On Stockdale and Strategy

The following article kicks off The Hunt for Strategic September, a week of analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies).

stockdaleFor two weeks in September, I participated in a Navy fleet exercise, supporting our nation’s defense by flinging razor-sharp PowerPoint slides at the enemy.

The nature of the exercise – which featured U.S. and coalition ships sailing into an escalating regional tiff – raised an important question with which fans of Admiral Stockdale may be familiar: “Who are we? Why are we here?” In other words, why did this fleet of American warships exist and why did it bother coming to this forsaken, if fictional, part of the world?

We can talk about Quadrennial Defense Reviews and Strategic Choices Management Reviews and TPS Reports endlessly, but they’re all at a level of granularity that misses the point, which is – why do we bother?

The national security strategy answers the question. At least, it should. But lately, it’s hard to define what it is.

Time was, it could be summed up as a doctrine (think Monroe or Truman) or perhaps in a word, such as “containment.” The armed forces were structured to support some overarching goal and their missions were more or less guided by it. But that time is past. This isn’t to say we don’t have a national security strategy – we do– but does the general public possess any common notion of what it might be?

Luckily, I know some members of this “public,” so I asked them. Respondents to my unscientific inquiry included teachers, scientists, cops, economists, retired military officers and everything in between. A sampling of responses follows.

 

“Our national strategy in foreign affairs seems to lack a strong guiding principle, well-founded or misguided or anything else it might be.  We seem to be reacting to a series of foreign crises (often in philosophically inconsistent ways) rather than making any serious attempt to proactively influence the course of foreign affairs.”

“Our national strategy in foreign affairs seems to be one of PR rather than defense.”

“Simply put… ‘might makes right.’”

“Strategy seems like a generous term – it suggests deliberate action. U.S. policy is set ad hoc and largely reactive. The terms “incoherent” and “ineffective” come to mind… though the administration would say it is promoting democracy and U.S. interests broadly.”

“Promote democracy, protect trade, maintain world power status.”

“Our national strategy is, despite all pronouncements, a strategic retreat from aggressive foreign policy, and a return to more diplomacy, less stick.”

“We either do not have one, or it is to shoot from the hip.”

“I’d have to surmise that our national strategy is to act in accordance with what we view to be our own short-term economic self-interest.”

“The U.S. post-WWII strategy has been to promote political and economic stability in those parts of the globe in which there is a perceived national interest… the last three administrations have done a terrible job articulating a foreign affairs strategy to the American people, or Congress.”

 

A couple of themes emerge here: First, respondents don’t know much about the national strategy, and events don’t give them a “warm fuzzy” that it either exists or is being executed. Second, they perceive a reactive streak to current U.S. strategy – events drive our actions, not the other way around.

Well, America, I’m happy to report we do have a National Security Strategy. Our nation’s actual priorities, per the National Security Strategy of 2010, can be summed up as Security, Prosperity, Values and International Order. I think. Actually, it might be Building Our Foundation, Pursuing Comprehensive Engagement, and Promoting a Just and Sustainable International Order. It’s hard to tell as written. Maybe I’m not so happy to report we have it, after all.

From a communications standpoint, this is a problem, which leads to at least one of three other problems in the real world (possibly – probably? – all three):

1.) Nobody understands it.

2.) Policymakers don’t follow it.

3.) Foreign powers don’t take it seriously.

What to do?

Hunted to extinction in 1991
Hunted to extinction in 1991

Let’s start by acknowledging that in this arena, the U.S. is a victim of its own success. With the Cold War won, the population of foreign dragons to slay was drastically reduced (though Christian Bale continued to find employment). The U.S. has become, in effect, a status quo power, whose chief goal is maintaining the world system (economic, diplomatic and otherwise) and bringing the outliers into it. “Okay, guys, let’s just keep things the way they are and try to encourage incremental improvement at the margins” is not a very sexy mission statement.

But that is no excuse. Whatever the challenges, a clear and concise strategy must be articulated. And most importantly, it has to be meaningful to the layperson, whose taxes are paying for it and whose children are wearing the uniforms.

