Wi-Vi: People Radar for Boarding Teams?

In war, we often take for granted the vast array of systems designed to detect the enemy. From the phased-array on a U.S. Navy DDG to the infrared scope on a soldier, locating the enemy is the first step in gaining a firing solution or determining one’s peril. There is one place, however, where this technology has been rather absent: indoors. Detection of people indoors is often no more advanced than sound or a mirror on a stick (which can be seen). At the highest end we’ve seen thermal imaging or advanced optics systems combined with discrete robotics, conceptually mirrors on a stick on a robot. At MIT, Mr. Fadel Adib and Professor Dina Katabi have developed a potential new weapon for those in the Close Quarters Battle (CQB) environment: the Wi-Vi, an affordable and portable system by which a simple WiFi device can detect motion through walls.

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Wi-vi signal return showing three distinct sources of movement.

While more expensive, unwieldy systems do exist, Wi-Vi is remarkable in its affordability and portability. With little more than a typical wireless router, one has the makings of a rudimentary people radar. Using an encrypted WiFi signal to differentiate the 2.4 GHz signal from white noise, multiple signals are fired into a room, reflected back, and processed. When nothing is moving, the signal is zeroed out. When objects moves, the signal changes. For each thing moving, there is a separate discernible changed return in signal, allowing the system to detect multiple objects or people. USCG and USN boarding teams would find a tactical, deployable version of this system particularly useful.

The ability to detect possible human movement in holds, around hatches, or even in CONEX boxes would be a boon to boarding teams. Tactical movement indoors are often the most dangerous; movements are limited to a small number of paths that can be easily monitored by an opponent. This especially applies to ships, where rooms and passageways are especially constrained. With a tactical version of the Wi-Vi, boarding teams could detect movement and the number of personnel in a room before entering. Wi-Vi could also potentially detect movement within a certain distance in large cargo-holds or eventually for checking CONEX boxes for potential victims of human trafficking as they move inside.

Penetration is the major challenge for shipboard use; although Wi-Vi has been tested on 8″ concrete, terrible shipboard cellphone reception has made Navy and Coast Guard personnel aware of the basic problems of signal propagation. Cellphones operate anywhere from a half GHz to 2GHz, and couldn’t receive a signal inside my patrol craft if life defended on it. The Wi-Vi system operates at 40 GHz: far less penetrating than the 2GHz of shipboard radios. Upon inquiry, Mr. Adib elaborated, “The walls with which we tested (i.e. concrete and hollow walls) have metal support; specifically, they are supported by steel frames. Naturally, most walls have metal support, and this is not a problem for the operation of Wi-Vi. However, the device does not work if the wall is fully covered with a metal sheet.”At this stage of development, then, a tactical version of the device would be best suited for wooden dhows, fiberglass fishing boats, or berthing areas with mostly false bulkheads in large commercial vessels.

It is also worth noting the identification limitations of this technology. Wi-Vi can show the number and relative movement of any objects in motion in space, but neither their specific locations, nor the presence of immobile objects. “Secure for sea” could well be the enemy of Wi-Vi onboard ships. So could complacency; teams untrained in the device might assume a “clear” reading on Wi-Vi means a room is empty as opposed to containing a very still and patient gunman.

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Wi-Vi is an exciting technology for those engaged in the CQB environment – our Marine Corps bretheren may make sooner use of the tech due to the less metallic nature of most urban walls. Wi-Vi may be deployable for hunting for stowaways on a commercial vessel or trafficked humans behind a false bulkheads on dhows. With further development of lower-frequency devices, Wi-Vi might be usable for CONEX boxes and lighter metal areas of ships. The ability to deploy relatively cheap, light-weight human detection systems to the field could mean this novel MIT project is the first snowflake in the avalanche of tactical-gear to come.

 

Matt Hipple is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity.  They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

h/t to Scott for sending the article.

 

Do We Need an Indo-Pacific Treaty?

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By Natalie Sambhi

Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa has recently articulated his proposal for an Indo-Pacific Treaty at no less than three different conferences (including ‘Intersections of Power, Politics and Conflict in Asia’ in Jakarta in June) and it bears careful reading because it contains ambitious ideas.

