The following article was originally featured by the Pacific Forum-CSIS’s PacNet series and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.
By Abhijit Singh
Recently, editorial columns in Indian newspapers have become a battleground for strategic commentators to debate the merits of India’s defense logistics pact with the United States. Despite a public declaration by the Indian government regarding the “non-military” nature of the Logistics Exchange Memoranda of Agreement (LEMOA), the pact hasn’t resonated favorably with a section of India’s strategic elite, who reject the idea of providing the US military with operational access to Indian facilities. New Delhi might have much to gain from the LEMOA, which could be critical in establishing a favorable balance of power in Asia.
The critics argue that the arrangement does not benefit India in the same way that it advantages the US military. As a leading Indian defense analyst put it, “the government seems to have been guided more by the fear of being accused of succumbing to pressure from Washington and less by an evaluation of whether this might benefit India’s military.” As a result, Indian defense ministry officials find themselves under pressure to explain why they believe an agreement with the US on military logistics is in India’s best interests.
New Delhi’s stock response has been that the pact is strictly “conditional,” and allows access to supplies and services to the military forces of both countries only when engaged in a specific set of predetermined activities. At a press conference in Washington after the signing of the agreement, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar was at pains to explain that the agreement has nothing to do with the setting up of a military base. “It’s only about logistics support to each other’s fleet” he averred, “like supply of fuel, supply of many other things which are required for joint operations, humanitarian assistance and many other relief operations.”
And yet there is little denying that in today’s maritime environment, every ‘place’ that provides logistics support essentially performs the role of a peacetime military base, albeit in limited ways. This is because operational logistics is the life-blood of contemporary maritime missions. Any ocean-going navy that can secure logistical pit-stops can guarantee itself a wider operational footprint in distant littorals. In fact, leading maritime powers, including the United States, Russia and China, are reluctant to set up permanent bases in distant lands because what they aim to achieve in terms of strategic presence is made possible through low-level repair and replenishment ‘places.’ To be sure, with over 800 foreign military installations, the US still has a globe-girdling presence, but few of its existing overseas facilities are permanent military bases.
To better appreciate why foreign military bases do not enjoy the same appeal as in earlier times, one must study the history of their evolution. The permanent naval base was a product of 19th-century politics when Britain, the leading maritime power, set up a network of military basesaround the world to sustain its global supremacy. In the latter half of the 20th century, Britain was replaced by the United States, which soon came to dominate the world’s economic and strategic landscape. The US system of military bases consisted of several thousand installations at hundreds of basing sites in over 100 countries. The logic of the military basing system was intimately related to the dynamics of conflict. A military base was seen as a forward deployment position to enforce a denial regime on the enemy. It was a useful way of keeping the pressure on adversaries, and it allowed the US military to dominate the international system and prevent the rise of another hegemon.
But the logic of overseas bases has eroded. The absence of a real war in the intervening years has seen the law of diminishing returns kick in vis-à-vis foreign military bases, and an attenuation of their animating rationale. After struggling with rising domestic opposition to its military presence in Asia, the United States has been looking for more pragmatic options.
Since prolonged military presence on a foreign land isn’t a practical solution to any of its strategic problems, the US has been prioritizing logistics pacts that involve continuing support of rotational troops but no permanent deployments. These are variants of the “Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements”(ACSAs)– or logistical arrangements for military support, supplies, and services (food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment) – that the United States shares with many of its NATO partners. And yet, despite being avowedly in support of peacetime operations and regional humanitarian contingencies, these pacts have not changed the public perception that US military presence overseas advance America’s imperialist ambitions.
A case in point is the recent Extended Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with Manila, which provides the US military access to five military bases in Philippines. Even though the agreement was signed in 2014, strong domestic opposition within Philippines from civil rights groups resulted in a legal stalemate at the country’s Supreme Court. In January this year, when the courtfinally ruled in the pact’s favor, its decision seemed motivated mainly by the China-factor – the increased threat posed by China in the Philippines’ near-seas.
While the defense pact has a limited objective – enabling US troops to rotate through the Philippines, ensuring a persistent but intermittent presence – the new military facilities in Philippines aren’t expected to be any less potent than the United States’ erstwhile permanent bases in the country. The infrastructure will facilitate a spectrum of peacetime missions in the South China Sea, including training and capacity building, area patrols, aerial surveys, and fleet exercises. It will also enable the Philippines to call upon the US for critical military assistance in the event of a crisis.
The United States isn’t the only country to depend on military logistics pacts to achieve broader strategic objectives. Increasingly, China is resorting to the same means. The PLA’s logistical base at Djibouti doesn’t just provide support for China’s anti-piracy missions, but also enables a round-the-year naval presence in the Indian Ocean. What is more, China’s recent commercial facilities in the Indian Ocean Region seem more in the nature of dual-use bases, which can quickly be upgraded to medium-grade military facilities in a crisis.
New Delhi must come to terms with the fact that LEMOA’s utility lies in facilitating greater US-India operational coordination in Asia. Notwithstanding Parrikar’s assurances to the contrary, closer maritime interaction between India and the US will increasingly involve operational access to each other’s bases for strategic purposes. Even if the necessary cooperation is cleared on a case-by-case basis and driven mainly by regional capacity building and HADR needs, the Indian Navy and the US Navy might find themselves acting increasingly in concert to achieve common strategic objectives in the regional commons.
