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Capability Analysis, Current Operations

Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence

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This piece was originally published by the National Defense University Press, and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Admiral Jonathan Greenert

Looking ahead to the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) fiscal prospects and security challenges in the second half of this decade and beyond, the Services and their partners will have to find ever more ingenious ways to come together. It is time for us to think and act in a more ecumenical way as we build programs and capabilities. We should build stronger ties, streamline intelligently, innovate, and wisely use funds at our disposal. We need a broader conversation about how to capitalize on each Service’s strengths and “domain knowledge” to better integrate capabilities. Moving in this direction is not only about savings or cost avoidance; it is about better warfighting.

Airmen working on Distributed Ground Station–1 Operations Floor at the U.S. Air Force’s 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing (U.S. Air Force)
Airmen working on Distributed Ground Station–1 Operations Floor at the U.S. Air Force’s 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing (U.S. Air Force).

The DOD historical track record shows episodic levels of joint deconfliction, coordination, and integration. Wars and contingencies bring us together. Peacetime and budget pressures seem to compel the Services to drift apart, and more dramatic fiscal changes can lead to retrenchment. While Service rivalries are somewhat natural, and a reflection of esprit de corps, they are counterproductive when they interfere with combat performance, reduce capability for operational commanders, or produce unaffordable options for the Nation. Rather than expending our finite energy on rehashing roles and missions, or committing fratricide as resources become constrained, we should find creative ways to build and strengthen our connections. We can either come together more to preserve our military preeminence—as a smaller but more effective fighting force, if necessary—or face potential hollowing in our respective Services by pursuing duplicative endeavors.

Figure. Smart Interdependence Improves Warfighting and Fiscal Responsibility

 

Unexplored potential exists in pursuing greater joint force interdependence, that is, a deliberate and selective reliance and trust of each Service on the capabilities of the others to maximize its own effectiveness. It is a mutual activity deeper than simple “interoperability” or “integration,” which essentially means pooling resources for combined action. Interdependence implies a stronger network of organizational ties, better pairing of capabilities at the system component level, willingness to draw upon shared capabilities, and continuous information- sharing and coordination. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey notes, “The strength of our military is in the synergy and interdependence of the Joint Force.” Many capstone documents emphasize greater interdependency between the Services’ structures and concepts including the Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, which calls for “combining capabilities in innovative ways.”

These concepts ring true for the maritime Services. The Navy–Marine Corps team has operated interdependently for over two centuries. Symbiotic since their inceptions, Marines engaged in ship-to-ship fighting, enforced shipboard discipline, and augmented beach landings as early as the Battle of Nassau in 1776. This relationship has evolved and matured through the ages as we integrated Marine Corps aviation squadrons into carrier air wings in the 1970s, developed amphibious task force and landing force doctrines, and executed mission-tailored Navy–Marine Corps packages on global fleet stations. Land wars over the last decade have caused some of the cohesion to atrophy, but as the Marines shift back to an expeditionary, sea-based crisis response force, we are committed to revitalizing our skills as America’s mobile, forward-engaged “away team” and “first responders.” Building and maintaining synergy is not easy; in fact, it takes hard work and exceptional trust, but the Navy and Marine Corps team has made it work for generations, between themselves and with other global maritime partners.

The Services writ large are not unfamiliar with the notion of cross-domain synergy. Notable examples of historical interdependence include the B-25 Doolittle Raid on Tokyo from the USS Hornet in 1942 and the Army’s longest ever helicopter assault at the start of Operation Enduring Freedom from the USS Kitty Hawk. The Navy has leaned heavily on Air Force tankers for years, and B-52s can contribute to maritime strikes by firing harpoons and seeding maritime mines. Likewise, other Services have relied on Navy/Marine Corps EA-6B aircraft to supply airborne electronic warfare capabilities to the joint force since the 1990s—paving the way for stealth assets or “burning” routes to counter improvised explosive devices. Examples of where the Navy and Army have closely interfaced include Navy sealift and prepositioning of Army materiel overseas, ballistic missile defense, the Army’s use of Navy-developed close-in weapons systems to defend Iraq and Afghanistan forward operating bases, and the use of Army rotary- wing assets from afloat bases. Special operations forces (SOF) come closest to perfecting operational interdependence with tight, deeply embedded interconnections at all levels among capability providers from all Services.

Opportunities exist to build on this foundation and make these examples the rule rather than the exception. We must move from transitory periods of integration to a state of smart interdependence in select warfighting areas and on Title 10 decisions where natural overlaps occur, where streamlining may be appropriate and risk is managed. From my perspective, advancing joint force interdependence translates to:

  • avoiding overspending on similar programs in each Service
  • selecting the right capabilities and systems to be “born joint”
  • better connecting existing tactics, techniques, procedures, concepts, and plans
  • institutionalizing cross-talk on Service research and development, requirements, and programs
  • expanding operational cooperation and more effective joint training and exercises.
USS Freedom, Littoral Combat Ship 1 (U.S. Navy/Tim D. Godbee)
USS Freedom, Littoral Combat Ship 1 (U.S. Navy/Tim D. Godbee).
USS Independence, Littoral Combat Ship 2 (U.S. Navy/Carlos Gomez)
USS Independence, Littoral Combat Ship 2 (U.S. Navy/Carlos Gomez).

