Tag Archives: Al Qaeda

Capability Analysis, Future War

Terrorists on the Ocean: Sea Monsters in the 21st Century

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By CAPT Robert N. Hein, USN

The call of the ocean has enticed generations to explore, and at times exploit her domain. Ninety percent of world commerce transits the oceans. Cruise ships represent a $40 Billion industry, and 30% of the world’s oil originates offshore. It is no wonder criminals and terrorists also feel drawn to the sea. As these groups expand their reach, the question is: When will ISIS and other terrorist organizations bring their brand of mayhem to the oceans?

A senior NATO Admiral, VADM Clive Johnstone, recently expressed concern that ISIS desired its own maritime force to spread its nefarious activities into the Mediterranean. These activities could include launching attacks against a cruise liner, oil terminal, or container ship. Soon after VADM Johnstone’s comments, Former Supreme Allied Commander and retired Admiral James Stavridis weighed in with his own concerns about ISIS entering the maritime domain: “I’m surprised [Islamic State militants] have not, as yet, moved into the maritime world and gone after cruise ships, which I think are a logical and lucrative target for them.”

While ISIS’ maritime capabilities have been limited to date, this has not been true of all terrorist organizations. ISIS’ predecessor, Al Qaeda, launched a vicious and successful attack against the USS COLE in October 2000. Somali pirates experienced tremendous success at sea for years, but strong responses from the international community and force protection measures by the maritime industry have limited further successful attacks. ISIS’ limited attempts at sea have achieved some effects though, such as the shore-launched rocket attack on an Egyptian naval ship in August. Additionally, there was a recent attempt by ISIS to conduct an attack from the sea against a Libyan oil terminal, but it was thwarted by Libyan security forces.

Footage of ISIS affiliated insurgent group launching missile at Egyptian Timsah class patrol boat in July 2015. 

How Real is the Threat?

The lure of expanding operations into the maritime domain is enticing to terrorist groups. The relative isolation is real, and external response is limited. Terrorist attacks on land receive a rapid government response, in large numbers, and with many assets to thwart an attack. Case in point is the Al Qaeda attack at a luxury hotel in Burkina Faso in January 2016. Three members of an Al Qaeda group took 126 hostages and killed two dozen more before security forces stormed the hotel, killing the terrorists and freeing the hostages. A logical extension of the attacks in Burkina Faso would be an assault on a large and remote or underdefended luxury hotel- such as an underway cruise ship. The narrative ISIS hopes to convey from attacking a cruise ship at sea is akin to many horror movies: a captive victim with nowhere to turn for help.

Following VADM Johnson’s prediction, the Cruise Line International Association quickly stepped in to reassure its passengers that cruises are still safe, but are they? The last successful terrorist attack against a cruise ship was 30 years ago by Palestinians. Their original intent was to use the Achille Lauro as transport to Ashdod, Israel, to launch a terror attack ashore. This plan rapidly changed when a crew member discovered the terrorists/attackers cleaning their weapons.

Egyptian central security police guarding the gangplank on which diplomats and others go to and from the Italian cruise liner ?Achille Lauro? which arrived, Thursday, Oct. 10, 1985 in Port Said in this port after being hijacked by four Palestinian for more than 48-hours. The four hijackers has left Egypt after they surrendered go to the Egyptian authorities on Wednesday. (AP Photo)
Egyptian central security police guarding the gangplank on which diplomats and others go to and from the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro which arrived, Thursday, Oct. 10, 1985 in Port Said after being hijacked by four Palestinian for more than 48-hours. (AP Photo)

While the Achille Lauro incident increased levels of security in the cruise ship world, threats to the cruise industry remain. In March 2015, cruise ship tourists visiting a museum during a stop in Tunis were attacked. Cruise lines are quick to cancel port visits in global hot spots, and most employ internal security forces. However, the allure for terrorists remains. Al Qaeda made plans as early as 2011 to capture a cruise ship and execute its passengers. Fortunately, those plans have failed to come to fruition as terrorist groups have found the task is harder than it looks.