This does not mean LEMOA promotes US geopolitical interests at India’s expense. If anything, the pact empowers the Indian Navy to expand its own operations in the Indo-Pacific region. It is an aspiration that the Navy professed to recently when it released a map for public viewing that showed Indian naval deployments over the past 12 months, spread across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region.
Given the fraught nature of security in the Asian commons, India has been looking for ways to emphasize a rules-based order in the region. To consolidate its status as a crucial security provider, the Indian Navy will need to act in close coordination with the US Navy, the leading maritime power in Indo-Pacific, to ensure a fair, open, and balanced regional security architecture.
Abhijit Singh (abhijit.singh27@gmail.com), a former Indian naval officer, is Senior Fellow and Head, Maritime Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi. You can follow him on Twitter at @abhijit227.
Featured Image: Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks with Indian Naval Officers as he tours Indian Naval Station Karwar as part of a visit to the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, April 11, 2016. Carter is visiting India to solidify the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.(Photo by Senior Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz)(Released)
This article originally featured at National Defense University’s Joint Force Quarterly and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.
By Daniel Hughes and Andrew M. Colarik
Recent analysis of cyber warfare has been dominated by works focused on the challenges and opportunities it presents to the conventional military dominance of the United States. This was aptly demonstrated by the 2015 assessment from the Director of National Intelligence, who named cyber threats as the number one strategic issue facing the United States.1 Conversely, questions regarding cyber weapons acquisition by small states have received little attention. While individually weak, small states are numerous. They comprise over half the membership of the United Nations and remain important to geopolitical considerations.2 Moreover, these states are facing progressively difficult security investment choices as the balance among global security, regional dominance, and national interests is constantly being assessed. An increasingly relevant factor in these choices is the escalating costs of military platforms and perceptions that cyber warfare may provide a cheap and effective offensive capability to exert strategic influence over geopolitical rivals.
This article takes the position that in cyber warfare the balance of power between offense and defense has yet to be determined. Moreover, the indirect and immaterial nature of cyber weapons ensures that they do not alter the fundamental principles of warfare and cannot win military conflicts unaided. Rather, cyber weapons are likely to be most effective when used as a force multiplier and not just as an infrastructure disruption capability. The consideration of cyber dependence—that is, the extent to which a state’s economy, military, and government rely on cyberspace—is also highly relevant to this discussion. Depending on infrastructure resiliency, a strategic technological advantage may become a significant disadvantage in times of conflict. The capacity to amplify conventional military capabilities, exploit vulnerabilities in national infrastructure, and control the cyber conflict space is thus an important aspect for any war-making doctrine. Integrating these capabilities into defense strategies is the driving force in the research and development of cyber weapons.
Located at Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station Pacific, Wahiawa, Hawaii, Mobile User Objective System is next-generation narrowband tactical satellite communications system intended to significantly improve ground communications for U.S. forces on the move, November 3, 2008 (U.S. Navy/John W. Ciccarelli, Jr.)
The Nature of Cyber Warfare
Cyber warfare is increasingly being recognized as the fifth domain of warfare. Its growing importance is suggested by its prominence in national strategy, military doctrine, and significant investments in relevant capabilities. Despite this, a conclusive definition of cyber warfare has yet to emerge.3 For our purposes, such a definition is not required as the critical features of cyber warfare can be summarized in three points. First, cyber warfare involves actions that achieve political or military effect. Second, it involves the use of cyberspace to deliver direct or cascading kinetic effects that have comparable results to traditional military capabilities. Third, it creates results that either cause or are a crucial component of a serious threat to a nation’s security or that are conducted in response to such a threat.4 More specifically, cyber weapons are defined as weaponized cyber warfare capabilities held by those with the expertise and resources required to deliver and deploy them. Thus, it is the intent to possess the skills required to develop and deploy cyber weapons that must be the focus of any national security strategy involving cyber warfare.
Notable theorists have judged that in cyber warfare, offense is dominant.5 Attacks can be launched instantaneously, and there is rapid growth in the number of networks and assets requiring protection. After all, cyberspace is a target-rich environment based on network structures that privilege accessibility over security. Considerable technical and legal difficulties make accurate attribution of cyber attacks, as well as precise and proportionate retaliation, a fraught process.6 There is also the low cost of creating cyber weapons—code is cheap—and any weapon released onto the Internet can be modified to create the basis of new offensive capabilities.7All of this means that the battlespace is open, accessible, nearly anonymous, and with an entry cost that appears affordable to any nation-state.
Strategies that rely too heavily on offensive dominance in cyber warfare may, however, be premature. Cyber dependence—the extent to which an attacker depends on cyberspace for critical infrastructure—is crucial to the strategic advantages that cyber weapons can provide. Uncertainty rules as the dual-use nature of cyber weapons allows them to be captured, manipulated, and turned against their creators.8 Equally important is the practice of “escalation dominance.”9 As shown by as yet untested U.S. policy, retaliation for a cyber attack may be delivered by more destructive military capabilities.10 And while the speed of a cyber attack may be near instantaneous, preparation for sophisticated cyber attacks is considerable. The Stuxnet attack required the resources of a technologically sophisticated state to provide the expansive espionage, industrial testing, and clandestine delivery that were so vital to its success. The above demonstrates that the true cost of advanced cyber weapons lies not in their creation but in their targeting and deployment, both of which reduce their ability to be redeployed to face future, unforeseen threats.