To summarise his proposal, Natalegawa sees the Indo-Pacific region as beset by a deficit of ‘strategic trust’, unresolved territorial claims, and rapid transformation of regional states and the relationships between them. The potential for these factors to cause instability and conflict requires the region to develop a new paradigm, an Indo-Pacific wide treaty of friendship and cooperation, to encourage the idea of common security and promote confidence and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. At present, Natalegawa has only provided the broad concepts behind the treaty but a precursor question is whether a treaty is really necessary?

Natalegawa argues that the Indo-Pacific region needs to be thought of as its own separate system. By having a treaty, regional states will start to think of themselves as members of a community responsible for common security. But the appeal of the idea depends on whether you consider multilateral agreements effective in encouraging member states to cooperate. Less powerful states in the Indo Pacific have few means to contribute to regional stability other than engaging more powerful states. In talking about managing the rapid transformation of regional states, Natalegawa espouses his idea of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ which entails ‘no preponderant power’. Rather than allow the region to be dominated by bilateral tension between powerful actors, Natalegawa argues their interests are inter-linked. The US and China, along with India and Japan are thus encouraged to see their actions in the context of ‘common security’.

The Indo-Pacific is an important geostrategic and economically significant area but it’s a long way from being a formal institution. Indonesia, a non-aligned state located at the geo-strategic centre of the system, might see itself as an obvious choice of broker for this treaty. However, the Indo-Pacific is, at best, a nascent ‘system’, and there’s no central body like ASEAN driving the process for this treaty. In absence of such a framework, it’s hard to see how Indonesia will be able to bring regional countries even to the negotiating table.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the East Asia Summit’s Bali Principles both had ASEAN providing the diplomatic management for negotiating these agreements. They too encourage member states to build ‘strategic trust’, renounce the use of force and settle disputes by peaceful means, as well as include norms like the promotion of ‘good neighbourliness, partnership and community building’. Yet, they’ve had limited effectiveness as a mechanism for action or conflict prevention. Almost all of the so-called ‘Indo-Pacific’ states belong to one or both of these agreements, but no multilateral system has yet demonstrated the ability to ensure that all states adhere to those norms.

In order to effectively tackle the region’s security challenges, including the rapid social and economic transformation of states and the friction this might bring, there needs to be a strong incentive to cooperate and a mechanism for conflict management. The proposed treaty, like the previous two, provides neither.

Security issues between ASEAN states show a clear preference for bilateral resolution. Most recently, smoke from burning forests in Sumatra last month blanketed Malaysia and Singapore in the worst haze since 1997, with severe risk to health. First Singapore then Malaysia sent their representatives to Jakarta to urgently discuss a solution with the Indonesian government. An agreement signed by ASEAN states in 2002 to tackle haze hasn’t been ratified by Indonesia. Instead, at an ASEAN–China Ministerial Dialogue in Brunei earlier this week, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to a trilateral process to manage fires and haze in future—the three states have a clear interest in cooperating on this issue. ASEAN can provide a forum to discuss the haze but, when push comes to shove, the actions of Southeast Asian states demonstrate a tendency to bypass the ASEAN framework.

Similarly, China’s assertive and uncooperative behaviour towards the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal is at odds with the TAC and Bali Principles. China’s made clear its preference for bilateral engagement with other territorial claimants and to avoid international courts. Without the most powerful states in the ‘Indo-Pacific system’ backing the treaty, norms (in this case, the expectation that states won’t resort to the use of force or coercion) won’t provide the restraint needed. States will continue to rely on traditional alliance partners for protection or to provide a balance to other aggressive actors.

Multilateral frameworks in parts of the Indo-Pacific have been most effective when they have formed for a clear purpose. As Victor Cha argues, coalitions have formed ‘among entities with the most direct interests in solving a problem’. I think the best we can expect for now is a complex network of overlapping agreements and groupings that form to solve clearly defined and immediate issues. Direct interests will yield definite action. The Indo-Pacific treaty could build trust in the long term and as a proposal for more order-building in a transformational Asia, it shows Indonesia trying to lead the way. But if the strategic outlook is as dire as Natalegawa describes, I’m doubtful a new treaty is what we’ll need to tackle some of the region’s most pressing security challenges.