While attacks on the open ocean remain a challenge, coastal attacks are more feasible. The Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba launched an attack in 2008 against Mumbai. They hijacked an Indian fishing boat and launched 10 terrorists ashore, ultimately killing 166 and injuring almost 500. The lack of a strong Coast Guard in both India and Pakistan certainly contributed to the terrorists’ success, and served as a wakeup call. In response to the Mumbai attacks, the Indian Navy was placed at the apex of India’s maritime security architecture and made responsible for both coastal and oceanic security. Since then, the Indian Navy has successfully prevented further attacks. However, even with the additional forces, indications persist that ISIS may be trying to infiltrate India by sea, disguised as fishermen.

Arguably, the most successful terrorist group on the sea was the Sri Lankan separatist group, the Tamil Tigers. In his treatise A Guerrilla Wat At Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War , Professor Paul Povlock of the Naval War College describes how at their strongest, their maritime branch (the Sea Tigers) boasted a force of 3000 personnel with separate branches for logistics, intelligence, communications, offensive mining, and — every terrorists’ favorite — the suicide squad. They conducted sea denial with great success, even demonstrating the ability to sink Sri Lankan patrol boats using fast attack craft and suicide boats.

Small vessels employed by the Sea Tigers.
Small vessels employed by the Sea Tigers.

The Tigers continued their attacks against Sri Lanka for 20 years until the Sri Lankan Navy was able to effectively neutralize them. The Sri Lankan Navy now has a formidable maritime patrol, but not before they lost over 1000 men to the Sea Tigers. Hardly a day goes by without illegal fishermen being chased away or arrested by the Sri Lankan government, who is ever mindful that their waters could again be used for more nefarious purposes.

Sometimes terrorists’ appetites are far bigger than their stomachs, as was the case in September 2014 when Al Qaeda operatives attempted to hijack a Pakistani frigate. If successful, it would have had epic implications. However, the attempted takeover was thwarted by a sharp Pakistani gunner who noticed the inbound boat did not have standard issue gear. He engaged, destroying the terrorist boat, while commandos onboard the frigate subdued crew members sympathetic to the terrorist cause.

Defeat and Deter

Operating in the maritime domain is far more challenging than operations on land. The Somali pirates were originally fishermen and familiar with operating at sea, but it still took them years to develop an offshore “over the horizon” capability. The lack of successful attacks at sea by terrorist organizations in spite of their indicated desire is at least a partial validation of the efforts made by the maritime security community.

The effective shutdown of piracy off Somalia served as a model for defeating maritime crime, showing coastal nations the effects of naval presence in deterring illegal behavior at sea. Malaysia has all but shut down sea crime in its waters, and blunted terrorist attempts to enter Malaysia by aggressively patrolling their coasts. Nigeria has similarly stepped up its game in the Gulf of Guinea where their navy stopped two hijackings in one week and separately announced they would soon take delivery of an additional 50 boats- both demonstrations of commitment to peaceful use of their waters. That doesn’t mean the work is over. ISIS, who has the funds for major purchases, is attempting to acquire naval capabilities like 2 man submarines, high powered speed boats, boats fitted with machine guns and rocket launchers, and mine planners made easily available by less discerning arms providers such as Korea, China, and Russia.

While the likelihood of near-shore attacks remains a possibility, including against cruise ships, the chance that ISIS will attack blue water objectives out of sight of land is still remote. However, the odds will remain remote only as long as the navies of the world continue to provide a credible presence on the oceans. When the seas are no longer effectively patrolled, terrorist organizations will take advantage of the same opportunities for freedom of maneuver at sea that they currently enjoy ashore.

Captain Robert N. Hein is a career Surface Warfare Officer. He previously commanded the USS Gettysburg (CG-64) and the USS Nitze (DDG-94). You can follow him on Twitter: @the_sailor_dog. The views and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: The U.S.S. Cole in 2000 after suffering an Al Qaeda attack in the port of Aden. 17 American sailors were killed, and 39 were injured.

