Notes to the New CNO Series

By James Kraska

The U.S. Navy must rebuild its capacity to shape and influence international maritime law. Since the first Code of Naval Warfare was published at the U.S. Naval War College in 1900 through the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Convention in the 1970s, the U.S. Navy was a thought leader in establishing and upholding the global rules of the game, producing influential scholarship, participating in international meetings alongside the Department of State, and engaging with counterparts around the world. In 1979, the United States launched the Freedom of Navigation program to ensure unimpeded global access to the world’s oceans.

These efforts have diminished greatly as both the aptitude or expertise of naval officers to articulate a vision for the legal order of the oceans and the bandwidth of the Navy to influence maritime law have declined in recent decades. The number of experts has dwindled from formerly dozens throughout the Navy and the U.S. government to a handful today. The reasons for this shortfall are manifold: U.S. hubris in thinking that the rules-based order of the oceans it shaped during the Cold War will continue as a matter of its own logic, failure to recognize and respond effectively to opposing views of maritime law from European states, developing countries and China, and since the Clinton Administration, deference to competing priorities like protection of the marine environment and climate change at the expense of naval and operational equities.

The consequences of ignoring naval and defense interests in maritime law are grave, as the rules for operating at sea during peacetime and armed conflict are shaped by other nations, officials, and scholars with different priorities. The Chief of Naval Operations has an opportunity to revitalize the Navy’s expertise and influence in international maritime law. First, mandate the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare are added to the core curriculum of the U.S. Naval War College, the Navy’s “home of thought.” In decades past, U.S. and international students received one week of instruction in all areas of international law, now it is three hours. Actively teaching maritime law throughout the force must be a priority.

Second, engage purposefully in the legal preparation of the battlespace by engaging in the numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations on maritime law to ensure new rules do not restrain naval commanders in peace and war. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, which is heavily subsidized by the United States, is working to restrict the use of autonomous warships during armed conflict, the very same platforms envisioned for the future force.

Third, rebuild maritime law expertise and train the force in the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare. Much of our collective experience in international law is from the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not operations at sea. We should refocus on the laws that apply throughout the global commons – sea, air, and space – that surround our Homeland and connects us to allies in Asia and Europe.

James Kraska is Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Maritime Law and Department Chair of the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College and Visiting Professor of Law and John Harvey Gregory Lecturer on World Organization at Harvard Law School, where he teaches a popular course on the International Law of the Sea. Professor Kraska served more than 20 years as a U.S. Navy officer and judge advocate, as a legal adviser with U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Pacific Command task forces and in the Pentagon, where he was Director of International Negotiations Division and Oceans Law and Policy Adviser on the Joint Staff. His forthcoming book, Marine Technology, Ocean Governance, and the Law of the Sea (with Khanssa Lagdami), is being published by Cambridge University Press. He is co-author (with “Pete” Pedrozo) of Disruptive Technology and the Law of Naval Warfare‘ (Oxford University Press).

Featured Image: A cargo ship transiting San Francisco bay (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

In past wars, small and well-armed ships have been a necessary complement to the large, multipurpose ships that dominate today’s U.S. Navy. China understands this and utilizes a full range of maritime capabilities to outmaneuver us. These ships can easily overwhelm the navies of smaller nations, like the Philippines, creating an unsustainable demand for support from our large ships, which are often disproportionate to the task at hand.

Our submarine and naval aviation forces are the best in the world, but our surface fleet is facing serious challenges. We do not have nearly enough destroyers to provide deterrence in the Pacific and other areas of the world. A recent CIMSEC article outlines the global growth of China’s dual naval and maritime militia forces, who are creating new demand signals for U.S. naval presence. We must begin to rethink end strength because numbers have a quality all their own. The LCS cannot take up the slack, and the Constellation class will take too long to build and there will be too few of them.

We also lack the logistics support needed for sustained operations and the tyranny of distance is very real. The answer is not to build more large logistics vessels, which will require escorts we do not have, but to reinvent what logistics means in this modern age, where range and endurance are ever more meaningful. Future warships can eliminate much of this problem through longer endurance and the ability to refuel at almost any civilian port to minimize the need for resupply. Small warships can also provide unique personnel logistics support by carrying Marines into harm’s way.

While AI and autonomy are advancing, these technologies are not yet suitable for many forms of deterrence and warfighting without human oversight. They are in a co-evolutionary period with crewed vessels, so the best path forward is to build manned ships on the AI and autonomy technologies being developed for USVs. This will dramatically reduce crew requirements and let us build a better understanding of these technologies for future applications.

