleships to safely make their way through into the Sea of Marmara.

Ottoman minelayer Nusret (replica). Deploying her mines under the cover of darkness in the midst of the Allied operating area, she was responsible for the March 18 outcome, emphasizing the need for persistent MCM efforts during all phases of conflict.
Ottoman minelayer Nusret (replica). Deploying her mines under the cover of darkness in the midst of the Allied operating area, she was responsible for the March 18 outcome, emphasizing the need for persistent MCM efforts during all phases of conflict.

Outgunned and outmatched in their conventional naval forces, the Ottomans utilized a defensive strategy that centred around the naval mine. In so doing, its forces needed to only prevent the minefields’ reduction – a fairly simple task that pitted Ottoman mobile howitzers against the Allies’ defenseless and slow minesweepers.[1] The vulnerability of big battleships to the humble mine was ably demonstrated during the March 18th, 1915, attempt at forcing the Dardanelles: there would be no reaching the Marmara unless the minesweepers could proceed free from howitzer harassment. Only through land forces would the howitzers be rooted out from behind their protective embankments.

Yet, the very land campaign that was to support the naval passage through the strait ended up being an operation that required naval support – resulting in even more losses for the RN in the form of Goliath, Triumph, and Majestic’s sinking by torpedo boat and submarine.[2] Instead of being an operation focused on the destruction of the howitzers, it became the standard trench warfare that plagued Western Europe and where Ottoman land forces proved that they were at no disadvantage. Furthermore, even had the Allies succeeded in taking and holding the Gallipoli peninsula, only half the problem would have been solved: the Asiatic shore still had to be controlled and would require much more effort given the lack of any landward chokepoints to that shore.

In the grand scope of the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign, it is quite clear to see what impact the humble naval mine had on Allied failure and Ottoman success: an instrument whose technical attributes so complicated matters at the tactical level that it completely altered the operational approach needed by the Allies, which in turn resulted in their loss of vision of the overall strategic objective. The mines could be trusted to do the job of sinking the heavily-armoured battlewagons – Ottoman guns only had to focus on the minesweepers to ensure this outcome.

Lessons for Today

What lessons might this suggest for today and tomorrow in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH)? The main lesson drawn from the Dardanelles is that minesweepers must be able to reach the mines and be able to conduct their mission safely once on-site. Today, the Avenger class MCM ships certainly face no problems against any open water currents. However, as modern mines have benefited from the drastic advances in electronics over the past decades, it is no longer advisable for MCM ships to put themselves into harm’s way to sweep mines. Modern influence mines can be set off by a wide variety of triggers: acoustic, magnetic, and pressure wave, just to name several[3] – the wood and fiberglass hulls of the Avengers will not guarantee safety. There is thus a move towards unmanned vehicles in order to keep sailors safe. Recently added to the USN MCM inventory was the SeaFox mine disposal system, meant to swim up to and explode against an identified mine. However, current battery technology means they can barely make six knots[4] – same as the Dardanelles minesweeping trawlers. SoH currents can run as high as 4.8 knots, depending on location and time of the year.[5] This reduces the effective range of the SeaFox, limiting the stand-off distance at which an Avenger can deploy the neutralizer. Thus, it will become very important to invest in better battery technologies to ensure manned MCM assets can stay as far back from the minefield as possible.

A Kongsberg REMUS 100 unmanned underwater vehicle being retrieved on one of USS Fort Worth LCS 3's boats in the South China Sea. Much like the Seafox, its speed (~4.5 knots) and endurance are limited and will struggle in areas of high current. U.S. Navy photo.
A Kongsberg REMUS 100 unmanned underwater vehicle being retrieved on one of USS Fort Worth LCS 3’s boats in the South China Sea. Much like the Seafox, its speed (~4.5 knots) and endurance are limited and will struggle in areas of high current. U.S. Navy photo.

