By Eric Lies

The United States Navy has set a course that will see it morph into an army on the sea. The differentiating factors between the sea services and its landbound compatriots are fast eroding, diminishing the value of the fleet as its capabilities are more constrained. Traditionally, the utility and strength of the U.S. Navy revolved around the supreme maneuverability of the fleet and its ability to pass without a trace, skills the U.S. Army could only dream of. Now, however, fleets have never been more visible or more movement constrained, exposing them to the same strategic limitations an army on campaign faces. Adding to these challenges is the development of a set-piece mentality within the force over the previous decades as the U.S. Navy acted as mobile strike assets for ground wars. Redressing this army-fication, however, will be key to ensuring the continued success of the sea services and ultimately the safety of the United States.

This article will unfortunately be short on answers but long on questions and identifying the fundamental problems the Navy and Marine Corps team faces. Correctly identifying these issues now will save immense amounts of misplaced effort and, more importantly, lives should war break out. Therefore, this piece is written more as an opening statement in the discussion as opposed to a neat, simple solution, if such a thing can even exist in this instance.

Hiding in a Fishbowl

Armies are traditionally easier to track than navies. They operate in the same domain that people live in and the opportunities to observe their movements are frequent. This is the case even when their direct movements aren’t recorded by opposing forces. Civilians may watch and then talk carelessly, spreading the information. Physical evidence such as disturbed fields or damaged roads are also left behind for the keen observer. The pieces are there to pick up.

In ages past, once a fleet left harbor there was practically no way of knowing where it was operating. Barring a lucky sighting or maintaining a visual track, difficult in the best of circumstances, the surest way of locating a fleet was to correctly identify where it was going and lie in wait. The ability to disappear upon setting sail largely holds when there’s a large capability gap, such as when the combatants are the United States and minor powers or terrorist organizations. This would not be the case if the United States were to engage a peer or near peer competitor.

Much like how armies leave behind evidence when travelling, modern navies do too. The combination of long-range radar/sonar, satellite surveillance, drones, and signals intelligence gives modern commanders unprecedented ability to locate and track fleets. Permanent sensors, such as fixed array sonar systems, provide real time monitoring of vital transit lanes and vast swaths of the ocean without sending out ships or aircraft. Current radar technology routinely allows for identification and tracking of vessels hundreds of kilometers away, a range that will only increase as AI and algorithmic improvements are made. With a dense enough satellite constellation, consistent satellite imagery will also make fleet transits readily trackable via image analysis. This says nothing of accidental leaks of position by sailors using various apps or devices.

The development of autonomous systems allows for the surveillance and identification zones to be pushed out even further. With low to no risk to manned assets, forces can deploy additional sensors that loiter nearly indefinitely, turning on only when needed, acting as relays for each other, and casting a wide detection net. These technologies will only become more readily available and cheaper with time, exacerbating commander’s struggle to operate unobserved.

Highways on the Seas

This is not to say that there are no countermeasures to being observed, but competent captains and admirals must operate under the assumption that it’s not a question of if they’re found at sea, but when. While the risk of detection is relatively low while out on the high seas, the chances of detection increase exponentially the closer the fleet comes to shore.  This vastly narrows the geographic scope of operations that are readily hidden or obfuscated. Layering the various detection methods and their ranges on a map and then adding weapon engagement ranges creates a vastly different operating picture than fleets have encountered in the past.

A reading of the major military thinkers quickly impresses upon students of war the importance of geography and the field of battle. Sun Tzu’s work dedicates 30 percent entirely to the topic and is identified as a core pillar of strategy. Clausewitz, while he doesn’t examine geography or the terrain in discrete chapters, does lace it throughout his writing and thinking, identifying it as one of the key “modifiers” a strategist must consider. Corbett even identifies the difference between an army and a navy, discussing how armies must follow roads or traversable terrain while “the sea knows no roads to limit or indicate our own lines of operation.”

The maps of today, and especially tomorrow, resemble “roads” and “safe passages” around and through identification and engagement zones that fleets will have to navigate within. Leaving these bounds exposes them to swift identification and possibly an engagement with shore-based forces or unmanned vessels. These constraints on fleet movements complicate attempts at maintaining a true “fleet in being” that is at once both dispersed as well as ready to combine and pounce on weak or isolated elements of an enemy’s forces. As seen within the land domain, the massing of forces exposes attackers to extreme risk when mass and near real time surveillance are combined.

Modern technology allows a capable force to restrict where opposing fleets are likely to operate and therefore prepare the battlefield in ways unprecedented for naval warfare. This can create opportunities to more consistently develop kill boxes, ambushes, and direct the fighting to areas of strength for the forces operating near their shorelines, and thus within range of supporting missile and drone units.

The Anchored Fleet

Naval strategy revolves around the concepts of isolation and convergence. The isolated elements of a fleet can be converged upon and destroyed, leading to the ultimate destruction of the fleet and its fighting strength. At the core of this concept is the understanding that a fleet is never stationary but shifts and flows where it can best be utilized. Balancing the freedom of movement underpinning fleet operations is the fact that a fleet could simply be “removed from the board” by pulling into port under the protective watch of shore-based batteries. The force could defend itself via movement or via fortifications that forced attackers to risk their fighting force against shore troops that neutralize the advantages of mobility.

