By Jason Flores Rutledge

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) represents a strong threat to the United States due to its rapid military expansion and destabilizing actions in the Indo-Pacific theater. The Indo-Pacific represents about twenty-seven percent of US trade and is vital to remain accessible to the United States.^1,2  Confronting the threat is difficult because of the vast distances and severe timeframes necessary to supply forward operating forces. Conventional means of resupply rely on shipping across that distance and on prepositioned stocks which would run out in short order. According to CSIS wargames, should conflict with the PRC begin, U.S. stockpiles are expected to be depleted within a week after conflict start even if continuous resupply could be guaranteed.³  New options are needed to address these complications involving distance and production.

This article makes two related proposals. First, it advocates the creation of sea-going factories and industrial facilities to secure decisive strategic advantages over the PRC and other future competitors. Such creations would significantly reduce the supply lines for crucial and specialized equipment and weaponry and offer strategic surprise through mobile industrial zones. Second, it proposes that the first incarnations of these new ship classes be adapted from ships presently being refitted or scheduled for decommissioning and will allow such factories and facilities to enter service quickly.

The Growing Threat

First, the PRC is laying disputed claims to many maritime territories. It presently claims the self-governing island of Taiwan.⁴  It lays claims to the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Reef, which has been determined by international courts as belonging to the Philippines.⁵  It is also laying claim to the entire South China Sea and its natural resources.⁶ Backing these claims is unprecedented gains in military production, technology, and increasing aggression. 

On October 12^th of 2025, Chinese cutters rammed two commercial Philippine fishing vessels near Thitu Island.⁷ In early January of 2026, PRC forces surrounded Taiwan and conducted military drills to intimidate Taiwan and regional neighbors.⁸ Should these agitations continue, and increase resulting in conflict, the geography favors China should the U.S. decide to protect its interests in the region.

In the event of regional conflict, China has very short communication and supply lines in the region whereas the U.S. must cross the vast Pacific Ocean to protect its interests, the sovereignty of allies and partner nations. The U.S. will need combat and sustainment power in theater. U.S. transports are vulnerable to actions that may impede or attempt to destroy them during transit.  With the belief the U.S. has an unmatched technological advantage, that transit time may prove to be the greatest factor in the defeat of the U.S. and those nations who stand with her.

There are options to cope. Examples include prepositioning supplies and producing more cargo ships, but the U.S. should also consider factory ships as a type of force multiplier. 

The Factory Ship

A “factory ship’ is a factory found within the boundaries of a mobile sea-going vessel. Its primary purpose is to exponentially reduce the supply lines for specialized weapons and equipment though it remains reliant on local raw materials.

A factory ship’s simplest incarnation is that of a standard factory with set outputs geared to service specific needs. For example, one could specialize in drone manufacturing or perhaps missile production through traditional methods.  It would also be worth considering outfitting these vessels with additive manufacturing capabilities which allows the creation of virtually anything from the same machinery.

Traditionally, every part of a machine would need repairs and require materials to be kept in stock. Unlike civilian life where a shopping trip can get any automobile part, the military world has limited space to store replacement parts and, like the civilian world, it has no idea what part will break next. The implication being that space is wasted on parts that later turn out to be unneeded, while more urgently required items were in short supply.

Decision makers will find massive advantages by including “additive” manufacturing to allow customized outputs for both land and sea-going assets. Additive manufacturing requires just raw materials to manipulate into needed parts, so there is no wasted space used for excess parts. This has the potential to meet all demands, so long as the raw materials last.

Additionally, the customizable quality of additive manufacturing would allow the vessel to also support allied and partner forces, which use different equipment from U.S. forces. The ability to customize local production to meet sophisticated needs on the spur of the moment represents a powerful advantage that must not be neglected.

The Factory Ship in Use: An Example

In this scenario, the PRC has engaged both Taiwan and the United States in massively bloody battles to determine the island population’s destiny. Several weeks into it, both sides have suffered tremendously in lives lost and vessels sunk. Sensing a strategic victory through their decisive ability to replace ships, the PRC has refused an armistice. Both sides are preparing for the next round of battle by replacing their exhausted supply stocks. The U.S.’ only chance is to strike Chinese shipyards directly as quickly as possible.

Such a maneuver will require supplies needed by land, air, and sea-going forces. All-out efforts are being launched to resupply and re-arm the fleet while still at risk of attack by PRC forces.  There is a factory ship anchored in Port Moresby of Papua New Guinea manufacturing new missiles for the task force while supplies are also coming from Los Angeles, California. In both cases the supply ships of the “USNS Lewis and Clark” class are involved and traveling at their maximum speed of twenty knots.⁹ The distance from Port Moresby to the operational area is 2,531 nautical miles whereas the distance from Los Angeles , California, USA is 6,533 nautical miles.¹⁰ That means the factory ship will help replenish the fleet in just over five days while those from San Diego need over 13 days. This means the factory ship could resupply the fleet two times before the first delivery from the U.S. arrives. With the presence of a factory ship, Gettysburg will be combat ready in ten days; with factory ships the strike happens, without them the PRC once again strikes first. Having a mobile industrial base is greatly advantageous, no matter how specific its output may be.