Of course, MCM vessels cannot conduct the slow and onerous hunt for mines if they are under threat. While the distances of the SoH are large enough to preclude attacks from most Iranian shore howitzers, such is not the case for longer-ranged weapons like anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). ASCMs are, of course, much more expensive than mines or artillery shells – the targets chosen for them must be of high value. While the obvious target choice may be an American aircraft carrier, the reality is that most Iranian ASCMs are of older generations and would likely be easily foiled by USN anti-air systems: the chance of a successful strike is fairly low. Taking a page from the Ottomans, then, Iran would have more success if they were to direct their ASCMs against American and allied MCM vessels. Unarmed and lacking the screen of heavy escorts enjoyed by carriers, current MCM assets would be vulnerable and easily neutralized. Coalition naval forces and civilian traffic, lacking suitable protection from the hidden and deadly mines, would be forced to remain away from the Strait of Hormuz. Unable to achieve freedom of maneuver along all areas of the coast, America’s ability to project power ashore would be significantly limited, with consequences not just in wartime, but peacetime deterrence as well.

CNO Adm. Richardson inspects a Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle, part of the LCS MCM mission package. Despite continued reliability problems, the concept of a long-endurance and relatively high-speed unmanned minehunting vehicle is sound and crucial for a robust modern MCM capability. More conventional unmanned surface vehicles are being considered for the RMMV's role. U.S. Navy photo.
CNO Adm. Richardson inspects a Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle, part of the LCS MCM mission package. Despite continued reliability problems, the concept of a long-endurance and relatively high-speed unmanned minehunting vehicle is sound and crucial for a robust modern MCM capability. More conventional unmanned surface vehicles are being considered for the RMMV’s role. U.S. Navy photo.

So how might the USN alleviate this rather dire-looking situation? Firstly, it must recognize that MCM vessels are attractive targets that may be prioritized over capital units like carriers. Accordingly, equip MCM assets with self-defense capability. For all their other faults, the Littoral Combat Ships, destined to be the USN’s next MCM platform, at least have basic self-defence weapons in the form of RAM or SeaRAM. This is a good start, but the centrality of the mine threat means that MCM assets require greater protection. They should not operate unless under the protective umbrella of higher-end surface combatants or air support. There are risks to providing such protection, of course: USS Princeton’s mining in 1991 took place as she was escorting MCM assets[6] – air cover may be preferable.

Secondly, invest greater capital on technologies that will increase the speed of mine-clearing. The Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) has been experiencing difficulties, though many of them appear to have been resolved. It appears to be the only method that has any promise for quickly identifying mines – a MH-60 flying over the ocean is a lot faster than waiting for an underwater drone to swim and scan the area with sonar. Ideally, reinstating the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearing System (RAMICS) and fixing its targeting difficulties would also go a long way towards speeding up the clearing of near-surface mines[7]: if Iran chooses to mine the SoH, the world cannot afford the three years that it took for coalition forces to completely clear Iraqi mines after the 1991 Gulf War. While shipping can probably resume within a few weeks as soon as a transit lane has been cleared, insurance companies will be unlikely to reduce their rates until all mines have been cleared. The need for speed, so to speak, is thus paramount.

An MH-60S equipped with the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) flies near Bahrain during the ALMDS' maiden deployment. The ALMDS will play a crucial role in quickly detecting moored minefields before friendly vessels enter an area, but the helicopter will require protection. U.S. Navy Photo.
An MH-60S equipped with the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) flies near Bahrain during the ALMDS’ maiden deployment. The ALMDS will play a crucial role in quickly detecting moored minefields before friendly vessels enter an area, but the helicopter will require protection. U.S. Navy Photo.

Finally, any attempt at clearing the SoH of mines must be accompanied by efforts to ensure that Iran does not use or reuse it shores as staging points for further attack. Such efforts may require ground forces – a modern Gallipoli, as it were. However, given the American war-weariness after Iraq and Afghanistan, a heavy presence of boots on the ground will be highly unlikely, not to mention causing the undesirable landward escalation of a littoral campaign. The advent of unmanned aerial vehicles may well alleviate the problem. Persistent surveillance and prompt overhead precision strikes can ensure that Iranian missile and artillery batteries are unable to maneuver into attack positions. Unlike the howitzers in 1915, hills and valleys will not provide protection.