This concept faded from prominence with the close of the Cold War and the U.S. Navy’s dominance of the maritime domain. Modern navy doctrine then shifted to force projection as the ultimate raison d’etre, a natural metamorphosis in support of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Commanders began utilizing “op-boxes” and deliberately restricted maneuvering schemes to minimize risk while supporting the ground fight. The maximum ranges and on-station times of airframes began dictating where a carrier could steam and, naturally, where the escort ships must station to provide cover or support. It didn’t matter that a fleet could show up anywhere along the coast, it mattered that the fleet was as close to the specific coast that allowed safe and direct flights inland.

This prioritization, combined with forward operating bases that are now within range of shore-based fires, creates a situation akin to army forts staring across a field at the enemy lines. Complicating matters, unlike in the past, pulling a fleet into port doesn’t ensure the safety of the ships, but could unintentionally increase the risk to the force. Ports are well imaged and mapped via satellite imagery, and as such represent easily precleared and evaluated targets. There is a growing push to harden bases and to disperse forces throughout potential operational areas, thereby increasing resilience and survivability. This doesn’t change the fact that this only increases the number of potential targets, even if it does decrease the payoff for successful strikes.

Modern commanders are thus stuck with a dilemma. To effectively employ the weapons and doctrine developed over the last three and a half decades they cannot freely move their ships. In order to replenish and repair, they must return to easily targeted ports. They therefore cannot leverage the fundamental strength of a fleet: its ability to change the location of its operations, to disperse itself and to converge when enemy forces are isolated. “Stay in the op-box,” “This is our circuit for flight ops, we can’t change it.” Phrases such as these make fleet operations sound more and more analogous to ground operations where forces need to “Take the hill” or “secure this rail depot.” It is this decades-long doctrinal development that could represent the biggest risk to mitigating the increased visibility and expanded engagement zones.

Charting the Course

Resolving the current transformation of the sea services will require bold thinking and innovative synthesis of emerging technologies and revised doctrine. While not exhaustive, the following few ideas can serve as a launch point for further discussion and to begin charting the course for a renewed and revitalized fleet.

First, developing a better understanding of how peer competitors are thinking of possible engagements, such as how the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is deployed and the doctrine they adhere to, will be vital to gleaning lessons learned and offsetting their advantages. The days where the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps could make nearly unilateral decisions about force structure, armaments, and employment is far gone. Any peer or near peer has an equal say in what kind of conflict they will engage in, and it is foolish not to study their thinking as much, if not more, than current U.S. doctrine.

Second, the Navy should consider fleet composition and organization. This has naturally occurred in tandem with developments in naval and military technology, but taking a deliberate and methodical approach that seriously evaluates how fleets are structured and operate will help mitigate unnecessary losses. Some fits and starts have been made on this front, normally under the guise of “lethality,” such as the hunter killer surface action groups or  modular lethality. The current approach of clamoring for more of the same ships and submarines fails to address the issue at hand in a viable manner, while redesigning the fleet could make a substantial difference.

Third, examining how joint operations in the littoral and just into blue water are conducted could bear fruit in the shorter term. It naturally takes some time to redesign fleets and to construct the newly required vessels. Finding avenues to better leverage current inventories of weapons and vessels across the military services can help offset the time delay that such a redesign and build out requires. The emphasis should be on novel combinations and employment of existing kit, better cross service planning and coordination, and seamless operational control that counters the strengthened position of shores-based fires.

 It is worth noting that some of the work on each of these topics has already been done. Notably, in 2016, a trio of Navy future fleet architecture reviews were conducted, and responded to, that sought to rigorously identify how the Navy should structure its forces to fight and win in 2030. Across all three reviews, the need to shift from the assumption of sea control, and even dominance, to a contested maritime domain while engaged in high intensity fighting with a peer/near peer was central. The CSBA report, for example, outlined a fleet structure organized around region/threat specific deterrent forces supported by maneuver forces, addressing elements of the first two suggestions made above. MITRE identified the need for better integration of air-based assets into missile defense structures.  The Navy team discussed distributed fleets and the use of non-kinetic offensive and defensive weaponry as being integral to modern warfare. Aspects from all three are visible in the current force, and the sea services were strengthened from their adoption. Where these reviews fell short was in their limited scope and their failure to address critical assumptions underpinning their analysis, however. The process of evaluation and adapting to new technology and adversary developments is never ending, and the gaps identified in this article must be addressed if the Navy and Marine Corps are to remain a viable fighting force.

The army is worthy of emulation in many respects, but to have the Navy and Marine Corps become nothing more than an army at sea would be an unmitigated disaster. The challenges facing the sea services are great even without factoring in the challenges within the defense industrial complex supporting them. No amount of enhanced lethality or iterative innovation can save a force sailing in the wrong direction. But there is still time to shift the rudder and steady on a course of relevance and enhanced capabilities. This piece merely begins the conversation by diagnosing the primary impediments to an effective naval force and outlining briefly a few initial steps to move in the right direction. The army-fication of the Navy can and must be reversed.

Eric Lies is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Alliance Futures Initiative and an expert in alliance systems, security strategy, and military affairs.

