History

The Story of William Garrison Payne, The U.S. Navy’s first Black Commissioned Officer

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By Reuben Keith Green

The hidden story of the U.S. Navy’s first Black commissioned officer spans five decades, three continents, two world wars, two wives from different countries, and one hell of a journey for an Indiana farm boy. For mutual convenience, both he and the United States Navy pretended that he wasn’t Black. This story had almost been erased from history until the determined efforts of one of his extended relatives, Jeff Giltz of Hobart, Indiana, brought it to light.1

From before World War I until after World War II, leaders in the U. S. government and Navy would make decisions affecting the composition of enlisted ranks for more than a century and that still echo in officer demographics today. Memories of maelstroms past reverberate in today’s discussions regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), affirmative action in the military academies, meritocracy over so-called “DEI Hires,” who is and is not Black, and in renaming – or not – bases and ships that honor relics of America’s discriminatory and exclusionary past. Before Doris “Dorie” Miller received the Navy Cross for his actions on December 7th, 1941, and long before the Navy commissioned the Golden Thirteen in 1945, Lieutenant (junior grade) William Lloyd Garrison Payne was awarded the Navy Cross for the hazardous duty of commanding the submarine chaser USS SC-83 in 1918. While his Navy Cross citation is sparse, the hazards of hunting submarines from a 110-foot wooden ship were considerable. His personal and professional history, still emerging though it may be, reveals much about the nation and Navy he served and deserves to be revealed in full. Understanding the racial and political climate during which he received his commission is crucial to understanding the importance of his place in Navy history.

Fig. 1: USS SC 83 underway. Lieutenant (junior grade) Payne was awarded the Navy Cross for his service as commanding officer. (Photo credit: National WWI Museum collection 2012.98, via subchaser.org.)

Quietly Breaking Barriers

William Lloyd Garrison Payne was born on Christmas day in 1881 to a White Indiana woman and a Black man, and completed forty years of military service by 1940 – before volunteering for more service in World War II. Garrison Payne’s virtual anonymity, despite his groundbreaking status as the first Black naval officer and a Navy Cross recipient, stemmed from pervasive racial discrimination, manifested in political and public opposition (notably by white supremacist politicians like James K. Varner and John C. Stennis), and internal resistance within the Navy. His long anonymity exemplifies a failure to learn from the past.2

Fig. 02. Ensign Payne (seated), in command of USS SC-83. (Photo credit: subchasers.org.)

Garrison Payne, or W.G. Payne, served in or commanded several vessels and had multiple shore assignments during his five-decade career. His officer assignments include commanding the aforementioned USS SC-83 and serving aboard the minesweeper USS Teal (AD-23), the collier USS Neptune (AC-8), submarine chasers Eagle 19 and Eagle 31, which he may have also commanded, and troop ship USS Zeppelin. He had a lengthy record as a Chief Boatswain’s Mate (Chief Bos’n).

Fig. 03: 1917 North Carolina Service Card, thirty-three year-old Chief Boatswain’s Mate Garrison Payne was discharged from the Navy and immediately “Appointed Officer” (Commissioned) on 15 December 1917 while assigned to the USS Neptune (AC-8) at Naval Base, Plymouth, England. (Credit: Public record in the public domain.)

After his commissioning in Plymouth, he presumably stayed in England and later took command of the USS SC-83 after she transited from New London, Connecticut to Plymouth, England in May 1918.

Garrison Payne took Rosa Manning, a widow with a young daughter, as his first wife in 1916. The 1910 North Carolina Census records indicate that she was the daughter of Sami and Annie Hall, both listed as Black in the census records. Later census records list Rosa Payne as White, and using her mother’s maiden name (Manning), as she did on their 1916 marriage license. His race was also indicated as White on the license, and his parents listed as Jackson Payne and Ruth Myers (Payne), his maternal grandparents.

Fig. 04: Garrison Payne and an unidentified woman, possibly his second wife Mary Margaret Payne, presumably taken in the latter 1920s, location unknown. Courtesy of Jeff Giltz.

In the photo above, Payne, wearing the rank of lieutenant, stands beside an unidentified Black woman, who may be his wife. He brought back Mary Margaret Duffy from duty in Plymouth, England on the USS Zeppelin, a troop transport, in 1919, listing her on ship documents as his wife. He used various first names and initials to apparently help obscure his identity.

