Tag Archives: North Korea

End States and Divided States: After the Kims

North Korea Topic Week

By Matt McLaughlin


A useful exercise in considering courses of action that could be taken in response to a North Korean collapse is to skip ahead to the aftermath. However and whenever the Kim regime falls, it will be ugly – but some kind of end state will follow. Identifying the most desirable (or least undesirable) one will be critical to planning for North Korean contingencies. After all, how can one plan without an objective? Considering outcomes enables us to write policies that increase the likelihood of our preferred end state, while also helping guide contingency planning should something else actually occur.

We may postulate three basic outcomes:

  • Everybody is wrong, and the Energizer Bunny of family autocracies doesn’t collapse at all. It just keeps going and going…
  • The Kims fall, and the peninsula is reunited.
  • The Kims fall, and the peninsula remains divided.

Before getting into those, a couple preliminaries must be stated first. The North Korean government has continually stood since 1948 because its neighbors have been able to live with it. This is not to pass a moral judgment, but simply to note that since the 1953 armistice was signed, no interested party has found dislodging the Kims to be worth the price. North Korean nuclear capability certainly changes the calculus, but the fundamental result appears to be the same so far. The existence of North Korea provides certain conveniences in other matters. For China, it provides a buffer zone between it and a U.S. ally on the East Asian mainland, as well as a client state with which it may deniably perturb the West. For Japan, to whom geography gives a vested interest in peninsular affairs, the standoff prevents Chinese influence from dominating all of Korea – and also prevents a unified Korea rivaling Japan’s eminent position in Northeast Asia. And for both Japan and the United States, the North Korean threat justifies the presence of defensive forces – to include missile defenses – that are intended for defense against Korea but could also be used to keep the Chinese in check.

With all this mind, how could the three basic scenarios play out? 


This is actually more reasonable than it might seem. A long tradition of existence is as good an indicator as any that the Kim regime knows how to stick around for the long haul. Nuclear brinksmanship will occur and deterrence will be tested, but fundamentally things will remain stable, if uneasy, in this scenario. For reasons described above, the situation has proven sustainable on the international stage.

Unfortunately, this does nothing to change the thousands of artillery tubes pointed at Seoul, but the status quo has still been decent enough for the South to amass one of the world’s largest gross domestic products. The Republic of Korea has made the best of the hand it’s been dealt, and will likely continue to do so. Not so much for the people north of the armistice line – but that appears to be the price of stability.

Reunification by the ROK

Should the Kim regime fall, another authority will have to fill the vacuum. The Republic of Korea would be the natural choice, and is sure to be the United States’ preferred option. However, this scenario places the Republic on the border of the People’s Republic of China. For the PRC to go along with this, U.S. forces will probably need to vacate the peninsula as soon as initial stability operations are completed. Continued U.S. relations with a unified Korea will become less a matter of our bilateral relationship and more a matter of how it plays vis a vis China.

However, diminished U.S. influence in Korea may not be to Japan’s liking. Undoubtedly a newly reunified Korea would be inward-focused for several years as it integrates the north into the peninsular and world economies – but the ROK would emerge stronger for it. Without the everyday American presence it has now, the unified Korea may attempt to assert itself on the world stage in ways counter to Japanese interests, not to mention those of China. We may again see Korea as a platform for competing international influences, as the 1890s saw between Japan, China, and the so far unmentioned but very-present northern neighbor, Russia.

Reunification by ???

War is a contest of probabilities, and no result is preordained. It is entirely possible that the Kim regime may fall, but could take Seoul with it, leaving the Republic of Korea just as dead as the People’s Democratic Republic. With no obvious authority, a new power would fill the vacuum. It may be a Maoist movement to succeed the Kims, a Korean nationalist one, or something else harder to predict. Whatever the case may be, any authority other than the ROK is likely to be less amenable to Western interests. The Republic essentially owes its existence to the UN effort of the 1950s and continued American presence thereafter. A post-ROK state would not feel the same obligations toward its predecessors’ enablers.

Continued Partition, Courtesy China

Reunification is not a foregone conclusion, even in the event of the Kim regime’s fall. It may be that the two Korean societies have simply diverged so much since the 1940s that a merger is no longer possible. Or it may be simply that power politics interferes.