Featured image: Albert Bierstadt, Beached Ship, 1859. (Wikimedia Commons)

By Bruce Stubbs

In 2022, Congress established the independent National Commission on the Future of the Navy to conduct two overarching studies, one examining naval force structure and the other focused on shipbuilding and innovation.1 The former will recommend the size and composition of the Navy, while the latter will identify opportunities to better integrate advanced technologies into shipbuilding, new construction, and repair shipyards. China now possesses the world’s largest navy by ship count, and its shipbuilding capacity vastly exceeds that of the United States. Chinese shipyards are producing warships faster than American yards can repair them. China has spent a generation building a fleet capable of contesting sea control and converting industrial scale into military power, while the United States has allowed its shipbuilding capacity, naval industrial base, and force structure to deteriorate over the same period. The Commission is required to submit an unclassified report in 2027, and its recommendations could shape American naval power for years to come. To fulfill its mandate, the Commission must resolve five foundational issues.

Issue #1: A Navy Without a Strategy

The Commission cannot responsibly recommend a force structure until it answers a question that Congress, the administration, and the Navy have all failed to answer clearly to date: what is the Navy expected to do?2 Without a clear answer, every force structure recommendation lacks a coherent strategic foundation.

The current situation reflects an accumulation of partial answers. Title 10 provides a floor. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped for the peacetime promotion of national security interests and for prompt and sustained combat at sea. But this is a generalized statutory minimum rather than a strategy.3 The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) provide overarching direction, but they are administration-specific documents that will not survive the current presidency. The strategic objectives they reflect, preventing Chinese hegemony in the Indo Pacific, deterring Russian aggression in Europe, maintaining freedom of navigation, and protecting maritime commerce, have remained substantively consistent across recent administrations even as the terminology, emphasis, and policy frameworks surrounding them have changed. But consistent objectives alone do not constitute a strategy. For decades, the Navy has acknowledged operational strain, force structure pressure, and readiness shortfalls without clearly identifying which missions would receive priority, which risks would be accepted, and what strategic tradeoffs would follow from those choices.

CNO Caudle’s Navy Fighting Instructions is an unclassified public document, but the Navy Warfighting Concept and the developing Navy Deterrence Concept, the foundational guidance documents that the Fighting Instructions references and depends upon, remain classified. What is currently absent in unclassified form is not operational detail. Classified guidance is the appropriate place for theater-specific net assessments and force-sizing specifics. Missing instead is strategic direction concrete enough to shape force planning decisions. Effective strategy must do more than describe objectives. It must identify priorities, accepted risks, and strategic tradeoffs clearly enough to drive force structure decisions. Without that level of clarity, force planning becomes vulnerable to bureaucratic drift, budget pressures, and competing operational demands unsupported by a coherent strategic framework.

Without that conceptual foundation available in both classified and unclassified form, the public, Congress, and the defense community cannot evaluate whether the Commission’s force structure recommendations derive from realistic strategic guidance. Congress requires a classified version to conduct effective oversight and an unclassified version to communicate requirements and justification to the American public. No adequate unclassified naval strategy currently exists to anchor the Commission’s work. Indeed, three days after the President’s Golden Fleet announcement, a Wall Street Journal editorial observed that the larger problem was the apparent absence of clear direction for the Navy.4

The 1980s provide the relevant model for how this problem should be solved. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway III established the correct analytical sequence in 1978. Force requirements depend on three factors: strategy, threat, and risk, in that order.5 As CNO, Admiral James D. Watkins declared the Maritime Strategy “the bedrock of planning, programming, and operations throughout today’s Navy,” providing “a clear framework against which all budget proposals are judged.”6 The Maritime Strategy existed in both classified and unclassified form. At least eight versions were produced at the secret level and above because Congress, the public, and allies all needed to understand the strategic logic supporting the 600 Ship Navy.7 Strategy defined the ends, and the 600 Ship Navy provided the means. That sequence and that transparency are what the Commission should require. This does not mean strategy alone determines force structure. Political and budgetary realities play an equally important role in shaping the size of the Navy. But strategy must come first and must provide the framework within which those realities are applied.8

The Commission must also look forward rather than remain anchored to current guidance. Ships built on the basis of its recommendations will still be operating in the 2050s. Force planning that ignores future threat environments across a service life extending more than thirty years risks producing forces optimized for today’s problems but poorly matched to tomorrow’s. Yet forecasting is genuinely difficult. Benjamin Jensen, a defense policy analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and former Marine Corps officer Michael Rountree observed that “there is no single future, but an endless unfolding of alternative pathways and timelines.”9 That difficulty is not a reason to avoid the effort. It is precisely why the Commission must undertake it seriously. It also argues for force designs that preserve room for adaptation. Ships operating in the 2050s must be capable of incorporating warfighting technologies and responding to threats that cannot yet be fully anticipated.

