Tag Archives: Force Design

French Maritime Strategy – Carrier-Led and Indo-Pacific Focused

NATO Naval Power Week

By David Scott

French maritime strategy has been on full public display with the deployment of the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) from November 2024 to April 2025, carrying out an extended deployment across the Indo-Pacific in the furthest ever Operation Clemenceau.

The French Carrier Strike Group included various components:

  • FS Charles de Gaulle: nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
  • FS Forbin: air defense destroyer,
  • FS Provence: anti-submarine frigate,
  • FS Alsace: air defense frigate
  • FS Duguay-Trouin: nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN)
  • FS Jacque Chevallier: logistics support ship
  • Loire-class offshore support and assistance vessel

The air wing included 22 Rafale Ms, two E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and three helicopters. The CSG, commanded by Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard, left Toulon on November 28.

The planned operation had been denounced in the Chinese state media, in the Global Times on November 4, under the headline “French aircraft carrier’s planned deployment panders to NATO’s expansion into Asia-Pacific.”

Initially the French CSG was deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, where France, like Italy, has concerns over Russian basing in Libya. It was initially accompanied for escort duties in the Mediterranean by the Italian frigate ITS Virginio Fasan. The CSG then transited the Suez Canal on December 24 and on April 10. The Houthis did not interfere in the CSG’s transit on its way to and from the Indian Ocean. 

Strategic Interests

France is a resident state in the Indo-Pacific, with around 1.5 million French citizens inhabiting its overseas territories of Mayotte, La Reunion, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. These parts of France are located south of the Equator, spread across the southern reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and are key to France having the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with 90 percent of it located in the Indo-Pacific. Freedom of navigation and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) are wider concerns for France in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, under threat from Houthis in the Red Sea and China in the South China Sea. Maritime cooperation and maritime partnerships with other countries has been a particular feature of French strategy. France’s President led from the top in visits to Australia and New Caledonia in 2018 where Macron talked of an “Indo-Pacific axis” (l’axe Indo-Pacific) amongst China-concerned states; amongst which “France is a great power (une grande puissance) of the Indo-Pacific.”

French maritime strategy for the Indo-Pacific has focused around three planks. First are its maritime holdings in the southern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally Reunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia), and the base in Djibouti. Second are deployments from metropolitan France. Third are varied strategic partnerships around the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally India and Japan) region. The latter two were very much on show with the deployment of its Carrier Strike Group for Operation Clemenceau.

Maritime interests require maritime assets to defend and maintain them. Here the French Navy is the only European navy, along with the British Royal Navy, that has a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and an aircraft carrier.

January 2025: Sailors from the Charles De Gaulle carrier strike celebrate the new year while deployed in the Indian Ocean as part of Mission CLEMENCEAU 25. (French Navy photo)

Carrier Capability

The nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle is the flagship of the French Navy. The ship, commissioned in 2001, is catapult-equipped for its three squadrons of Dassault Rafale M warplanes, which also allows for operations by U.S. Super Hornets. Its full load displacement is 42,500 tons, surpassing France’s earlier and conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau and the Foch, which served from 1961 to 2000 and had a full load displacement of 32,780 tons.

With the successful construction of the Charles de Gaulle, there was initial consideration during the 2000s of building a second aircraft carrier, to be called the Richelieu, in collaboration with U.K. designs being used for the construction of HMS Queen Elizabeth. However, that co-development route was abandoned in 2008, and the 2013 French Defense White Paper likewise abandoned the pursuit of a second French carrier. In retrospect, might this have been a strategic error in force design?

Instead, attention eventually turned to a long-term replacement of the Charles De Gaulle. Macron’s announcement in 2020 was for another nuclear-powered New Generation Aircraft Carrier (Porte-avions de nouvelle generation, or PA-NG) which leaves France as a one-carrier navy. Nevertheless, this represents a jump in capacity, a super-carrier of 75,000 tons displacement, that was also longer and wider than the Charles de Gaulle. The main construction and assembly is envisaged between 2032-2035 with initial sea trials on nuclear power in early 2036. If this timetable can be met, then the ship is scheduled to commission in 2038, ready for the de-commissioning of the Charles De Gaulle.

Work has already started on the new French super-carrier. The commitment to the program was demonstrated by the placing of contracts for long lead items in April 2024. This included elements of the nuclear propulsion system and preparatory infrastructure work at the Chantiers de l’Atlantique shipyard. General Atomics landed a $41.6 million contract in December 2024 to design cutting-edge Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for the envisaged carrier.

With regard to general French maritime strategy the Charles de Gaulle is a particularly powerful aircraft carrier, its nuclear propulsion nature unmatched in Europe where the U.K. (HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales), and Italian aircraft carriers (ITS Cavour) remain conventionally powered. Only the U.S. has nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 11 in all: CVN-68 to CVN-78, made up of 10 Nimitz-class carriers and one Gerald R. Ford-class carrier.

However, France remains hampered by its single status aircraft carrier, powerful though it is. China, India, and the U.K. have two aircraft carriers, which enables one to remain active while the other is refitted and maintained. The Charles de Gaulle’s mid-life refit between February 2017 and September 2018 removed her from operations for 18-months. Given this limitation, the French Navy’s decision to deploy this sole carrier to the Indo-Pacific for five months is all the more significant.

Aims of Operation Clemenceau

The operation was announced in November 2024. Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard announced that the deployment had “4 main objectives:”

(1) First of all, contribute to national and European operations in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean. These operations are meant to strengthen the maritime security in the area.

(2) To develop interoperability with partners and allies in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

(3) To promote through this deployment a free, open and stable Indo Pacific with our regional partners in the frame of international law.

(4) Finally, to contribute to the protection of our population and of our interests in the Indo Pacific where France is a coastal nation, and it must exercise its sovereignty on all its overseas territories.

In going across the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific various exercises were carried out with various partners and allies in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, in effect a focus on objectives 3 and 4. However, in actually not deploying to French possessions in the southern reaches, the CSG did not particularly meet objective 4, where local forces continued to maintain French presence.