This essay has identified several difficulties the United States and its allies may face in the event of an Iranian mining of the Strait of Hormuz. It has also offered several areas – technological, tactical, and operational – that coalition forces will need to improve upon or address in order to increase chances of success. In the particular problem of a littoral area-denial operation by a small power against a large navy, mines remain an effective and efficient weapon requiring as much attention as the threats posed by high-tech anti-access platforms.

Timothy Choi is a PhD candidate at the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security, & Strategic Studies. Interested in all areas of maritime security and naval affairs, he struggles everyday with the fact that he studies at an institution located hundreds of kilometres away from the nearest ocean. When not on Twitter (@TimmyC62), he can be found building tiny ship models and plugging away at his dissertation on Scandinavian seapower.  

[1] Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes, “66. Keyes to his wife,” in 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern, vol. 1 of The Keyes Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Baron Keyes of Zeebrugge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 106.

[2] Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 117-118; Langensiepen and Güleryüz, The Ottoman Navy, 74;

[3] U.S. Navy, “21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare: Ensuring Global Access and Commerce” (PDF primer, June 2009), http://www.navy.mil/n85/miw_primer-june2009.pdf, 10.

[4] “SeaFox,” Atlas Electronik, last accessed January 20, 2016,  https://www.atlas-elektronik.com/what-we-do/unmanned-vehicles/seafox/.

[5] “Fujairah, UAE: Currents and Tides,” last modified February 2006, http://www.nrlmry.navy.mil/medports/mideastports/Fujairah/index.html; Prasad G. Thoppil and Patrick J. Hogan, ”On the Mechanisms of Episodic Salinity Overflow Events in the Strait of Hormuz,” Journal of Physical Oceanography 39(6): 1348.

[6] U.S. Navy, “21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare,” 14.

[7] Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 15.

Capability Analysis, Current Operations

Army’s Apaches Bring Fight to Maritime and Littoral Operations

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Littoral Arena Topic Week

By Aaron Jensen

Military operations in the littoral domain are typically associated with the navy and the marines. In the future however, the U.S. Army will also play a key role in maritime and littoral operations. Developments such as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)[1], as well as the Asia Pivot, have compelled the army to consider how it can best contribute to possible future conflicts. One area where the army is seeking to contribute is in the maritime domain. The army has been preparing its rotary-wing assets, especially the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, to fight in the maritime environment.

In recent years, Apache units have begun to train with their navy counterparts. In 2013, the Texas Army National Guard’s 36th Combat Aviation Brigade began testing its helicopters for operations at sea. From March through August, soldiers spent time aboard the amphibious transport docks Ponce and Green Bay, dock landing ship Rushmore and aircraft carrier John C. Stennis. During this time army aviators practiced deck landings, as well as live-fire practice.[i] In 2014, the Army sent eight Apaches from Fort Carson, Colorado to the U.S. Navy’s RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise where they conducted deck landings and simulated attacks against enemy ships.[ii]

The Apache’s impressive offensive capability is well suited for operations against smaller vessels at sea. In 2011, the British Army demonstrated the Apache’s lethality against maritime threats. During tests aboard the HMS Ocean, British Apaches fired nine Hellfire missiles (AGM-114) and 550 rounds from its canon against seaborne targets, achieving a 100% success rate.[iii]

An Apache attack helicopter of 656 Squadron Army Air Corps is pictured firing a Hellfire missile during an exercise conducted from HMS Ocean. Photographer: LA(PHOT) Guy Pool Image 45152700.jpg from www.defenceimages.mod.uk
An Apache attack helicopter of 656 Squadron Army Air Corps is pictured firing a Hellfire missile during an exercise conducted from HMS Ocean.
Photographer: LA(PHOT) Guy Pool
Image 45152700.jpg from www.defenceimages.mod.uk