Jeff Giltz of Hobart, Indiana is the great grandson of Gertrude “Gertie” Giltz, Garrison’s half-sister by the same mother, Mary Alice Payne. She was unmarried at the time of his birth in 1881. Her father, Jack Payne was the son of a Robert Henley Payne, who traveled first from Virginia to Kentucky, and then settled in Indiana, may have been mixed race. During the U.S. Census, census takers wrote down the race of household occupants as described by the head of the household. Many light-skinned Blacks thereby entered into White society by “turning White” during a census year. It is unknown when Garrison made his “transition” from Black or “Mulatto” to White.

None of Garrison’s half-siblings, who were born to his mother after she married Lemuel Ball, share his dark complexion. When she married, Garrison was sent to live nearby with his uncle, William C. Payne, whose wife was of mixed race. In the 1900 Census, Garrison is listed as a servant in his uncle’s household, not his nephew.

Taken together – Garrison Payne’s dark skin, the fact that the identity of his father was never publicly revealed and that he was born out of wedlock with no birth certificate issued, that he was named for a famous White Boston abolitionist and newspaper publisher,3 that his White mother gave him her last name instead of his father’s, that he was sent away after his mother married, and the oral history of his family – all point to the likelihood that Garrison Payne was Black.

In the turn of the century Navy, individuals were sometimes identified as “dark” or “dark complexion” with no racial category assigned. Payne self-identified as White on both of his known marriage licenses. According to Jeff Giltz, there are many references to Garrison Payne in online genealogy, military records and newspaper sites, but none appear on the Navy Historical and Heritage Command (NHHC) website. His military service likely began in 1900.

Rolling Back Racial Progress during Modernization

In his 1978 book Manning the Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1898-1940, former U.S. Naval Academy Associate Professor Frederick S. Harrod discusses several of the policies enacted during that period that helped shaped today’s Navy.4 He describes how the famously progressive Secretary of the Navy (1913-1919) Josephus Daniels, otherwise notorious for banning alcohol from ships, brought Jim Crow policies to a previously partially integrated Navy (enlisted ranks only) and banned the first term enlistment of Negro personnel in 1919, a ban that would last until 1933. No official announcement of the unofficial ban was made, but Prof. Harrod asserts that it was instituted by an internal Navy Memorandum from Commander Randall Jacobs, who later issued the Guide to Command of Negro Personnel, NAVPERS-15092, in 1945. President Woodrow Wilson and Daniels were both staunch segregationists and White supremacists. The Navy became more rather than less racially restrictive during the Progressive Era because of the lasting effects of both Secretary Daniels and President Wilson.

The number of Negro personnel dropped from a high of 5,668 in June of 1919 – 2.26% of the total enlisted force – to 411 in June of 1933, a total of 0.55% of the total force of 81,120 enlisted men. Most of the Black sailors were in the Stewards Branch, and most were low ranking with no authority over White sailors, despite their many years of service and experience. Those very few “old salts” outside that branch, like Payne, were difficult to assign, as the Navy did not want them supervising White sailors, despite their expertise and seniority.

Following his temporary promotion to the commissioned officer ranks – rising as far as lieutenant on 01 July 1919 – Garrison Payne was eventually reverted to Chief Bos’n, until he was given an honorific, or “tombstone”, promotion to the permanent grade of lieutenant in June of 1940, just before his retirement. Payne died on 14 October 1952 in a Naval Hospital in San Diego California, and was interred in nearby Fort Rosacrans National Cemetery on 20 October 1952, in Section P, Plot P 0 2765 – not in the Officer’s Sections A or B, despite being identified as a lieutenant on his headstone. Garrison Payne’s hometown newspaper’s death notice indicates that he was the grandson of Jack Payne, with no mention of his parents. A handwritten notation on his Internment Control Form indicates that he enlisted on 31 March 1943, making him a veteran of both world wars, as also reflected on his headstone. His service in World War II – as a volunteer 62-year-old retiree – deserves further investigation.

Fig. 05: Garrison Payne’s final resting place, in Section P, Plot P 0 2765 of Fort Rosacrans National Cemetery. Courtesy of U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs, Veteran’s Legacy Memorial.