Asia-Pacific, South Pacific/Oceania, Strategic Outlook

Forecast 2015: Maritime Challenges in the Indian Ocean

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Guest Post by Vijay Sakhuja

What could be the trend lines for 2015 in the Indian Ocean? A quick survey of events, incidents and trends in the Indian Ocean during 2014 suggests that the region witnessed cooperation, competition and inclusiveness among the littoral states.

Three baskets could be identified: geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic, to help forecast trends in 2015. However, a caveat is in order i.e. these baskets can spring a number of surprises, given that ‘prediction is a risky business’.

IORA: Moving from Australia to Indonesia
In the geopolitical domain, the region remained peaceful and pan-Indian Ocean multilateral organizations such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) were proactive and provided the platform and leadership to address issues of common interest among the partner states. The Perth Communiqué released in September 2014 reinforced the Association’s commitment to ‘building a more stable, secure and prosperous Indian Ocean region’ and promote the IORA’s six priority areas of cooperation. The regional navies met under the IONS banner and addressed a number of common security issues confronting the region.

Later in 2015, the IORA baton will pass from Australia to Indonesia who would continue to carry the great work done by the earlier Chair – India. The new government in Jakarta led by President Joko Widodo has endorsed the importance of maritime matters through the establishment of a new Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and announced the doctrine of ‘global maritime axis’ (poros maritim dunia). In addition, South Africa, the next Vice Chair of IORA, will prepare to take the leadership role in 2017. These provide ‘continuity and purpose’ to the IORA.

China and the Maritime Silk Road: Increasing footprints in the Indian Ocean
China would continue to make attractive offers to Indian Ocean states and seek support for the MSR. Its forays in the Indian Ocean can potentially sharpen difference between China and India and may even lead to these powers becoming more assertive.

During 2014, the Indian Ocean geostrategic environment, though peaceful, was a bit tenuous. The presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean created unease in New Delhi. Though predicted, it surprised the Indian strategic community and the Indian Navy is beefing up capabilities to respond to the Chinese forays in the Indian Ocean.

India was also ruffled by the Chinese Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative and its growing popularity among a number of Indian Ocean states particularly Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. New Delhi believes that the MSR can potentially help China consolidate its naval / maritime strategy of access and basing in the Indian Ocean in support of PLA Navy’s future operations.

Continuing US Anchor
The US will continue to be the strategic anchor and security provider in the Indian Ocean and its role welcomed by the regional countries to ‘correct security imbalances, challenge the hegemony of any dominant power and ensure regional stability’.

Likewise, the UK decision to permanently position a number of power projection platforms  in the Persian Gulf prompted New Delhi to recall the idea of  Indian Ocean ‘Zone of Peace’ and withdrawal of extra regional naval powers from the Indian Ocean.

2015: End of Piracy, Attractiveness of Drug smuggling and Re-emergence of Maritime Terrorism in the Indian Ocean
One of the important positive developments in the Indian Ocean was the near total suppression of piracy in the Gulf of Aden / Somali coast. It took eight years for the naval forces from nearly two dozen countries including a number of UN Security Council resolutions, to send pirates back home.

However, another ugly face of illegal activities at sea i.e. drug smuggling appears to have caught the attention of the Indian Ocean countries. During 2014, the multinational forces operating in the Indian Ocean intercepted a number of dhows/boats carrying narcotics from South Asia bound for destinations in East Africa. Perhaps what is more disturbing is that east coast of Africa emerged popular among drug smugglers from Colombia. Kenyan President Kenyatta’s initiative to oversee the destruction of a vessel carrying about 370 Kilograms of heroin worth US $ 11.4 million in international market exhibited Indian Ocean countries resolve to counter global trade in narcotics.

The rise of the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the new wing of the Al Qaeda, has already raised a new threat whether Pakistan will become a haven for maritime terrorism.

Will 2015 see the idea of “Blue Economy” leaping forward?
The geo-economic environment in the Indian Ocean witnessed the emergence of a new concept ‘Blue Economy’ led by Seychelles and Mauritius. The idea is resonating among a number of Indian Ocean littorals including Australia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, South Africa to name a few. The leaders are committed to the sustainable development of living and non-living marine resources to enhance food and energy security.