Tests by the U.S. Army have also verified the Apache’s ability to execute missions in the maritime domain. In August, 2014 the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) conducted a series of tests on the Apache in different environments and mission tasks. For the maritime segment, Apaches were tasked to secure a shipping lane by defending against swarms of small enemy attack boats. The attack boats carried man-portable infrared missile-simulators to simulate a typical threat that would be posed by small boats. Threat radar systems were also simulated in several cases to simulate the danger from radar-guided missile launches. Over eight maritime mission tests, the Apaches performed well, receiving a score of 4.3 (out of a maximum score of 5) and nearly achieving complete success.[iv]

The Apache has also shown that it can operate from ships to attack land targets. During the 2011 military intervention against Libya (Operation Ellamy), several British Apaches operating from the HMS Ocean successfully destroyed targets in Libya. Utilizing Hellfire missiles and 30mm cannon fire, the Apaches destroyed a radar site and a military checkpoint.[v]

The army is modifying the Apache so that it will function better in a maritime environment. The Apache’s fire control radar will be upgraded so that it can more effectively detect and target small ships. Additional upgrades will also give the Apache the ability to better communicate and share information with assets from other services through a connection with LINK 16, a digital data link used widely by the U.S. Air Force and Navy.[vi] Further upgrades for operations at sea may also be necessary. The British Army is seeking to configure its Apaches with flotation devices to enable crew members to ditch in the event of an emergency over water.[vii] As U.S. Apaches move toward maritime operations, similar modifications may be necessary.

The Apache’s lethality is further amplified by its ability to interface with unmanned aerial systems under the manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) concept. The army is in the process of integrating the RQ-7B Shadow tactical unmanned aerial system into Apache units.[viii] Under this arrangement, Apache crews can receive data from the Shadow, and even take control of the drone itself. The development of MUM-T capability appears to be paying off for the Apache. In Afghanistan, some Apache units have received help from drones in 60% of direct fire missions.[ix] The ability to receive information from UAVs will provide Apache crews with greater situational awareness and improved ability to detect targets.

Apache operating on USS Bonhomme Richard. U.S. Navy photo.
Apache operating on USS Bonhomme Richard. U.S. Navy photo.

In preparation for its new mission, army aviators have been working with their navy counterparts to develop Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) to effectively utilize Apaches in a maritime role. In 2014, the South Carolina Army National Guard’s 1-151st Attack Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) sent several aviators to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC). During the exchange, U.S. Navy Rotary Wing Weapon School instructors shared information on Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR) tactics to protect navy vessels in confined littoral waters.[x] Similarly, the Texas Army National Guard’s 36th Combat Aviation Brigade has also been developing TTPs for operations against small attack craft.

The threat from swarms of fast attack craft operated by countries like Iran poses a serious challenge to the U.S. Navy. The deadly asymmetric which fast attack craft present to larger ships was well documented during exercise Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02). In this scenario, a Middle Eastern nation conducted attacks on the U.S. Navy with swarms of fast attack craft and anti-ship missiles. The results of the test were disastrous as sixteen ships, including an aircraft carrier and two amphibious assault ships were destroyed.[xi] The intent of countries to employ swarms of small attack boats against larger ships was vividly illustrated in February, 2015 when the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) conducted a live-fire exercise against a mock-up of an aircraft carrier. Expressing confidence in their ability, Admiral Ali Fadavi of the IRGCN boasted that his forces could sink American aircraft carriers.[xii]

In the Pacific, modern fast-attack craft such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Type 022 ‘Houbei’ could also present a serious threat to the U.S. Navy. In recent naval exercises, the PLAN has emphasized the use of the Type 022 fast attack craft against aircraft carriers using multi-axis attacks.[xiii] The Type 022 packs a powerful punch for its size, carrying eight YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missiles with a 135 nm range.

With growing challenges to U.S. military operations in areas such as the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea, the military will need to fully utilize and integrate the full range of its assets. The inclusion of maritime and littoral operations into the Apache’s mission spectrum constitutes an important step in furthering joint operations.

Aaron Jensen is a PhD student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taipei, Taiwan.

[1] JAM-GC is the successor to the Air-Sea Battle concept.