French Navy aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle sets sail for Operation Clemenceau on Feb. 21 2021. (French Navy photo)

Activities of Operation Clemenceau

Operations with India were in two phases. The first was after friendly port call at Goa, the CSG carried out varied exercises off Kochi on January 9. Tactical evolution maneuvers were carried out by the CSG with INS Mormugao, during which the fleet replenishment tanker FNS Jacques Chevallier refueled the Indian vessel; while Rafale fighters from the Charles de Gaulle carried out joint anti-aircraft drills with Indian Sukhoi and Jaguar fighters.

Operations in the Indonesia Sea commenced with a historic port call at Jakarta, the first ever by a French carrier. This was followed by the 5th iteration of the multinational exercise La Perouse, from January 16-24, in which the French CSG led maritime security and cooperation drills with the Indian, Australian, Canadian, U.K. and U.S. navies. In addition to these established partners and allies, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore participated in La Perouse for the first time.

La Perouse was divided into three components, in the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits locations reflecting the French mission statement that the exercise was designed and located “to secure strategic maritime lines.” The Malacca Strait phase ran from Thursday to Sunday, with the Forbin drilling first with RMN corvette KD Lekir (FSG26), training ship KD Gagah Samudera (271), an RMN fast combat boat, and two Royal Malaysian F/A-18D Hornet fighters in the Malacca Strait. These drills included a simulated local air-defense exercise, a surface firing exercise, and an advance interdiction and boarding exercise. The Forbin then conducted drills with the Singapore littoral mission vessel RSS Independence in the Singapore Strait, which joins the Malacca Strait’s southern exit. The Jacques Chevalier also pulled into Singapore for a logistical stop. In the Sunda Strait phase Indonesia provided base support for two French Navy Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) participating in La Perouse, which had arrived on January 11, after a four-day trip from Lann-Bihoue naval air base in France with a logistics stopover in India.

French Navy destroyer Forbin departing from her homeport of Toulon ahead of the Clemenceau 25 deployment. (Photo by Hervé Dermoune)

The largest part of the exercise, the Lombok Strait phase, involved the CSG drilling with established partners. Commanding officers from Australia’s destroyer HMAS Hobart, the Canadian frigate HMCS Ottawa, India’s destroyer INS Mumbai, the U.K. offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey and the U.S. Littoral Combat Ship USS Savannah gathered aboard the carrier Charles De Gaulle on Saturday for a pre-exercise meeting. This six-state format was yet another permutation within the flexible Indo-Pacific strategic geometry that has evolved in response to China. Further spin-offs from the Carrier Strike Group were the friendly port call of the Forbin and Provence to Bali from January 28 to February 3, and the Jacque Chevallier to Darwin on February 4.

The next event for Operation Clemenceau was the CSG participation in Exercise Pacific Steller 2025, a Multi-Large Deck Event (MLDE) hosted by the French Navy in the Philippine Sea from February 8-18. For this first iteration, 14 units from the three participating nations deployed in the Philippine Sea. The French CSG was joined by the Japanese Self Defense Force’s JS Kaga helicopter carrier and the destroyer JS Akizuki, and by the American aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the destroyers USS Princeton, USS Sterett, and USS William P. Lawrence, and one P-8A maritime patrol aircraft.

PHILIPPINE SEA (Feb. 12, 2025) Ships and aircraft from the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (VINCSG) and Charles De Gaulle French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) travel in formation in the Philippine Sea with ships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) during Pacific Steller 2025 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Pablo Chavez)

This tri-carrier exercise was visually striking, and the first of its kind between the three states. The high-level training drills included anti-submarine warfare, air defense, cross-decking aircraft, and replenishment at sea exercises. Cross-deck operations included F/A-18F Super Hornets and a CMV-22B Osprey from Carl Vinson landing on and taking off from Charles De Gaulle. In turn, Charles De Gaulle’s embarked Rafale fighters landed on and launched from Carl Vinson. The Jacques Chevalier performed a replenishment at sea for the KagaPrinceton, and Sterret.

This high-powered trilateral carrier exercise was criticized in the Chinese State media, on February 9 in the Global Times, under the headline “Steller 2025 exercise shows Philippine attempts to expand foreign military presence in SCS.” The North Korean state-state Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also denounced the trilateral exercise as involving “foreign invasion forces.” France responded by sending the frigate Alsace and oiler Jacque Chevallier from the CSG to Okinawa on February 13 to help in monitoring operations in support of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. One of the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft dispatched for La Perouse were also sent on to Okinawa.

The next stop for the CSG was the South China Sea, where the CSG paid a port call to Subic Bay (Manila) on February 23. Its significance was three-fold. Firstly, this was the first ever appearance in the Philippines by a French aircraft carrier. Secondly, this visit was preceded by the largest bilateral drill between the two sides. Thirdly, the exercising with the Philippine Navy took place in the South China Sea waters off Western Luzon in the Philippine EEZ. The exercising involved the French CSG, the Philippine flagship BRP Jose Rizal and BRP Gregorio del Pilar, as well as French Rafale and Philippine FA-50PH fighter jets. Their exercise focused on aerial and anti-submarine warfare. This was a deliberate signal to Beijing and an equally measure of support to the Philippines which had faced rising Chinese pressure over the South China Sea during 2024. French trilateral exercising with the US and the Philippines in the South China Sea the previous year had been denounced in China.

The Provence was detached from the French CSG to carry out a week-long visit to Ho Chi-Minh City from March 1-7. Port call visits were combined with joint maritime search and rescue missions off the Vietnamese coast.

The final substantive operation for Operation Clemenceau, following friendly port calls at Singapore and Colombo, was the bilateral Varuna exercise with India from March 19-22. This involved dual carrier operations between the French Charles de Gaulle CSG and the India INS Vikrant CSG. This second round of exercising with India was an indication of the particularly strong maritime links developing between France and India.

Local Assets

Part of French maritime strategy is to base units in its island territories, and from there deploy around the Indo-Pacific. This is a complement to the periodic more powerful deployments from the French metropolitan waters, witnessed with the CSG between November 2024 and March 2025.