Will 2015 ensure better Search and Rescue Coordination?
Perhaps the most traumatic and heartrending events in 2014 were the tragic loss of Malaysian Airlines flight MH 370 in the southern Indian Ocean, which still remains a mystery, and the more recent loss of Air Asia flight QZ 8501 in the Java Sea. These were stark reminders of the need to develop robust search and rescue (SAR) mechanism in the Indian Ocean. Yet, these incidents exhibited the Indian Ocean countries’ commitment to provide ‘public goods at sea’ and a number of navies deployed their navies for SAR.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is the Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Maritime Foundation. He can be reached at director.nmf@gmail.com.

This article is courtesy Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi and originally appeared at http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/ipcs-forecast-the-indian-ocean-in-2015-4797.html It is a precis of the larger document of the same name, that is part of the IPCS’s ‘Forecast 2015’ series. Click here to read the full report.

Global Analysis

The ISPS-Code and Maritime Terrorism

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By Lars H. Bergqvist

As a response to the 9/11 attacks, the International Ship and Port Security code (ISPS) came in to force 1st July 2004. Thus, 10 years have passed, since merchant ships in international trade and the ports they are calling, were required to be certified to a certain security standard.

Background

Most legislation in the maritime world is initiated by some kind of maritime disaster or accident. The Titanic catastrophe, where many passengers and crew members perished due to the fact that there were not enough lifeboats, gave birth to international safety regulations.(1) The MARPOL-convention came in to force a few years after a serious oil pollution, caused by the grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon on rocks near the Isles of Scilly.(2) Further, despite proper rules and regulations, a very high number of accidents caused the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to implement the International Safety Management Code (ISM).(3)

Contrary to previous conventions and codes, the creation of the ISPS-code was caused by a disaster that happened ashore, when hijacked aircrafts on the 11th of September 2001 flew into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, destroyed part of Pentagon and crashed on a field in Pennsylvania.

In peace time, to facilitate trade, merchant ships have traditionally been entering territorial waters and ports without much hindrance. The embarkation of port authorities, with clearance and free pratique granted has occurred once the ship was alongside a berth or at a customary anchorage.

With such an easy access to seaports, security experts were of the opinion that merchant ships could be used as a tool by terrorists. Different scenarios were developed, where merchant ships were means of transportation of terrorists and their weapons, or that the ship in its own right was a weapon. An example given was the risk of gas ships being hijacked and blown up in busy seaports.

Urgently, legislation was needed to protect both merchant ships and seaports.

Implementation

At a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), held at IMO headquarters in December 2002, The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code was adopted.

A code written and adopted, just in little more than one year after 9/11, must have been some kind of record. The time period from adoption to enforcement was also very short, only 18 months had passed when the Code came into force on the 1st of July 2004.

During that one and a half year some 50,000 ships were certified, and hundreds of thousands of seafarers and office personnel were educated for their new roles as Ship Security Officers (SSO) and Company Security Officers (CSO). An equally daunting task, port facilities on all continents, with personnel, should be certified and educated.

However, extraordinary times demand extraordinary measures and with a concerted effort from all stake holders in the shipping industry, the ISPS-code was properly enforced.(4)

What is maritime security?

Maritime security has always been a part of commercial shipping. Piracy is as old as shipping itself and stowaways is hardly a new problem either. During wars, the merchant marine has been an integral part of the war effort, being a vital support line for warring nations in need of weapons, food, oil and other commodities.(5)

Thus, war, piracy and stowaways are threats that the shipping industry has been dealing with for a long time. Administrations and ship owners´ associations have for decades been issuing regulations and instructions in an attempt to assist seafarers to deal with the perils.

For example, during the cold war, all Swedish ships were by the Swedish Maritime Administration issued with an instruction about how to act during crisis and war.