As noted above, China values a buffer between it and the U.S. forces in South Korea. It could maintain this by invading the moment the regime collapses and establishing control of the North’s territory before the ROK (with U.S. support) can do so. It could then set up a puppet state and demand global recognition of its fait accompli.

North Korean military officers. (Reuters)

At greater length, a similar outcome could also be achieved via a hybrid war effort in a destabilized North Korea. No doubt the Chinese have studied Russian operations in Ukraine. Even if the ROK controlled all of Korea on paper, a push by Chinese “little green men” could establish a frozen conflict keeping the ROK and its Western allies off balance. An ephemeral Korean version of the Donetsk People’s Republic might be good enough for China’s purposes.

Continued Partition, Berlin 1945-Style

It is conceivable that a wartime stalemate or diplomatic impasse leads to further partition of North Korean territory, reminiscent of Germany after World War II. Different players could have sectors, including China, the Republic of Korea, the U.S., and, just possibly, Russia. If such an occupation scheme was to go into place, it would almost certainly be an arrangement exclusively by the states involved. The presence of multiple veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council implies the UN will probably not have much utility.

Moving Forward

What we think will happen is not necessarily what will happen. If one believes history arcs toward justice or that despots always fail, it is easy to blithely assume Korean unification is just a matter of time. This analysis reminds us it is not. Many potential outcomes exist and each will have unique second- and third-order effects. Some of the likelier effects can be identified, and today’s diplomatic efforts and operational planning may be able to mitigate them, and even nudge events in a preferred direction. Perhaps more importantly, the relationships built and knowledge gained in hedging against the North Korean challenge will enable quick, effective decision-making when something completely different occurs.

Matt McLaughlin is a Navy Reserve lieutenant commander, strategic communications consultant, and Naval War College student whose opinions on matters large and small do not represent the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, or his employer.

Featured Image: Monuments of North Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il on Mansudae (Mansu Hill) in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Wikimedia Commons)

North Korea’s Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities: An Evolving Threat

North Korea Topic Week

By Matthew W. Gamble


North Korea stunned the world by conducting its first nuclear test in 2006, a mere three years after its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Despite the small, one-kiloton yield of the device, the test nevertheless signified the rogue state’s entry into the nuclear arena and further complicated the already strategically challenging position on the Korean Peninsula. A recent report by the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies estimated that Pyongyang currently possesses a growing stockpile of between 10-16 nuclear weapons, though the exact number remains unknown. More alarming are the rapid advancements North Korea has recently made in developing nuclear weapon delivery systems, including the recent missile test-launch on May 14th showing considerable progress toward an intercontinental ballistic missile. Considerable resources have been devoted to this pursuit by the famine-stricken state, and investments are beginning to bear fruit. Despite its emphasis on land-based systems such as the new Hwasong-12, North Korea’s evolving sea-based nuclear delivery potential is beginning to pose a considerable threat, lending additional credibility to the Kim regime’s nuclear deterrent.

Nukes at Sea

Of particular concern, North Korea has been making progress toward attaining a nuclear triad by developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. After several failures, the DPRK successfully tested its first SLBM, known as the Pukkuksong-1/KN-11, in late August 2016. With a two-stage solid fuel propellant system, the KN-11 has an estimated range of almost 500 nautical miles, more than enough to threaten major population centers such as Seoul and Tokyo, or military installations like Kadena Airbase in Okinawa, with only limited travel of its launch platform outside of home waters. Notably, it seems the decision was made to opt for a more stable, solid fuel propellant at the expense of range after a series of liquid-fueled missile failures. Not only is a solid fuel propulsion system less volatile, but it enables the missile to be launched on short notice, as it does not require the lengthy and dangerous fueling process required before the launch of a liquid fueled ballistic missile. Currently, the operational status of the KN-11 is unclear, with estimates of service entry varying from late this year to 2020.

In addition to technical advances in SLBM technology, North Korea has made considerable progress in developing a new class of submarine for the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) capable of deploying these weapons. With the first vessel launched in the summer of 2014, the Sinpo-class represents Pyongyang’s first diesel-electric ballistic missile submarine. Similar in size and shape to older Yugoslavian designs like the Heroj-class, the Sinpo-class appears to have incorporated features derived from the Soviet Golf II-class ballistic missile submarine. Indeed, in 1993 North Korean technicians had the opportunity to examine a number of ex-Soviet Pacific Fleet Golf II-class boats before they were scrapped.