Issue #2: A Sea Control or Sea Denial Navy

The Commission must determine whether the Navy should be designed primarily to achieve sea control or to conduct sea denial. These are fundamentally different strategic objectives that require similar but not identical force structures. Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action to use the sea for one’s own purposes while denying that use to the enemy. It enables all other naval functions and historically has been the objective of the stronger naval power. Sea denial involves partially or completely denying the adversary use of the sea without necessarily securing it for one’s own purposes. It has generally been the objective of the weaker side.10

The current administration and the Navy have shifted toward sea denial as the primary organizing concept. The 2025 NSS directs the military to build a force “capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.”11 The 2026 NDS reaffirms this approach by directing a “strong denial defense along the First Island Chain” and declaring that making clear any attempt at aggression will fail “is the essence of deterrence by denial.”12 CNO Caudle’s December 2025 C-NOte stated explicitly that the Navy will “build an integrated, all domain Fleet capable of conducting sea denial and, when needed, sea control.”13 His Navy Fighting Instructions translated this concept into operational guidance through the Hedge Strategy, which he described as necessary because “building a Fleet to cover every possible threat is too expensive, unrealistic, and sub optimized.”14

This was an acknowledgment that the current fleet of roughly 295 ships cannot sustain sea control and therefore must prioritize sea denial supported by unmanned and tailored offset capabilities.15 The Navy’s own emerging small surface combatant concepts reinforce this reality. While senior leaders increasingly describe frigates and other lower-end platforms as necessary to relieve operational pressure on destroyers, those same platforms lack the area-air-defense capability required to replace large surface combatants in high-threat environments. The result is an implicit admission that the Navy is designing portions of the future fleet around the operational requirements of sea denial and presence missions rather than sustained sea control against peer adversaries. Throughout the Cold War and afterward, the Navy described its overarching purpose as sea control or power projection, and at times both, but never as sea denial. Naval Doctrine Publication-1 states explicitly that “Sea control enables all other naval functions.”16

The Commission cannot recommend a force structure without first determining whether that structure is designed to control the seas or merely to contest them. Nor can it make that determination without telling the nation plainly what each choice costs, what each choice risks, and what each choice forfeits.

Issue #3: The Navy’s High–Low Force Mix

The statute’s core mandate to recommend the size and force mixture of ships across four funding scenarios directly requires resolving the Navy’s high- low balance. CNO Caudle acknowledged the operational cost of failing to do so plainly at the Paris Naval Conference when he stated, “what I find now is I end up having to use CSGs [carrier strike groups] and amphibious strike groups in places where I believe I could tailor a force package and be more suited to the threat.”17

High-end forces such as aircraft carriers, nuclear powered submarines, and advanced multi mission surface combatants are designed to operate in contested environments against capable adversaries. They are essential for sea control, deterrence, and power projection. They are also expensive, finite in number, and poorly suited for missions that do not require their capabilities. Every high-end platform assigned to a mission below its capability threshold is a platform unavailable for the high-end fight it was designed and funded to win. The Navy’s operational problem is increasingly one of using sledgehammer solutions for missions that require only a tack hammer. Destroyers designed for high-end combat are routinely consumed by counter-drug patrols, maritime security missions, presence operations, and other low-threat requirements that steadily expend readiness, service life, and maintenance capacity without contributing meaningfully to preparation for major war.

The definition of low-end forces has evolved considerably beyond the crewed patrol ships and frigates of previous decades. Today it encompasses two distinct categories. The first consists of affordable crewed surface combatants. These are smaller and simpler ships optimized for presence, maritime security, and constabulary missions while still capable of contributing to wartime escort and force protection without the cost and complexity of a destroyer. The second and increasingly important category consists of robotic and autonomous systems. These include uncrewed surface vessels configured for scouting, screening, offensive mining, and containerized missile payloads; uncrewed underwater vehicles designed for area denial and counter mine missions; and attritable autonomous platforms capable of coordinated operations without continuous human control.18 CNO Caudle’s Hedge Strategy explicitly identifies these systems as “Tailored Offsets,” describing them as force multipliers that expand mass and complicate adversary targeting at a fraction of the cost of crewed platforms.19 The unifying characteristic of low-end forces, whether crewed or uncrewed, is mission specificity. They are optimized for defined tasks rather than the full multi mission spectrum expected of high-end combatants.

Not all adversaries operate high-end warships. China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia employs hundreds of nominally civilian fishing vessels to assert maritime claims and harass foreign ships in the South China Sea. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fast attack craft have repeatedly threatened U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf. Houthi forces have used anti-ship missiles, drone boats, and mines to disrupt Red Sea shipping, requiring sustained naval responses. None of these threats requires a carrier strike group. All require a capable, persistent, and affordable low-end presence that the current force structure cannot efficiently provide.

Six factors shape the Commission’s resolution of this question. The Navy is only infrequently engaged in high-consequence, low-probability conflicts such as war with China or Russia, but it must remain constantly prepared for them. That reality means high-end platforms cannot expend their readiness on lower tier missions. For most of this century, the Navy has instead been consumed by high-probability, lower-consequence maritime security and naval diplomacy missions that neither require nor should routinely employ its most sophisticated combatants. In a general war, low-end forces are essential for convoy escort and force protection. They cannot be absent from the wartime order of battle. Shipbuilding and weapons system costs continue to rise faster than defense budgets, making affordability a binding constraint. The sophisticated weapon systems that define high-end combatants are unnecessary for low-end missions and add cost and maintenance burdens without corresponding operational benefit. The Navy has also repeatedly demonstrated an institutional inability to define and maintain clear requirements for small combatants. The Constellation–class frigate, cancelled after its cost approached that of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, stands as the most recent and costly example. Persistent maritime security requirements cannot be sustained indefinitely through episodic deployment of scarce high-end combatants.