FNS Floreal was dispatched for CTF-150 operation in the Arabian Sea, for Eagle Claw One and Eagle Claw Two in November and December 2024, alongside Pakistan’s PNS Zulfiquar. Even as the CSG was operating in the Western Pacific in Pacific Steller, the French frigate FNS Vendemiaire (based at New Caledonia) docked in Denpasar, Bali, on February 14 as part of its participation in the multilateral exercise Komodo hosted by the Indonesian Navy from February 14-17. Spring 2025 witnessed the Prairial visiting various places in the South Pacific, including the Cook Islands on February 27, whose government welcomed the visit as “strengthening regional security efforts” and demonstrating “Pacific solidarity.” The context for this is Chinese penetration of South Pacific island states. In a tidy local division of labor, the 2-yearly Southern Cross exercise hosted by France at Wallis and Futuna Islands from April 22 to May 3 brought together forces from Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand. Colonel Frederic Puchois, Chief of the Joint Staff in New Caledonia announced its purpose was to test French “capacity to project forces” from New Caledonia.

Political Underpinnings

 The CSG deployment was not only complemented by ongoing use of local French assets, but also given political support from the highest level during 2025. In January Macron announced at the Ambassadors’ Conference that the Indo-Pacific “is obviously a priority for us.” Ministers also maintained this support.

India enjoys a very high profile for France, already indicated by the two rounds of exercises held by the CSG with India, in January and March. Strategic convergence was reflected in the 7th India France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue held in New Delhi on January 14. It was co-chaired by Shri Pavan Kapoor, Deputy National Security Advisor and Alice Rufo, Director General for International Relations and Strategy, Ministry for the Armed Forces. Their Joint Declaration recorded their common interest in freedom of navigation and need to “support free and secure access to sea lanes of communication.”

On January 28, the French Carrier Strike Group made a port call to Jakarta, to lead the La Perouse exercise. Three days later, on January 31, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Sebastien Lecornu, flew into Jakarta to meet with President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and Foreign Minister Sugiono. In the Philippines, the French Joint Commander for Asia Pacific, Rear Admiral Guillaume Pinget, met with Lt. Gen. Jimmy Larida, Acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City on February 13, to push forward a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The French Foreign Minister’s visit Jean-Noel Barrot’s visit to Indonesia on March 26 brought their signing of the Indo-Pacific Port Security Project. Finally, President Macron’s Keynote Address at the IIIS Shangri La Dialogue on 30 May, made during his state visit to Indonesia, re-emphasized French interest and commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

The French CSG deployment fits into this pattern of growing European maritime involvement in the Indo-Pacific during the past few years. Indeed, the 2023 U.K.-France Summit had agreed on “the sequencing of more persistent European carrier strike group presence in the Indo-Pacific.” In this vein, the Italian CSG deployment in the second half of 2024 was followed by French CSG deployment in the first half of 2025 and immediately followed by U.K. deployment in the second half of 2025. The French CSG group can be seen as a “force multiplier” in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the event of a U.S.-China confrontation. 

Uncertainties

It remains to be seen how far the downturn in U.S.-Europe cooperation witnessed in splits over Ukraine arising in Spring 2025 will affect European juggling of resources between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. With Macron’s address on March 5 identifying Russia as a “threat to France and to Europe,” might France now focus on deploying in European waters rather than across the Indo-Pacific? In light of growing concerns about Russia and signals of American retrenchment from Europe, there may be a shift towards greater French focus on the Mediterranean, given Russian influence in Libya, and up to the Black Sea, in light of Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine. However, and perhaps crucially, France’s resident sovereignty and associated EEZ give France a continuing anchor in the Indo-Pacific, and interests to maintain, that other European actors do not have.

Dr. David Scott is an associate member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. A prolific writer on Indo-Pacific maritime geopolitics, he can be contacted at [email protected].

Featured Image: April 25, 2024 – The French Navy carrier Charles de Gaulle off the coast of Toulon. (NATO photo)

Japan’s Submarine Industrial Base and Infrastructure – Unique and Stable

By Jeong Soo “Gary” Kim

The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) possesses a modern and highly capable fleet, including light carriers, large AEGIS destroyers, and advanced conventional submarines which are renowned for their size and stealth. While individual Japanese naval vessels and their crews are certainly world class, Japan’s unique approach to naval industrial base strategy is often underappreciated, especially its submarine industrial base. This approach relies on three deliberate policy pillars:

  • Ensuring an extraordinarily stable production system for new boats,
  • Decommissioning operational boats with plenty of service life left in them, and
  • Maintaining these retired submarines in training and ready reserve fleets.

This industrial policy admirably balances cost, readiness, and wartime surge capacity. 

Pillar 1: Stable Production Capacity

The JMSDF received its first submarine, the JS Kuroshio (ex-USS Mingo) as Foreign Military Aid in 1955. Soon after, the JMSDF started ordering domestically produced submarines based on both Imperial Japanese Navy and U.S. Navy designs. Starting in 1965, the JMSDF consistently built ocean-going fleet submarines, and by 1980 starting with the Yushio-class of submarines, Japan had established an incredibly stable submarine industrial base. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industry’s shipyards in Kobe each produce one boat every two years. With the exception of 1996 (due to the great Kobe earthquake of 1995) and 2014, Kawasaki or Mitsubishi has delivered a submarine on March of every single year like clockwork. This production scheme has held steady through the massive expansion of the Soviet Navy during the 1980s, the peace dividend era of the 1990s and 2000s, and even through the PLA Navy’s surge in the 2010s and 2020s.

Another stabilizing leg of the JMDSF’s submarine industrial base is the forward-looking and well institutionalized research and development scheme. For example, detailed design for the current Taigei-class of submarines kicked off in 2004, even before the previous Soryu-class was laid down. Detailed engineering for a follow-on class, including such features as pump jet technology, was already in the works when the JS Taigei entered service in 2022. Furthermore, when the JMSDF implements new technology, like Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) or large lithium battery packs, it inserts these technologies into an existing class of submarines to validate technical maturity. For example, in 2000 the JMSDF retrofitted a conventional, Harushio-class submarine, JS Asashio, with a Sterling-type Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) module to test its effectiveness before applying the technology to the future fleet. Similarly in 2020, Soryu-class submarines JS Oryu and JS Toryu were fitted with large lithium-ion battery packs instead of the Sterling AIP modules in anticipation of the lithium-ion power pack transition in the Taigei-class. 