When looking at the Sinpo’s ballistic missile launch tubes, the influence of older Soviet designs becomes apparent. In a similar arrangement to the Golf II, a rectangular section of the conning tower houses what appear to be one or two ballistic missile launch tubes. Likewise, given its diesel-electric propulsion system, the Simpo-class shares the Golf-class’ range limitation, estimated to be around 1,500 nautical miles. When paired with the moderate range of the KN-11, the Sinpo-class would require fueling to achieve launch distance of the continental United States. Nevertheless, once made fully operational, these submarines could potentially threaten strategic targets throughout East Asia and could prove difficult to track and eliminate. Moreover, a ballistic missile submarine can launch its SLBMs from a variety of directions, complicating missile defense planning and increasing the vulnerability of potential targets.

Kim Jong Un in the conning tower of what appears to be a Project 633 diesel submarine. (KCNA)

Currently, only one Sinpo-class ballistic missile submarine appears to be active, but additional vessels will likely be completed in the near future. The submarine reportedly suffered damage to its conning tower on 28 November 2015, after a KN-11 failed to successfully eject from its launch tube during a test. Nevertheless, on 24 August 2016, a successful test was conducted where a KN-11 was launched from the vessel. Despite this success, the operational status of North Korea’s SLBM capability remains unclear. Ultimately, the Sinpo-class remains the largest submarine built for the KPN and will represent a significant enhancement of North Korea’s nuclear delivery capacity once perfected, though its small size, limited range, and rudimentary design are substantial shortcomings.

Complicating Deterrence 

The addition of an SLBM, complemented by a workable launch platform, will greatly enhance the survivability of North Korea’s nuclear delivery capacity and improve the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Currently, North Korea’s land-based nuclear delivery systems rely heavily on fixed infrastructure and operate in the open, which makes them particularly vulnerable to attack. As a result, if Washington were to lose ‘strategic patience’ with the DPRK, Pyongyang would likely see its land-based nuclear forces neutralized in a first strike. Ballistic missile submarines, on the other hand, are more survivable than fixed infrastructure because the vastness and depth of the oceans provide concealment within a wide operational area.

Though the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of the combined U.S.-ROK forces are second to none, even a rudimentary submarine such as the Sinpo-class would be difficult to locate and destroy quickly. Consequently, it is plain to see how a ballistic missile submarine would enhance North Korea’s nuclear deterrent. If the DPRK were to ever lose its land-based nuclear delivery systems in a surprise attack, it would still have the ability to retaliate with an SLBM launch against South Korea or Japan. Politically, this would alter the cost-benefit analysis when weighing military action against Pyongyang. Once the nuclear armed Sinpo-class becomes fully operational, it will be even more difficult for the United States to guarantee the complete elimination of all North Korean nuclear delivery systems in a first strike. Under those circumstances, it seems unlikely that South Korea would agree to any preemptive military action against North Korea. Therefore, the scope of action that can realistically be taken against the rogue state is diminished, granting the Kim regime additional political leverage on the international stage. With this in mind, the significance of a fully operational nuclear armed North Korean ballistic missile submarine becomes abundantly clear.

The Range of DPRK Seaborne WMD Threats

Given the range limitations and reliability issues associated with North Korea’s current arsenal of ballistic missiles, the Kim regime may turn to unconventional methods to deliver nuclear weapons to targets well outside the range of its missiles. In the extreme, North Korea could smuggle a nuclear or radiological weapon in a shipping container aboard one of its numerous merchant vessels. A 2005 report by the Congressional Research Service titled, “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response,” highlighted the challenging nature of preventing such an attack. Certainly, North Korea has already demonstrated its willingness and ability to smuggle contraband aboard its merchant vessels undetected.