Cyber weapons are further limited by their lack of physicality. As pieces of computer code, they generate military effect only by exploiting vulnerabilities created by reliance on cyberspace.11 They can attack vulnerable platforms and infrastructures by manipulating computer systems or act as a force multiplier to traditional military assets. This may lead to the disruption and control of the battlespace, as well as to the provision of additional intelligence when payloads are deployed. These effects, however, are always secondary—cyber weapons cannot directly affect the battlefield without a device to act through, nor can they occupy and control territory.
Ultimately, the debate regarding the balance of power in cyber warfare and the relative power of cyber weapons will likely be decided by empirical evidence relating to two factors. The first is the amount of damage caused by the compromise of cyber-dependent platforms. The second will be the extent to which major disruptions to infrastructure erode political willpower and are exploitable by conventional military capabilities. For the moment, however, it is safe to presume that conflicts will not be won in cyberspace alone and that this applies as much to small states as it does to major powers.
Uses of Cyber Weapons by Small States
To be worthy of investment, a cyber weapons arsenal must provide states with political or military advantage over—or at the very least, parity with—their adversaries. To judge whether a small state benefits sufficiently to justify their acquisition, we must understand how these capabilities can be used. A nonexhaustive list of potential cyber weapon uses includes warfighting, coercion, deterrence, and defense diplomacy. As cyber weapons are limited to secondary effects, they currently have restricted uses in warfighting. Their most prominent effect likely will be the disruption and/or manipulation of military command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and the degradation of civilian support networks. Attacks on civilian infrastructure remain most feasible, and attacks on automated military platforms are possible.12 The effective use of cyber weapons as a coercive tool is constrained by the relative size and cyber dependence of an opponent and carries the risk of weapons acting in unforeseen ways. Both of these dependencies are shared when cyber weapons are used as a deterrent. This is due to the peculiar nature of the cyber domain, where both coercion and deterrence rely on the same aggressive forward reconnaissance of an adversary’s network. This results in the difference between coercion and deterrence being reduced to intent—something difficult to prove. The final potential use of cyber weapons is as a component of defense diplomacy strategy, which focuses on joint interstate military exercises as a means to dispel hostility, build trust, and develop armed forces.13 This could be expanded to encompass cyber exercises conducted by military cyber specialists. Defense diplomacy can act as a deterrent, but it is effective only if relevant military capabilities are both credible and demonstrable.14 The latter is problematic. Advanced cyber weapons are highly classified; caution must therefore be exercised when demonstrating capabilities so that “live” network penetrations are not divulged.
These four capabilities have crucial dependencies, all of which can limit their suitability for deployment in a conflict. First, the conflicting parties must have comparable military power. Disrupting an opponent’s C4ISR will be of little consequence if they still enjoy considerable conventional military superiority despite the successful deployment of cyber weapons. Second, as demonstrated by the principle of cyber dependence, one state’s disruption of another’s cyber infrastructure is effective only if they can defend their own cyber assets or possess the capability to act without these assets with minimal degradation in operational effectiveness. Third, states must have the resources and expertise required to deploy cyber weapons, which increase commensurate with their efficacy. Fourth, cyber weapons rely on aggressive forward reconnaissance into networks of potential adversaries; weapons should be positioned before conflict begins. This creates political and military risk if an opponent discovers and traces a dormant cyber weapon. Finally, all use of cyber weapons is complicated by their inherent unpredictability, which casts doubts over weapon precision and effect. Once unleashed, the course of cyber weapons may be difficult to predict and/or contain.15 Unforeseen results may undermine relationships or spread to neutral states that then take retaliatory action.16 Accordingly, weapon deployment must follow sound strategy against clearly identified adversaries to minimize unforeseen consequences.
MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper assigned to 432nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, especially during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (U.S. Air Force/Vernon Young, Jr.)
A Predictive Framework
What is offered in this section is an analytical framework that may provide a customized evaluation of whether a particular small state should—or will—acquire cyber weapons. In essence, what is being provided is a baseline for a comparative, comprehensive study on a state-by-state basis. The framework itself yields its maximum value when numerous states have been analyzed. This enables potential proliferation patterns to emerge and a clearer picture of the threat landscape to present itself.
The outline of the basic process for analysis is provided in the figure.
Each step is explained by a purpose statement and demonstrated through a case study. The subject of the case study is New Zealand, chosen due to its membership in the Five Eyes intelligence network and because it both self-identifies as and is widely perceived to be a small state.17 Ideally, each step of the framework would be completed by a group representing a variety of perspectives from military forces, government entities, and academic specialties. There is the potential for a much more detailed evaluation than that presented, which has been condensed for brevity.