The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept, and the capabilities that underpin it, represent one example of an opportunity to become more interdependent. While good progress has been made on developing the means, techniques, and tactics to enable joint operational access, we have much unfinished business and must be ready to make harder tradeoff decisions. One of the principles of ASB is that the integration of joint forces— across Service, component, and domain lines—begins with force development rather than only after new systems are fielded. We have learned that loosely coupled force design planning and programming results in costly fixes. In the pursuit of sophisticated capability we traded off interoperability and are now doing everything we can to restore it, such as developing solutions for fifth-generation fighters to relay data to fourth-generation ones. ASB has become a forcing function to promote joint warfighting solutions earlier in the development stage. For example, the Navy and Army are avoiding unaffordable duplicative efforts by teaming on the promising capabilities of the electromagnetic railgun, a game-changer in defeating cruise and ballistic missiles afloat and ashore using inexpensive high-velocity projectiles.

Additional areas where interdependence can be further developed include the following.

Innovative Employment of Ships. The Navy–Marine Corps team is already developing innovative ways to mix expeditionary capabilities on combatants and auxiliaries, in particular joint high speed vessels, afloat forward staging bases, and mobile landing platforms just starting to join the force. We see opportunities to embark mission-tailored packages with various complements of embarked intelligence, SOF, strike, interagency, and Service capabilities depending on particular mission needs. This concept allows us to take advantage of access provided by the seas to put the right type of force forward— both manned and unmanned—to achieve desired effects. This kind of approach helps us conduct a wider range of operations with allies and partners and improves our ability to conduct persistent distributed operations across all domains to increase sensing, respond more quickly and effectively to crises, and/or confound our adversaries.

Mission-tailored packages for small surface combatants such as the littoral combat ship, and the Navy’s mix of auxiliaries and support ships, would enable them to reduce the demand on large surface combatants such as cruisers and destroyers for maritime security, conventional deterrence, and partnership- building missions. We cannot afford to tie down capital ships in missions that demand only a small fraction of their capabilities, such as contracted airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) services from Aegis destroyers. We are best served tailoring capability to need, interchanging platforms and their payloads suitable to the missions that they are best designed for. At the end of the day, it is about achieving economy of force.

To make these concepts real, the Navy would support an expanded joint effort to demonstrate roll-on, roll-off packages onto ships to create a set of specialized capability options for joint force commanders. Adaptive force packages could range from remote joint intelligence collection and cyber exploit/attack systems, SOF, modularized Army field medical units, humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief supplies and service teams, to ISR detachments—either airborne, surface, or subsurface. Our ships are ideal platforms to carry specialized configurations, including many small, autonomous, and networked systems, regardless of Service pedigree. The ultimate objective is getting them forward and positioned to make a difference when it matters, where it matters.

Tightly Knitted ISR. We should maximize DOD investments in ISR capabilities, especially the workforce and infrastructure that supports processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED). SOF and the Air Force are heavily invested in ISR infrastructure, the Army is building more reachback, and the Navy is examining its distribution of PED assets between large deck ships, maritime operations centers, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. While every Service has a responsibility to field ISR assets with sufficient “tail” to fully optimize their collection assets, stovepiped Service-specific solutions are likely too expensive. We should tighten our partnerships between ISR nodes, share resources, and maximize existing DOD investments in people, training, software, information systems, links/circuits, communications pipes, and processes. To paraphrase an old adage, “If we cannot hang together in ISR, we shall surely hang separately.”

ISR operations are arguably very “purple” today, but our PED investment strategies and asset management are not. Each Service collects, exploits, and shares strategic, anticipatory, and operational intelligence of interest to all Services. In many cases, it does not matter what insignia or fin flash is painted on the ISR “truck.” Air Force assets collect on maritime targets (for example, the Predator in the Persian Gulf), and Navy assets collect ashore (the P-3 in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom). Yet each Service still develops its own particular PED solutions. We should avoid any unnecessary new spending where capability already exists, figure out dynamic joint PED allocation schemes similar to platform management protocols, and increase the level of interdependency between our PED nodes. Not only is this approach more affordable, but it also makes for more effective combat support.

We can also be smarter about developing shared sensor payloads and common control systems among our programmers while we find imaginative ways to better work the ISR “tail.” Each Service should be capitalizing on the extraordinary progress made during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in integrating sensors, software, and analytic tools. We should build off those models, share technology where appropriate, and continue to develop capability in this area among joint stakeholders.