In 2013, a North Korean-flagged freighter, the Chong Chon Gang, traversed parts of the Pacific undetected after disabling its Automatic Identification System. Eventually, the freighter made it to the Panama Canal where its illicit cargo was discovered after being boarded by Panamanian port authorities. Fortunately, in this case its cargo merely consisted of surface-to-air missile components, disassembled MiG-21s, night-vision goggles, and ammunition. Yet, if the ship was transporting a nuclear or radiological device, the damage that could have been inflicted upon the Panama Canal would have been substantial.

A man looks at a MIG-21 jet found inside a container on the North Korean Chong Chon Gang vessel seized at Manzanillo Port, Panama, on July 21, 2013. Panamanian authorities have found two Soviet-era MiG-21 fighter jets aboard the North Korean ship. (AFP)

For North Korea, smuggling a nuclear device on a freighter would be a high-risk high-reward strategy. A successful smuggling operation followed by a detonation in close proximity to the intended target could serve as the first strike in the opening of a larger war. On the other hand, if the nuclear cargo was intercepted en route to its destination, North Korea would lose the element of surprise and open itself to a retaliatory attack. Although it is unlikely that North Korea would opt to smuggle a nuclear weapon aboard one of its merchant vessels, the threat should not be discounted entirely.


Recent developments in the sea-based nuclear delivery capacity of the KPN have complicated the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula even further. By diversifying the means by which it can deliver nuclear weapons, the Kim regime has strengthened the credibility of its nuclear deterrence, forcing the U.S. and its allies to think twice before considering military action. Although the North Korean military would eventually succumb to the overwhelming force of American-ROK full-spectrum dominance in a full-scale war, the possibility of nuclear strikes against South Korea and Japan would likely be considered an unacceptable risk by political leaders, thereby taking the option preemptive military action against North Korea off the table. Meanwhile, the threat of nuclear smuggling looms large, adding an additional layer of complexity to the North Korean nuclear problem.

As the DPRK continues to perfect its missile technology, we may one day see Pyongyang with the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon to the continental United States with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). At this point, whether or not to pursue a strategy of forcible denuclearization is up for debate, but given this turn of events it seems the window of opportunity to do so is closing rapidly.

Matthew Gamble is based in New Brunswick, Canada. His research interests primarily focus on Eurasian geopolitics, capability analysis, and Canadian defence policy. Find him on twitter @Matth_Gamble.

Featured Image: North Korean underwater test-fire of submarine-based ballistic missile. (KCNA/via Reuters)

The Definition of Insanity: Carrots and Sticks with North Korea

North Korea Topic Week

By Richard Kuzma


On May 5th the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act, to “modify and increase the President’s authority to impose sanctions on persons in violation of certain U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea.”1 This law, along with the White House’s aggressive language and not ruling out “military options” on the peninsula, is merely political posturing and not constructive to curbing development of North Korea’s ballistic missile or nuclear weapons programs. To do this, the United States must find the balance between carrots and sticks; making the existing sanctions regime effective while offering incentives for Kim Jong Un to negotiate a freeze of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.

A military solution in North Korea is unfeasible. A preemptive U.S. strike would not destroy North Korea’s entire nuclear arsenal. One has only to look at the mobile off-road platforms on display at the military Day of the Sun parade commemorating the birthday of Kim Il Sung.2 Following a U.S. strike, Kim Jong Un would likely bombard Seoul, South Korea’s capital located only 35 miles from the demilitarized zone. The artillery strikes would kill many of the 25 million citizens of the city.

Forceful elimination of North Korea’s entire nuclear program would require troops on the ground. The RAND Corporation estimates that 273,000 U.S. troops would be needed to secure all nuclear sites in a high-threat environment. This number does not include any forces conducting combat operations or humanitarian assistance.3 There is little political backing for a ground war in North Korea, and let us not forget what happened the last time U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel. U.S. intervention—even in the event of regime collapse—would be viewed as threatening by China.

There are two main tools left in the U.S. arsenal: economic sanctions and diplomacy. The first has been attempted, and leaves much to be desired. The second has received little play because it is politically unpopular to look “weak” against North Korea.