The Commission must resist two symmetrical errors in resolving the high-low question. The first is allowing the desire for low-end platforms to participate in high-end warfare to drive their cost and complexity toward that of the high-end platforms they are intended to supplement. Both the littoral combat ship and the Constellation–class guided missile frigate illustrate this problem clearly. The second error is designing low-end platforms so narrowly around peacetime security missions that they become wasted assets during conflict and cannot contribute to escort, force protection, or sea control operations when war comes. In a general war, every hull counts. Low-end ships must therefore be affordable enough to procure in quantity, simple enough to crew and maintain, and capable enough to contribute meaningfully to the wartime fleet.

The 2025 NSS and 2026 NDS sent strong demand signals for both ends of the spectrum simultaneously. High-end forces are needed to deny Chinese aggression in the First Island Chain. Low-end Navy and Coast Guard forces are needed to control sea lanes, counter narco-terrorists, and secure key terrain in the Western Hemisphere.20 The high-low force mix is ultimately not an acquisition question, but a strategic question. A fleet composed entirely of high-end platforms would be strategically capable but numerically insufficient and operationally inefficient. A fleet composed primarily of low-end platforms would be numerically adequate but strategically hollow. The Commission must define the proper balance, specify what low-end actually means in terms of capability and cost, and recommend a force structure capable of performing the full spectrum of naval missions, from maritime security in the Caribbean to sea control in the Western Pacific, without exhausting its high-end platforms on missions they were never intended to perform.

Issue #4: The Navy’s Shipbuilding Crisis and Its Legislative Fix

The Commission’s Study on Shipbuilding and Innovation should draw upon the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 as a model for correcting the shipbuilding crisis confronting the Navy today.21 That Act served as the charter that built the modern U.S. Navy.22 Its enduring principles for maintaining the fleet and sustaining the associated shipbuilding industrial base, if applied consistently, would have prevented most of the problems affecting the Navy’s industrial base today.

First, the United States must build and maintain a Navy composed of modern warships that remain on true parity with rival maritime powers. Achieving that goal requires determining on a long-range basis the numbers, types, and tonnages of warships to be laid down each year. Second, any surface ship more than twenty years old should be considered obsolete and of limited military value. Large numbers of aging hulls can mislead policymakers about actual naval strength, especially when a rival power is building rapidly. Third, sufficient warship replacement programs must be financed consistently from year to year in order to prevent mass obsolescence, maintain constant modern fleet strength, and reduce costs through repetitive construction. Finally, the sequence itself is nonnegotiable. National security requirements and sea power needs must be established first. Only afterward should cost considerations be applied. The purpose of that sequencing is to ensure budgets do not silently redefine national strategy through force erosion and deferred replacement.

The abandonment of these principles after the Cold War did not create an immediate crisis. It produced a slow-moving one whose consequences are now fully visible. When the peace dividend gutted shipbuilding budgets during the 1990s, the Navy retained aging ships in service rather than replacing them on schedule, violating the principle of systematic replacement. Without steady and predictable construction programs, private shipyards lacked any basis for investing in facilities or workforce development, violating the principle of repetitive construction. Public naval shipyards fell decades behind in infrastructure modernization. The skilled workforce contracted. When submarines required overhaul, there were too few dry docks, too few workers, and insufficient spare parts because the industrial base had not been sustained in the manner the Vinson-Trammell framework required.

The fate of USS Boise (SSN-764) illustrates the cumulative consequences of that failure. Commissioned in 1992 and docked a decade ago for what should have been a routine overhaul, Boise remained out of service for years while the Navy awarded a $1.2 billion repair contract in 2024.23 More than $800 million was spent. The overhaul was only 22 percent complete when CNO Caudle announced in April 2026 that Boise would be inactivated.24 Every dollar spent on her refurbishment was wasted. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed called Boise the “poster child” for the Navy’s submarine maintenance backlog. From then, Bosie waited until the service awarded a $1.2 billion contract to HII for the work in 2024. Combined, the Navy has invested about $1.6 billion Boise, based on Pentagon contract announcements. 25 Boise was not simply a story about one submarine. It became a visible symbol of what happens when long-range shipbuilding discipline, maintenance capacity, and industrial sustainment are allowed to erode simultaneously.

The Commission, whose mandate explicitly includes recommending legislative changes, can present this case publicly and with full analytical authority. The Navy cannot resolve its shipbuilding and maintenance crisis through internal reform alone. The incentive structures, funding mechanisms, and oversight frameworks that produced the current crisis are embedded in law and congressional process, and correcting them requires Congress to act. Recent small surface combatant proposals also suggest the Navy is increasingly attempting to use force structure decisions to stabilize the shipbuilding industrial base itself. In practice, some future fleet programs appear driven as much by the need to sustain shipyard capacity and production continuity as by clearly defined warfighting requirements. That reality further reinforces the need for coherent long-range maritime planning linking strategy, force structure, and industrial capacity rather than allowing industrial weakness to shape fleet design indirectly through crisis management. A modern Vinson-Trammell Act, properly conceived and boldly recommended, could do for the twenty-first century Navy what the 1934 original Act did for the Navy that won the Second World War. It could establish the legislative foundation for sustained naval power adequate to the strategic competition the nation now faces.