Apra Harbor, Guam (April 12, 2013) – Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Soryu-class submarine Hakuryu (SS 503) visits Guam for a scheduled port visit. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jeffrey Jay Price/Released)

Pillar 2: Unique Utilization Strategy at the Operator Level

The JMSDF’s submarine utilization system is unique and may seem odd to American and other Western Navies. While Japanese submarines are well-built and likely could serve as long as their American counterparts (35-40 years), they serve around 18 years before being decommissioned or transferred to training status. While most navies try to sustain submarines as long as economically feasible, the JMSDF “prunes” serviceable submarines out of its operational fleet in order to maintain the number of boats required in Japan’s maritime strategy. For example, between 1980 and 2018, the national strategy called for 18 submarines in the operational fleet, therefore most submarines were decommissioned between the 17-20 years of service to achieve this fleet goal. Starting in 2019, in order to match China’s rising naval power (and perhaps to hedge against the U.S. submarine base’s sluggish production increase), Japan’s maritime strategy increased its submarine requirement to 22 submarines in the operational fleet, and the JMSDF raised the “retirement age” of its submarines from 18 to 22 years until annual submarine production rate allowed the fleet size to reach 22. Officers in the JMSDF’s ship repair unit describe maintaining older submarines as “more costly, but not particularly difficult”, implying that if operational needs dictate, they could increase the number of operational submarines without having to increase the production rate.

Figure 1. Historical JMSDF submarine fleet size and average age of fleet. Credit: Author’s work.

 

Figure 2. Age in which JMSDF submarines were decommissioned. (Author graphic)

Another unique aspect to the Japanese submarine industrial base planning is that submarines typically do not go into an extensive mid-life refit like their American counterparts. JMSDF leaders cite that overhauling older vessels can often be unpredictable and lead to schedule growth, as submarines can be in much worse material condition than anticipated. They admit that conducting a mid-life upgrade could save cost in peacetime, but the current system that prioritizes new construction ensures more stability in the submarine industrial base. On the ground level, JMSDF ship repair officers cite that cutting holes into a pressure hull and then replacing major components in already tightly packed submarine is time consuming, and believe that new submarine construction “delivers more submarine sea power per man-hour worked” than conducting a midlife overhaul. They jokingly called this practice similar to the “Shikinen Sengu”, which is a ritual where one of the most revered Shinto shrines in Japan, Ise Shrine, is traditionally torn down and rebuilt every 20 years.

Pillar 3: Consistent Supply of Reserve Submarines

Another benefit of consistent production and early retirement is the ability to keep several reserve submarines in good material condition on reserve prior to final decommissioning and disposal. Typically, when submarines are decommissioned from the operational fleet, they are transferred to the training squadron and then consistently sail to train and qualify sailors prior to assigning them to operational boats. The training submarine fleet not only helps supplying the operational fleet with sailors already equipped with sea time inside a submarine, but also allows boats to be quickly transferred back to the operational fleet whenever new construction and delayed decommissioning cannot meet requirements. While the JMSDF has yet to recommission a training submarine back to active service, it has transferred older destroyers, the JS Asagiri and JS Yamagiri, from the training fleet back to the operational fleet in 2011/2012 to meet increased operational surface vessel demand. It is not unimaginable that the JMSDF would be willing to use its training submarines in a similar manner during a period of surging demand.

Furthermore, when submarines stop sailing with the training squadron, they stay on a reserve status receiving a certain amount of maintenance until they are finally stricken and disposed of. The number of submarines kept in this status is not well known, but parts are typically not salvaged to sustain other boats for a number of years. If submarine demand were to outstrip operationalizing the training submarines, the reserve boats could possibly be put out back to sea after some period in maintenance. Consequently, the combination of operationalizing the training and reserve submarines could give the JMSDF the ability to surge up to four additional operational submarines without accelerating its build schedule, which would constitute an impressive 20% increase in capability from the current fleet of 22 boats. 

Conclusion

All in all, Japan sustains an advanced, powerful conventional submarine fleet staffed by dedicated, overworked sailors, and supported by a robust, stable shipbuilding industry. Considering how quickly a shipbuilding industrial base atrophies without consistent inflow of new construction orders, the Japanese method of consistent production and fleet size control through early decommissioning may prove to be a viable template that even the U.S. Navy can incorporate into its long-term naval shipbuilding plan.

Jeong Soo “Gary” Kim is a Lieutenant in the U.S. Naval Reserves and currently a student at the Lauder Institute at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania earning an MBA and MA in East Asian studies. He previously served with the Seabees of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5, and with NAVFAC Far East in Sasebo, Japan. He graduated from Columbia University with a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering and a minor in history.

The author would like to give special thanks to LCDR Hiroshi Kishida of the JMSDF’s Sasebo Ship Repair Facility, and various junior officers serving in Sasebo-based ships for assisting with the research for this article.

References

Dominguez, Gabriel. “Recruitment Issues Undermining Japan’s Military Buildup.” The Japan Times, The Japan Times, 2 Jan. 2023, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/01/02/national/japan-sdf-recruitment-problems/.

Kevork, Chris. “The Revitalization of Japan’s Submarine Industry, From Defeat to Oyashio.” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 14, Dec. 2013, 14 Dec. 2013, pp. 71–92.

Ogasawara, Rie. “Observing the Horrible State of JSDF Military Housing through Photos.” ダイヤモンド・オンライン, 27 Sept. 2022, diamond.jp/articles/-/310137?page=2.

Takahashi, Kosuke. “Japan Launches Fourth Taigei-Class Submarine for JMSDF.” Naval News, 17 Oct. 2023, www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/10/japan-launches-fourth-taigei-class-submarine-for-jmsdf/.

일본 신형잠수함 타이게이(大鯨)진수의 의미 (Implications of the JMSDF’s New Taigei Class of Submarines), Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, 11 Dec. 2020, kims.or.kr/issubrief/kims-periscope/peri217/.

Featured Image: Launch Ceremony of SS Taigei. (Japanese Ministry of Defense photo)

Shifting the Role of Leader and Led: Using Year Group Cohorts to Accelerate Marine Corps Force Design

Human Factors Week

By Travis Reese 

“The United States has a perfect record in modern times of predicting when and where future outbreaks of war will occur—it always gets it wrong.”–Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

During the first three years of the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 effort, there has been a lively discussion over the intended goal of the transformation coupled with intense criticism over how the debate for change has been conducted. Critics have decried a lack of openness and transparency including a debate over the degree to which individuals feel empowered to contribute to the creation of the next iteration of the force. Force Design 2030 has been unique compared to prior design efforts in another regard; not only has there been the debate among serving Marines at every stratum of rank and experience, but there has been an intergenerational challenge from retired Marines who shaped the legacy organization of the Corps upon which these changes are being measured.