USNS Lewis B. Puller, Mobile Landing Platform–3/Afloat Forward Staging Base–1, under construction at General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company shipyard
USNS Lewis B. Puller, Mobile Landing Platform–3/Afloat Forward Staging Base–1, under construction at General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company shipyard.
Artist’s conception of MLP/AFSB with departing V-22 Osprey (U.S. Navy/Courtesy General Dynamics NASSCO)
Artist’s conception of MLP/AFSB with departing V-22 Osprey (U.S. Navy/Courtesy General Dynamics NASSCO).

Truly Interoperable Combat and Information Systems. The joint force has a shared interest in ensuring sufficient connectivity to effect information-sharing and command and control in all future contingencies. We cannot afford to develop systems that are not interconnected by design, use different data standards/ formats, come without reliable underlying transport mechanisms, or place burdens on our fielded forces to develop time-consuming workarounds. We still find DOD spending extraordinary time and effort healing itself from legacy decisions that did not fully account for the reality that every platform across the joint community will need to be networked.

Greater discipline and communication between planners, programmers, acquisition professionals, and providers for information systems at all classification levels are required. We must view all new information systems as part of a larger family of systems. As such, we should press hard to ensure convergence between the DOD Joint Information Environment and the Intelligence Community’s Information Technology Enterprise initiatives. Why pay twice for similar capabilities already developed somewhere else in the DOD enterprise? Why would we design a different solution to the same functional challenge only because users live in a different classification domain? Ensuring “best of breed” widgets, cloud data/storage/ utility solutions, advanced analytics, and information security capabilities are shared across the force will require heightened awareness, focused planning, inclusive coordination, and enlightened leadership for years to come.

In the world of information systems, enterprise solutions are fundamentally interdependent solutions. They evolve away from Service or classification domain silos. We are not on this path solely because we want to be thriftier. Rationalizing our acquisition of applications, controlling “versioning” of software services, reducing complexity, and operating more compatible systems will serve to increase the flow of integrated national and tactical data to warfighters. This, in turn, leads to a better picture of unfolding events, improved awareness, and more informed decisionmaking at all levels of war. Enterprise approaches will also reduce cyber attack “surfaces” and enable us to be more secure.

In our eagerness to streamline, connect, and secure our networks and platform IT systems, we have to avoid leaving our allies and partners behind. Almost all operations and conflicts are executed as a coalition; therefore, we must develop globally relevant, automated, multilevel information-sharing tools and update associated policies. This capability is long overdue and key to enabling quid pro quo exchanges. Improved information-sharing must become an extensible interdependency objective between joint forces, agencies, allies, and partners alike. Improving the exchange of information on shared maritime challenges continues to be a constant refrain from our friends and allies. We must continue to meet our obligations and exercise a leadership role in supporting regional maritime information hubs such as Singapore’s Information Fusion Center, initiatives such as Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) designed for counterpiracy, and other impromptu coalitions formed to deal with unexpected crises.

Other fields to consider advancing joint force interdependence include cyber and electromagnetic spectrum capabilities, assured command and control (including resilient communications), ballistic missile defense, and directed energy weapons.

To conclude, some may submit that “interdependence” is code for “intolerable sacrifices that will destroy statutory Service capabilities.” I agree that literal and total interdependence could do just that. A “single air force,” for example, is not a viable idea. Moreover, each branch of the military has core capabilities that it is expected to own and operate—goods, capabilities, and services no one else provides. As Chief of Naval Operations, I can rely on no other Service for sea-based strategic deterrence, persistent power projection from forward seabases, antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, covert maritime reconnaissance and strike, amphibious transport, underwater explosive ordnance disposal, diving and salvage, or underwater sensors, vehicles, and quieting. I cannot shed or compromise those responsibilities, nor would I ask other Services to rush headlong into a zone of “interdependence” that entails taking excessive risks.

Newest naval platforms include Joint High Speed Vessel, Mobile Landing Platform, and Landing Craft Air Cushion (U.S. Navy)
Newest naval platforms include Joint High Speed Vessel, Mobile Landing Platform, and Landing Craft Air Cushion (U.S. Navy).

Joint interdependence offers the opportunity for the force to be more efficient where possible and more effective where necessary. If examined deliberately and coherently, we can move toward smarter interdependence while avoiding choices that create single points of failure, ignore organic needs of each Service, or create fragility in capability or capacity. Redundancies in some areas are essential for the force to be effective and should not be sacrificed in the interest of efficiency. Nor can we homogenize capabilities so far that they become ill suited to the unique domains in which the Services operate.

Over time, we have moved from deconflicting our forces, to coordinating them, to integrating them. Now it is time to take it a step further and interconnect better, to become more interdependent in select areas. As a Service chief, my job is to organize, train, and equip forces and provide combatant commanders maritime capabilities that they can use to protect American security interests. But these capabilities must be increasingly complementary and integral to forces of the other Services. What we build and how we execute operations once our capabilities are fielded must be powerful and symphonic.