Economic Sanctions

In response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and violation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2270 in March 2016.4 This resolution was the most comprehensive sanctions regime against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in twenty years and mandated the following: (1) all flagged North Korean planes and ships carrying cargo be inspected; (2) banned North Korea from exporting most of its natural resources; (3) asked UN member states to prohibit the opening of North Korean banks within their borders, and shut down banks associated with DPRK nuclear and missile programs; (4) directed member states to expel DPRK diplomats and foreign nationals engaged in illicit activities; (5) prohibited members states from training DPRK nationals in fields that might benefit their nuclear or missile programs (ex. Physics, aerospace engineering); (6) banned member states from allowing DPRK to charter foreign aircraft or ships; and (7) prohibited the sale of rocket fuel and small arms to DPRK.5

The sanctions never reached full force. In February 2017, a UN Panel of Experts report showed that despite being the most heavily sanctioned country in the world, DPRK and its ruling elites were not being squeezed by U.S. and UN efforts.6 Some UN member states failed to implement sanctions on the books, China has not leveraged its full potential to influence North Korea, and the government of North Korea has found ways to evade sanctions using sophisticated corporate networks.7

Earlier this year, China suspended coal imports from North Korea, which is a strong step.8 Banning fuel and crude oil exports to North Korea would truly put a squeeze on the DPRK economy. This could cause instability, threatening the Kim government with collapse.9 China has a strategic interest in keeping a stable North Korea, rather than allowing loose nukes on its borders that may invite a large American military presence beyond the 38th Parallel and lead to a possible reunification of the peninsula under a government friendly to the United States. China has enough economic weight to not be swayed by U.S. pressure to cut oil exports, especially at the cost of China’s national interest.

DPRK Adaptations

Counterintuitively, sanctions have made it easier for North Korea’s to procure components for its nuclear and missile programs through state-sponsored front companies and Chinese intermediaries.10 Imagine a bacterium that gains antibiotic resistance. UN sanctions target and eliminate the least skilled sources of procurement, and raise the cost of doing business. The most sophisticated actors survive, and the Kim regime is forced to pay higher fees to Chinese intermediate companies. This attracts even more sophisticated actors to the game.11 These actors are more discrete and have wider procurement networks, which provides more opportunities for North Korea to do business in the outside world without being detected.12

An worker walks between front-end loaders used to move imported North Korean coal at Dandong port in the Chinese border city of Dandong, Liaoning province, December 7, 2010. (Reuters/Stringer)

In addition to these Chinese networks, North Korea state-owned enterprises have established footholds in financial hubs like Hong Kong, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur via “Hwa-gyos,” ethnically Han Chinese North Korean citizens or their descendants, usually wealthy businessmen.13 Finally, North Korea hides its businessmen in embassies, declaring them as diplomats. These middlemen are allowed free passage in and out of North Korea and surrounding nations and build connections that becomes commercial nodes for the larger illicit networks.14


American politicians routinely take a hardline stance against North Korea, with little results. Each threat only forces the Kim regime into a more defensive and mistrustful posture. The United States should stop its goal of regime change, peninsula reunification, and its refusal to come to the negotiating table unless nuclear disarmament is guaranteed. Kim Jung Un sees the maintenance of his nuclear program as paramount to his regime’s survival. This is entirely rational, given America’s interventions in non-nuclear states Iraq and Libya, and subsequent regime change. Though the North Korean government is abhorrent, ensuring its security is key to any freezing and elimination of the grave threat that comes from its nuclear and missile programs.

Real progress on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs can only come through diplomatic processes. The United States and North Korea distrust one another, so tit-for-tat negotiations seem unlikely.  Social psychologist Charles Osgood offers a model of graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT) where the stronger party offers a small concession that does not show weakness, while expressing interest that the adversarial party offers something commensurate.15

A North Korean soldier takes a photo of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson during his visit to Panmunjom, the truce village near the inter-Korean border, on Friday. (Yonhap/EPA)

The power asymmetry between the United States and North Korea dictates that the U.S. be the first to make a move. An example of this might be removing overflights of the Korean Peninsula by American B-1B bombers or perhaps suspending the annual Foal Eagle exercise between the U.S. and South Korea. If North Korea reciprocates with a similar concession, the two countries can enter what U.S. Naval War College Professor Lyle Goldstein calls a “cooperation spiral,” the opposite of an escalation spiral.16 The end hope of this spiral is increased relations with North Korea, more fruitful multilateral negotiations, and a security guarantee for North Korea that preserves the regime while preventing further development of North Korean ICBMs that could hold America and her allies at risk.