To solve this problem, we should build smaller, well-armed, and lightly manned warships that can sustain persistent operations. Our proposed lightly manned warship design – LMACC – will help solve this problem by bringing in smaller U.S. shipyards to increase competition and capacity. The Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability is a program at the Naval Postgraduate School. CONOPS have been written and are the subject of technical reports. It has produced theses, journal articles, fundamental and applied research, and an operationally-validated warship design that can be built in large quantities for less than $200 million per platform, today. The design includes the remedies described above, can support USMC littoral operations, and provides affordable capacity for missions like countering the cartels.

The crew of approximately 25 provide the decision making necessary for combat and deterrence. They are intended to work with the larger unmanned surface vessels in a 5G cloud-based infrastructure independent of satellite data or GPS positioning. These innovations are currently being tested and further refined at NPS.

LMACC will serve a critical function in developing future leaders. In today’s destroyer-centric surface fleet, platform command opportunities are only available after more than a decade of service. LMACC is intended as an O-3 command, affording naval officers an opportunity to command earlier in their careers and develop critical leadership skills, including initiative, adaptability, risk taking, and tactical acumen. Autonomous systems will become increasingly important, but cultivating warrior skillsets early will always be central to victory.

Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue-water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to build a prototype of the LMACC and its flotilla of innovations.

Dr. Shelley Gallup is a retired surface warfare officer. As an Associate Research Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Gallup has spent 25 years assisting the Navy in developing large-scale experiments at sea. His current work includes research in human-machine partnerships, the role of emergence in combat at sea, and leads the small warship LMACC project at NPS. He can be contacted at spgallup@nps.edu.

Ben DiDonato is a volunteer member of the LMACC team. He is responsible for LMACC’s armament and most engineering work. He has provided systems and mechanical engineering support to organizations across the defense industry from the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC) to Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, working on projects for all branches of the armed forces. He currently serves as vice president of technology for Expanse Laboratories Corporation, a startup developing novel physical encryption technology. He can be contacted at benjamin.didonato@nps.edu.

Additional information can be found on the LMACC website: https://nps.edu/web/LMACC

Featured Image: LMACC design screenshot courtesy of Ben DiDonato.

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Captain Renato Scarfi, (Italian Navy, Ret.) and Captain Gian Carlo Poddighe (Italian Navy, Ret.)

Today, the new global order imposes a different vision of alliances. On the Western side, we are experiencing a temporary crisis of the values of transatlantic ties due to the political winds swaying, typical of democratic systems. But the idea of having achieved the conditions for an irreversible peace has unfortunately faded in the face of entrenched rivalries and strongly divisive attitudes. In this context, to be effective in the new world order, alliances must be global as a demonstration of shared will to achieve common well-being and prosperity. The naval instrument is a powerful tool for manifesting shared will and projecting influence, and the theater where this will be most effective is the Indo-Pacific. The main competition will take place in those waters, and marks an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to strengthen its naval cooperation with Europe.

A Western presence in the Indo-Pacific will be essential for our well-being and will be the true key to commercial and energy survival, particularly for the southern European countries. They are strategically vital for the balance of the Euro-Mediterranean region and to counter the growing Chinese influence on African territory. It will also be critical for containing the increasing Chinese maritime presence and claims in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and North Africa, which currently sees the development of numerous maritime initiatives concentrated along those coasts, up to the Atlantic coasts of Morocco.

In this context, the Indian Ocean holds strategic importance, being both the key to maintaining freedom of navigation and trade to and from the Far East, as well as the route along which energy travels and investments develop. Maritime presence in the Indian Ocean is therefore not a possibility but an obligation, which should see a convergence of interest from NATO European countries. This should include cooperation with India, a democratic country that has historical tensions with China.

The U.S. Navy can help serve as a catalyst for this kind of naval presence. A permanent European naval presence in the Indian Ocean should be of extreme interest to the U.S. Navy, which could free up U.S. naval forces to better focus on the Pacific, in conjunction with Japan, South Korea, Australia and other allies. Equipped with aircraft carriers and capable of projecting power, European countries could strive to establish a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean and serve as a deterrent against assertive rivals. The Italian Navy, besides a longstanding presence in the area, can add over 20 years of experience from the VRMTC (Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre), a system that collects maritime domain awareness data for over half the Atlantic, the whole Persian Gulf, and even the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. Navy and its Pacific allies can promote cooperation with European navies in Indo-Pacific theater. It can mark a catalyst that mobilizes and focuses Western resources while improving burden sharing. This initiative will strengthen our friendship and naval cooperation, and will represent a key factor in strengthening deterrence.