Together, with a commitment to greater cross-domain synergy, the Services can strengthen their hands in shaping inevitable force structure and capability tradeoff decisions on the horizon. We should take the initiative to streamline ourselves into a more affordable and potent joint force. I look forward to working to develop ideas that advance smart joint interdependence. This is a strategic imperative for our time. JFQ

Admiral Jonathan Greenert served as the 30th Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy from 2011-2015. 

Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup: April 2016

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to the April 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past month CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including the strategic implications of China’s land creation in the South China Sea, Russia and China’s testing and deployment of offensive hypersonic weapons, the U.S. Navy’s development of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, India’s maritime ambitions in the Asia-Pacific and finally, increasing maritime tensions between African coastal countrie,s and the resulting naval build-up taking place on the continent.

Beginning the roundup in the Asia-Pacific, Lauren Dickey for the Asia Unbound Series at the Council on Foreign Relations analyzes the current political turmoil challenging the stability of Taiwan’s government. Ms. Dickey explains that Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party has retreated from an agreement with the country’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to conduct an item-by-item review of a service trade pact arranged with mainland China. The resulting breakout of severe protests by citizens, unions, and the DPP have demonstrate the harmful affects approval of the trade pact would have on Taiwan, including an increase in Beijing’s influence over domestic Taiwanese policy and the ability for large corporations to increase control over Taiwanese industry at the expense of local enterprises. Ms. Dickey highlights the perspective that the KMT party’s decision is one that has and will continue to challenge democratic principles within Taiwan while also creating a public atmosphere non-conducive to cooperative cross-strait relations.

Kyle Mizokami, at Popular Mechanics, discusses the test of China’s new hypersonic weapon, the DF-ZF, at the Wuzhai missile test center in central China. The DF-ZF is likely launched by a DF-21 IRBM, which releases a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) just before leaving the atmosphere. Mr. Mizokami explains how the HGV released in the upper atmosphere is capable of travelling at speeds from 4000-7000 miles an hour making it difficult to intercept and capable of reaching almost any target in the world within an hour. In a second article at Popular Mechanics, Mr. Mizokami continues the discussion on hypersonic weapons with Russia’s continued development of its Zircon anti-ship missile. He explains how the missile will increase the surface warfare capabilities of Russia’s aging battlecruisers by providing a new offensive capacity capable of penetrating sophisticated air-defense systems. Dave Majumdar, at the National Interest, also discusses the technicalities and implications of Russia’s development of the Zircon anti-ship missile, which you can find here.    

Harry Kazianis, at The National Interest, highlights China’s primary strategic objective in the South China Sea; that Beijing views complete control of the waters from Taiwan to Malaysia as imperative to supporting regional Chinese sovereignty. Mr. Kazianis notes that Beijing has used a process of incremental aggression throughout the region to slowly, and perhaps unnoticeably, challenge the status-quo maintained by the U.S. with the ultimate goal of achieving regional hegemony. However, as outlined by Mr. Kazianis, there is potential for the U.S. and regional allies to limit and even halt this Chinese aggression at Scarborough Shoal just West of the Philippines, where the U.S. has already begun operations with A-10 Warthogs and Sikorsky HH-60 helicopters providing air and maritime situational awareness to local forces while also articulating to China that reclaiming the reef will not be tolerated.

In a second article at The National Interest, Mr. Kazianis provides a list of different methods for confronting Chinese antagonism in the South China Sea, including a joint U.S. and allied A2/AD strategy, utilizing media and communications to demonstrate a clear U.S. regional objective and lawfare – the notion that the U.S. and regional allies should coordinate legal actions and claims against China to maximize their effectiveness.

James Goldrick, at The Interpreter, discusses the impact China’s artificial island construction in the South China Sea will have on peace and stability in the region when combined with its aggressive territorial claims under a pretense of sovereign rights. He outlines how China’s objective of creating a safe haven for its naval forces in the region will collide with the national interests of the rest of maritime Southeast Asia. He suggests that Beijing should adapt a more sensitive approach to their regional claims as to not risk international, kinetic conflict.

Alex Calvo, for the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute Blog, examines the sinking of a Chinese fishing vessel by an Argentinian Coast Guard vessel and highlights the incidents’ significance should China succeed in breaking out of the First Island Chain and seek an expanded posture in the Southern Atlantic. He notes that China operates the world’s largest long-distance fishing fleet and its interaction with foreign nations and their waters should merit appropriate attention considering how similar fishing related events have contributed to an increasingly tense political and security environment in the East and South China Seas.

To conclude the April 2016 Members’ Roundup, Paul Pryce at Offiziere discusses Africa’s rapidly growing naval forces in relation to the rise of piracy threats in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf Guinea while also noting an increase in maritime boundary disputes rooted in contested off-shore oil deposits. While identifying several examples, Mr. Pryce notes increased tensions between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and the corresponding procurement of 40 patrol vessels by Ivorian defense officials in response as a primary example of the new arms-race on the continent. He also mentions the procurement of three HIS 32 interceptor patrol vessels and three Ocean Eagle 43 OPVs by the Mozambican Navy in addition to the procurement of seven Macaé-class OPVs by Angola.