My recommendation: Get back to basics. The security establishment is spending a disproportionate amount of time on the means – budgets, force structures, manpower reviews – when what needs some articulation is the end. What does the U.S. want the world to look like? What goals are we working toward? Even a status quo power can have ideals to strive for. We could do far worse than refer back to Admiral Stockdale and ask ourselves, “Who are we? Why are we here?”

 

Matt McLaughlin is a Navy Reserve lieutenant and strategic communications consultant who doesn’t work on that kind of strategy. Opinions expressed do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or his employer.

Sea Control: First Podcast

CIMSEC-LogoSea Control- Doyle Hodges Interview (Download)

So, as required of millennials (or people who know millennials) with opinions, we’ve started a weekly (we hope) podcast. Think of it as your moment of PowerPoint Rehab.  Our first episode is with Doyle Hodges, author of the 1998 USNI Article, “Listen to the JO’s“. We intended to talk about leadership, which we made a great college try of. In the end, we segwayed into sea stories, technology, and other things. I am easily distracted and he has a beard. What do you expect? I suppose that’s at least ONE advantage of the “Next Slide” button.

If you have any suggestions, want to get involved, or have ideas for the show, email me at NEXTWAR@CIMSEC.ORG. If I know what I’m doing (which I don’t) it may be on Itunes soon.

What Can the Navy Learn from Netflix?

Or: How the Military Can Use a Content Delivery Network (CDN)
By ENS William McGough, USN

ENS William McGough will speak at the San Diego chapter of Disruptive Thinkers on Monday, September 23rd at 7pm at the Co-merge workspace.  This post was inspired by a question on the application for this year’s U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC): “If you had $1 million and 18 months to change the Navy, what would you do, and how would you accomplish it?” We will be running additional innovative ideas in this series in conjunction with the CRIC’s new discussion forum “The Whiteboard.”
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NetflixWhat is a CDN?
Several years ago, leading internet companies began to encounter a problem.  As broadband internet became increasingly available, consumers’ demand for digital content likewise increased.  However, in spite of the new speed afforded by end-users’ high-speed connections, content providers found it difficult to supply their data at the high-speed rates consumers could now handle and expected.

This problem resulted from the way the internet is organized.  There is no direct connection between your computer and the server hosting the website you are accessing.  Instead, an indirect connection is established via several intermediate servers.  A similar arrangement is found in air travel, in the same way you might connect through a “hub” airport to fly to a regional airport not serviced by a direct flight.  As in the analogy, the actual travel between hubs is quite rapid, occurring at the speed of light via fiber-optic connections. However, delay occurs at the hubs in a process called switching, where incoming data is analyzed for completeness and then retransmitted along the best-calculated path to its destination.

To solve this problem, the technology industry borrowed a technique from the military: forward staging/basing.  Militaries often send soldiers and supplies to a base near an area of anticipated action (so that the troops can arrive on final station rapidly and with very little advance notice).  Similarly, technology companies began to set up geographically-distributed servers which could transmit their content to nearby end-users much more rapidly than a more-distant central server could.  These servers became known as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs).  To use Netflix as an example, the company has even begun placing its CDN servers directly in the offices of local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) creating an almost-direct connection between their customers and their content.

Why does the Navy need a CDN?
At the time of writing, the rapid delivery of high-definition TV programs was not one of the CNO’s three tenets, nor could it be found in his more-exhaustive Sailing Directions.  So, this raises the question: why would the Navy want or need a CDN? The answer is simple. Bandwidth at sea is very limited and demand for bandwidth is ever-increasing.

There are two potential approaches to this problem: 1) launch newer satellites in greater numbers or 2) make smarter use of bandwidth.  In any fiscal environment, let alone a constrained one, the Navy/DoD can only afford to launch a limited number of billion-dollar communications satellites.  Therefore, it is prudent to examine how to maximize the use of existing bandwidth.  And, as internet-based companies have learned, the best way to maximize existing bandwidth is to employ a CDN.

What could a Navy CDN do?
1.Eliminate the duplicate transmission of data
Instead of transmitting a file to a ship every time a user on that ship requests it, a CDN server aboard the ship would cache (store) the file after it is originally downloaded, and deliver the file directly across the ship’s local network to any users who subsequently requested it.  (Instead of retrieving the same file from the internet every time it was requested.)  The end-user would notice no difference, except that the file would load considerably faster if they were not the first person to access it.

