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Chokepoints and Littorals Week

Strategic Chokepoints and Littorals Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

During these past two weeks, CIMSEC featured a wide array of publications on strategic maritime chokepoints and littorals, submitted in response to our call for articles issued in partnership with the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity of U.S. Marine Corps University. This turned out to be one of the most packed CIMSEC topic weeks in recent memory, and one of the most insightful.

Maritime chokepoints and littorals remain strategic areas of interest in global strategy and potential warfighting campaigns. CIMSEC contributors pointed to a number of themes that can shape strategic calculations with respect to these critical geographic features.

Chokepoints and littorals magnify the influence of nearby states, who often by other measurements of national power are seen as lesser nations relative to major states. Yet in times of conflict or crisis, it is major states who could very well come to depend on these littoral nations for critical support and access, nations whose political sensitivities can powerfully constrain diplomatic and warfighting options for great powers. Even non-state actors, such as insurgents or pirates, can force multinational responses and contingency planning through small-scale actions in a chokepoint of global import.

Another major theme authors touched upon was the role of strategic chokepoints and littorals in emerging American warfighting concepts, particularly those of the U.S. Marine Corps that encompass archipelagic defense. As the Marine Corps transforms into a stand-in force that can hold the line against a great power while enabling follow-on access from friendly forces, it will have to master schemes of fire and maneuver across the vast array of chokepoints and littorals within Western Pacific island chains. Some authors envisioned the Marines as an anti-shipping force, with a few touching on the vital role mine warfare in particular can play in contesting chokepoints and manipulating an adversary’s avenues of access, while also bemoaning U.S. naval forces’ longstanding lack of interest in offensive mining. As U.S. forces develop new warfighting concepts for the Pacific, it is clear that open-ocean combat and fighting for chokepoints and littorals are two sides of the same coin. As 21st century great power competition begins to take shape, one can look to the world’s coastlines to find its major contours.

Authors also challenged traditional ideas of chokepoints being fixed geographic areas, whose influence is as supposedly permanent as their location. And yet the world is witnessing major changes that are redefining the chokepoint and its value. The Arctic is melting away, revealing a complex mosaic of chokepoints and littorals that will lend themselves toward new lines of communication for global commerce, as well as new zones of competition. Chokepoints may also emerge not as geographic features, but as more abstract zones that develop within the seams of operational concepts, intelligence collection abilities, diplomatic clout, and even in in the information environment. Their constraining effect remains the same, but the ability to adjust to their influence becomes much more complex than simply being in the right place at the right time.

Strategic chokepoints and littorals will continue to have major influence on world events, both in peace and in conflict. Today as thousands of ships sail through these narrow channels and naval forces traverse nearby waters, the access these zones create may have become an assumed feature of global activity. But should that access come under threat or become outright contested, the vital importance these areas will hold will become all too apparent, and in the form of consequences that could ripple across the globe.

Below are the articles that featured during the extended topic week, with excerpts. We thank these authors for their excellent contributions.

Sea Control 180 – Narrow Seas: The Black Sea with Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.) by Jared Samuelson

Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.), former commander, U.S. Army Europe, stops by the podcast to discuss lessons learned from the exercise Defender 2020, Russia’s Black Sea strategy, and the importance of the Black Sea to NATO. 

“Let Me Get this Strait: The Turkish Straits Question Revisited” by Paul Pryce

Since 1936, the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, hereinafter referred to as the Montreux Convention, has allowed for the peaceful flow of commerce through the Turkish Straits. However, recent calls from Turkish and Russian policy circles for revisions to the Montreux Convention should be cause for concern, as these proposals threaten to either spur a naval arms race in the Black Sea region or look to exploit the Straits as a geostrategic chokepoint.

“The Assumption of Access in the Western Pacific” by Elee Wakim and Blake Herzinger

The cornerstone of this power projection complex in the western Pacific is forward deployed military forces, which are in turn enabled by the availability of proximate and friendly basing in theater. However, the ability of the United States to sustainably conduct expeditionary operations in the strategic chokepoints and littorals of Asia could crumble in the absence of the allied access it has come to rely on.

“Mine the Littorals and Chokepoints: Mine Warfare in Support of Sea Control” by Major Brian Kerg, USMC

While DMO and EABO provide the essential building blocks of sea control and denial, their deterrent power can be exponentially increased through the integration of mine warfare. Whether deployed between EABs by ExMIW companies, activated from UFPs and maneuvered into place as the situation dictates, or fired into shallow waters with the modified Quickstrike-ER and moved as required by C2 systems, MIW is the most promising yet underdeveloped capability for today’s maritime strategists.