This intergenerational tension in force design, even within the active-duty force, can be improved by re-arranging the relationship between senior and subordinate and creating a process that receives input from multiple generations of Marines. This can be done by passing earlier responsibility for designing the next iteration of the Marine Corps on to successive generations of the Corps from early in a Marine’s career. The Marine Corps can achieve this change in force design methodology by establishing generational cohorts organized in 10-year increments, that are tasked with forecasting force design requirements 30 years out from the present.

These cohorts can interact and transition ideas via a process of inter-generational and cross-functional dialogue captured through an electronic learning platform and knowledge exchange portal. The concepts developed on the platform can be augmented by live conferences and standing committees led by senior Marine Corps leaders actively listening to, and coordinating with cohort members to manage recommendations for force design for further development among responsible Marine Corps agencies and commands. The role of seniors will be to guide, mentor, and resource the testing of ideas generated by successor generations in continuous campaigns of learning (plural not singular) and not simply initiate or direct change through specialized efforts in ad-hoc cycles that have an uneven track record of capability adoption and meeting timely demand. This cross-generational knowledge management will also serve as a means for talent management. A Marine’s involvement in the force design process could lead to future assignments based on demonstrated interest and relevant contributions to the force design process.

Most importantly, passing some of the responsibility for force design onto younger cohorts of Marines is a way for the Marine Corps to harvest the reservoir of ideas already in the service and turn them into actionable designs for concepts and testing solutions. This will enable the service to stay ahead of adversaries and prepare generations to lead fully resourced forces for each era with a knowledge of what will come next. These cohorts would be the basis for, and creators of, force development and design solutions impacting their generation via a “crowd sourced” but “leader-managed” methodology that would inform institutional choices and force design focus.

This methodology would overcome institutional capacity limits that force the Marine Corps to plan in a sequential era-by-era fashion that potentially misses innovative opportunities that would benefit from earlier investment under a clear conception of their potential. There is ample evidence that talented futurists reside within the ranks who can contribute to force design beyond the current effort.

The Case for an Internal Forum

The Corps prides itself on the inherited legacy of those who came before, but history shows that the challenges the Marine Corps has faced are decidedly generational. Each generation of the Marine Corps needs to develop tactics, techniques, and means that fit the circumstances of their time. How soon should that start in a generation of Marines? Marines are rarely afforded an officially sanctioned opportunity during their career to formally influence the design of the force they will eventually lead. Without a well-managed forum to harvest ideas on force design, the Marine Corps is missing out on the ability to gain and maintain momentum on future concepts and develop means conceived by steady study, debate, analysis, and investment. Thus, the service is effectively decelerating its preparation for future conflict by limiting the number of Marines who can contribute to address future problems and by not having a common platform to proactively consider timely solutions.

No forum within the service exists to place those ideas where they can be received, tracked, harvested, and tested for application at the time-horizon in which they will be likely suitable or useful. Instead, Marines have relied on participation in ad-hoc dialogue through informal professional societies to contribute ideas and in professional writing. As for professional writing, there is little correlation between contributing to a public discourse and impact on the direction of the service. Marines interested in force design but kept outside of the formal combat development process are forced to play a waiting game until they are senior enough to introduce their ideas as commanders or are otherwise touched by a campaign of learning effort to support experimentation. Simply put, young Marines do not have a way to contribute their ideas into the force design process. Rather their ideas merely float in the ether of abstract conversation and vigorous, but indifferent, debate. Additionally, the Marine Corps’ force design process is not optimized to incubate ideas over multiple time frames and for extended periods.

Unfortunately, future force planning in Department of Defense frequently falls into two habits that create static logic: first, fixation on the current security challenge which becomes an anchor to perceptions of the future. This results in the military using the current state of global affairs as the model for all future conditions or second, establishing a single point in the future and then using that point alone to design a future force with more or less a constant interpretation of the threat. The latter occurs due to the institutional inertia that builds up around an adversary model as agencies work to align their programs and efforts to an accepted framework. Each change in the model often generates a halting effect on force development or design as organizations take years or better to adjust to a new conception of the future or threat. Yet, knowing this pattern of thought and activity, the Marine Corps and Department of Defense have never really considered a method to make transitions between force design efforts more fluid. Rather, every new era of challenge is “jump started” by some national security directive with large institutional transitions surrounding the effort. The Marine Corps is currently caught in this trap as it has adopted the departmental focus on 2030 as a target date and has not begun to consider the next, but inevitable, planning horizon. This is despite the fact that a new Marine today may serve until the year 2055 and could possibly face the next design effort having to change a force conceived in 2019, realized in 2030, and sustained until 2045 or 2050.

Marine Corps lore is rife with stories of determined innovators or mavericks who forced their way in the system to “save the day” with the just in time solution that, by luck, gained the attention of a senior sponsor. Trying to cross the valley of ex-officio debate and gain the notice of senior leaders to influence change may involve uncertain, and possibly unnecessary, career-risking approaches. Personal favor, institutional connections and chance notice by a senior leader are not the ways to harvest ideas for the future of the Corps. The refrain of “send us your ideas” from senior leaders is insufficient if no one is sure who is listening and there is no place to “post the letter” for a willing leader to receive and consider.

What To Do About It? Setting Up Year Group Cohorts

The Marine Corps needs to improve the relationship between leadership and successor generations to proactively shape the inevitable transition from current to future. This can be done by dividing the force into 10-year cohorts that participate in a managed service-wide mass participation learning framework incremented into 10, 20, and 30-year horizons. Why 30 years? First, it often takes 30 years to conceive and design capabilities and doctrine and put them into practice. Most of that time is focused on building an institutionally agreed-upon problem frame and discovering potential solutions. Secondly, if one assumes that the career of most senior leaders (officer and enlisted) may be sustained out to 35 years it makes sense that cohorts should cover that outcome. Third, a 10-year cohort would include groups with diversity in rank and experience to prevent myopia in terms of outlook and experience but remain close enough that near-contemporary relationships facilitate ease of dialogue and frankness of critique. Lastly, taking a longer-range look provides institutional freedom of action to explore options and alternatives free from the constraints of contemporary pressures (although informed by them) and in a more risk accepting posture.