When submerged, Los Angeles–class fast attack submarine USS Santa Fe is among world’s stealthiest platforms, capable of supporting missions including anti-submarine warfare, anti–surface ship warfare, strike, naval special warfare involving special operations forces, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, August 8, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Sebastian McCormack)
Step One: Identify Foundational Small-State Characteristics. The purpose is to identify key characteristics of the small state within three categories: quantitative, behavioral, and identity.18Quantitative refers to measures such as land area, population, and gross domestic product (GDP). Behavioral refers to qualitative metrics concerning the behavior of a state, both domestically and within the international system. Identity refers to qualitative metrics that focus on how a state perceives its own identity. This article proposes that metrics from each category can be freely used by suitably informed analysts to assign a size category to any particular state. This avoids the need for a final definition of a small state. Instead, definition and categorization are achieved through possession of a sufficient number of overlapping characteristics—some quantitative, some behavioral, and some identity based.19 Quantitatively, New Zealand has a small population (approximately 4.5 million), a small GDP (approximately $197 billion), and a small land area.20 It is geographically isolated, bordering no other countries. In the realm of behavior, New Zealand practices an institutionally focused multilateral foreign policy. It is a founding member of the United Nations and was elected to the Security Council for the 2015–2016 term after running on a platform of advocating for other small states. It participates in multiple alliances and takes a special interest in the security of the South Pacific.21 Regarding identity, New Zealand’s self-identity emphasizes the values of fairness, independence, nonaggression, cooperation, and acknowledgment of its status as a small state.22 Its security identity is driven by a lack of perceived threat that allows New Zealand to make security decisions based on principle rather than practicality.23 This was demonstrated by the banning of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships within New Zealand waters, and its subsequent informal exclusion from aspects of the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty. Despite reduced security, however, domestic opinion strongly supported the anti-nuclear policy that, along with support for nonproliferation and disarmament, has strengthened the pacifistic elements of New Zealand’s national identity.24
Step Two: Identify Resource Availability and Policy Alignment for Cyber Weapon Development, Deployment, and Exploitation. The purpose is to identify how the use of cyber weapons would align with current security and defense policies; whether the small state has the military capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities caused by cyber weapon deployment; and whether the small state has the intelligence and technical resources needed to target, develop, and deploy cyber weapons.
In key New Zealand defense documents, references to cyber primarily mention defense against cyber attacks, with only two references to the application of military force to cyberspace. There is no mention of cyber weapon acquisition. New Zealand’s defense policy has focused on military contributions to a secure New Zealand, a rules-based international order, and a sound global economy. Because the likelihood of direct threats against the country and its closest allies is low, there has been a focus on peacekeeping, disaster relief, affordability, and maritime patrol. New Zealand’s military is small (11,500 personnel, including reservists) with limited offensive capabilities and low funding (just 1.1 percent of GDP). Accordingly, the New Zealand military lacks the ability to exploit vulnerabilities caused by the successful use of cyber weapons.
New Zealand is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence network and thus can access more sophisticated intelligence than most small states. This can be used to increase its ability to target and deploy cyber weapons. It has a modern signals intelligence capability, housed by the civilian Government Communications Security Bureau, which also has responsibility for national cybersecurity. It most likely has the technical capability to adapt existing cyber weapons or develop new ones, particularly if aided by its allies. Due to fiscal constraints, however, any additional funding for cyber weapons will likely have to come from the existing defense budget and thus result in compromises to other capabilities.25
Step Three: Examine Small-State Cyber Dependence.The purpose is to examine the small state’s reliance on cyberspace for its military capabilities and critical infrastructure, as well as its relative cyber dependence when compared to potential geopolitical adversaries.
New Zealand has moderate to high cyber dependence, with increasing reliance on online services and platforms by the government, business sector, and civil society. This dependence will increase. For example, the acquisition of new C4ISR capabilities to increase military adoption of network-centric warfare principles would create new vulnerabilities.26New Zealand’s cyber dependence is further increased by limited cybersecurity expertise.27 It does not have obvious military opponents, so its relative level of cyber dependence is difficult to calculate.
Step Four: Analyze State Behavior Against Competing Security Models. The purpose is to analyze how state behavior aligns with each competing security model and how cyber weapon acquisition and use may support or detract from this behavior. Cyber weapon arsenals are used to advance political and military objectives. These objectives depend on a state’s behavior and identity, both of which are difficult to quantify. A degree of quantification is possible, however, through the use of conceptual security models. A synthesis of recent small- state security scholarship generates four models: the first focused on alliances, the second on international cooperation, and the third and fourth on identity, differentiated by competing focuses (collaboration and influence, and defensive autonomy).28 The alliance-focused model presents small states with persuasive reasons to acquire cyber weapons. This applies both to balancing behavior (that is, joining an alliance against a threatening state) and bandwagoning (that is, entering into an alliance with a threatening state).29 The additional military resources provided by an alliance present greater opportunities for the exploitation of vulnerabilities caused by cyber weapons. In the event that a cyber weapon unwittingly targets a powerful third party, a small state may be less likely to be subjected to blowback if it is shielded by a strong alliance. Furthermore, cyber weapons may be a reasonably cost-effective contribution to an alliance; a great power could even provide preferential procurement opportunities for a favored ally.
New Zealand maintains a close military alliance with Australia and is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It also has recently signed cybersecurity agreements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Kingdom.30 The alliances above have focused on security and mutual defense rather than offensive capabilities. New Zealand does, however, have a policy of complementing Australian defense capabilities.31 This could be achieved through the acquisition of cyber weapons, so long as it was closely coordinated and integrated with the Australian military. Thus this model assesses state behavioral alignment as medium/high and cyber weapon support as medium/high.
The international cooperation model assumes that small states can exert influence by strengthening international organizations, encouraging cooperative approaches to security, and creating laws and norms to constrain powerful states.32 Small states acting under this model will favor diplomatic and ideological methods of influence. As such, they are less likely to acquire cyber weapons. Instead, it is more likely that they will try to regulate cyber weapons in a manner similar to the restrictions on biological and chemical weapons or by leading efforts to explicitly incorporate them into the international laws of warfare.