Issue #5: American Sea Power and the Coast Guard

Any assessment of American sea power that excludes the Coast Guard is incomplete. The Commission’s governing statute requires it to ensure the Navy possesses sufficient capacity for current and anticipated homeland defense missions. That requirement cannot be fully addressed without considering the Coast Guard’s unique statutory authorities, capabilities, and role within the maritime domain, particularly given the 2025 NSS direction calling for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence” in the Western Hemisphere. The United States has always required constabulary power. It must possess the capability to uphold maritime sovereignty, prevent illegal and illicit use of its waters, protect maritime borders, ensure the safe passage of cargo and people, and preserve marine resources. These are maritime law enforcement missions that constitutional practice and historical precedent have assigned primarily to the Coast Guard rather than the Navy.

The case for including the Coast Guard in the Commission’s deliberations rests on six grounds. The Coast Guard possesses maritime law enforcement and counterterrorism authorities the Navy does not have, including statutory authority to arrest vessel operators and crews suspected of illegal activities on the high seas. That authority is essential for the constabulary missions the NSS and NDS now explicitly prioritize. The Coast Guard also operates the nation’s only icebreaking fleet, which is necessary to assert sovereignty and protect national security interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions that the current administration has identified as priorities. The National Fleet Policy requires Navy and Coast Guard commonality and interoperability. Colin Gray observed in 2000 that the predictable shortage of frigate sized warships in the future Navy pointed toward closer integration with the Coast Guard because large cutters would increasingly need to function as warships.26 The 2025 NSS explicitly calls for a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence in the Western Hemisphere in order to control sea lanes, reduce human and drug trafficking, and secure key transit routes during crisis. This direction acknowledges that the Coast Guard is part of American maritime dominance rather than a peripheral service. The 2025 executive order on shipbuilding directs a government-wide review of production delays and cost overruns that specifically includes Coast Guard programs alongside those of the Army and Navy. Finally, the Coast Guard has served, fought, and died beside the Navy in every major American war and contingency, including its permanent patrol boat presence in the Persian Gulf, which in 2026 consisted of six Sentinel class cutters, a shore maintenance unit, and a maritime engagement team.

Recent operations have reinforced this argument. In March 2026, CNO Caudle identified maritime domain awareness and drug interdiction as the principal challenges facing U.S. Southern Command.27 He acknowledged that he wished the Navy had progressed further in developing alternatives so that when the Ford Carrier Strike Group departed the Caribbean, he could have offered something more appropriate for the mission. Historically, that mission set has belonged to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is also directly relevant to Issue #3. The low-end presence gap identified in the high-low force mix discussion, namely the need for persistent and affordable maritime security capacity below the threshold of high-end combat, is precisely the mission the Coast Guard was designed and statutorily authorized to perform. The Commission cannot responsibly address force structure without asking whether a properly resourced and integrated Coast Guard is the answer Caudle acknowledged the Navy could not yet provide. Force structure recommendations that fail to incorporate Coast Guard capabilities fully will remain incomplete.

Conclusion

Congress directed the Commission to examine force structure, readiness, shipbuilding capacity, naval aviation, personnel policy, and the force-generation model that sustains combat power at sea. Those problems are interconnected and their causes are well understood. Based on the Commission’s public statements, hearings, and commentaries, the recurring problem is that immediate operational demand, near-term political pressures, and annual budget cycles have repeatedly overpowered long-term maritime planning, industrial continuity, and strategically disciplined force planning. The consequences are now visible across the fleet. Readiness is consumed to meet current tasking. Maintenance is deferred to preserve near-term presence. Shipbuilding programs expand, contract, and change direction before industrial capacity can stabilize around them. Force structure drifts as priorities shift between administrations and budget cycles. Long-term strategic priorities blur because the Navy is continually forced to satisfy immediate operational requirements at the expense of sustained strategic coherence.

The underlying relationships are not conceptually complicated. During the Cold War, the United States understood that strategy had to establish priorities and accepted risks, force structure had to reflect those priorities, industrial capacity had to sustain that force structure over time, and readiness had to be preserved for the conflicts the nation considered most dangerous. The Commission’s statutory task is to provide Congress an unclassified report with findings, recommendations, and legislative proposals addressing those interconnected problems. In practice, however, the Commission is being asked to do something broader and more consequential. It must identify not only how to recover from the Navy’s present readiness, maintenance, force structure, and industrial base problems, but also how to prevent their recurrence. That requires more than shipbuilding targets or future fleet numbers. It requires a realistic framework for setting maritime priorities, defining accepted risks to the force and to the nation, aligning strategy with resources and industrial capacity over time, and sustaining American sea power across decades rather than budget cycles.

The Commission has the independence, the authority, and the mandate to confront these problems directly. Its report will have little value if it merely restates the Navy’s existing challenges or proposes force structure ambitions disconnected from industrial reality, operational sustainability, and accepted strategic risk. The Commission’s real task is to impose long-term strategic discipline on problems that have repeatedly been overwhelmed by short-term operational demand and political pressure. Whether it does so candidly and coherently is the measure by which its work should ultimately be judged.

1 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, 136 Stat. 2395 (2022), § 1092.

2 Mackenzie Eaglen, Filemon Vela, and Benjamin Jensen, “How Congress Can Revitalize American Sea Power,” The National Interest, January 21, 2026.

3 10 U.S. Code § 8062, subparagraph (a).