How would this work? At the beginning of his or her career an officer or SNCO (who is now on a career-focused path) is assigned to a cohort focused on a specific time frame. Each cohort will consider how their generation will be defined in terms of security challenges and solutions. A cohort will remain in its assigned year and transition to become the 20- or 10-year group as a new cohort is created behind them to deal with the next 30-year horizon. The oldest cohort becomes the “current” year and/or begins to retire and transition from service. Groupings would be developed based on recommendations from Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA). Cohorts would be organized as a large learning entity under a supervised management collaboration with Training and Education Command (TECOM) and Capabilities Development and Integration (DC CD&I). TECOM would be responsible to furnish access to qualified educational mentors. Professionally qualified mentors will be hired to manage the inputs, encourage research, and stimulate dialogue among the respondents. Combat developers from CD&I would be able to observe and harvest the ideas produced by the cohorts. Management of cohort contributions would be enabled via a web-based platform residing on unclassified and classified networks developed by Deputy Commandant for Information (DC I). The platform will facilitate discovery, search, and visualization of the various ideas produced by the cohorts. Problems or issues for a specific year group would be sponsored by the Deputy Commandants.

Annually, a Force Design conference would be led, structured as an activity for a regular three or four-star executive offsite. Cohort managers and mentors would provide a report back to the Commandant and deputy commandant sponsors on a cohort’s responses to a design question or specific challenge. Further, cohort managers could introduce new initiatives or concepts spawned by the cohort for consideration by the senior leaders. Select cohort members could be called in to brief their recommendations or future operating environment insights to the senior leaders. From these recommendations, debate would ensue on proposed investments, experiments, research, manpower adjustments, or concept development activities to conduct in support of each time-frame’s force development or design requirements. Nothing about this effort would disrupt standing institutional processes of capability development, acquisition, or budget planning. If anything, it would generate a faster-paced, iterative, institutionally understood, and data-informed pedigree to many force design initiatives under a participant-led and leader-managed effort. 

The overall benefits of an institutionally integrated knowledge and professional exchange framework would be vast. Rather than random discoverability of talent or ideas spread across informal learning societies, intra- and intergenerational dialogue would exist across the Marine Corps with the express purpose of developing actionable ideas on future concepts directly. Participants, without disruption to necessary career progression, can engage in early strategic thinking about the future. This would have an impact on the quality of professional military education since instruction on strategy and strategic thinking would be amplifying to an embedded institutional activity. The knowledge portal would enable the service to discovery solutions to current and future challenges on a persistent basis rather than by exception through the ad-hoc use of events like challenge days or military “shark tanks” whose outcomes on capability development are uncertain and still require interest for adoption. Iterative doctrine development and deliberation would begin sooner rather than constrained to small writing venues or billet-specific offices. Force design as a process would shift to participant-driven and leader-managed generating large-scale buy-in and removing the variable of personality-focused initiatives. Lastly, every participant would have common appreciation of each 10-year framework guiding force development and design activities which they can articulate to external stakeholders in positions to support USMC discovery or resource solutions.

The Role of Mentors

Effective mentorship is essential to this proposal and would necessarily vary from cohort to cohort. Younger Marines focused on the 30-year horizon likely need very little encouragement to conceive of the next innovations that can be applied in the future. At this phase in their careers, they would likely need more guidance on how to research appropriately, create a sound argument, understand the implications of history and where to harvest those lessons. They need mentorship in the tools that make it possible to form a testable hypothesis for their intuitive vision. The 20-year horizon group is a mid-tier professional who needs insights regarding the institutional processes that will govern force design and development. They need mentors who will advise on institutional memory and help them navigate the gates of the system that will make it possible to shift from ideation to action.

The 10-year horizon group is in the nexus of decision between realizing their concepts that have been matured and challenged over 15-20 years and managing the acquisition risk of replacing the current force. They need executive-level mentorship in decision making and risk management at this stage of force design. The same mentors should not remain with a cohort as they are specialists in certain skills with biases and conceptions that should be minimized by exposure to other schools of thought.

Overall, it is important for the Marine Corps to not select mentors based on perceived authority bias or reputational history alone. Rather, cohorts may consist of iconoclasts and relative unknowns whose talents and skills are familiar to a small group but whose history of institutional challenge and change far exceeds their reputation.

Preventing Silos and Creating Institution-wide Cross-functional Dialogue

A risk of cohorts is that they can become silos of competition and become protective or adversarial against their counterpart cohorts. This can be prevented by incentivizing cross-functional exchange among the cohorts. A simple example: the 20-year cohort is depending on a particular technology to realize their proposed capabilities. It is discovered that the technology is viable, yet unachievable in that timeframe. Rather than abandon the investment, a decision is made for the 30-year cohort to inherit consideration of this option. Likewise, the 30-year group was considering a particular advancement and it is realized that the technology will be available in 10 years.

A decision could be made to transfer development to the 10-year cohort accelerating outcomes for them, potentially generating an unexpected overmatch for a range of adversaries, but also forcing a change to manpower requirements and doctrine development. To sustain this exchange, it would be necessary to conduct an annual conference, likely geared around the budget cycle, led by the Commandant. Cross-functional discussion of cohort discoveries sponsored by the Deputy Commandant for CD&I or a cohort manager can be led and investments in various force design options can be considered under unique scenarios for each year group. This process would help shape the transition of force design efforts to a participant-led and senior-leader managed process and enable the capacity to manage investments over a longer horizon with a better transition between current and future forces.

Conclusion

Members of the military live and work in two timeframes: present and future. The present is all about competency with current tools and techniques to be ready for today’s challenges. It is achieved through training, practiced in exercises, and measured in inspections and evaluations. The future is about preparedness for tomorrow’s challenges and requires the planning, preparation and imagination necessary to avoid strategic surprise. It is achieved through considering future scenarios, practiced in wargames, realized through investment in doctrine and technology, and measured in live and virtual experimentation.