Some 30 years ago, with the appearance of modern piracy, the International Maritime Organization(6) and the International Chamber of Shipping(7) issued guidelines.

In 1957, an international convention relating to stowaways was adopted, although not yet in force (8), and there are policies issued about how to deal with stowaways.(9)

However, any specific instructions, how to protect a ship against terrorists, prior to the ISPS-code, were never issued. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which was agreed upon after the spectacular hijacking of Achille Lauro, was only addressing punishment of acts that could threaten the safety of maritime navigation.(10)

Maritime terrorism before ISPS-code (before 1 July 2004)

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific(11) has offered an extensive definition for maritime terrorism:

“…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.”

Similar to the ISPS-code, not only ships are considered as objects for maritime terrorism, but also port facilities.

Maritime terrorism is not rampant, nevertheless there have been a steady flow of incidents during the last 50 years. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland(12) is an open-source database on global terrorist incidents (including maritime), covering events from 1970 through 2012.

From 11th June to 1970 to 1st July 2004, there were 212 maritime terrorism incidents. However, most of those incidents were on rather low level, like the incident with GTD ID: 200112120005; “12/12/2001: Members of People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) set up an illegal checkpoint along the Cauca River near Magangue, Sucre, Colombia. The rebels stopped a canoe traveling along the river and abducted nine of the passengers. Three people were released the next day. Specific motive is unknown.”

Still there are some significant incidents that got an extensive media coverage.

–          Santa Maria: The hijacking of the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria is considered to be first case of maritime terrorism. On January 22, 1961, 24 leftist Portuguese terrorists hijacked the luxury cruise liner. The ship was carrying 600 passengers and a crew of 300. The would-be hijackers embarked the vessel as passengers at the port of La Guairá in Venezuela and on the Dutch island of Curacao, with weapons hidden in their suitcases. The terrorists took over command of the vessel, but eventually surrendered when they were given political asylum in Brazil.(13)

–          Sounion: A few years prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, in March 1973 the Greek passenger ship Sounion sunk in the port of Beirut. A limpet mine was attached to the ship`s hull by Palestinian terrorists while ship was in dock, with the aim of blowing up the ship once at sea. Due to the interference of a Swedish undercover agent based in Lebanon, the departure was delayed, passengers could disembark and the ship sunk while still alongside the berth.(14)

–          Shadow V; A fishing boat owned by the former First Sealord and last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten. In September 1979, while onboard the boat in waters near his summer home on Ireland, a bomb planted by the Irish Republican Army exploded and killed him.

 –          Rainbow Warrior; A Greenpeace ship sunk by the French foreign intelligence service in the port of Auckland, New Zealand, July 1985. Not an act of terrorism as such, but two French secret service agents was found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison by the New Zealand court of law.

–          Achille Lauro; InOctober 1985,the passenger ship while on a cruise in the Mediterranean, was hijacked by four terrorists from Palestine Liberation Front, off the coast of Egypt. After only two days of negotiation, but after they had killed an elderly American passenger, the hijackers gave up when they were promised political asylum in Tunisia. However, justice was swift, as US warplanes forced the Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers to land in Italy.

As a result of the hijacking, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) was developed and adopted.

–          The Tanker War; With something that can be refer to as state terrorism, both sides attacked shipping in the Persian Gulf, mainly tankers, during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. According to sources more than 400 seamen were killed and 340 ships were attacked, during the conflict.(15),(16)

–          The Tamil Tigers; During the civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the latter was involved in maritime terrorism with its Sea Tigers brigade. The brigade was accused of hijacking several vessels in waters off the coast of Sri Lanka, including Irish Mona (in August 1995), Princess Wave (in August 1996), Athena (in May 1997), Misen (in July 1997), Morong Bong (in July 1997), MV Cordiality (in Sept 1997) and Princess Kash (in August 1998).(17) One spectacular act of maritime terrorism was the suicide attack on the tanker Silk Pride. (18)

–          USS Cole; Although a warship, the modus operandi used by the attackers was kind of a harbinger, when in October 2000, a small craft laden with explosive commanded by Al Qaeda suicide bombers hit the US Navy destroyer. The attack killed 17 sailors and wounded another 42.