New Zealand usually pursues a multilateral foreign policy approach and is a member of multiple international organizations. It has a long history of championing disarmament and arms control, which conflicts with the acquisition of new categories of offensive weapons. This model assesses state behavioral alignment as high and cyber weapon support as low.
Both of the identity focused models (collaboration and influence versus defensive autonomy) are centered on analysis of a small state’s “security identity.” This develops from perceptions of “past behavior and images and myths linked to it which have been internalized over long periods of time by the political elite and population of the state.”33 This identity can be based around a number of disparate factors such as ongoing security threats, perceptions of national character, and historical consciousness. A state’s security identity can lead it toward a preference for either of the identity focused security models mentioned above.Regarding collaboration and influence, New Zealand’s identity strikes a balance between practicality and principle. It strives to be a moral, fair-minded state that advances what it regards as important values, such as human rights and the rule of law.34 It still wishes, however, to work in a constructive manner that allows it to contribute practical solutions to difficult problems. The acquisition of cyber weapons is unlikely to advance this model. Thus this model assesses state behavioral alignment as medium and cyber weapon support as low.
Despite its multilateral behavior, New Zealand retains some defensive autonomy and takes pride in maintaining independent views on major issues.35 Its isolation and lack of major threats have allowed it to retain a measure of autonomy in its defense policy and to maintain a small military. Its independent and pacifistic nature suggests that cyber weapon acquisition could be controversial. Thus this model assesses state behavioral alignment as medium and cyber weapon support as low/medium.
Table 1. Cyber Weapon Cost-Benefit Risk Matrix for New Zealand
Warfighting
Coercion
Deterrence
Defense Diplomacy
Benefits
Ability to complement military capabilities of allies
Cost effective offensive capability
Limited coercive ability from cyber weapons
Limited deterrence from cyber weapons
Deterrence from demonstrating effective cyber weapons via defense diplomacy
Feasibility
Allies may provide favorable procurement opportunities
Appropriate technical and intelligence resources exist
Appropriate technical and intelligence resources exist
Appropriate technical and intelligence resources exist
Appropriate technical and intelligence resources exist
Risks
Procurement may result in reduced funding for other military capabilities
Domestic opposition to acquisition of new offensive weapons
Cyber weapon acquisition may reduce international reputation
Cyber weapons exploitation relies on allied forces
High level of cyber dependence increases vulnerability to retaliation
Domestic opposition to acquisition of new offensive weapons
Security identity not reconcilable with coercive military actions
Procurement may result in reduced funding for other military capabilities
Cyber weapon acquisition may reduce international reputation
High level of cyber dependence increases vulnerability to retaliation
Procurement may result in reduced funding for other military capabilities
Cyber weapon acquisition may reduce international reputation
High level of cyber dependence increases vulnerability to retaliation
Lack of identified threats reduces ability to target and develop deterrent cyber weapons
Procurement may result in reduced funding for other military capabilities
Cyber weapon acquisition may reduce international reputation
High level of cyber dependence reduces deterrent effect
Step Five: Analyze Benefits, Feasibility, and Risk for Each Category of Cyber Weapon Use. The purpose is to first identify the benefits, feasibility, and risk of acquiring cyber weapons based on each category of potential use, as shown in table 1. Next this information is analyzed against the degree to which cyber weapon use may support different security models, as shown in table 2. This results in a ranking of the benefits, feasibility, and risk of each combination of cyber weapon use and small-state security model. This is followed by an overall recommendation or prediction for cyber weapon acquisition under each security model and category of cyber weapon use.
Table 2. Cyber Weapon Acquisition Matrix for New Zealand
Security Model
BFR
Warfighting
Coercion
Deterrence
Defense Diplomacy
Overall
Alliances
Benefits
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Feasibility
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Risk
High
Very High
High
Low
High
Recommendation/Prediction
Further Investigation
No
No
Further Investigation
Further Investigation
International cooperation
Benefits
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Low
Feasibility
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Risk
High
High
High
Low
High
Recommendation/Prediction
No
No
No
Further Investigation
No
Identity and norms: collaboration and influence
Benefits
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Low
Feasibility
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Risk
High
High
High
Low
High
Recommendation/Prediction
No
No
No
Further Investigation
No
Identity and norms: defensive autonomy
Benefits
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Feasibility
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Risk
High
High
High
Low
High
Recommendation/Prediction
No
No
No
No
No
Step Six: Recommend or Predict Cyber Weapon Acquisition Strategy.The purpose is to summarize key findings, to recommend whether a small state should acquire cyber weapons, and to predict the likelihood of such an acquisition. The key findings are that New Zealand is unlikely to gain significant benefits from the acquisition of cyber weapons. This is due to its limited military capabilities, multilateral foreign approach, extensive participation in international organizations, and pacifistic security identity. Factors that could change this evaluation and increase the benefits of cyber weapon acquisition would include an increased focus on military alliances, the emergence of more obvious threats to New Zealand or its close allies, or a changing security identity.
Therefore, the recommendation/prediction is that New Zealand should not acquire cyber weapons at this time and is unlikely to do so. The framework’s output has considerable utility as a decision support tool. When used by a small state as an input into a strategic decisionmaking process, its output can be incorporated into relevant defense capability and policy documents. If cyber weapon acquisition is recommended, its output could be further used to inform specific strategic, doctrinal, and planning documents. It also provides a basis for potential cyber weapon capabilities to be analyzed under a standard return-on-investment procurement model. This would involve a more detailed analysis of benefits, costs, and risks that would allow fit-for-purpose procurement decisions to be made in a fiscally and operationally prudent manner.