[i] Meghann Myers, “Army helicopters fly from Navy ships, test joint ops,” Navy Times, September 5, 2103. http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20130905/NEWS/309050004/Army-helicopters-fly-from-Navy-ships-test-joint-ops 

[ii] William Cole, “Army tests Apaches during RIMPAC exercises at sea,” The Honolulu Star-Advertiser, July 28, 2014. http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/army-tests-apaches-during-rimpac-exercises-at-sea-1.295581/apache-rimpac-2014-1.295605

[iii] “Army’s Apache fires first Hellfire missiles at sea,” UK Ministry of Defence, May 13, 2011.

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/armys-apache-fires-first-hellfire-missiles-at-sea

[iv] “Lot 4 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report” Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), December 15, 2014. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a617060.pdf

[v] Kim Sengupta, “Libya: Flashes of orange and shattering noise as Apaches go to war” The Telegraph, June 4, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8557266/Libya-Flashes-of-orange-and-shattering-noise-as-Apaches-go-to-war.html

[vi] Kris Osborn, “Army Configures Apaches for Sea Duty,” DOD Buzz, October 13, 2014.

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/10/13/army-configures-apaches-for-sea-duty/

[vii] Andrew Chuter, “Flotation Equipment slotted for U.K. Apaches,” Defense News, February 8, 2013. http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20130208/DEFREG01/302080018/Flotation-Equipment-Slotted-U-K-Apaches

[viii] Beth Stevenson, “US Army establishes first manned unmanned unit,” Flightglobal, March 24, 2015. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-army-establishes-first-manned-unmanned-unit-410504/

[ix] Richard Whittle, “MUM-T Is The Word For AH-64E: Helos Fly, Use Drones” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2015. http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/mum-t-is-the-word-for-ah-64e-helos-fly-use-drones/

[x] Matt Summey, “1-151st Attack Reconnaissance Battalion holds strong bond with U.S. Navy,” South Carolina National Guard, March 13, 2014. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/121969

[xi] Brett Davis, “LEARNING CURVE: IRANIAN ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE AND MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 14, 2014. https://cimsec.org/learning-curve-iranian-asymmetrical-warfare-millennium-challenge-2002-2/11640

[xii] Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran’s Navy Blasts Away at a Mock U.S. Carrier,” The New York Times, February 25, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/world/middleeast/in-mock-attack-iranian-navy-blasts-away-at-replica-us-aircraft-carrier.html?_r=0

[xiii] John Patch, “Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft: Beyond Sea Denial,” in China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities, edited by Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, China Maritime Studies Institute, February 2014. https://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/publications

Capability Analysis

Would Britain Really be Back as a Traditional Carrier Power?

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This article originally appeared on RealClearDefense. It can be read in its original form here.

By Ben Ho Wan Beng

The United Kingdom’s new national security document – the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (SDSR 2015) – was released to much fanfare. This document has been generally well received in the defense community with most analysts believing that the review’s proposed changes would profoundly boost Britain’s military capabilities in the coming years. 

Among SDSR 2015’s myriad initiatives, particularly eye-catching is the reiteration by London to have a two-carrier fleet comprising HMS Queen Elizabeth and sister ship Prince of Wales. Paralleled to this is the decision to acquire 138 F-35B Lightning II Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) strike fighters over the life of the aircraft program. 

Various defense commentators have lauded these measures, arguing that Britain is now on its way to becoming a traditional aircraft-carrier nation again with the F-35B operating from the Queen Elizabeths. To illustrate, Philip Radford writes at The Strategist that the Royal Navy (RN) would soon have a “viable, independent, strike-carrier capability”. Similarly, a War On The Rocks piece by Matt Schnappauf speaks of the U.K. obtaining the ability to “deliver hard power through traditional carrier strike and maneuver missions.” 

Would this really be the case? Arguably not during the first few years of the two British flat-tops’ projected 50-year service life. This is because their primary striking force – the F-35B complement – is likely to be considerably under-strength during their early years. 