4 The Editorial Board, “The Navy Needs Direction,” The Wall Street Journal, December 25, 2025.

5 CNO Admiral James L. Holloway III, Naval Warfare Publication 1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, May 1978, in John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, Naval War College Press, 2007, p. 59.

6 CNO Admiral James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986.

7 Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970–2010), Center for Naval Analyses, MISC D0026437.A1, December 2011, slide 21.

8 Anand Toprani, “Was the 600-Ship Navy a Chimera? Budgets, Force Structure, and the Political Realities Behind Reagan-Era Naval Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, June 24, 2024, p. 3.

9 Benjamin Jensen and Michael Rountree, “Driving the Dark Road to the Future: A Guide to Revitalizing Defense Planning and Strategic Analysis,” War on the Rocks, July 1, 2022.

10 Naval Doctrine Publication-1 (NDP-1), April 2020, p. 22.

11Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy, November 2025, p. 24.

12 Pete Hegseth, National Defense Strategy, January 2026, p. 4.

13 ADM Daryl L. Caudle, CNO C-Note #3, “World-Class Fleet,” December 1, 2025.

14 ADM Daryl L. Caudle, CNO C-Note #3, “World-Class Fleet,” December 1, 2025.

15 ADM Daryl L. Caudle, CNO C-Note #4, “The Way We Fight,” January 15, 2026; Breaking Defense, January 28, 2026.

16 NDP-1, April 2020, p. 22.

17 ADM Daryl L. Caudle, Speech, Paris Naval Conference, February 2026; Naval News, March 13, 2026.

18 ADM Daryl L. Caudle, CNO C-Note #4, “The Way We Fight,” January 15, 2026; Breaking Defense, January 15, 2026; NAVSEA Modular Surface Attack Craft contracting notice, 2025.

19 ADM Daryl L. Caudle, Remarks, Surface Navy Association. See also: Press Office, Department of the Navy, “Chief of Naval Operations Unveils ‘Fighting Instructions’ at U.S. Naval War College,” Press Release, 9 February 2026.

20 Trump, National Security Strategy, November 2025; Hegseth, National Defense Strategy, January 2026.

21 Matt Wright, “Just-in-Time Production,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2023.

22 Charles F. Elliott, “The Genesis of the Modern American Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1966.

23 Justin Katz, “CNO Nominee Adm. Caudle Says He’ll Look ‘Hard’ at Whether to ‘Walk Away’ from Sub Boise,” Breaking Defense, July 24, 2025.

24 Sam LaGrone, “Navy to Inactivate Attack Boat USS Boise After $1.6B Repair Effort,” USNI News, April 10, 2026.

25 Justin Katz, “Navy Awards HII $1.2B Contract to Overhaul Long-Sidelined Sub Boise,” Breaking Defense, February 23, 2024.

26 Colin S. Gray, “Keeping the Coast Guard Afloat,” The National Interest, No. 60, Summer 2000.

27 Caitlyn Burchett, “SOUTHCOM Doesn’t Need a Carrier for Maritime Interdiction, CNO Says,” USNI News, April 6, 2026.

Prior to his full retirement as a member of the U.S. senior executive service, Bruce Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations from 2009 to 2022. He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the OPNAV N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career U.S. Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the Assistant Commandant for Capability (current title) in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive.

Featured Image: IONIAN SEA (Feb. 21, 2022) Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 ships and submarines sail in formation in the Ionian Sea off the coast of Sicily Feb. 21, 2022 during Exercise Dynamic Manta 22 (DYMA 22). 

By George Galdorisi

Perspective

Military leaders often use military-industry conferences to unveil new strategies. Coming on the heels of a new National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in December 2025 and a National Defense Strategy (NDS) issued in January 2026, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Daryl Caudle, revealed the Navy’s strategy designed to support the NSS and NDS, the U.S. Navy Fighting Instructions in February 2026.

The venue for unveiling this document was The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)/U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) “West” symposium, the largest military/industry symposium on the West Coast with over 10,000 registered attendees. Admiral Caudle was the keynote speaker on day one of this event, and he provided a briefing on the U.S. Navy Fighting Instructions.

One of the key points the CNO made during this keynote, as well as during a subsequent Service Chiefs panel, was that the U.S. Navy is a differentiator. Here is how he described it in the Fighting Instructions:

“Winners set themselves apart by excelling in difficult endeavors. It is what separates successful businesses or world-class athletes from the competition. Doing difficult things well means identifying and delivering differentiated value. For the United States Navy, prioritizing what the Navy does better than anyone else—any other Service, any other Nation—is central to ensuring that the Chief of Naval Operations designs and resources a strategy that ruthlessly prioritizes the Sailors, Foundry, Fleet, and Fight needed to execute our essential global missions. We provide differentiated value to two primary stakeholders: the Nation and the Joint Force.”

The CNO’s emphasis on the U.S. Navy as a differentiator comes at a time when there is intense discussion regarding the different options for what the Navy-After-Next will look like. The discussions within the Navy, the Department of Defense, the Executive Branch, the U.S. Congress, think tanks and a plethora of other stakeholders and influencers and others have never been more varied or intense, and much of that discussion occurred during the “West” symposium.

Which Fleet?

Four options for fleet composition have gained purchase within the U.S. Navy.

The first is the Navy’s current shipbuilding plan as reported by the Congressional Research Service. This includes 381 crewed ships and a number of uncrewed surface vessels. This number comports with the recently released Navy Shipbuilding Plan which envisions a battle force inventory reaching 382 crewed ships in 2056.