“There are no Strategic Chokepoints” by Captain Jamie McGrath, USN (ret.)

Military strategists often speak as Fisher did of strategic chokepoints, believing them to have significant geopolitical value and act as epicenters for maritime strategy, where the control of which is considered vital for success in maritime conflict. But are these chokepoints truly strategic? Does the success of a nation’s maritime strategy actually hinge on the control or loss of control of these narrow seas?

“An Emerging Strategic Geometry – Thawing Chokepoints and Littorals in the Arctic” by Robert C. Rasmussen

The ongoing transformation of the Arctic from an inaccessible frozen wasteland to an accessible and untapped reserve creates not only a new contested space, but will create new strategic chokepoints and littoral operating environments. The United States, in concert with its allies, will need to invest in the ability to access and secure this environment in order to maintain sovereignty and security in this new world.

“The Strategic Littoral Geography of Southeast Asia” by Pete McPhail, Arthur Speyer, Bret Rodgers, Steve Ostrosky, Jesse Burns, and Dan Marquis

The INDOPACOM AOR continues to be a primary focus of U.S. naval forces, and the area is of central importance to China. This map describes the strategic importance of Southeast Asian littoral geography to China’s interests. By studying the map the user sees correlations between China’s diplomatic and economic investments and chokepoint geography.

“Chiseled in Space: Temporary, Non-Geographic Chokepoints in the Battle of the Atlantic” by Heather Venable

Much can be gained, then, by conceptualizing chokepoints more broadly as areas of temporary advantage that may be created or destroyed through the application of either new capabilities or existing ones in ingenuous ways to create an outsized advantage. In the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, these types of chokepoints resulted in the greatest strategic effect. 

“Thinking Like a Pirate: Contesting Southeast Asia’s Chokepoints” by Drake Long

The chokepoints and littorals surrounding Indonesian and Philippine waters would make for excellent forward positioning for a Marine Corps stand-in force. It would provide a critical bulwark for U.S. force posture in the Pacific by facilitating access for follow-on forces from allied Australia, and access into the South China and Philippine Seas.

“Sea Control 181 – The ‘Amphibious’ 8th in the Pacific War” with Jared Samuelson, Major General Pat Donahoe, and Don Chisholm

Major General Pat Donahoe, Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. 8th Army, and Prof. Don Chisholm of the U.S. Naval War College join us to discuss why the 8th Army is known as “the Amphibious 8th,” the campaign through the southern Philippines in World War II, Admiral Daniel Barbey, and the different amphibious cultures that emerged during the war.

“Sink ‘Em All: Envisioning Marine Corps Maritime Interdiction” by Dustin League and Dan Justice

The drone circling overhead continued to pace them, repeating its message, its demands growing increasingly terse and harsh. The ship’s master counted no less than three times his vessel was threatened with lethal force with never a blip on the radar to indicate a closing vessel or aircraft. Open seas, open skies, and toothless demands. Twenty-five minutes after the initial challenge, two long-range anti-ship missiles, their telemetry continually updated by the overhead drone, slammed into the Píng Jìng De Hǎi Yáng.

“Seeing the World Through Points” by Captain H. Clifton Hamilton, USMC

Strategic chokepoints and littorals are the arena of current and future power struggles. Great power competition is layered within these maritime and littoral domains. To a lesser extent, but still consequential, are the potential actions of regional and non-state actors capable of causing disruption along maritime chokepoints and littoral zones. The United States will be required to address multi-layered challenges to its maritime dominance in these areas while also fulfilling the role of humanitarian and the facilitator of free and open commerce.

“Guarding the Gates: Is International Naval Control of the Bab Al Mandeb Feasible?” by Elizabeth White

Many a discussion of the Bab Al Mandeb Strait starts with the translation from the Arabic name (Gate of Tears) as an introduction to the chokepoint’s woes. They are not wrong to do so. The Gate of Tears seems to be a place of permanent melancholy, surrounded by a depressing miasma of conflict, state failure, famine, crime, and now global pandemic. Unfortunately for all concerned, it is also the key trading route between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

“Developing Security in a White Water World: Preparing for the Arctic” by Ian Birdwell

The Arctic is changing physically and the security dimensions of the region are changing along with it. The region will not be ice-free overnight, and the United States is not without partners in addressing those changing strategic considerations. It behooves the United States to not pursue a hardline balancing arrangement against Russian militarization and instead pursue what it has been doing for some time, preparing for the potential of Arctic operations across all service branches.