Moving Forward

The United States can be both tough and productive by helping the UN better enforce its sanctions regime while also pursuing diplomatic relations and trust-building measures with North Korea. Immediate measures are needed to support the UN Panel of Experts recommendations to improve the economic sanctions, while a longer-term change in dialog—both in domestic political discourse and internationally—is needed to make the relationship with North Korea more productive.

The U.S. and UN should empower nations in Southeast Asia to enforce the sanctions regimes. The UN Panel of Experts report “named names” of actors and state-owned companies involved in some capacity with North Korea’s illicit trade. Most of these revelations were not new. The same players are involved in key positions and act as hubs within the network. Empowering countries like Malaysia and Singapore through intelligence sharing will help them expel North Korean intermediaries and diplomats, concentrating the illicit network to mainland China.

The U.S. should then improve cooperation with China. Reframing the elimination of Chinese intermediaries as an anti-corruption issue will make the cause more amenable to the Chinese government.17 The United States should challenge the Chinese government to enforce its domestic laws and international agreements, setting the example as a responsible rising power. American leaders must show that that enforcing sanctions will squeeze, but not destabilize, North Korea, and demonstrate the United States is willing to engage diplomatically rather than militarily to curb North Korean weapons programs. To truly generate Chinese cooperation, the United States may have to consider concessions on South China Sea issues, which are unpalatable, but perhaps necessary in combating the larger threat of a North Korean nuclear strike.


More effective sanctions are not the answer to the world’s problems with North Korea. However, by first understanding the nature of our failures in implementing these sanctions we can pursue more effective methods that will open the door to a potential freezing of the intercontinental ballistic missile program. Political bluster is counterproductive. Diplomatic concessions are needed to change the status quo. If the Trump administration wants to move away from “strategic patience,” the way forward is not with force, but diplomacy.

Richard Kuzma is an Ensign and Master in Public Policy Candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. His research focuses on North Korea’s business networks and their adaptations to UN sanctions.


1. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1644

2. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-parade-missiles.html

3. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RB9800/RB9805/RAND_RB9805.pdf

4. “Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2270 (2016),” March 2, 2016, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm

5. Richard Roth, “U.N. Security Council Approves Tough Sanctions on North Korea,” March 3, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/02/world/un-north-korea-sanctions-vote/

6. UN Panel of Experts Report, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/150 

7. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-the-missiles-stop-north-korea-inc.html

8. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-oil-idUSKBN17U1I1

9. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-oil-idUSKBN17U1I1

10. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-the-missiles-stop-north-korea-inc.html

11. John Park and Jim Walsh, “Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences,” MIT Security Studies Program, August 2016, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_ph0c6i87C_eGhCOGRhUVFaU28/view, 22.

12. Park and Walsh, 23

13. Park and Walsh, 26

14. Park and Walsh, 26

15. Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

16. http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/meeting-china-halfway

17. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-the-missiles-stop-north-korea-inc.html

Featured Image: People take part in an oath-taking meeting before the statues of late North Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il on Mansudae Hill in Pyongyang April 10, 2013 in this photo distributed by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).  Sign reads: “Let’s become faithful youth vanguard of our party!” 

North Korea Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

Recent developments on the Korean Peninsula have prompted concerns over North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, how to deter conflict, and find a peaceful solution to the dilemma. This week CIMSEC will be publishing articles submitted in response to our call for articles on North Korea.

Below is a list of articles featuring during the topic week that will be updated as the topic week rolls out and as prospective authors finalize additional publications.

The Definition of Insanity: Carrots and Sticks with North Korea by Richard Kuzma
North Korea’s Sea-Based Nuclear Capabilities: An Evolving Threat by Matthew Gamble
End States and Divided States: After the Kims by Matt McLaughlin
Putting Trump’s Reputation to Work in North Korea by Travis Lindsay
North Korea – Shaping the U.S. Response by Commodore Anil Jai Singh (ret.)
Rethinking the Korean Peninsula Crisis by Ching Chang

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un salutes during a visit to the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces on the occasion of the new year, in this undated file photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on January 10, 2016. (Reuters/KCNA)