For example, every year sailors are required to complete online training in several areas (such as sexual-assault prevention and information security).  If a sailor is deployed when the training is due, they will access the training presentation via ship’s internet.  Without a CDN, all 5,500 sailors aboard an aircraft carrier might each download identical copies of the presentation across the ship’s limited internet connection (consequently slowing the connection speed to a crawl).  With a CDN, that multimedia-rich presentation would be downloaded only once across the ship’s internet connection.  The 5,500 sailors would then access it across the ship’s much faster Local Area Network (LAN).  Messages indicating that each sailor had completed a training module would still have to be sent across the internet connection for each sailor; however, these messages are extremely small in size and so do not constitute a great problem – even when multiplied by 5,500.  While some sailors achieve the bandwidth advantage by manually downloading frequently used files and storing them on a ship’s LAN “sharedrive,” a CDN can greatly reduce the administrative burden of such a method.    

2.Smarter Content Delivery

a. Offline-download:
Placing a CDN server on a ship or submarine would enable new methods of delivery – especially for the “Silent Service.”  Surface ships typically have some degree of internet connectivity; however, submarines only have internet connectivity a minority of the time (typically while surfaced – their least-favorite state).  If a submariner wanted to download a new publication or training file, they would have to wait until their boat next surfaced, quickly navigate the internet to find the correct file, and download it completely before they submerged (and lost connectivity).

However, with a CDN server, a sailor could request a file be downloaded when the internet was next available (which might be while he/she was otherwise engaged).  If the file was only partially downloaded during the first period of connectivity, the incomplete file could be retained by the CDN server and the remainder downloaded during the next period(s) of connectivity.  The sailor could then access the complete file, even when his/her ship had no internet access.

This would be similar to emailing a person on shore and asking them to send a reply email with the requested file attached.  However, use of a CDN as described would have such advantages as being faster (as it is automated) and not being subject to the attachment-size limits of email.

b. Content Subscription:
Similarly, a ship’s CDN server could automatically download the latest version of a file (such as a reference publication) made available on the Navy’s shore-based CDN server.
• Ships in different fleets and of different classes could be subscribed to relevant files by shore commands.
• Each ship could subscribe to additional content as desired.
• When an update to an existing file is sent, the shore-based CDN server would calculate and transmit a diff file (a file describing the difference between the original file and the updated version).  Upon receiving the diff file, the ship-based CDN server would patch (combine) the existing file with the diff file to recreate the updated version.  This would save bandwidth by eliminating the transmission of all of the content which remained the same across the two versions of the files.  (In the case of long publications with minor revisions, this savings would be substantial.)  This would also eliminate the need to physically mail to ships CDs with revised publications that were too big to email or otherwise download in their entirety.
• Content updates could be scheduled during hours when bandwidth utilization is minimal (e.g. during the midwatch).

Impetus for a Navy CDN:
Implementing a Content Delivery Network will not provide the Navy with a new warfighting capability in the way a new weapons system would.  However, at minimal cost – my rough back-of-the-envelope calculations estimate $100,000 for total software development, $2,500 for hardware per ship, the cost of day’s worth of contractor labor per ship, plus the additional government contract mark-up – it would eliminate a great deal of time wasted on administrative distractions and offer new support capabilities for submarines.

What is the Navy Doing?
At the time of writing, the Navy is implementing a service with many of the CDN features described above: the Navy Information Application Product Suite (NIAPS).  This service has been used, for example, to allow consolidated and offline access to online training materials through a program called “NKO at Sea”.

Potential for Future Development
If development of the NIAPS CDN service continues and is successful, there is great potential for it to serve as the platform for a new generation of web-applications which would replace the Navy’s current myriad of outdated and poorly-designed software packages (or even, as this author argues for, a single web service progressively integrating all of these features into a single system).  When combined with proposed on-ship WiFi networks, these applications could allow sailors efficiently complete work from anywhere onboard ship, regardless of internet connectivity.  Although this may not sound like a great technological breakthrough for the military, it has great potential to free the Navy from the burdens of its paperwork while retaining the high-standards said paperwork was created to maintain.