Members at CIMSEC were active elsewhere during the month of April:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies, international law and defense policy.

Seamanship and Leadership

The End of Uniformed Naval Strategic Study?

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By Steve Wills

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson’s recent decision to dissolve the long-running Strategic Studies Group (SSG) has prompted questions regarding the group’s recent viability, and whether it has made measurable contributions to naval strategy or national security. The answers to these questions are debatable to be sure. The real questions to ask are does the U.S. need mid grade and senior uniformed naval officers to think seriously about naval strategy? Should that “strategy” be something more than mere platform numbers, 30-year shipbuilding plans and associated budgets? What processes best inform and support generation of usable strategy, and how can Navy uniformed personnel, civilians and supporting contractors best support a strong, 21st century U.S. Maritime Strategy. An SSG that is returned to its 1980’s roots is the best process to achieve that goal.

The SSG was founded by CNO Admiral Thomas Hayward in 1981 with the specific mission of supporting a new era of strategic thinking by uniformed naval personnel in how to counter the rising Soviet Navy. A short review of the works of John Hattendorf, Peter Swartz, and John Hanley details the SSG’s significant influence on the development of naval strategy in the 1980’s. The efforts of the SSG were crucial to making the Maritime Strategy work at the operational and even tactical level of execution. It was a “disruptive” organization in that it had direct access to every senior officer in the Navy cosmos of that era. It had a number of innovative individuals within its ranks who later made flag officer rank. This organization was one where the people were as much the product as the concepts they created.

The SSG’s success was perhaps based on its direct association with the 1980’s era Maritime Strategy. The conditions for the SSG’s work and its own charter have considerably changed since the 1980’s. The Cold War ended in 1991, and with it the focus on defeating a global opponent. CNO Admiral Mike Boorda changed the SSG’s charter in 1996 to a focus on “revolutionary naval warfare concepts” rather than “Grand Strategy.” The group is now larger, more “joint” in construct and includes more junior personnel. Perhaps this is the wrong mix for supporting strategic thinking and development?

The SSG may not now seem to be as working well because it does not have a similar grand strategic construct to guide it it as it did in the 1980’s. In his 1990 Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, CNO Admiral Frank Kelso said a nation “didn’t need a strategy if it did not have an enemy.” The Maritime Strategy was soon placed “on the shelf” and was never really replaced. White papers such as “From the Sea” and more detailed concepts such as the 2007 and 2015 Cooperative Maritime Strategies have appeared, but none are in the same league as the 1980’s Maritime Strategy, a concept described by former Dean of Naval Warfare at the Naval War College Barney Rubel as one that could used as a “contingent warfighting doctrine.”

(Oct. 5, 2015) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson meets with the fellows of the CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC). Richardson visited NWC to address the students and faculty and to meet with the SSG. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathan Laird/Released)
(Oct. 5, 2015) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson meets with the fellows of the CNO Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathan Laird/Released)

The disestablishment of the SSG is also, in effect, a dismissal of the efforts of the U.S. Naval War College; the home base of the SSG since its commission in 1981. The SSG was originally anchored to the War College to physically remove its members from corrosive Washington D.C. politics and to leverage the traditional capabilities of the College as a center of strategic excellence. Is the Naval War College now just another Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) degree production location? This decision seems to entirely separate the War College from its traditional role as a center of deep strategic naval thinking. Is it really so difficult and costly to move a dozen Commanders and Captains to Newport, as the 1980’s-era SSG did, so that they can think about big picture ideas without the usual distractions inherent in basing them in the National Capitol Region (NCR)?

The death of the SSG may be indicative of a larger lack of historical self-examination by naval leaders when making significant strategic decisions. The 2003-2012 process where the surface Navy closed the basic training school for new Surface Warfare Officers (SWOSDOC) at Newport, RI, tried to replace it with computer-based training and then subsequently returned to schoolhouse training could have been avoided had people looked at why the surface warfare school training program was instituted. New technology and a desire for greater professionalism caused ADM Zumwalt to implement a more regimented training program for surface officers. It was recognized that the previous, “journeyman” training program of the 1950’s and 1960’s was not sufficient to provide operators for then new ships like the DD 963 class, or deal with the increasing complexity of surface warfare. Those same conditions were in play in the early 2000’s as the fleet decreased in size, but was beset with greater responsibilities, made greater use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) material, and was developing whole-ship computing environments through programs like “smart ship” and IT21. In killing SWOSDOC, the Navy in effect steamed over its own towline and needlessly weakened its junior surface warfare training program. Sadly, the dissolution of the SSG may be following a similar pattern to that of the basic Surface Warfare Officers School. Excellence in a process has become more important than the product that is created.