The Navy reluctantly commissioned the Golden Thirteen in 1945 only because of political pressure from the White House and from civil rights organizations like the NAACP, led by Walter F. White, the light-skinned, blond-haired, blue-eyed Atlanta Georgia native who embraced his Black heritage. Unlike Walter White, though, Garrison Payne likely hid his mixed-race heritage to protect his life, his family, and his career. When he married Mary Margaret Duffy in 1937, at the age of 54, he travelled more than 170 miles from San Diego, California to Yuma, Arizona to do so. Why? His new wife, Mary Margaret Duffy, was 37, and an immigrant from Ireland. He had previously listed her as his wife when he transported her to America in 1919. Are there records of this marriage overseas? Would that interracial marriage have been recognized, given that interracial marriage would remain illegal in both states for years to come? On their marriage certificate, as with Payne’s first marriage certificate, both spouses are listed as White.

The Navy’s Circular Letter 48-46, dated 27 February 1946, officially lifted “all restrictions governing the types of assignments for which Negro naval personnel are eligible.” Despite that edict, and President Truman’s Executive Order desegregating the armed forces in 1948, it would be decades before the Navy’s officer ranks would include more than fifty Blacks.

The stories of several early Black chief petty officers are missing from the Navy’s Historical and Heritage Command’s website, though it does include the story of a contemporary of Payne’s, Chief Boatswain’s Mate John Henry “Dick” Turpin, a Black man. That Payne, a commissioned officer, is absent and unrecognized can be attributed to at least five possible reasons.

The first is that the Navy didn’t know of his existence, significance, or accomplishments. Table 5 in Professor Harrods’s book is titled “The Color of the Enlisted Forces, 1906 – 1940,” and is compiled from the Annual Reports of the Chief of Navigation for those years, with eleven different racial categories, including “other.” Where Garrison Payne fell in those figures during his enlisted service is uncertain, but he was present in the Navy for each of those year’s reports.

The second is that Payne had no direct survivors to tell his story, and no one may have asked him to tell it. He and his first wife Rosa likely divorced sometime after the death of their only child. It is unknown if his Irish-born wife Mary Margaret produced any children by Garrison.

The third reason could be that the Navy may have kept his story quiet for his own protection, and that of the Woodrow Wilson administration and the Indiana political leadership. Garrison Payne was commissioned by the same President Woodrow Wilson who screened the movie Birth of a Nation at the White House in 1915, re-segregated the federal government offices in Washington DC, refused to publicly condemn the racial violence and lynching during the “Red Summer” of 1919, and whose Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, was one of the masterminds behind the 1898 Wilmington Insurrection, which violently overthrew an elected integrated government in Wilmington, North Carolina. Acknowledging Payne as a decorated and successful Black naval officer would have been an embarrassment to Wilson, Daniels, and undercut their political and racist agendas.

Black veterans were specifically targeted after both world wars, by both civilians and military personnel, to reassert White supremacy. Payne was from Indiana, where the Ku Klux Klan was revived in 1915, and became a very powerful organization in the 1920’s. Such organizations may have sought out and harassed Payne and his family, had they known that this Black Indiana farm boy, born to a White mother, had not only received a commission in the U.S. Navy but had commanded White men in combat.

The fourth reason is that the Navy may have wanted to hide his racial identity. His record of accomplishment as a Navy Cross recipient and ship’s C.O. would have undermined the widespread belief that Black men could not perform successfully as leaders, much less decorated military officers. He was not commissioned as part of some social experiment or social engineering, but because the Navy needed experienced, reliable men to man a rapidly-expanding fleet and train inexperienced crews. Garrison Payne did just that, during years of dangerous duty at sea.

The fifth reason may be that Payne recognized the benefits of passing for White to his life and career, which may have compelled him to do so. He was raised in a largely white society, by white-appearing relatives. Had he not successfully “passed,” he likely would not have been commissioned.

Regardless of the reasons in the past, it is now time to herald the brave naval service of Garrison Payne. The Navy Historical and Heritage Command, the Smithsonian Institution, the Indiana Historical Society, the Hampton Roads Navy Museum, and others should work together to bring his amazing story out of the shadows.