Alternatively, the framework, which is low cost and allows a variety of actors to determine the likelihood of cyber weapon acquisition by small states, could be used as a tool to develop predictive intelligence. Furthermore, when the framework is used on a sufficient number of small states, it could be used as a basis for making broader predictions regarding the proliferation of cyber weapons. This would be particularly effective over geographical areas with a large concentration of small states. For more powerful states, this might indicate opportunities for increased cyber warfare cooperation with geopolitical allies, perhaps even extending to arms sales or defense diplomacy. Conversely, the framework could provide nongovernmental organizations and academics with opportunities to trace cyber weapon proliferation and raise visibility of the phenomenon among international organizations, policymakers, and the general public. These outcomes provide significant benefits to the broad spectrum of actors seeking stability and influence within the international order.
Conclusion
The evolution of the various domains of warfare did not occur overnight. Learning from and leveraging the changing landscapes of war required continuous investigation, reflection, and formative activities to achieve parity, much less dominance, with rivals. Treating cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare requires a greater understanding of the battlespace than currently exists. This goes well beyond the technological aspects and requires the integration of cyber capabilities and strategies into existing defense doctrines. The framework we have developed has the potential to help guide this process, from strategic decision to procurement and doctrinal and operational integration. Similarly, its predictive potential is significant—any ability to forecast cyber weapon acquisition on a state-by-state basis and thus monitor cyber weapon proliferation would be of substantial geopolitical benefit. We further propose that decisionmakers of large, powerful states must not ignore the strategic impact that small states could have in this domain. We also remind small states that their geopolitical rivals may deploy cyber weapons as a means to advance national interests in this sphere of influence. Therefore, it is our hope that, as a result of clarifying the potential conflict space, future policies might be developed to control the proliferation of cyber weapons. JFQ
Daniel Hughes is a Master’s Candidate with a professional background in Defense and Immigration. Andrew M. Colarik is a Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, New Zealand.
3 Paulo Shakarian, Jana Shakarian, and Andrew Ruef, Introduction to Cyber Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach(Waltham, MA: Syngress, 2013); Catherine A. Theohary and John W. Rollins, Cyber Warfare and Cyberterrorism: In Brief, R43955 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 27, 2015), available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43955.pdf>.
4 Raymond C. Parks and David P. Duggan, “Principles of Cyber Warfare,” IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine 9, no. 5 (September/October 2011), 30; Andrew M. Colarik and Lech J. Janczewski, “Developing a Grand Strategy for Cyber War,” 7th International Conference on Information Assurance & Security, December 2011, 52; Shakarian, Shakarian, and Ruef.
5 Fred Schrier, On Cyber Warfare, Democratic Control of Armed Forces Working Paper No. 7 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015), available at <www.dcaf.ch/content/download/67316/…/OnCyber warfare-Schreier.pdf>; John Arquilla, “Twenty Years of Cyberwar,” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 1 (April 17, 2013), 80–87.
6 Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg, “Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook,” Parameters 38, no. 4 (Winter 2008–2009).
7 P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
14 Andrew T.H. Tan, “Punching Above Its Weight: Singapore’s Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy,” Defence Studies 11, no. 4 (2011), 672–697.
15 David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Waging Cyber War the American Way,” Survival 57, no. 4 (2015), 7–28.
18 Joe Burton, “Small States and Cyber Security: The Case of New Zealand,” Political Science 65, no. 2 (2013), 216–238; Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States’ Military Policies After the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (2008), 307–325.
19 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).
24 Andreas Reitzig, “In Defiance of Nuclear Deterrence: Anti-Nuclear New Zealand After Two Decades,” Medicine, Conflict, and Survival 22, no. 2 (2006), 132–144.
Earlier this year, Admiral John Richardson, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, released his Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, articulating a vision for how the Navy intends to both deter conflict and conduct “decisive combat operations to defeat any enemy.” Some of the factors it identifies as making the maritime system “more heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever before” include expanded trade, the impact of climate change opening sea lanes in the Arctic, increased undersea exploitation of the seabed, and illicit trafficking.
As U.S. Navy operations afloat take place within a more contested maritime system, the need for better “Battlespace Awareness,” one of the three “Fundamental Capabilities” identified in the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance, is clear. Battlespace Awareness requires a deep and substantive understanding of the maritime system as a whole, including tasks such as the “persistent surveillance of the maritime and information battlespace,” “an understanding of when, where, and how our adversaries operate,” and comprehension of the civil maritime environment.
The U.S. Navy operates across a spectrum ranging from simple presence operations, maritime security, strike warfare ashore in support of land forces, to potential high-end conflict at sea and even strategic nuclear strike from ballistic missile submarines. These operations do not occur in a vacuum, but in a highly complex and dynamic international environment that continues to require real expertise, particularly in its uniquely maritime aspects.