Industrial Secrecy and a Changing World Situation

Those opposed to factory ships, but who acknowledge the problems regarding supplies and distance, could suggest building additional U.S. owned and operated factories, supply or maintenance centers on foreign soil. This option represents a significant risk of technological compromise and advanced production becoming enemy assets.

States and their industries do change alliances during conflict, either through being overrun by the enemy, defection, or voluntarily switching allegiances. In World War Two, the states of Romania, Bulgaria, Finland and Italy switched sides from the Axis to the Allies as the military and political situation changed.¹¹ In 2016, President Duterte of the Philippines shifted away from a longstanding partnership with the United States and sought to revitalize relations with the PRC.¹² Such things must be considered in future force planning.

Conversely, a factory ship has the option of hoisting its anchors and slipping away when the situation begins to turn hostile. The factory ship also represents the opportunity to manufacture sensitive products in allied/partner territories without as many political risks. 

Factory ships could be stationed in international waters, but the loading of raw materials may be difficult, time consuming, and resource intensive; a fact borne out by considering ship-to-ship transfers and the fuel requirements for onloading. While this is an option, foreign port or berthing is preferred.

Design Considerations

A key design feature for every factory ship would be a flight deck though its purpose would differ partly from traditional use. Helipads would be required to support VTOL drones responsible for transporting customized loads to various land formations and ships. Factory ships would also require space for storage and maintenance for aerial assets while navigation systems for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) would be integrated in the ships’ communication and navigation suites.

The U.S. Navy is already experimenting with drones for those supply purposes. According to The EurAsian Times, the U.S. Navy experimented with six drones meant for transporting supplies.¹³ Trial runs for these experimentations involved ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore deliveries. Considerable time and benefit could be realized by adopting lessons learned from these for the factory ship design and employment. An analysis is recommended to ensure a factory ship meets power generation requirements inherent in its role. Should additional power be required, power plant ships, an innovation discussed later, could be an option.

The Survivability of Factory Ships

A concern would be that a factory ship would tie down other fighting vessels as escorts when they would be desperately needed elsewhere.  A factory ship would indeed depend on other ships for its safety for the extended transit across the Pacific. The factory would sensibly need to travel with a taskforce or surface action group (SAG); however, the factory ship would not be defensively useless.  The factory ship could be retrofitted to bristle with aerial defenses. The flight deck incorporated into its design is an ideal surface for many aerial defenses including those mounted on vehicles. As an example, aerial defense would in part be provided by vehicles like the Avenger, a vehicle that can engage a variety of aerial targets such as drones, aircraft, and even cruise missiles.¹⁴ The numerous anchor points on the deck would secure the vehicles from unintended movement. This ideally would defeat everything from aircraft to missiles to ballistic missiles. Therefore, the factory ship would contribute significantly to any taskforce’s survivability.

Though strange, a practical idea would be to station VTOL fighters like the F-35B onboard. The aircraft would defend the factory ship whether at port or in transit for the domains it is suited to address. Also, the F-35 fighters could be kept on land when the factory is at port. This would cure the problem of the jets obstructing the ship’s role as a factory.

Once in a port, the factory ship’s defenses would complement the local area’s capabilities. Many of the aerial defenses could be temporary, i.e. land-going vehicles which could be offloaded and stationed in the surrounding environment. This would also free up deck space for the ship’s industrial roles. This practice would maximize defense during transit and stationing while also maximizing the ship’s industrial role.

As can be seen, the industrial factory ship would not be a burden constantly requiring escorts, and instead, could potentially add to the overall force generating capability to a task force.

Power Plant Ships

Another advantageous innovation is the “power plant” ship, a vessel that powers a given area of industrial might which has lost use of its own power plant due to enemy action, be it by conventional warfare, cyberattack, or sabotage.

Traditionally, cities blessed with the industrial prowess to source the military’s logistical needs have been targeted by the enemy to retard friendly progress. Targeting land-bound power plants serve as a relatively easy way to render entire swaths of such industry inactive, thereby denying friendly forces of the subsistence, support, and weaponry necessary to advance the country’s interests. Coping with the blow usually means accepting the loss in production and the resulting defeats and personnel sacrificed. However, the powerful innovation represented by power plant ships means rapidly restoring industrial might and all the advantages inherent in it, be it strategic or tactical.