Why Garrison Payne’s Story Matters

For years, many Black naval officers have searched in vain for stories of their heroic forebearers. Actions taken by politicians regarding nominations to military academies for much of the 20th century helped ensure that Black military officers remained a rarity, particularly those hailing from Southern states.5 The life story of Lieutenant Garrison Payne needs to be thoroughly documented and publicized because representation matters. On a personal note, knowing of his story while I was serving as one of the few Black officers in the Navy would have inspired me immensely. Garrison Payne served as likely the only Black officer in the Navy for his entire career. He showed what was possible. Heralding his trailblazing career can only positively impact the discussions about the future composition of the U.S. Navy’s officer corps as it inspires generations of sailors. Historians and researchers should continue the work of archival research to gain a fuller understanding of his story and significance. My hope is that veteran’s organizations and national institutions such as the Smithsonian Institution begin the effort to flesh out the story of Lieutenant Garrison Payne.

Reuben Keith Green, Lieutenant Commander, USN (ret) served 22 years in the Atlantic Fleet (1975-1997). After nine years in the enlisted ranks as a Mineman, Yeoman, and Equal Opportunity Program Specialist, he graduated from Officer Candidate School in 1984 and then served four consecutive sea tours. Both a steam and gas turbine qualified engineer officer of the watch (EOOW), he served as a Tactical Action Officer (TAO) in the Persian Gulf, and as executive officer in a Navy hydrofoil, USS Gemini (PHM-6). He holds a Master’s degree from Webster University in Human Resources Development, and is the author of Black Officer, White Navy – A Memoir, recently published by University Press of Kentucky.

Endnotes

1. Except as otherwise cited, research in this article is based on documents in the author’s possession and oral history interviews with Mr. Jeff Giltz.

2. War and Race: The Black Officer in the American Military. 1915-1941, 1981, Gerald W. Patton, Greenwood Press

3. All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery, 2008, Henry Mayer, W. W. Norton and Company

4. Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940, 1978, Frederick S. Harrod, Greenwood Press.

5. The Tragedy of the Lost Generation, Proceedings, August 2024, VOL 150/8/1458, John P. Cordle, Reuben Keith Green, U.S. Naval Institute.

Featured Image: SC 83 underway, steaming under a bridge. (Photo via Subchaser.org)

Education

The Theoretical Edge: Why Junior Officers Should Study Military Classics

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By Jack Tribolet

Throughout history, war has tested human ingenuity, often deciding the fate of empires, nations, and ideologies. Imagine looking out over an active battlefield, the air thick with tension and kinetic projectiles. Each choice could alter history, and you suddenly have a consequential decision to make with lives on the line. This is not only a hypothetical scenario but a possibility for which junior officers must be mentally prepared. While proficiency in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) is essential, broadening their understanding of the warfighting domains is equally important. This broader understanding can be achieved by studying military theory in a challenging era where the history discipline is contracting.1

Studying prominent military theorists before mid-level Professional Military Education would give junior officers a comprehensive understanding of the warfighting domains, enhancing their situational awareness and decision-making abilities. By studying theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and John Boyd before mid-level Professional Military Education (PME), junior officers can enhance their situational awareness and decision-making capabilities, increasing their lethality.

Dominant military theorists such as Clausewitz, Mahan, and Giulio Douhet provided perspective to their respective eras and domains of war, adding clarity and grammar to chaos. Others, such as Antoine Jomini, Julian Corbett, and Boyd, refined and built upon previous theorists, sometimes not amicably. For cadets, midshipmen, and junior officers, delving into the works of these great minds is not merely an academic exercise but an integral piece of their professional development. By studying military theory in officer accession programs, officers could gain additional tools to think critically and lead effectively, ensuring they are well-equipped to face the increasingly complex modern battlefield.

By understanding the evolution of warfare and the application of historical lessons to contemporary conflicts, officers can develop what the French call coup d’œil — “a glance that takes in a general view.”2 Clausewitz defined coup d’œil as an “inward eye” enabling a “rapid and accurate decision” that would typically only be perceived “after a long study and reflection.”3 Coup d’œil requires trained observation and an exhaustive look at previous campaigns—strategy, tactics, decision points, technology, and truisms—all best encapsulated by military theory.

The great captains of military history, Caesar, Napoleon, Patton, and Mattis, have demonstrated the value of applied military theory. Each read history voraciously, Napoleon famously stating, “Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of the great commanders.”4 Therefore, the early introduction of this practice has infinite potential for the training of junior officers.