The Navy seems to be groping again toward a concept of real geopolitical strategy as it did in the 1970’s. The 2015 Maritime Strategy is a step in that direction. The 1991-2010, “strategy” of 30-year shipbuilding plans, force structure, and budget management is no longer sufficient for the current environment that again features peer/near peer competitors in addition to non-state actors. The Navy needs uniformed personnel (preferably with a defined career path such as CNO’s operations analysts) to examine and recommend grand strategy. The global maritime battlespace has always made naval leaders deep strategic thinkers. The other services do not think along the same geographic lines. The U.S. has no strategic land frontier such as the Franco-German one of 1870-1945 where the Army might build grand strategy. The Air Force alternately operates in support of operational Army requirements or ignores geography altogether in its strategic bombing efforts.

The post 1986 Goldwater Nichols era of geographically isolated combatant commanders “drawing lines in the sea” and overly focused on land-based events disrupted the ethos of strategic naval thinking. Naval leadership must support the idea of the naval officer as a strategic thinker. Sadly, dissolution of groups like the SSG makes this more difficult to achieve. The Navy seems to have returned to the conditions of 1981 when incoming Secretary of the Navy John Lehman said that naval officers “did not do strategy.”

There is hope, however, to correct these deficiencies within the CNO’s “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” It states that, “history should be studied so that old lessons do not have to be relearned.” History suggests that the SSG in its pre-1996 format provided excellent support to the creation and implementation of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980’s. Learning-centered technologies, simulators, online gaming analytics and other tools not available in the mid 1980’s could further expand the reach and impact of 22 mid grade officers working on big picture ideas in the relative quiet of Newport. Such an organization for a new SSG would do much to maximize combat effectiveness and efficiency. It could be a team effort across the Navy’s strategic enterprise and would do much to reinvigorate an assessment culture and processes. An SSG that returns to its pre-1996 roots and adopts the best practices as recommended by “high velocity learning” can have as great an impact in building 21st century maritime strategy as did the SSG of the mid 1980’s.

Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare officer and a PhD candidate in military history at Ohio University. His focus areas are modern U.S. naval and military reorganization efforts and British naval strategy and policy from 1889-1941. 

Featured Image: Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson speaking at the Naval War College. (Photo: MC1 Nathan Laird, US Navy)

Capability Analysis, Current Operations

Shifting to Shore Power?

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By J. Overton

The concept that a nation’s means to compel its will originates “from the sea” is a fallacy.

For history’s greatest maritime powers, greatest navies, and greatest naval actions, the sea is at best a temporary operating environment. Sea power has always been created, tended, and entirely dependent on land. This is true even for the world’s largest and most globally-active modern Navy. The U.S. Fleet, its Sailors, civilian workers, and Navy family members spend most of their time ashore, in the United States. But this fact is conspicuously absent from both the 2015 version of the maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS21R) and its 2007 predecessor. In these and other recent strategic documents, the Navy’s largest, oldest, most expensive, most resilient, and most complex operational platforms, shore installations in the United States, suffer almost total neglect. [1][*]

To understand the role of America’s Navy in this young century, however, requires understanding the role of Navy shore infrastructure in America. To that end, the following offers a reality check on CS21R, an examination of how the naval resources concentrated in Navy bases gives them a power all their own, and an exploration of the capabilities these bases really contribute.

Design, Organize and Employ the Sea Services

“This maritime strategy describes how we will design, organize, and employ the Sea Services in support of our national, defense, and homeland security strategies. It also sets maritime priorities in an era of constrained resources, while emphasizing warfighting capabilities and forward naval presence to advance national interests today and guide preparations for tomorrow’s challenges.”CS21R[2]

Defining the meaning of “strategy” is difficult, defining a strategy itself even more so. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as reliable a source as we have, tells us that strategy is “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” [3] CS21R is indeed a set of ideas for employing instruments of national power to achieve objectives, with the employment ideas mostly involving warfighting capabilities and forward naval presence. Many of the instruments mentioned, such as the 300-plus ship fleet, various technological advances, and even some partnerships mentioned, are not currently in existence. They are on wish lists which may never be realized.  Of those which do exist, most are not now employed primarily either for warfighting or in providing forward presence.

121220-N-ZN152-178NORFOLK (Dec. 20, 2012) The aircraft carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), USS Enterprise (CVN 65), USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) are in port at Naval Station Norfolk, Va., the worldÕs largest naval station. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ernest R. Scott/Released)
The aircraft carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), USS Enterprise (CVN 65), USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) in port at Naval Station Norfolk, Va., (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ernest R. Scott/Released).