William is a Surface Warfare Officer assigned to USS Shiloh (CG-67).  He received his commission through the Naval ROTC program at the University of Notre Dame from where he graduated with a B.S. in Computer Science.  He has eight years of experience designing websites and web applications on a freelance basis.

The Odessa Network

Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network
Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network

The think-tank C4ADS recently published a new study, The Odessa Network: Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers, which analyzed commercial maritime networks linked to the Russian state and their involvement in arms shipments, particularly those to Bashar al-Assad’s forces in Syria fighting in that ongoing Civil War.

The report received some additional publicity when it formed the meat of a 7 September Washington Post story, with discussion especially devoted towards the report’s analysis of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, claiming that vessels likely carrying arms from the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk were turning off AIS when traveling to Syria.

The analysis conducted by Tom Wallace and Farley Mesko is certainly interesting and provides an in-depth look at commercial maritime networks and practices not generally seen outside of specialist literature on the shipping industry.  The work does leave some questions unanswered and makes unwarranted conclusions based on the available data, however:

  • The piece goes into great detail to lay out the various networks that Russia uses to ship arms, composed of interlocking companies headed and/or controlled by individuals with links to the state.  What’s unclear is why that should be considered unusual or bad.  Shell companies, convoluted ownership, and Flags of Convenience are commonplace for a variety reasons (many business-related) in the maritime industry.  It is not much of a “So What” to reveal that cronies in the maritime industry would be the facilitators used by Putin’s Russia to ship weapons to a pariah state. (Of note for those interested in topics like Flags of Convenience, Rodney Carlisle’s Sovereignty for Sale is a good read which explains the creation of the famous Panamanian and Liberian registries and provides context on why ship “ownership” is rarely straightforward in the maritime industry).
  • Russian arms shipments to Assad’s forces in Syria are clearly “bad,” but the implication in the Odessa Network study is that not only is Russia doing something bad, but that they are also doing it in a particularly devious and underhanded way.  The data provided by Wallace and Mesko only proves, however, that Russia is choosing to use “discreet” means to ship weapons to Syria.  It’s not clear that the Odessa Network’s ties to the Russian state or its business practices are that particularly egregious or unusual within the maritime industry.
  • The authors look at both publicly available data regarding Russian arms shipments as well as AIS data.  According to available data for ships/shipments, they note that “publicly known maritime weapons shipments from Russia to Syria” departed from “northern Russian ports of St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad.”  They then claim, however, based on the curious absence of AIS data for Russian ships in the eastern Mediterranean originating in Oktyabrsk, that there is “a strong circumstantial case that these ships and companies are moving weapons or other sensitive cargo to the Assad regime.”  The argument is inconsistent.  On one hand they make a case that operational security concerns or potential EU pressure on the Ukrainian government is stopping the use of Oktyabrsk as a transshipment site for Syria-bound arms, while on the other hand claiming that nefarious Russian intent is demonstrated by ships originating in Oktyabrsk deliberately not broadcasting AIS data when traveling to Syria.  Can both these assertions be true at the same time?
  • While certainly suspicious, is it actually illegal to turn off AIS as these Russia ships have allegedly done? The authors point out that there is the possibility that data may not be available in certain locations due to a lack of receivers, but also note that the eastern Mediterranean is not exactly an isolated area, and that AIS on these ships seems to work quite well everywhere else in the world.  According to the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO), “all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size” shall “maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.”  These rules were implemented as part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).  Although there is no real chance that these rules could be enforced against Russian ships since they are adopted and enforced by IMO member states themselves, are these ships doing something illegal by not using AIS properly?  Could operators of these vessels be subject to penalties?  Could enforcement of these rules be a round-about way to stop Russian arms shipments to Syria?

Despite my minor criticism above, this sort of analysis is welcome and could be applied to a variety of other maritime issues.  More publicly available detailed network analysis of the commercial networks benefiting from oil theft in West Africa or Somali piracy  could provide new, non-kinetic policy or law enforcement options in the fight against these illicit activities afloat.  Similarly, the methods toward which Iran has been driven by sanctions to facilitate its oil exports could be a useful subject of interest to analysts and policy-makers alike.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence officer currently serving on the OPNAV staff. He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2).  The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.