–          M/T Limburg; In October 2002, the French owned crude oil carrier was attacked when approaching an offshore terminal off the coast of Yemen. An explosive-laden boat rammed the hull of the tanker, causing an explosion followed by fire.(19)

 –          Superferry 14; Regrettably, the ferries of the Philippines have a very bad safety record. Also, the maritime security record has been tarnished. The February 2004 terrorist attack on

Superferry 14 caused the death of 116 persons.(20) Suicide bombers from the Al Qaeda linked

Abu Sayyaf group, using a boat loaded with explosives, were the perpetrators.

Maritime terrorism after ISPS-code (after 1st July 2004)

Supporters of the ISPS-code may argue that the code has been successful since there have been no serious maritime terrorist attacks since the implementation.

Detractors may argue that the code did not help much in protecting seafarers against the menace of modern day piracy.

Whatever opinion someone may have, the code was developed to protect the international community against terrorism, and as such it has been a success. Piracy and terrorism are different crimes, needing different approaches. And, according to conventional wisdom, the link between terrorist and pirates is very weak.

Although a positive impact on the security situation by the Code, there have been some serious incidents.

–          Don Ramon; The second maritime terrorist attack by Abu Sayyaf took place in August 2005 onboard the passenger ship Don Ramon in Filipino waters. Terrorist had placed a timed bomb beneath gas cylinders in the ship`s galley, causing the ship to sink and wounding 30 passengers.(21)

 

–          M Star; In July 2010, the Japanese owned very large crude oil carrier experienced an explosion when transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Although no craft was sighted, the explosion made a large dent in the hull, parts of accommodation were slightly damaged and one crewmember was injured. After two days, the terrorist group Brigades of Abdullah Azzam claimed responsibility.(22)

–          Yemen, level 3; In August 2013, due to a high level of activity by Al Qaeda affiliated groups in Yemen, the Government of United Kingdom raised the ISPS security level to level 3 for British flagged ships in Yemeni territorial waters. A serious situation indeed, since an elevation to level 3 was unprecedented since the ISPS code was introduced in 2004.(23)

 

–          Cosco Asia; In September 2013, while on transit in the Suez Canal, the Chinese owned container vessel under the flag of Panama, was hit by a rocket propelled grenade. The ship sustained only minor damages, and there were no casualties. An Islamist group named Al-Furqan claimed responsibility for the attack.(24) Although a minor attack, it was of great concern for the Egyptian government, due to the economic importance of the Canal. To increase security, a protective wall along the Canal is in the process of being constructed.(25)

The future of the code

Like with all new regulations, ISPS-code was initially met with some skepticism from the end users, i.e. the seafarers. However, the code is now an accepted part of shipping, and the advantages are being appreciated.

Obviously, the code can be modified to the better, by catering more for the threat of piracy and stowaways that are much more of real threats than terrorism.

IMO has listed some of the remaining challenges; (26)

  1. Lack of national legislation/guidelines on ISPS code implementation.
  2. ISPS code as a mean to address all maritime security threats.
  3. Deciding on an appropriate risk assessments methodology.
  4. Dissemination of good practices on port facility security.
  5. Who audits the auditor?
  6. Ships` encountering difficulties after calling a high-risk port.

Lars H. Bergqvist is a Swedish master mariner and a reserve officer in the Royal Swedish Navy.