“Does Tomorrow Ever Truly Die?” by Capt. John Holmes, USMC

My cinematic reveries were interrupted when it became apparent that 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies, starring Pierce Brosnan as the titular hero, was a lot closer to our current reality than I had ever expected. Themes of great power competition, technological proliferation, state and non-state conflict, media manipulation, and conflict in the strategic waterways and littorals, which may have seemed somewhat out of place in 1997, feel all too prescient in 2020. 

“Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Mine Warfare in Littoral Control” by Mark Howard

Naval mines have the ability to shape the battlespace, manage vertical escalation of hostilities, act as cost-effective force multipliers, and are a proven coercive diplomatic tool that can have deep psychological and strategic impact. With advancements in naval mines and the changing naval threat environment, the USMC should reconsider the role of mine warfare to explore how it may complement nascent force development and warfighting concepts.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: SUEZ CANAL (March 16, 2013) The aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) transits the Suez Canal. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Kameren Guy Hodnett/Released)

Chokepoints and Littorals Week

Strategic Chokepoints and Littorals Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC received a tremendous response to our call for articles on strategic chokepoints and littorals, issued in partnership with U.S. Marine Corps University’s Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity, and as a part of Project Trident. Because of the high volume of excellent submissions received, this topic week will be extended through June 12. 

The authors took insightful and creative approaches toward exploring the significance of strategic chokepoints and littorals. One major theme is that chokepoints, usually thought of as fixed areas, are becoming more flexible in definition and function. Whether it be new chokepoints emerging in the Arctic as the ice thaws, or more abstract chokepoints flowing from gaps in operational concepts, it is clear that the nature of the chokepoint itself is evolving. What remains consistent is that the final value of influencing chokepoints and littorals is not defined by simply controlling adjacent geography, but whether economic and military access is ultimately preserved and sustained.

Another critical theme the authors point to is how great power competition is affecting the role of chokepoints and littorals. Chokepoints and littorals have often been considered as an arena for mainly competing against non-state actors or third-rate states in the developing world. But with great power competition on the rise, chokepoints and littorals are emerging as the front line in potential battlegrounds. Authors looked at the role of new technology and warfighting concepts in contesting chokepoints and littorals in great power conflict, especially through the lens of emerging constructs such as U.S. Marine Corps’ stand-in forces and expeditionary advanced bases.

Below is the lineup of articles featuring during the topic week, which will be updated as more publications are finalized.

Sea Control 180 – Narrow Seas: The Black Sea with Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.) by Jared Samuelson
“Let Me Get this Strait: The Turkish Straits Question Revisited” by Paul Pryce
“The Assumption of Access in the Western Pacific” by Elee Wakim and Blake Herzinger
“Mine the Littorals and Chokepoints: Mine Warfare in Support of Sea Control” by Major Brian Kerg, USMC
“There are no Strategic Chokepoints” by Captain Jamie McGrath, USN (ret.)
“An Emerging Strategic Geometry – Thawing Chokepoints and Littorals in the Arctic” by Robert C. Rasmussen
“The Strategic Littoral Geography of Southeast Asia” by Pete McPhail, Arthur Speyer, Bret Rodgers, Steve Ostrosky, Jesse Burns, and Dan Marquis
“Chiseled in Space: Temporary, Non-Geographic Chokepoints in the Battle of the Atlantic” by Heather Venable
“Thinking Like a Pirate: Contesting Southeast Asia’s Chokepoints” by Drake Long
“Sea Control 181 – The ‘Amphibious’ 8th in the Pacific War” with Jared Samuelson, Major General Pat Donahoe, and Don Chisholm
“Sink ‘Em All: Envisioning Marine Corps Maritime Interdiction” by Dustin League and Dan Justice
“Seeing the World Through Points” by Captain H. Clifton Hamilton, USMC
“Guarding the Gates: Is International Naval Control of the Bab Al Mandeb Feasible?” by Elizabeth White
“Developing Security in a White Water World: Preparing for the Arctic” by Ian Birdwell
“Does Tomorrow Ever Truly Die?” by Capt. John Holmes, USMC
“Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Mine Warfare in Littoral Control” by Mark Howard

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: The Strait of Taiwan, located between the coast of southeast China and Taiwan. (Gallo Images/Getty Images)

Interviews

Vice Admiral Brian Brown On the U.S. Naval Information Warfare Community

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By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss the formation and future of the U.S. Navy’s Information Warfare (IW) community with Vice Admiral Brian B. Brown, commander of U.S. Naval Information forces (NAVIFOR). In this discussion, Vice Admiral Brown discusses how the IW community came together, how it is delivering capability to the fleet, and how information warfare is featuring in an era of great power competition.