In such a situation, a power plant ship would sail urgently into port and have the local power grid attached to it. Within hours vital industry resumes. This is the promise represented by power plant ships.

Power plant ships also open offensive options unimaginable previously. The ability to launch moderate to major offensives is in part limited by the ability to service casualties to prevent unacceptable losses; this is in reference to the “golden hour” when casualties must be serviced or they die.¹⁵ Many could state the formula will not be able to be implemented anymore and friendly forces must accept those losses or forego war-winning maneuvers. Forward medical bases can be established near or within enemy territory to support major operations of a surprising nature.  However, a power plant ship can be anchored near shore and power lines run out to the base. This would power modern medical equipment and defensive needs like Patriot batteries. The result is lives saved while giving friendly forces strategic options.          

Immediate Opportunities for Ship Construction

One opportunity to economically create an industrial factory ship is presently available. At the time of this writing, the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis is presently undergoing an extensive overhaul while having its nuclear reactors refueled.¹⁶ The work is so difficult that the vessel is not expected to return to service until October 2026. While unfortunate, the delay presents an opportunity.

If feasible, the USS John C. Stennis should be retrofitted into an industrial factory ship. The hull, engine, reactor, and other necessities already exist while space and available tonnage for industrial equipment can be created by removing anything deemed non-essential.

An additional benefit is that the Stennis could also work as a “mobile power plant” thanks to its nuclear reactor. This means it could power its own needs, port equipment and land facilities useful to the factory role. Using the Stennis would be an economical and time sensitive measure given the accelerating PRC threat in the near term. Trading an aircraft carrier for a factory ship may be deemed unwise, yet the need for a factory ship remains.

Good fortune has it that two nuclear powered aircraft carriers are slated for decommissioning in 2026 and 2027, the USS Nimitz and USS Enterprise respectively.¹⁷ Repurposing these prestigious vessels represents the unique opportunity to create factory ships without reducing the fleet’s combat value. They would also have all the benefits of the proposed changes to the USS John C. Stennis. However, the U.S. Navy may still not be able to afford the costs.

An excellent alternative is the USNS John Glenn. The John Glenn is an Expeditionary Transfer Dock Ship designed to transfer vast quantities of equipment and fuel to forward depots.¹⁸ Emptied out the vessel has 25,000 square feet of cargo space which can be dedicated to manufacturing instead. It also has the integral capacity to haul up to 380,000 gallons of fuel, which would be useful for manufacturing and extended voyages. Further pluses exist in that the vessel already has a vehicle staging area, a vehicle transfer ramp, and large mooring fenders which are features that greatly enhance the “factory” ship role. The best part is that the U.S. Navy officially no longer wants the John Glenn; it is to be decommissioned even though it has years left in its service life.¹⁹

Smaller vessels can be used as “power plant ships,” a possibility represented by Ticonderoga class ships. According to Naval News, all these guide-missile cruisers are to be retired by the year 2027.²⁰ The reason for their decommissioning is not because they are too worn out, but because they are too expensive to maintain.²¹

But what if these vessels were used strategically as sailing power plants? What would the maintenance costs be if they were stripped down? The cost would likely be minimal though they would need to be estimated for the tear down. This is especially true since there would be inevitable costs for stripping away equipment anyway.  However, the resulting maintenance costs would very likely be affordable. That being said, a conventional ship may not suffice.

Another option would be employing a nuclear-powered vessel as a “power plant’ ship. Once again, there is the aforementioned USS Nimitz and USS Enterprise. If not used as factory ships, such vessels would provide substantial and sustained electrical output for use by ports and select industries as power plant ships. Factory ships can be introduced into the Navy quickly and economically no matter which vessels are used, and not all innovations need to be on a grand scale.

Conclusion

This article proposes the creation of sea-going factories and power plant ships to obtain decisive strategic advantages. Advantages range from shortened supply lines to specialized and customized resupply of both land and sea forces. The consideration of factory ships should not be framed as specialized vessels versus generalized ones. Factory ships should be viewed foremost as factories that happen to float and move like ships, and not primarily as ships.

Though such vessels will need to be specifically designed one day, the present threat represented by the PRC can be addressed by refitting unwanted, but functional, vessels into sea-going factory ships. This article strongly urges a study to be performed to decide the feasibility of the pure concept and its rapid implementation through retrofitting existing vessels.

 

Jason Flores Rutledge is a civilian friend of the US Navy. He has unfortunately been disabled but seeks to contribute to society through his writings. He also hopes to eventually earn an honorary rank. Jason enjoys studying and analyzing wargame theory and practice. Presently, he is working on further enhancing the American military through various means.

 

References

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2 “What is the value of US trade overall?”. USA Facts, 01 Jan. 2026, https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-value-of-us-trade/country/united-states/. Accessed 20 Jan. 2026.