The second option that has gained traction is called the “hybrid fleet.” This concept was unveiled by then-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, and endorsed by his successors. This envisions a Navy of 350 crewed ships and 150 uncrewed surface vessels. The idea of a hybrid fleet evolved due the U.S. Navy’s ongoing challenge of building enough crewed ships to adequately meet the Navy’s global commitments.

The next option is called the “hedge fleet.” This envisions a forward-deployed force of robotic autonomous systems and crewed ships to be employed quickly in any crisis. Of the four options, the CNO spoke most extensively about the hedge fleet, explaining the rationale this way: “We need ‘tailored forces’ and a Navy that has other battle formations beyond carrier strike groups. Tailored offsets include capabilities such as attritable and easily replenishable unmanned surface vessels, unmanned undersea systems, mine warfare and cost-effective counter drone defense. The hedge fleet avoids a brittle single-purpose force.”

The final option is the “golden fleet,” a recent initiative announced by President Trump in late 2025 to rapidly expand and modernize the fleet. This plan focuses heavily on battleships alongside frigates and uncrewed surface vessels. While media reporting regarding the golden fleet centers primarily on large ships, knowledgeable observers have suggested that the small- and medium-sized uncrewed surface vessels armed with long range strike and missile defense systems will be the most strategically impactful in the near term.

One common feature among these four options is the inclusion of uncrewed surface vessels as vital assets within a future fleet. There are two reasons for this sea change.

The first is that ships are expensive to build and operate. The cost of Ford-class aircraft carrier is $13B and an Arleigh Burke destroyer is $2.2B. The new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine approaches $10B. However, those procurement costs only represent the tip of the iceberg. Populating those vessels with sailors is also increasingly expensive, given that seventy percent of the total operating cost (TOC) of a ship over its lifespan is providing a crew year-over-year.

The second is that after over a decade of development the Navy has confidence that uncrewed surface vessels have reached a point in their development that they are no longer prototypes, but production-ready vessels (some are commercial-off-the-shelf or COTS). that are ready to deploy with their crewed counterparts.

As evidence of this technological maturity, the CNO noted how Navy and Marine Corps exercises, experiments, and demonstrations such as the those conducted by Fifth Fleet/CTF-59, Fourth Fleet and a series of uncrewed surface vessel-focused events with NATO allies have accelerated the development of these craft. As just one of many examples of this testing in recent years, MARTAC, a U.S. uncrewed surface vessel designer/builder, has frequently been invited to showcase its MANTAS T12, Devil Ray T24 and Devil Ray T38 unmanned surface vessels (USV) to a wide range of Navy and Marine Corps at-sea events.

These events have included the U.S. Pacific Fleet-led Integrated Battle Problem series of exercises, the Integrated Maritime Exercise series held under the auspices of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Commander Task Force 59 in the Arabian Gulf, NATO exercises BALTOPS, REPMUS, and the follow-on Dynamic Messenger, Australian Defence Force Exercise Autonomous Warrior, among others.

The Navy Shipbuilding Plan reveals how this confidence in the technical maturity of uncrewed surface vehicles has given the Navy confidence to provide funding for USVs to: “serve as a direct, dual-use supplement to existing ready forces, providing a flexible “tailored force” to enhance the nation’s maritime posture.”

The number of medium uncrewed surface vessels (MUSVs) projected in the Shipbuilding Plan are substantial, growing from 39 in FY27 to 83 in FY31 when MUSVs will comprise 18% of the Navy’s fleet. As the Plan explains, MUSV integration will unburden higher-value assets, such as Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, as the autonomous fleet can take up long endurance maritime domain awareness missions.

The Road Ahead

Regardless of which design for the Navy-After-Next prevails in the coming years – be it one of the existing conceptual designs, a hybrid design drawing elements from among these options, or a completely different design – a future U.S. Navy comprised of formations of integrated crewed ships and uncrewed surface vessels represents a once-in-a-generation sea change for the U.S. Navy.

While deciding on the composition of the Navy-After-Next is a necessary first step it is not a sufficient one. The U.S. Congress has been reluctant to authorize the Navy’s planned investment of billions of dollars in USVs until the Service can come up with a concept-of-operations (CONOPS) for using them. Congress has a point.

Via the Navy Shipbuilding Plan, the Navy has announced plans to procure large numbers of uncrewed systems—especially medium uncrewed surface vessels—but a CONOPS, in even the most basic form, has not yet emerged. Such a CONOPS must be thoughtfully conceived, analyzed, vetted through stakeholders, war-gamed and widely distributed. Only through this disciplined process can the Navy-After-Next be the strongest Navy the nation can field.

Captain George Galdorisi, USN (Ret.) is a career naval aviator and national security professional. During his 30-year career he had four tours in command and served as a carrier strike group chief of staff. Additionally, he led the U.S. delegation for military-to-military talks with the Chinese Navy. He is the Emeritus Director of Strategic Assessments and Technical Futures at the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific. He is the author of seventeen books, including four consecutive New York Times bestsellers. His most recent novel, Fire and Ice, is eerily prescient, as it foresaw Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Nov. 16, 2018) Ships with the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group and John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group transit the Philippine Sea during dual carrier operations. (U.S. Navy photo)