Footnotes

  1. http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/Pages/default.aspx
  2. http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofMARPOL/Pages/default.aspx
  3. http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/ismcode1993.html
  4. http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/instruments/pages/ispscode.aspx
  5. Sometimes referred to as “The Fourth Service”.
  6. Resolution A.545(13), “Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.” http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=22356&filename=A545(13).pdf
  7. International Shipping Federation/International Chamber of Shipping published in 1986 the first edition of “Pirates and Armed Robbers: A Master’s Guide.”
  8. International Convention Relating to Stowaways 1957 (“Brussels Convention”).
  9. http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/453/Stowaways.pdf
  10. http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx
  11. http://www.cscap.org/
  12. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
  13. http://www.maritimeprofessional.com/Blogs/Maritime-Musings/December-2011/Hijacking-of-the-SS-Santa-Maria.aspx
  14. http://jcpa.org/article/mikael-tossavainen-on-theyll-die-anyway-ten-years-in-the-swedish-intelligence-service/
  15. war http://www.amazon.com/Tanker-Wars-Iran-Iraq-1980-1988-International/dp/186064032X
  16. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap14.pdf
  17. Dr Vijay Sakhuja, South Asia Analysis group, SEA PIRACY IN SOUTH ASIA
  18. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/30/slanka.tiger.attack/
  19. http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/limburg_oil_tanker_attacked.htm
  20. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/philippines0707/background/2.htm#_Toc168986107
  21. http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/dsd/research/researchgroups/corbett/corbettpaper8.pdf
  22. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/06/japanese-oil-tanker-terrorist-explosives
  23. http://www.rederi.no/nrweb/cms.nsf/($all)/AE4BD4693E6CD476C1257BC00026E77C?OpenDocument&qnfl=Nrprint
  24. http://news.usni.org/2013/09/05/video-terrorists-rocket-commercial-ship-suez-canal
  25. http://www.skuld.com/topics/voyage–port-risks/port-news/africa/egypt-construction-of-security-wall-along-the-suez-canal/
  26. http://www.seasecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/IMO-Presentation-SAMI-PORT-SECURITY.pdf

 

 

 

 

Africa, Strategic Outlook

Africa: “A Problem As Unique As Each of its Constituent Parts”

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Still terrifying, but not as monolithic as some envision.
“Security issues are still terrifying, but not as monolithic as some suggest.”

Regarding Mr. Hipple’s article “African Navies Week: Al Shabaab is Only the Beginning”, he addressed a critical issue which all too often does not receive proper attention.  It is a daunting prospect to try and pull in the disparate threats from across the continent formulating a single threat analysis and, while his conclusion is accurate in that he points out the diverse threats facing the continent, from a purely security-focused perspective, it still lacks some necessary clarity.  The problem is the moment you start looking at how individual factors within a given country are driving conflict/instability, you quickly lose the scent of how it ties into the transnational threat groups.  There is also the problem of how far back you are willing to look, the specter of Colonialism is still present and the post-colonial relationships cannot be entirely discounted.

There are too many fundamentally different factors at play across Africa to compare the potential for total, though not collective chaos that threatens the continent and still have the comparison to Afghanistan be a strong one.  While Afghanistan is easily evoked as a common point of reference and there are elements of similarity that narrowly can be compared, each region of the continent has enough of its own issues to cause the wheels to come off of the Afghan comparison.  Additionally, once you make the comparison to Afghanistan it easily leads to a false equivalency.

The threat from Boko Haram (BH) is real and growing yet the Nigerian Government is wholly unprepared to handle it – their heavy-handed tactics have increased distrust in the government and have not deterred or degraded BH.  More importantly, the growing alignment between Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and BH marks a significant development in the connectivity of pan-African terrorism.  However, these groups do not monopolize the West African threat.  The spread of BH into Cameroon is tied to their evasion the Nigerian military’s offensive operations.  What is happening in Niger with regards to BH is mostly proximate.  The more apt comparison for the growing instability in Niger is the likeness to Mali where you see disenfranchised Tuaregs of the north returning from service in Libya (Gaddafi’s desert battalions) flush with weapons, training and a desire to have a say in their government.  In both Mali and Niger, the Tuaregs have been persecuted and altogether cut out of the political process by the ethnically separate majority in the southern capitals.