The IW community was founded 10 years ago and saw the establishment of its own warfighting development center (NIWDC), numbered fleet command (10th Fleet), type command (NAVIFOR), and other critical components. What has the journey of establishing this community been like? 

First, I have to give due credit to the founding fathers of what we call Information Warfare today, strategic thinkers like then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Gary Roughead and Vice Adm. Jack Dorsett (the first N2/N6). Over ten years ago, those two leaders had the vision and foresight to see that we needed to reorganize to meet the needs of warfighting in the Information Age. And then they took the decisive action that made that vision real.

We started as a collection of high-performing individual specialties, including Information Professionals (IP), Intelligence, Cryptologic Warfare (CW), Meteorology/Oceanography (METOC), and the Space Cadre, which were originally established together as the information dominance corps (IDC). This was later rebranded under CNO Adm. John Richardson as the Information Warfare (IW) community. The change of IDC to IW community was more than just a name change. It was a recognition of our community’s value in delivering battle-minded warfighters and capabilities to the full spectrum of warfighting. Our current CNO, Adm. Mike Gilday, was a commander of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet, so the IW community continues to be a focus area at all levels.

It would be an understatement to say that we face more complex challenges in this information-based era of great power competition. It is now a much more cognitive operating space and requires a different kind of fighting force. We find ourselves in a time where information, no longer just firepower, brings true advantage. How effectively we operate in this information space determines our ability to decisively act faster than our competition.

Monterey, Calif. (January 17, 2020) Vice Adm. Brian B. Brown, commander, Naval Information Forces, discusses chief of naval operations’ strategic intent and Sailor readiness during an all-hands call and visit to Information Warfare Training Command (IWTC) Monterey. (U.S. Navy photo by Cryptologic Technician (Interpretive) 3rd Class Shelby Sims)

We have come a long way in the past 10 years. While each information-based skillset brings significant and needed capabilities (the Navy still needs great intelligence, IP, CW, METOC professionals, and space expertise), this is a true case of the sum being greater than its parts. The combination of these capabilities brings winning advantage to the Navy’s needs in today’s complex fight. 

In the IW domain, you are constantly dealing with competitors every day, with DCNO for IW Vice Adm. Kohler stating “We consider ourselves in contact with the adversary now.” The Navy traditionally has its Phase 0 to Phase 5 spectrum of operations, but how does this apply to IW operations? How does the IW community balance winning the daily fight with being ready for what may be needed in a major conflict?

In today’s complex warfighting environment, we talk less about phases and more about the spectrum of conflict. That spectrum spans from so-called day-to-day/peaceful presence, through escalation and all the way up to lethal combat. We absolutely have to be ready for that high-end fight – lethal combat, but we also need to be successful across the entire spectrum.

Having said that, though, even in the peaceful presence side of the spectrum, there is daily conflict in the cyber domain. Both state and non-state actors leverage cyber to gain advantage in the strategic space below the threshold of armed conflict. Activity in this left-of-conflict spectrum run the gamut from intellectual property theft, to election interference, to ransomware and DDoS attacks, just to name a few. From a Navy IW perspective, this conflict at the left end of the spectrum is more than cyber, it is also contested engagement in intelligence, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum, and in understanding the physical domain.

Information Warfare is in that fight today in all those areas. The keys to this success are two-fold. First, we must defend forward. A great power’s weaponized information and influence operations are possible because of cyberspace. Defending forward means defending U.S. critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity, individually or as part of a campaign, to prevent a significant cyber incident. Second, we must maintain persistent engagement. In cyberspace, this means the continuous execution of the full spectrum of cyberspace operations to achieve and maintain cyberspace superiority, including defending vulnerable networks through maintaining advantage in the electromagnetic spectrum.

Navy IW professionals use sensors, systems, and information to generate operational outcomes—passively and actively in all domains. While all those systems provide the tools to fight and win across the spectrum, people remain our greatest asymmetric advantage. We are fully using existing personnel policies and are constantly looking for new methods to attract and retain the best and brightest personnel. We need to maintain technical talent and personnel overmatch that includes our active and reserve uniformed personnel, as well as our civilian workforce. The Navy’s IW skillsets are needed more than ever in the daily fight of today as well as to be prepared for any potential high-end conflict.