The raison d’etre of the aircraft carrier is its air wing, and the latter’s size and composition dictate the kind of operations the ship can carry out. A major doctrinal role for the flat-top is to project power and being able to carry out offensive missions is therefore essential for the vessel. Being a capital platform, however, the protection of the carrier is of utmost importance to its commanders, and a good portion of the ship’s air wing will invariably be dedicated to fleet air defense. 

The onus is thus on the carrier task force leadership to maintain a judicious balance between defense and offense. Having a sizeable air wing on the carrier would certainly facilitate this endeavor, but this is not something the Queen Elizabeth-class vessels will have up till the year 2023 and maybe even beyond. 

This is because although the new British carriers can each deploy up to 36 F-35Bs as part of its Tailored Air Group, a fraction of that figure is likely to be the norm during the ships’ fledging service period as there will not be enough of the aircraft to go around initially. Indeed, while theQueen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales are slated to be commissioned in 2017 and 2020 respectively, only 42 F-35Bs (24 for carrier deployment, 18 for training) will be in service by 2023 when both vessels and the F-35B are expected to reach full operational capability. 

As Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne declared a day before the release of SDSR 2015: “We are going to make sure that when these aircraft carriers are available, they are going to have planes that can fly from them in force (emphasis added)… By 2023, we will be able to have 24 of these jets (F-35Bs)… on the decks of these carriers.”

That being said, it is not entirely clear exactly how many F-35Bs each flat-top will operate. Using the figure provided by the Chancellor, 24 of the aircraft for carrier duty works out to a measly 12 per ship, prima facie. As a matter of fact, various media outlets have reported that the carrier will routinely deploy with only a dozen of the aircraft. However, one informed source states that 15-20 F-35Bs will make up one squadron, of which there will be two. Given that one carrier and its constituents will be at sea at any one time while the other in port for refitting and crew rest, this means that each flat-top is likely to deploy with only one Lightning squadron. 

A tactical combat aircraft complement of 12, or even 15-20, is rather small for traditional carrier operations, especially force-projection ones that are likely to predominate considering the SDSR’s expeditionary-warfare slant. Indeed, it is worth considering the fact that the two British small-deck carriers involved in the Falklands War carried 20-odd Harrier jump jets each, and they were about three times smaller than the Queen Elizabeth-class ships.

In fact, each new carrier might even be operating with a much fighter complement fewer than 15-20 in the years leading up to 2023, giving lie to the phrase “in force” used by George Osborne when he spoke of equipping the carriers with significant airpower. 

In any case, the small fighter constituent means that if the Queen Elizabeth carrier were to get involved in a conflict with an adversary with credible anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the vessel would be hard-pressed to protect itself, let alone project power. With a displacement of over 70,000 tons and costing over three billion pounds each, the new British carriers will be the crown jewels of the Royal Navy; indeed, HMS Queen Elizabeth is slated to be the RN’s flagship when she comes into service. The protection of the ship would hence be of paramount importance in an era that has witnessed the proliferation of A2/AD capabilities even to developing nations. Hence for a Queen Elizabeth carrying 20 or less Lightnings in such circumstances, it remains to be seen just how many of the aircraft will be earmarked for different duties. 

Should a F-35B air group of that size put to sea, at least half of them will be assigned to the Combat Air Patrol (CAP), leaving barely 10 for offensive duties. It is worth noting that of the 42 Harrier VSTOL jets deployed on HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible during the Falklands War, 28 of them – a substantial two-thirds – had CAP as their primary duty. It is also telling that of the 1,300-odd sorties flown in all by the Harriers, about 83 per cent of them were for CAP. 

Faced with modern A2/AD systems such as stand-off anti-ship missiles, how likely then would the carrier task force commander devote more resources to offense and risk having a vessel named after British royalty attacked and hit? Having said that, having too many planes for defense strengthens the argument made by various carrier critics that the ship is a “self-licking ice cream cone,” in other words, an entity that exists solely to sustain itself. 