Chokepoints and popular world trading routes illustrate the complicated nature of the maritime domain. (Atlantic Council)
To execute these operations the U.S. Navy needs an intelligence arm employing experts that understand the details of the maritime system and how it can impact naval operations at sea. Three ways to move towards achieving real expertise in the maritime environment include:
Fielding better analytic tools and using advanced analytics to assist in collection, exploitation, and all-source fusion
Deploying intelligence analysts and tools to lower echelon units closer to the fight
Training intelligence personnel in vital skills such as foreign languages
Task 1: Improve Use of Advanced Analytics and Sophisticated Tools
The Design portrays a world in which rapid technological change and broadened access to computing power have narrowed the distance between the U.S. Navy and potential competitors. Wealthy states no longer have a built-in military advantage simply by having access to immense sums of money to invest in military platforms and weapons, including communications and information technology.
The Design notes that this advantage has been eroded as new technologies are “being adopted by society just as fast – people are using these new tools as quickly as they are introduced, and in new and novel ways.” Virtually anyone now has the ability to access and analyze information in ways that were previously only the preserve of the most advanced intelligence agencies. Indeed, today’s “information system is more pervasive, enabling an even greater multitude of connections between people and at a much lower cost of entry – literally an individual with a computer is a powerful actor in the system.”
This story of rapid technological change does not necessarily have to be one where the leader in a particular field inevitably loses ground to more nimble pursuers. The explosion of “Big Data” gives the U.S. Navy opportunities in which to better understand the maritime system, provide persistent surveillance of the maritime environment, and achieve what the Information Dominance Strategy describes as “penetrating knowledge of the capabilities and intent of our adversaries.”
In addition to an explosion of social media across the planet that provides readily exploitable data for analysis, the maritime environment has its own unique indicators and observables. One example of the ways publicly or commercially available data can be used to develop operationally relevant understanding of maritime phenomena was a 2013 study byC4DS that detailed how Russia has used commercial maritime entities to supply the Syrian government with weapons.
DigitalGlobe’s Worldview-3 satellite was launched in 2014 and provides commercial imagery with a 31cm (12in) resolution. (DigitalGlobe)
Nation-states and their agencies no longer control the raw materials of intelligence by monopolizing capital-intensive signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) collection platforms or dissemination systems. Anyone can now access huge amounts of potentially informative data. The barrier to entry for analytic tools has drastically declined as well. An organization that can develop analytic tools to exploit the explosion of data could rival the impact that British and U.S. experts in Operations Analysis achieved during the Second World War by improving Anti-Submarine Warfare(ASW) efforts in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The navy that can successfully exploit the data environment and make it relevant to operations afloat will be better positioned to formulate responses to challenges fielded by potential adversaries often characterized by the now discouraged term “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD).” With the barrier to entry for advanced analytics and use of statistical techniques so low, it would be criminal to not apply cutting edge methods to the various analytic problems faced by intelligence professionals.
Task 2: Employ Intelligence Tools at the Tactical Edge
For a variety of historical and technical reasons, all-source intelligence fusion for the U.S. Navy has generally taken place at the “force” or “operational” levels; typically by an afloat Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), or numbered Fleet staff, rather than with the forward-most tactical units. Since at least the Second World War, the U.S. Navy has emphasized the importance of deploying intelligence staff with operational commanders to ensure that intelligence meets that commander’s requirements, rather than relying on higher echelon or national-level intelligence activities to be responsive to operational or tactical requirements.
Advanced analytic programs, like Analyst Notebook shown in the screen shot above, can enable intelligence personnel at the tactical level to tailor analysis to their unit’s requirements- as long as those programs are pushed down to them. (Image: Army-Technology.com)
Since the Cold War, technological limitations such as the large amounts of bandwidth required for satellite transmission of raw imagery had limited the dissemination of “national” intelligence to large force-level platforms and their counterparts ashore. The need to exploit organic intelligence collected by an embarked carrier air wing, coupled with the technological requirements for bandwidth and analytic computing power, made the carrier the obvious location to fuse nationally-collected and tactical intelligence into a form usable by the Carrier Strike Group and the focal point for deployed operational intelligence afloat.
With computing power no longer an obstacle, however, only manpower and the ability to wirelessly disseminate information prevents small surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and expeditionary units from using all-source analysis tailored to their tactical commander’s needs. The Intelligence Carry-on Program (ICOP) provides one solution by equipping Independent Duty Intelligence Specialists onboard surface combatants like Aegis cruisers and destroyers (CG/DDGs) with intelligence tools approaching the capability of those available to their colleagues on the big decks.
The next step for Naval Intelligence in taking advantage of these new technologies is to determine whether it is best to train non-intelligence personnel already aboard tactical units to better perform intelligence tasks, or deploy more intelligence analysts to the tactical edge of the fleet. Additionally, Naval Intelligence must advocate for systems to ensure that vital information and intelligence can actually get to the fleet via communications paths that enable the transmission of nationally-derived products in the most austere of communications environments.
There is an additional benefit to pushing intelligence analysis down-echelon. The potential for an enemy to deny satellite communications means that the ability of a tactical-level commander to make informed decisions becomes even more important. The Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority argues that “one clear implication of the current environment is the need for the Navy to prepare for decentralized operations, guided by the commander’s intent.”
The F2T2EA targeting process is inextricably linked with intelligence functions for collection and assessment. (Image: NAVAIR)
Five of the six steps of the “Kill Chain” or “Dynamic Targeting” process of Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) involve intelligence. These include tasks such as detecting and characterizing emerging targets (Find), identifying potential targets in time and space (Fix), observing and monitoring the target (Track), the decision to engage the target (Target), and assessment of the action against the target (Assess). Decentralized operations require the ability to apply more or all steps of the Kill Chain at the tactical edge meaning forward units need an organic intelligence capability.