Captain Renato Scarfi (Ret.) joined the Italian Naval Academy in 1977. As LTJG he attended the U.S. Navy Pilot Training Program in Pensacola and Corpus Christi where he gained the Navy Wings for multi-engine fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. After the Staff Officer Course in Leghorn (Italy) he served in the Defence General Staff, the Navy General Staff (Plans and Policy), the Joint Operation Headquarters (JOHQ) as Head of Crisis management section, and the Cabinet of the MOD as Senior Military Assistant of the Diplomatic Advisor of the Minister. He has two Master’s Degrees in International Relations and in Maritime Strategies and a Second Level Master Degree in International anti-terrorism. 

Captain Gian Carlo Poddighe (Ret.) is a former Italian Navy officer who has served in the Navy research center, in shipbuilding programs, and conducted cooperation activities with foreign navies in Italy and abroad. He has been a member of  commissions of international organizations (ONU, BID, CELAC, CAF, AEC/CSO). He is a magazine and newspaper columnist, in The Independent, Diario de las Americas, El Globo, G.d.I. and others.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 9, 2024) Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and Cavour Carrier Strike Group sail in formation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Daniel Kimmelman)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Paul Nickell

The new CNO’s vision to place the Sailor at the center of the Foundry, the Fleet, and the Way We Fight provides a powerful focus for the U.S. Navy. The enduring question is how we build the intellectual foundation to connect these pillars. While our service possesses an abundance of technical and procedural manuals, we lack a unifying warfighting philosophy that informs Sailors on not just what our forces do, but also how to think about the fundamental nature of combat at sea.

The central challenge of modern naval warfare is grappling with profound decision-making under uncertainty. Our current doctrine, NDP-1 Naval Warfare, is an essential description of our forces, but it is insufficient as a guide for thinking through the friction, fluidity, and ambiguity inherent in conflict. To truly equip our Sailors to fight and win for tomorrow, the CNO should supplement this document with a doctrine focused on the cognitive art of warfighting. The solution is to champion a new, companion publication – NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting.

Modeled on the transformative success of the Marine Corps’ classic MCDP-1 Warfighting, this new, concise doctrine would provide the philosophical depth that NDP-1 currently lacks. It should serve as the intellectual framework for every Sailor, Marine, and Coast Guardsmen, fostering a common framework for understanding the challenges of combat. Drawing from the lessons that made MCDP-1 so effective, NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting should be founded on the following three principles:

A Philosophy-Driven Approach. Doctrine should articulate a clear philosophy for action that values initiative, adaptation, and decentralized decision-making in the face of uncertainty. It should be a guide to thinking through the complexities of the maritime domain in joint operations, not a rigid playbook.

A Strong Conceptual Foundation. Doctrine should be supported by theoretical underpinnings of developing the foundry, and will describe the fundamental nature of naval warfighting to establish common ground among the sea services. This includes examining the unique challenges of the maritime domain, including the fluidity of the environment, the immense scale, and the complex interplay of technology, geography, and human factors that create friction.

An Elevation of Leadership and Decision-Making. Doctrine should place leadership and decision-making at its core. It is time to codify concepts like Mission Command and the Charge of Command, moving them from a standalone document into the fabric of our warfighting philosophy. By focusing on the human factors like experience, training, and critical thinking skills, this doctrine arms our leaders of all ranks to overcome uncertainty in the fog of war.

The publication of NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting must be the capstone of a service-wide campaign of engagement, dialogue, and education, integrated into our Naval University System and schoolhouses from accession to flag. It deserves to be read and revisited in wardrooms and ready rooms across the fleet. Publication alone is not enough, it must be formally incorporated into curriculum and training, and deliberately socialized into the fleet.

To truly place the Sailor front and center, we must first invest in their mind. NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting can provide the enduring intellectual framework to strengthen the Fleet, empower the Foundry’s purpose, and master the Way We Fight. It is a foundational reform and a legacy worthy of the CNO’s tenure.

Captain Paul Nickell recently completed his tour as a Military Professor at the College of Leadership and Ethics within the Naval War College. He is starting his training to take over as commanding officer of the Navy’s largest master jet base at Naval Air Station Lemoore in 2026. As part of the naval aviation community, he has commanded a squadron, facilitated learning at the Navy’s Leadership and Ethics Command for major commanders and commanding officers, and developed tomorrow’s joint force leaders. His graduate thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School focused on how the Navy can become a better learning organization.

Featured Image: NEWPORT, R.I.— Adm. Daryl Caudle, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), delivers a lecture to students, staff and faculty at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) onboard Naval Station Newport, RI, Apr. 30, 2025. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Connor Burns)