If anything, the efforts of FD2030 should make the Marine Corps realize that current and future live in a symbiotic relationship and although everyone is required to master the threats of today, it is equally important to think about and prepare for tomorrow. Adversaries are always preparing to develop countermeasures to our well-developed structures and means.

Rather than simply leveraging industry or academia as sources of alternatives and solutions, the same level of alternative thinking (coupled with a greater sense of the implications) can occur inside of the Marine Corps. Modern technology and information exchange has made it possible to overcome the limits of happenstance discovery and the need for patronage of reformers and thinkers that formally infused the system.

Every Marine can become a force designer. The Marine Corps can harvest those ideas into action vice merely be observers/encouragers of the dialogue. Marines can level their interest in the future training, design, and development of the force into career-making choices supported by an institution that not only cares about what they think but acts on it.

The institutional conflict around FD2030 shows that the Marine Corps must improve how it leverages each generation of the Corps in preparing for future challenges. Those decisions must be informed by relevant institutional experience, but not be mired in the preferences and predilections of prior generations. The role of responsible generations to solve the problems they will face in the future must be given a commensurate opportunity and appropriate authority earlier if force design is to become a fluid, timely, inclusive, and less disruptive in the future.

Travis Reese retired from the Marine Corps as Lieutenant Colonel after nearly 21 years of service While on active duty he served as an artillery office and in a variety of billets inclusive of tours in capabilities development, future scenario design, and institutional strategy. Since his retirement in 2016 he was one of the co-developers of the Joint Force Operating Scenario process. Mr. Reese is now the Director of Wargaming and Net Assessment for Troika Solutions in Reston, VA.

Featured Image:

All You Need is a Landing Craft

By Przemyslaw Ziemacki

Amphibious and transport operations can play a vital role at all levels of war, but landing craft can do much more than just move things – they can also shoot. The global growth of anti-access/area denial capabilities favors smaller, harder to find, more numerous, and attritable vessels. At the same time, the potent evolution of missiles can be combined with the open cargo area on small and medium landing craft to shoot back against both sea and land targets. Civilian offshore support vessels suggest what tomorrow’s landing craft might look like, while the missions they could fulfill are only limited by the imagination.

A Question of What and How Many

Western navies with expensive and highly-trained crews typically focus on high-quality vessels as a deciding factor in contemporary naval operations. On the other side, Russian military thought and even Josef Stalin himself espoused that “quantity has a quality all its own.” Both considerations are important: quality plays a key role but there is a minimum quantity needed to perform particular task, particularly when considering combat attrition. A navy can have a single high-end warship, like a French aircraft carrier, that simply cannot be operationally available 365 days a year. The insufficient quantity of modern vessels is a widely known problem for many navies.  Each vessel can only be in one place at a time, which periodically includes the dry dock for planned and unplanned maintenance.

Constructing and maintaining more high-quality and single-mission vessels is rarely the best option due to fiscal constraints. Instead, multi-mission vessels can help fill these gaps. One of the ways to fulfill this concept is to build a hull with possibility of changing its payload, such as the Littoral Combat Ship and Absalon-class support vessels – both frigate-like ships with replaceable modules. A more natural word association with “payload,” however, is “landing craft” rather than “frigate.”

Many naval discussions fixate on large, high-profile navies that mainly need expeditionary vessels to perform operations all over the world and to transit rapidly between theaters. So, even if a vessel class is dedicated for green water or littoral operations, it is usually designed with the range and seakeeping of a typical blue water warship to simply arrive in theater.

Maritime geography is vitally important for both warship and fleet design, but this applies to all navies, both large and small. Many small navies have a more focused area of operations – along their national coasts or within a particular inland sea, many of which are also strategic hotspots (e.g., the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Arabian/Persian Gulf and the South China Sea). Naval presence and potential conflicts in these regions require relatively smaller but more numerous vessels. Naturally, this does not mean that frigates, destroyers and cruisers are useless, but to fulfill missions close to coasts, larger numbers of smaller vessels are more optimal in many scenarios. Moreover, many of these smaller countries have land borders with their main potential enemies instead of extensive land or ocean buffers, and so with a more compelling national requirement for a standing army and tactical air force, small vessels may be the only affordable option for small navies.

Even then, truly numerous flotillas with several types of bespoke and single-purpose small vessels is not feasible. Budget cuts often target more complex and expensive warships programs over simpler, less expensive ones. For example, Poland has only 3 vessels of the project 660M (NATO code: Sassnitz-class) fast attack craft. Sweden, which is far wealthier, has a longer coastline, and more focused on naval matters than Poland, has only 5 Visby-class corvettes. They are far from sufficient in wartime. The Baltic States only have mine and patrol vessels.

In these conditions, designing a small naval vessel several roles is an attractive proposition. The basic question is what roles are essential and which of them could be put together in a single small hull that can satisfy the various required operational capabilities. Although major NATO navies have largely abandoned small surface combatants, often called fast attack craft, these vessels remain popular on a global scale because they are simple to construct, inexpensive to build and operate, and have a relatively good size-to-weapon power ratio. Of course, they have many disadvantages, including poor seakeeping and limited sensor suites, but these are not crucial for operations in coastal waters while protected by a land-based air force and receiving off-board targeting data.

However, such combatants have one particular feature that is problematic for countries that share land borders with their main potential enemies. The lack of land attack capability means that these vessels could be entirely useless, or useful only as a “fleet in being” during the most critical phases of a potential war. Although most of the modern ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) have a land attack mode, this use is generally sub-optimal because it wastes the expensive and complex anti-ship targeting capabilities and specialized anti-ship warhead to hit a fixed land target. A better solution would be to use containerized versions of missiles, and more carefully pair the missile type with the target. Rather than a dedicated launcher fixed onboard the vessel with one kind of anti-ship missile, containerized missiles launchers in the form of standard 20- or 40-foot containers would allow them to be deployed and launched from nearly any surface platform. There are many simulations and concepts showing how such system could work on the deck of a cargo ship or an ocean-going patrol vessel, but deploying one or more of such containers on a ship-to-shore connector with an open cargo hold would be even simpler. 