Another definition of strategy, perhaps more cynical if equally applicable, is “what you’re doing right now, intended or not.” [4] A snapshot “Status of the Navy,” taken in March  2016, shows that of the U.S. Navy’s 272 deployable battle force ships, about 49%  are deployed either underway or overseas. Of the 326,046 active duty Sailors, it can be assumed that a similar percentage is deployed or underway. This leaves less than half of the U.S. Navy’s deployable battle force ships in port, about the same number of her Sailors, and almost all of the 107,115 reservists, 195, 258 civilian employees, and hundreds of thousands of Navy dependents berthed and working ashore in the United States [5]

Strategic proclamations aside, shore installations are where, at any given moment in the year 2016 and the many years preceding it, one finds the majority of the U.S. Navy’s deployable platforms, people, and money.

Where it Matters, When it Matters

“The Navy’s current budget submission will provide for more than 300 ships and a forward presence of about 120 ships by 2020, up from an average of 97 in 2014, to be “where it matters, when it matters.” CS21R[6]

Although some Navy bases are inland, most are necessarily in the littoral, that narrow near-shore area where what happens on land influences the sea and what happens at sea influences the land. When applied to strategic thinking about foreign lands, the littoral realm is often considered a place inundated with both opportunities and threats. This is true when planning for combat or humanitarian operations in developing nations, but true for the continental United States as well. Our coastal areas tend to be the most populated, have the most desirable and expensive real estate, be the most environmentally sensitive, and be the most vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters.[7] They are also, of course, where the majority of Navy installations must exist. Those bases, many consisting of more than one geographic installation separated physically but under a single Commanding Officer, are mostly clustered into a few fleet concentration areas: [8] Significant naval presence in these regions pre-dates World War II, the aircraft carrier, submarine, diesel-power, and in some places, even the formation of the United States as a nation.

Bremerton naval base 2
An overhead view of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton,Washington.

For more than a decade Navy has stated its need for total fleet number somewhere in excess of 300 ships. Deployable force ships now stand at about 280, and haven’t been over 300 since 2003. [9] The extra 20 or 30 ships wished for may or may not arrive to fit themselves into CS21R. While there is much debate and handwringing over the optimal size and mission-set of the U.S. fleet and its overseas bases, ships can be built relatively quickly and cheaply compared to acquisition and maintenance of the real estate from which they’ll be based, and the long-term viability of bases not on U.S. soil is never assured.

Stateside shore installations are where it matters, when it matters: here, and now. And they’ve developed their own type of power to sustain them, without major course changes, for the foreseeable future.

Self-Sustaining Naval Forces

“Our self-sustaining naval forces, operating in the global commons, ensure the   protection of the homeland far from our shores, while providing the President with decision space and options to deny an adversary’s objectives, preserve freedom of action, and assure access for follow-on forces.” CS21R [10]

There is no robust discussion or controversy about the need for the current fleet concentration areas, or even for most individual Navy bases in the United States.  Navy leadership implicitly recognizes the strategic value of their finite real-estate and unlike the Army and Air Force, is not currently calling for consolidation or closing of their shore infrastructure. [11] The decisions that usually matter about bases are those of policy makers, particularly Congress. Political leadership, generally of both parties and certainly going down from Capitol Hill to mayors and county commissioners of Navy base-dependent communities, has shown little desire to close bases, even if they do espouse curtailing some of the base’s more onerous operations. The smaller overall number of bases now in operation since previous rounds of Base Realignment and Closure, and their concentration into fewer Regions, means that most installations are a major source, if not the major source, of economic life for their immediate locale.

This economic power keeps Navy installations in the U.S. relatively safe from existential political threats. They have developed what journalist Walter Russell Mead refers to as “Sticky Power… [a power] based neither on military compulsion nor on simple coincidence of wills. Consider the carnivorous sundew plant, which attracts its prey with a kind of soft power, a pleasing scent that lures insects toward its sap. But once the victim has touched the sap, it is stuck; it can’t get away. That is sticky power…”[12]Mead was referring to the relationships between countries, such as that between China and the United States, but his theory is applicable for most major Navy bases and their local civilian communities. The two cannot extricate themselves from one another without mutually assured damage. Politicians, business leaders, education officials, and all manner of non-profits physically close to Navy bases are supporters of their local base, even if they disagree with overall U.S. military policy, or have an ignorance or contempt of traditional naval hard-power missions.

San Diego Naval base
San Diego Naval Base, as seen from a commercial airliner. Source: Wikipedia.

The effect of CONUS Naval installations’  power, rooted more in economics than grand strategy or traditional notions of Mahan or Corbett, leaves America a dispersed and networked range of Navy bases fairly secure from foreign attack, fairly secure from political infringement, and fairly secure from credible, capable local opposition. [13].

That Unique Capability: Presence

“Looking at how we support our people, build the right platforms, power them to achieve efficient global capability, and develop critical partnerships will be central to its successful execution and to providing that unique capability: presence.”CS21R [14]

To paraphrase a dead Prussian General, the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that must be made is to establish what a Navy base actually does, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. The disparate missions these bases perform go well beyond simply supporting the Navy’s families and deploying Fleets and fighters. They are not, in the parlance of our most recent strategies and Sailing Directions, fighting wars or operating forward. But they are engaged, and they are ready.