Disenchantment with the government in Bamako and simmering ethnic discord set the stage for French operations in January, however, what caught world attention was the marriage of convenience by the MUJWA and elements of AQIM.  Given the disassociated natures of the AQ franchise, it can be difficult to make sweeping generalities because the various strains (AQIM, AQEA, AQAP, AQI and AQSL) each have their own local idiosyncrasies, but one thing they do have in common is their ability to first bond with a local cause/faction on ideologically tenuous grounds and then quickly alienate themselves from the population with their unique extremist ideology which is often incompatible with local norms – see AQI and the Sunnis, AQAP and the Tribes of south central Yemen or AQIM and the Tuaregs.

My point is, while virulent strains of AQ exist across the corners of the continent and in their own right pose a threat, they have had difficulty building and maintaining strong and enduring relationships with other local movements.  The AQ-BH connection is growing, and AQEA/AS in the past two years “formalized” their relationship, however, when you look at the nature of the threat on the ground in Somalia for example, there is a definite rift.

Continuing in the East, while the threat from AS/AQEA has expanded beyond Somalia, it is worth noting that the focus of their ire has not been indiscriminate but has targeted those countries participating in AMISOM.  With regards to CAR, while Seleka partnership with anyone would only further degrade a poor situation, the nature of the Seleka rebels themselves does not lend itself to partnership with any of the aforementioned groups.  It is also worth noting that within days of capturing the capital, the rebel groups splintered and immediately fell into the same trap as their government predecessors – an inability to exert influence beyond the capital.  What this means in the long term is that the security vacuum is being filled by the rebels with no real solution.

Moving North, there is a fascinating and frightening mélange of issues at play in the Maghreb and the single commonality is that each of the governments in their various degrees of weakness is attempting to quell internal dissent.  Libya is the new frontier since the fall of Gaddafi, and the government has no ability to project power, they cannot control the capital let alone anywhere else are forced to in equal measure threaten and placate the militias within Tripoli.  However, the ungoverned spaces elsewhere have been, at least temporarily ceded, as the government attempts to consolidate power.  Tunisia is still dealing with the fall out of the Arab spring and has been unable to form a coalition government that meets the needs of both Islamic factions and strong secular sentiments/groups.

While the graphic paints a fairly grim picture of the continent, the reality is even grimmer yet as it fails to capture one of the longest ongoing conflict in the Kivu region of Eastern DRC.  Furthermore, with regards to the maritime threat, there are fundamentally different factors at play on the East and West Coast; while piracy is the end result, the elements driving them are quite different.  In HOA you have piracy being driven by the fact that Somalia is a failed state and pirates take advantage of their proximity of shipping lanes in the Bab-el-Mandeb.  Along the West coast, the piracy issue is being driven by the desire to exploit components associated with the off-short oil wealth of Nigeria.  The biggest problem as it applies to maritime security is that too many governments across Africa still perceive maritime security to be a luxury they cannot afford.  It is easy to discuss how it Maritime security has a chance to minimize the flow of extremists and the vast potential to make a positive impact, but like so many things, without sufficient local buy-in, the effort is dead on arrival.

It is difficult to address broad security threats across Africa without becoming hopelessly mired in the details; this is why all too often security threats on the continent are looked at in isolation without broader thought given to overarching threats.  This is further complicated by the fact that the commonality of the threats spanning the breadth of the continent, their origins and likely the solutions, exist beyond the security realm.  Uneven and underdevelopment, disenfranchised populations, and natural resource exploitation along often colonial lines drive what has to date been considered an acceptable level of instability.  The various extremist movements are indicative of systemic and structural failures.  Mr. Hipple’s article was a valiant effort at addressing one of these issues, but it is exceptionally difficult to frame the problem appropriately so as to address the relevant factors at appropriate depth while not missing necessary nuance and simultaneously addressing significant transnational factors.  Until the broader issues driving current conflict and instability are addressed, we are likely to see more of the same.

Timothy Baker is Marine Officer in the United States Marine Corps Reserve and a Masters Candidate at Columbia University.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity.  They do not necessarily represent the views of Columbia University, U.S. Department of Defense or the United States Marine Corps.

(Editor’s note: Another fine example of my over-simplification is the note that the map also showed “Somalia” as one unit, when in reality it is three distinct organizations each with different problems)