The task force commander would thus be caught between a rock and a hard place. Allocate more F-35Bs to strike missions and the susceptibility of the task force to aerial threats increase. Conversely, set aside more aircraft for the CAP and its mother ship’s ability to project power decreases. All in all, with a significantly understrength F-35B air wing, the Queen Elizabethflat-top would be operating under severe constraints, making it incapable of the traditional carrier operations it could have carried out with a larger tactical aircraft complement. Indeed, one naval commentator is right on the mark when he argues that two squadrons with a total of 24 aircraft should be a “sensible minimum standard” for each carrier. 

A counter-argument can be posited that the F-35Bs of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) could deploy off the Queen Elizabeth carriers, and this will surely augment their air groups. Indeed, USNI News reported last September that such an arrangement is in the works. A similar counter-argument can also be made that the British carriers will invariably be operating in the company of the U.S. Navy and its supercarriers, rendering the need for a full-size air group not as pressing. While valid, these two contentions ignore the fact that American assets would only operate together with the Queen Elizabeth carriers during joint operations agreed to by both London and Washington. 

Another counter-argument can be made that the two British flat-tops can operate together once Prince of Wales is commissioned, thus doubling the combat airpower of the carrier task force. This argument is flawed as it does not consider the fact that aircraft carriers are highly complex systems that need regular and lengthy refits. As such, when both Queen Elizabeths are in service, one is likely to be at sea while the other is in port undergoing maintenance, as mentioned earlier. Even if both ships happen to be sea-worthy at the same time, operating the two together, however, means that Britain would not be able to maintain the continuous at-sea carrier presence crucial to protecting its far-flung global interests. 

A different counter-argument can be put forth that aircraft and crew from the 18 training F-35Bs, or even the other carrier, could be “surged” in extremis to the active-duty carrier. This assertion is seemingly more watertight, but it is not certain exactly how many of the aircraft and the requisite personnel to operate and maintain them would be available for redeployment to the flat-top at sea. As an article on the Navy Matters blog argues cogently along these lines: 

“Those who might suggest that the a dozen aircraft are just fine for routine operations and that the rest of the aircraft can be instantly surged are just not seeing reality. The F-35 is not a WWI powered kite that can be piloted by someone with a few hours training and maintained by any mechanic with a pipe wrench. Surging F-35s may take weeks or months and a carrier caught in a moment’s notice conflict will be severely limited in its capabilities.” 

Even if a considerable number of Lightnings and their requisite crew could be surged to the active-duty carrier on relatively short notice, it remains to be seen how effectively the augmented air wing could be utilized. As the aforementioned Navy Matters piece maintains perceptively, the transition from operating a dozen or so aircraft to 30-40 of them is unlikely to be seamless for the carrier; in addition, “(l)earning on the fly on a carrier is a recipe for disaster.” 

Rounding up, the Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015 promises much for Britain in terms of aircraft carrier capability. While the document seeks to re-instate the U.K. as a traditional carrier power, it is still early days to proclaim that this will be a reality like what some have maintained. This is especially so considering the fact that the Queen Elizabeth flat-tops will be operating with a significantly reduced tactical aircraft complement till at least 2023. Of course, if the size of the British carrier’s F-35B complement could be increased, ideally closer to its full strength of 36, more possibilities will definitely open up for the Royal Navy with regard to its carrier capabilities. 

Then again, this is contingent on the availability of financial resources in the years to come. This is especially crucial in view of the fact that various British naval programmers have been truncated or even completely shelved due to austerity. Think the Type 45 destroyer and the Cooperative Engagement Capability initiatives. In fact, HMS Prince of Wales was conceived at one stage to handle more capable catapult-launched aircraft, but prohibitive costs put paid to this idea. 

That being said, if there is one thing that could ameliorate any fiscal problems that may arise in the future, it would be political will. Would Whitehall muster the political will needed to see the F-35B project through to its entirety? This is an issue that the defense community will certainly keep tabs on in the years to come.

Ben Ho Wan Beng is a Senior Analyst with the Military Studies Programme at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and he received his master’s degree in strategic studies from the same institution. Ben’s main research interest is in naval affairs, and his works in this area have been published inBreaking Defense, The Diplomat, War Is Boring, as well as the Center for International Maritime Security’sNextWar blog. He can be reached at [email protected].