Perhaps the best analogy for the collective power and capability they provide America would be that of a “Fleet in Being,” a concept historically applied to a naval force which, though not deployed or concentrated for battle, provided a deterrence function or caused some reaction on the part of an opposing force.[15] A “Fleet in Being” has a strategic value because, even if seemingly uninvolved in the most pressing contemporary operation, it has great potential.

Likewise, U.S. Navy bases are on American soil. They are dispersed around America, and nearly all share each of the following attributes: on Federal property; located in or near major commercial ports; located in areas prone to natural disasters; and having ample and diverse infrastructure, equipment, and personnel under Federal control.

Pearl Harbor naval base 4
A satellite view of Pearl Harbor. Photo Source: NASA.

This simple but rare combination of characteristics gives the Navy base great flexibility and potential. In recent years they have done essentially whatever need they were able to do, when they were asked. Navy bases in the United States have been used as relief, staging, and command centers during floods, fires, and terrorist attacks. They’ve hosted educational and entertainment venues and events for their local communities. They’ve provided environmental restoration and mitigation functions to local and national organizations. They’ve been used as test cases for experimental energy initiatives. They were even on tap to house unaccompanied migrant children from Central America. [16] Navy bases are the best and only option for decision makers to use in so many situations that have no resemblance to traditional naval missions. Their presence, individually and when used in concert with multiple installations, makes them a unique element of U.S. power.

Building the Future Force

“In building the future force, we will make institutional changes and take prudent risk as we balance investment in readiness, capability, and capacity.” CS21R [17]

None of this is to argue for or against a shift to shore power, be that defined as more bases, more funding for bases, or fewer deployable platforms. Nor is it to argue that such a shift is now underway. Rather, it’s a reminder of what could be described as the Navy’s real strategy, if your strategy is what you’re doing right now: Despite repeated emphasis on forward presence and warfighting, in 2016, the U.S. Navy spends the majority of its time and resources at shore installations in the United States. [18] These shore installations also have their own inherent strategy for self-sustainment, and provide an uncodified but vital national capability. They are the most enduring and most visible instruments of American sea power. Barring the most Stranglovian conflict scenario or a radical adjustment in the current course of budgets and funding, they will outlast the service life of today’s ships, sailors, and maritime strategies. The Navy’s future force has already been here for long time, and it’s not going anywhere anytime soon.

 J. Overton is a civilian writer/editor for the U.S. Navy, and has been an adjunct professor for the Naval War College and Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government.

[*] CS21R encompasses the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, but this essay focuses mainly on just the U.S. Navy. The other sea services have differing installation realities and requirements.

[1]    “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” available at http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf. Commander, Navy Installation Command (CNIC) has issued various Shore Investment Strategies or Strategic Guidance documents which focus on “warfighter” support and saving money rather than the range of installation missions. See “CNIC Visit to NAF Atsugi Reveals Navy Shore Priorities” at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=87620 and  “Chief of Naval Operations Shore Investment Guidance” at http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2015/NAV15128.txt

[2] “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,” pg.iii

[3] “The Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf 

[4] Ron Ratcliff, “Strategy is Execution” (Newport: Naval War College, 2005), 1.

[5] “Status of the Navy” accessed on March 25, 2016 , available at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146

[6] “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” and “Department of the Navy Releases Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Proposal” available at  http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=85430

[7] J. Overton “Don’t Forget Seapower’s Dry Foundation”, The Northwest Navigator, August 19, 2011, pg. 4

[8] Commander, Navy Installation’s Command web site – http://cnic.navy.mil/about.html

[9]  “US Ship Force Levels” Naval History and Heritage Command http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html

[10] “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” pg. 2

[11] “CNO: Navy is not pushing for BRAC” available at  http://archive.militarytimes.com/article/20140324/NEWS05/303240037/CNO-Navy-not-pushing-BRAC

[12] Walter Russell Mead, “America’s Sticky Power,” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/29/americas-sticky-power/

[13]  “The Battle Is On to Save Military Bases from Closure” available at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/04/10/Battle-Save-Military-Bases-Closure  and “CNO: Navy is not pushing for BRAC”

[14] A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” pg. i

[15] The Merriam-Websters Dictionary has a concise definition at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fleet%20in%20being), and the following Naval War College Review article has a more in-depth and nuanced discussion “The Idea of a Fleet in Being in Historical Perspective” https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/b128b7e6-aa98-494e-be55-8000ba30db29/The-Idea-of-a–Fleet-in-Being–in-Historical-Persp.aspx  

[16] “Navy Supports Firefighting Efforts and Families” at  http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=32740,  “NASNI Provides Makeshift Shelter Wildfire Victims” http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=32776 and “California naval base becomes home to detained Central American children at http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/13/us/children-immigrant-crisis/

[17] “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” pg. 26

Featured Image: Naval Station Pearl Harbor.