Moreover, some of these vessels could also deploy with self-propelled coastal defense missile or rocket artillery systems, rather than craned-aboard containerized missile launchers, allowing this class of vessels to distribute and support mobile long-range fires in addition to launching its own missiles. Although the U.S. Marine Corp’s Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) concept for stand-in forces is mainly envisioned for the Pacific theater, it also could also have application in the Baltic and other confined seas.

The Multi-Role Landing Craft

The concept of using a ship-to-shore connector as a missile launching platform suggests an evolution into a multirole vessel based on the hull of a medium landing craft – a vessel with obvious utility for small coastal states outside of combat operations. Such a multirole vessel should have enough space and displacement for a single main battle tank or 3 – 4 lighter vehicles, or at least two 40 foot containers, along with permanently installed weapon systems, passive decoys, and sensors adequate for basic self defense. Conceptually, this means a single light naval gun, short-range self-defense missiles, and a light rotary 3D radar system. With that in mind, the hull should be on the larger side of ship-to-shore connectors, around 130 – 170 feet, or 40 – 50 meters long, have shoal draft, high speed, moderate range (as compared to a fast attack craft) and moderate seakeeping. The proposed multirole vessel could fulfill three main missions:

  • Tactical landing and transport operations
  • Surface attacks with standard container versions of both anti-ship and land attack missiles, including rocket artillery
  • Mine laying

A landing craft-based vessel would be capable of refueling and reloading from unprepared beaches and navigating rivers.

Traditional displacement-type landing craft are not known for their speed. However, recent shipbuilding trends suggests a suitable approach for the proposed vessel, called a surface effect ship (SES), or less often, a sidewall hovercraft. Such a vessel is a mix of a hovercraft and a catamaran, forming an air cushion between twin hulls to minimize resistance. The most famous naval design is the Skjold-class corvette, but with the full displacement of 274 tons and remarkable speed, this design is better classified as a fast attack craft. With its speed of 60+ knots, draft of 1 m, a range of 800 Nautical miles at 40 knots, and relatively wide beam, the Skjold-class corvette is an attractive basis to design the proposed multirole vessel. Moreover, it has an option of transporting 50 combat-equipped soldiers instead of missiles. Norway also has two older SES naval designs, the Alta-class and Oksoy-class minesweepers. Any of these vessels would lend a promising basis upon which to design the proposed vessel, but the civilian Aircat 35 Combi, designed for offshore service sector, would be even better. Although it is a civilian design and it is slightly shorter than the envisioned design, it shares the most valuable features – speed, range and draft – with the Skjold-class corvette and also has a large cargo space on a near-waterline level deck. A militarized variant could be easily adapted from it.

The proposed SES concept – essentially a landing craft upgraded with self-defense capabilities and offensive options, so call it a fast multirole craft – would be an attractive solution for most Baltic and Black Sea navies. Sweden and Finland have many islands that require fast deployment of high mobility troops between them as well as capable and flexible anti-ship capabilities to counter enemy landing operations. The concept would also incorporate minelaying capabilities, which is strong emphasized in Finnish naval strategy. For the Baltic States, the proposal for small naval vessels with survivable and long-range land attack capabilities could provide strong fiscal justification for acquiring vessels beyond inshore patrol and mine warfare vessels – vessels which would provide Baltic navies with significant combat capabilities.

Unfortunately, the geopolitical situation of certain Baltic Sea states may also require a reverse landing operation, or evacuation, which is yet another factor in favor of a fast landing craft. In Poland there is an opinion that mobile land batteries of anti-ship cruise missiles are more optimal than shipborne ones because of the exposed seacoast where a fast attack craft does not have many places to hide. However, the proposed fast multirole craft moves faster than a truck, but is always ready to launch a missile. Landing capabilities may be required by the Polish Navy to support its Baltic Allies if Russia captured the Suwalki Gap or otherwise interdicted land lines of communication with the Baltic States. In such case, moving troops across the south east part of the Baltic Sea would be much more risky in the large, slow Lublin-class (project 767) landing ships, which the Polish Navy operates today, than in a numerous flotilla of small and very fast vessels. Poland, Romania, and Ukraine could use such flexible vessels on their big rivers – Vistula, Odra, Dnieper, and Danube. Finally, these vessels would be well-suited for inland seas.

Bigger Applications for Small Craft

Bigger navies could also deploy these vessels in green and brown waters as well – either by transporting them in amphibious warfare ships or permanently forward-deploying them in-theater. Although the U.S. Navy, needs more true blue water warships, it should be remembered that during WWII the U.S. Navy had large numbers of motor torpedo boats and all sizes of landing craft – including those equipped for shore bombardment with rocket artillery. A future war would likely require a similarly large, dispersed, and hard-hitting force. As previously proposed on CIMSEC, missile-equipped SES landing craft would bring the perfect mix of speed and flexibility.

Of course, not all of these small, fast, and heavily armed vessels would necessarily be manned. The proposed vessels could be easily designed as optionally manned and become incorporated into the U.S. Navy’s fleet architecture plan. The US Navy’s need of fast attack craft was discussed in the June 2019 USNI Proceedings article, which proposed a very interesting concept of using LHDs and LPDs as corvette-carrier mother-ships for Skjold-class-like vessels.

Both China and Russia, the main potential enemies of the United States and its Allies, invest in fast attack craft and small landing craft, for example the Houbei-class and the Dyugon-class. Now especially the PLAN has great numbers of true blue waters vessels as well as the fast attack craft. To counter these threats, the United States and its Allies may need both kinds of vessels as well. The SES design seem to meet the needs of numerous green and brown waters flotillas nearly perfectly.

In 1982 none other than Tom Clancy himself proposed firing strategic nuclear missiles from hovercraft – repurposed ship-to-shore connectors that could scatter on alert. The vessel concept described above is not revolutionary or even wholly novel, but an evolutionary case of form following function. 

Przemysław Ziemacki is a freelancer journalist and photographer from Poland. He currently writes for Polityka, one of the largest Polish weeklies. He previously worked for the local press and has also published in National Geographic Poland. He has a long-standing avocational interest in naval matters as reflected in his first CIMSEC piece, “Is the Moskva-class Helicopter Cruiser the Best Naval Design for the Drone Era?”

Featured Image: Skjold-class fast attack craft KNM Storm of the Royal Norwegian Navy (Wikimedia Commons)