Natalie Sambhi is an analyst at ASPI and editor of The Strategist. Image courtesy of Indonesian Foreign Ministry. This post first appeared at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (APSI)’s blog The Strategist.

Defeating Floating IEDs with USVs

By CDR Jeremy Thompson, USN

This concept proposal explores a technology solution to the problem of risk to first responders when identifying, neutralizing, and exploiting “surface-floating” maritime improvised explosive devices (SF/MIEDs).

Does the Navy need a maritime equivalent of the Talon Counter-IED robot?
Does the Navy need a maritime equivalent of the Talon Counter-IED robot?

When considering the proliferation of technology for use against land-based improvised explosive devices (IEDs), it may be puzzling to many observers why remote IED Defeat (IEDD) technologies, particularly robots, have yet to fully cross over into the maritime domain. Although some unmanned underwater vehicle programs designed for limpet mine-like object detection on ships are in development, much less attention has been given to countering SF/MIEDs. In general, the purpose of MIEDs is to destroy, incapacitate, harass, divert, or distract targets such as ships, maritime critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR), and personnel. MIEDs may also present obstacles (real or perceived) with the purpose of area denial or egress denial. As a subset of the MIED family, the “surface-floating” MIED operates on the water’s surface in environments such as harbors, the littorals, the riparian, and the open ocean. It may be either free floating or self-propelled, with remote control (manual or pre-programmed) or with no control (moves with the current). It is a tempting low-tech, low-cost option for an adversary.

Thankfully, SF/MIED incidents have been rare in recent times, the last significant use occurring during the Vietnam war. Nonetheless, a capability gap is highlighted by the challenge they represent—namely, that a human must unnecessarily expose themselves to the object. One material solution to a surface-floating IED may be to develop an IED Defeat Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) around a design philosophy based on IEDD robots used in land warfare. Protection of high value units and critical infrastructure / key resources would be its primary missions along with counter-area denial. Its most likely operating environment would be CI/KR dense areas such as harbors and seaports as well as the riparian environment since rivers are constricted in the water space available to shipping to maneuver around SF/MIED threats. A key element of design philosophy in an IEDD USV would be to meet the expectations of the customer—the first responder. Military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units and civilian bomb squads are much more likely to accept a platform in which the console and all other human interface features are nearly identical in look, placement, feel, and responsiveness as the most popular robots they have been accustomed to operating such as the TALON robot by QinetiQ and Packbot by iRobot.

A functional hierarchy could be drawn around major tasks such as reacquisition of a suspected surface-floating IED, identify/classify, threat removal, neutralization, and recovery of the IED for exploitation. Modularized payload packages to execute these tasks may include a towing package, an attachments package (e.g. hooks, magnets), a neutralization tool package to include both precision and general disruption EOD tools, an explosives, chemical, and radiological detection package, and an electronic counter-measures package.

Numerous trade-offs between weight, power, stability, and the complexity of modular packages would need to be considered and tested, however, variants like a “high-low” combination of a complex and simple USV working together may minimize some of the trade-off risk. If an IEDD USV were to be developed key recommendations include:

  • Official liaison between NAVSEA (US Naval Sea Systems Command) between PMS-406 (Unmanned Maritime Systems) and PMS-408 (EOD/CREW program) to ensure the transfer of USV expertise between PMS divisions.
  • A DOTMLPF assessment to determine whether limpet mines or surface-floating IEDs are more likely and more dangerous to U.S. assets and personnel given the uncertainty of future naval operations.
  • Including civilian bomb squads in the design and development process early to increase the potential for demand and cross-over with the law enforcement sector and therefore reduced long-term program costs.

Current UUV programs under development include the Hull UUV Localization System (HULS) and Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (HAUV).

This article was re-posted by permission from, and appeared in its original form at NavalDrones.com.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.