How does information warfare fit into the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept and other future warfighting concepts?

DoD’s and, in particular, the Navy’s primary mission is to protect the nation by defending forward. In the IW domain, that means disrupting and halting threats before they reach our networks or our forces. In the current era of great power competition, the concept of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) provides the ability for the fleet to maneuver effectively for advantage in a distributed manner, to create dilemmas for an adversary, while simultaneously maintaining the benefits of force integration. To accomplish that kind of maneuver across potentially multiple maritime combat formations requires all that IW delivers. The glue that pulls that all together is the collective set of IW capabilities.

Information warfare is a deeply cross-cutting discipline. How has the rise and establishment of the IW community elevated the understanding of IW more generally across the Navy’s communities? 

IW is a warfighting discipline, a set of warfighting capabilities, and a key enabler for all Navy mission areas. It underpins every warfighting domain from sea to land, to air, to undersea, to cyber, to space. It is a complex capability comprised of humans, machines, electromagnetic spectrum, and data that, when effectively combined, provides our force with non-kinetic options, increases the lethality of kinetic options, enables Distributed Maritime Operations, and delivers critical advantages in great power competition.

Over the past 10 years, the IW community has continued to further integrate fleet operations to provide vital decision space for our commanders. It is through collective IW capabilities that data from multiple sources are optimally transferred into actionable information to use for operational superiority.

One way the IW community has been elevated within the Navy is with the establishment of the Information Warfare Commander afloat. For several years now, the Navy has been operating with a senior, board-screened, post O-6 command tour IW captain as the warfare commander for information warfare on carrier strike groups, equal to other traditional warfare commanders. Based on value, the demand is expanding to amphibious ready groups and expeditionary strike groups.

We also have the Naval Information Warfare Development Center (NIWDC), established in 2017, that works with the other community Warfare Development Centers (WDCs) and the Naval Warfare Development Center (NWDC) to ensure our concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures are fully integrated. This integration is critical, because the collective IW capabilities that assure command and control, provide predictive battlespace awareness, and deliver integrated IW fires are integral to all plans and operations.

What has been done to make IW capability and capacity more easily leveraged by sailors and commanders on the deckplate and afloat?

I’ve already mentioned the IW Commander Afloat role and the NIWDC, which bring the capabilities directly to the fleet, but I would also add that we have created an IW Training Group. This organization is analogous to and works closely with the long-standing Afloat Training Group structure to train individual ships and crews in IW capabilities at the deckplate level. This, along with NIWDC, is overseen by the IW Type Commander (TYCOM) – Naval Information Forces (NAVIFOR), which was established six years ago.

From the cybersecurity of the naval industrial base to hiring top-notch civilian talent, IW arguably demands an especially close relationship with the private sector. How do you view the nature of the IW community’s relationships that go beyond government?

Put simply, we could not succeed without our partners in industry. We work very closely with industry reps, at all levels, to ensure that the capabilities the Navy and Joint Force need to fight and win in the IW domain are available when needed. We feature significantly in a wide range of industry-focused forums, such as the annual USNI/AFCEA WEST Conference in San Diego, AFCEA EAST in Norfolk, and the Navy League’s Sea Air Space Symposium here in Washington, D.C., to build and maintain those relationships.

San Diego, Calif. (Feb. 13, 2019) Vice Adm. Brian B. Brown (center), commander, Naval Information Forces, speaks with Aerographer’s Mate 2nd Class Annalina DiMaggio (left) and Aerographer’s Mate 1st Class Deserae Laczniak (right) from Naval Oceanographic Special Warfare Center (NOSWC), at the Information Warfare Pavilion while attending WEST 2019.

From year one of our existence, we have co-sponsored, with AFCEA and the Naval Intelligence Professionals organization, an annual IW Industry Day. This IW Industry Day provides a day-long series of briefs and discussions, in a classified venue, to allow us to discuss where the Navy and Information Warfare in particular, are focusing our efforts and what we need to fight and win. We have had up to 500 industry representatives attend our most recent event. And, of course, I and my fellow IW military and civilian leaders participate in various other industry breakfast, luncheons, meetings, and conferences throughout any given year.

With the advent of technologies like artificial intelligence and big data, some suggest we may be in the midst of an IW-driven revolution in warfighting. How do you view the potential of IW to transform the nature of the warfighter and warfighting going into the future?