3 Jones, Seth. “The U.S. Defense Industrial Base Is Not Prepared for a Possible Conflict with China”. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 Feb. 2023, https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/. Accessed 20 Jan. 2026.

4 BBC News. “China and Taiwan: A really simple guide.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 25 Oct 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59900139.

5 Pompeo, Michael. “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”. U.S. Department of State, 13 July 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2026.

6 Center for Preventive Action. “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 25 Oct 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.

7 Lariosa, Aaron-Mathhew. “Chinese Cutters Ram Philippine Fishery Vessels in Spratly Islands”. U. S. Naval Institute, 14 Oct. 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/10/14/chinese-cutters-ram-philippine-fishery-vessels-in-spratly-islands. Accessed 14 Jan. 2026.

8 Villarroel, Maria. “China accused of ‘intimidation’ following military drills threatening Taiwan forces”. Microsoft Network, 01 Jan. 2026, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/china-accused-of-intimidation-following-military-drills-threatening-taiwan-forces/ar-AA1TbYw4?ocid=BingNewsVerp. Accessed 15 Jan. 2026.

9 Naval Technology. “Lewis and Clark Class T-AKE Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship.” Last modified 2008. Accessed 21 Oct 2024. https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/lewisandclarke/?cf-view&cf-closed.

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11 Land, Graham. “4 Countries That Switched From the Axis Powers to the Allies”. History Hit, 29 Oct. 2022, https://www.historyhit.com/countries-that-switched-from-the-axis-powers-to-the-allies/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2026.

12 “The Philippines’ Institutionalised Alliance with the
US: Surviving Duterte’s China Appeasement Policy”. National Security Journal, 13 June 2021, https://nationalsecurityjournal.nz/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2021/06/NSJ-2021-March-Wong-Tan.pdf#:~:text=Duterte%20declared%20his%20intent%20to%20chart%20an%20%E2%80%9Cindependent%E2%80%9D,concessions%20in%20Manila%E2%80%99s%20maritime%20sovereignty%20conflict%20with%20Beijing.. Accessed 20 Jan. 2026.

13 Dangwal, Ashish. “RIMPAC 2024: US Navy Draws Lessons On ‘UAV Warfare’ From Ukraine to Counter China in Pacific.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 23 Oct 2026. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/tg-us-navy-integrates-drones-in-naval/.

14 “Avenger Air Defense System”. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 02 July 2020, https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/avenger-air-defense-system/. Accessed 10 Jan. 2026.

15 Smith, Nicola. “Understanding the Golden Hour in Medical Emergencies.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 20 Aug 2025. https://blog.mymedicalchoice.org/2024/03/19/understanding-the-golden-hour-in-medical-emergencies/.

16 Suciu, Peter. “1 Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier ‘Will Go Nowhere’ for over 5 Years.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 21 Oct 2024. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/1-nimitz-class-navy-aircraft-carrier-will-go-nowhere-for-over-5-years/ar-AA1otvEc?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=DCTS&cvid=b77661df97aa49e9a31f7f786f010c45&ei=41.

17 Brodsky, Sascha. “The Navy Is Decommissioning Two Nuclear Aircraft Carriers in a Row.” Last modified 2023. Accessed 24 Oct 2024. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a43646315/navy-decommissioning-uss-nimitz-uss-eisenhower/.

18 United States Navy. “. Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD).” Last modified 2024. Accessed 24 Oct 2024. https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2226182/expeditionary-transfer-dock-esd/.

19 Shelbourne, Mallory. “New Navy Budget Seeks 6 Battle Force Ships, Decommissions 19 Hulls in FY 2025.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 24 Oct 2025. https://news.usni.org/2024/03/11/new-navy-budget-seeks-6-battle-force-ships-10-decommissions-in-fy-2025.

20 Cavas, Chris. “U.S. Navy’s Cruiser Countdown.” Last modified 2024. Accessed 23 Oct 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/cavasships/2024/06/u-s-navys-cruiser-countdown/#:~:text=Next%20to%20leave%20service%20will%20be%20the%20Vicksburg,71%29%2C%20both%20to%20be%20decommissioned%20in%20fiscal%202027.

21 Lagrone, Sam. “After a Decade of Debate, Cruisers Set to Exit Fleet in 5 Years.” Last modified 2022. Accessed 24 Oct 2024. https://news.usni.org/2022/04/21/navy-plans-for-all-22-ticonderoga-cruisers-to-exit-fleet-in-5-years.

 

Featured Image: The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Anzio (CG 68) conducts a fueling at sea with the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), May 5. Eisenhower and embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 7 are on a regularly scheduled deployment in support of Maritime Security Operations (MSO). MSO help set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment, as well as complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations. These operations deny international terrorists use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or as a transport for personnel, weapons or other material.