Enabling tactical units to perform intelligence tasks essential to the Kill Chain at the tactical edge through trained manpower and better intelligence tools could greatly enhance the ability of afloat forces to operate in a what are sometimes described as Disrupted, Disconnected, Intermittent, and Limited bandwidth environments (D-DIL). Potential adversaries have developed a wide variety of capabilities in the information domain that would deny the U.S. military free access to wireless communications and information technology in order to “challenge and threaten the ability of U.S. and allied forces both to get to the fight and to fight effectively once there.” In a possible future war at sea where deployed combatants cannot rely on the ability to securely receive finished national- or theater-level intelligence, the ability to empower tactical-level intelligence analysts is a war-winning capability.
Task 3: Develop Widespread Language and Cultural Understandings
One of the Design’s four lines of effort is to “Achieve High Velocity Learning at Every Level” by applying “the best concepts, techniques, and technologies to accelerate learning as individuals, teams, and organization.” It also calls for a Navy that can “understand the lessons of history so as not to relearn them.” The irony here is that Naval Intelligence continues to ignore one of its most successful education efforts in history: the interwar program that detailed dozens of officers to study Japanese language and culture in Japan (with others studying Chinese and Russian in China and Eastern Europe) during the inter-war years.
LCDR Layton and LT Rochefort’s intelligence efforts were so effective in determining the Japanese plans that on the day of the battle, Admiral Nimitz remarked “well, you were only five minutes, five degrees, and five miles out.” (Image: ‘Midway – Dauntless Victory’ by Peter C Smith)
Emphasizing the importance of language training and regional expertise would seem obvious goals for Naval Intelligence in light of the Information Dominance Strategy’s call for “penetrating knowledge” and deep understanding of potential adversaries. The direct result of sending men like Joe Rochefort and Eddie Layton to Japan to immerse themselves in that society was victory in the Central Pacific at Midway in June 1942.
While there are language training programs available to the U.S. Navy officer corps as a whole (such as the Olmsted Scholar program), they are not designed to provide relevant language or expertise of particular countries or regions for intelligence purposes. If Olmsted is the way which Navy Intelligence plans to bring deep language and regional expertise into the officer corps, it has done a poor job in terms of ensuring Intelligence Officers are competitive candidates as the annual NAVADMIN messages indicate that only eight have been accepted into the program since 2008.
There has been much debate in recent years, particularly heated in the various, militaryblogs, over the relative importance of engineering degrees versus liberal arts for U.S. Navy officers. What has been left out of that debate is the obvious benefit associated with non-technical education in foreign languages. A deep understanding of foreign languages and cultures is not just relevant to Naval Intelligence in a strictly SIGINT role. Having intelligence professionals fluent in the language of potential adversaries (and allies) allows deep understanding of foreign military doctrine and the cultural framework in which a foreign military operates.
Foreign language expertise for a naval officer is not a new concept. In the late nineteenth century prospective Royal Navy officers had to prove they could read and write Frenchin order to achieve appointment as a cadet, and officers were encouraged to learn foreign languages. Interestingly, the U.S. Naval Academy does not require midshipmen majoring in in Engineering, Mathematics, or Science to take foreign language courses.
Conclusion
Naval Intelligence is vitally relevant to the U.S. Navy’s afloat operations, but can be significantly improved by taking advantage of the current technological revolutions in data and data exploitation. While the Design uses new terminology and does not address intelligence’s role specifically, the core missions and tasks of Naval Intelligence remain the same as they were in 1882 when Lieutenant Theodorus Mason started work at the newly established Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Maritime experts can provide the decisive edge in combat operations through more advanced and sophisticated tools, by pushing intelligence expertise to the tactical edge to advise front-line commanders and mitigate new high-end threats, and by applying more detailed knowledge of the languages and cultures of potential adversaries in the most challenging environments.
Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a naval intelligence officer assigned to United States Africa Command. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Featured Image: 140717-N-TG831-028 WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (July 17, 2014) Operations Specialist 1st Class Brian Spear, from Senoia, Georgia, assigned to the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd (DDG 100), stands watch in the combat information center. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Declan Barnes/Released)
Articles Due: December 8
Week Dates: December 12-16 Article Length: 1000-3000 words (with flexibility) Submit to: Nextwar@cimsec.org
CIMSEC will launch a topic week featuring analysis of the defense and foreign affairs of Russia in mid-December. Under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russian behavior on the international stage has become more pronounced and controversial. Russia has launched military operations in Syria, sustained its support for Ukrainian separatists, and employed cyber capabilities to influence the politics of rival states. Russia’s military is also embarked upon an ambitious modernization program despite lower energy prices that have forced the state to draw heavily on strategic reserves and slash ministerial budgets.
Prospective authors are encouraged to submit analysis on a broad variety of topics relating to Russian national security developments and foreign policy. Potential topics include but are not limited to: the scope and feasibility of military modernization programs, threat perceptions relating to NATO, cyber operations, and escalation and deterrence dynamics. Please submit drafts to Nextwar@cimsec.org.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org.
Featured Image: Russian President Putin watches the launch of a missile during naval exercises in Russia’s Arctic North on board the nuclear missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great), Aug. 17, 2005. (REUTERS/ITAR-TASS/PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE)