These technologies bring significant capability, with increasingly more expected. We spend a good deal of effort focused on what those new technologies mean to us, and how they can improve our capabilities. These new technologies will continue to advance how we train and fight, not just in IW, but in every domain. We work hand-in-glove with the Office of Naval Research, and across the Navy staff and the fleet, to continually harness this revolution in technology to give the Navy and Marines Corps team the edge we need to succeed, across the spectrum of conflict and operations. We will be directly involved in developing and employing the advantages to be gained through the use of revolutionary technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning.

Any final thoughts to share?

The recognition of the need for IW capabilities is now universal across the Department of Defense. We (the Navy) may have gotten to the table earlier, but all our sister services now have in place their own organizations aligned to the spirit of information warfare and are employing and building capabilities in the information domain. Each service may do it a little bit differently based on their own unique service cultures, but all understand the importance of harnessing these capabilities to fight and win today and in the future.

The Air Force, for example, combined their A2 (Intelligence) and A6 (Communications) directorates at the headquarters level here in the Pentagon as we did, while also creating the 16th Air Force at the next level down. Within the Department of the Navy (DON), the U.S. Marine Corps created a counterpart to OPNAV N2/N6, the Deputy Commandant for Information (DCI), with Lt. Gen. Lori Reynolds in the role. They call their effort “Operations in the Information Environment (OIE)” and include psychological operations and strategic communications in their OIE approach.

We work very closely together to provide the DON an integrated Naval IE/OIE capability – bringing the power of both the Navy and Marine Corps to bear.

Vice Adm. Brian Brown is currently serving as Commander, Naval Information Forces (NAVIFOR), and is a 1986 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Dmitry Filipoff is the Director of Online Content for CIMSEC. Contact him at content@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: Fort George G. Meade Md. (Sept. 27, 2018) – Sailors stand watch in the Fleet Operations Center at the headquarters of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet (FCC/C10F). (U.S. Navy Photo by MC1 Samuel Souvannason/Released)

CNO's Design Week

CNO’s Design Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC featured writing submitted in response to our Call for Articles on the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations’ Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority. From new warfighting constructs to interwar period lessons on Navy-Marine Corps integration, these contributors built upon the tenets of the CNO’s design to carve a path forward for the Navy. We thank these authors for their excellent contributions. 

“A New Carrier Strike Group Staff for Warfighting and Warfighters” by Capt. Bill Shafley

“The CNO charged senior leaders to simplify their focus. Warfighting, the Warfighter, and the Future Navy are its tenets. At the nexus of these tenets rests the staff of the Carrier Strike Group, where this staff employs the combat power of the premier maneuver arm of the Fleet Commander, the Carrier Strike Group (CSG). To master fleet-level warfare and leverage the power of the integrated fleet as the CNO urges, this staff must be organized, manned, and educated for the complexity of the high-end fight.”

“Interwar Navy-Marine Corps Integration: A Roadmap for Today” by Capt. Jamie McGrath (ret.)

“Admittedly, the crucible of a world war played a significant role in forging the Navy-Marine Corps team into a virtually unstoppable amphibious juggernaut that systematically took over Imperial Japan’s Pacific empire. But the foundation for the integrated team began in the interwar period with three interrelated efforts: large-scale Fleet Problem exercises, which included amphibious operations, constant wargaming at the U.S. Naval War College, and all-out effort at the Marine Corps schools to develop and refine amphibious doctrine.”

“Integrate with the Marines…And Who Else?” by Walker D. Mills

“The FRAGO harped on integration with the Marine Corps – mentioning it seven times over the course of the short, eight-page document. This is to be lauded, as General David Berger, the new Marine Commandant, has been pushing for integration as hard or more so from the green side. This naval integration is critical to the Navy and Marine Corps moving forward…But there is still a piece missing – where is the Coast Guard?”

“Operating at the Edge of Chaos: Enhancing Maritime Superiority Through People” by Christine MacNulty

“We believe that innovation in the human domain is as important as it is in the technological domain – and figuring out the right things to do morally, mentally, and physically is as important as doing them right. All ideas come from or through the human mind. Why not explore what it takes to operate at the edge of chaos—and win?”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: GULF OF THAILAND (Feb. 29, 2020) Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) Enrico Rabina, native of Round Rock, Texas, directs an F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 (Reinforced) to take off from the flight deck of amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) in support of Exercise Cobra Gold 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Vance Hand/Released)