Defining Military Theory

Some might question the necessity of studying military theory before attending PME. To answer this, we need to understand the role of theorists. Clausewitz explains, “The theory of any activity, even if it aimed at effective performance rather than comprehensive understanding, must discover the essential, timeless elements of this activity, and distinguish them from its temporary features.”5

In other words, theorists identify and describe enduring principles of warfare. These principles remain functional across time and space, providing a framework for understanding historical and modern conflicts.

Niccolo Machiavelli, who predated Clausewitz by three centuries, said, “In peace he (the warfighter) should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.”6 Machiavelli’s discourse recodified the ancient Roman way of citizen war and reintroduced the Roman practice of applied history. His treatise was placed on the first papal Index of Prohibited Books in 1559 for his effort.7 It is ironic that perhaps the premier military theorist, Clausewitz, had suspicions of applied theory, warning, “Theory can never lead to complete understanding, which is an impossibility, but it can strengthen and refine judgment.”8 He believed theory should “guide him [the warfighter] to self-education” and hazarded against it accompanying “him on the field of battle.”9

Despite Clausewitz’s warnings, studying theorists affords officers essential battlefield grammar: friction, center of gravity, lines of communication, strategic versus tactical bombing, and many more vital employable descriptive terms. Clarity in writing equates to clarity in thought. Many senior leaders use these terms colloquially, sometimes confusing an untrained audience, which prompted their quick introduction into the midshipman’s repertoire at the University of Southern California Naval ROTC unit so that they could decipher “Colonelese.”

Ultimately, studying military theory links the past and present in the officer’s mind, developing an internal timeline for the continuum of conflict and facilitating the identification of timeless principles from precedents. Clausewitz’s emphasis on enduring principles and Machiavelli’s advocacy for continuous study highlights the timeless relevance of military theory in developing critical thinking and decision-making skills.

Historical Context and the Evolution of Warfare

Individual theorists define their age, but more importantly, correspond to their chosen domain of war. Battlespace environments or military domains, defined by physical characteristics, require “unique doctrines, organizations, and equipment for military forces to effectively control and exploit in the conduct of military operations.”10 Consequently, theorist grammar produces the archetypes of their respective warfighting domain, defining the realm and rules for operation.

Prominent theorists can be assigned to domains as follows:

Land Domain

Clausewitz and Jomini, who fought against and with one another in the Napoleonic Wars, endeavored to describe the fundamental nature of war but ultimately became the golden standard for land-centric campaigns. Jomini spent most of his literary career struggling against Clausewitz’s ghost, calling his logic “frequently defective.” However, he provided a valuable counterbalance to Clausewitz’s theories.11

In the scrum of theorists, Clausewitz has emerged as the champion, peerlessly describing war as a “continuation of policy with the addition of other means.”12 However, while Jomini’s attempt to entirely “sciencefy” war failed, his concepts of interior lines and the application of force are integral to land domain comprehension.13

Sun Tzu, who predates Clausewitz and Jomini by two thousand years, remains shrouded in mystery as the author’s existence and when he wrote his treatise fall under scrutiny. However, Sun Tzu provides insight into Chinese war grammar and way of thought, which is valuable in light of the inevitable Taiwan Crisis. His use of creative naturalistic dialectical metaphors to tether common sense principles to practices is absent in Western literature. Using dialectical oppositional pairs to capture a concept challenges the Western military mind and provides insight into the pacing threat.14

Other prominent land theorists include Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Miyamoto Musashi, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Mentecuccoli, Maurice Marshal de Saxe, Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Henry Lloyd, Helmuth von Moltke, B.H. Liddell Hart, and Heinz Guderian—an all-star lineup of some of history’s finest commanders.

Maritime Domain

Mahan and Corbett clashed on naval warfare in the age of the ever-enlarging capital ship, taking opposing views on employing fleets. Mahan advocated for decisive fleet-on-fleet battles involving capital ships, believing such engagements would determine naval supremacy. In contrast, Corbett viewed maritime power as a means to support land operations, emphasizing the importance of controlling sea lines of communication to ensure the movement and supply of land forces. These differing perspectives continue to influence modern naval strategy, as seen in the strategic deployment of carrier strike groups and the protection of critical maritime routes.

Other prominent maritime theories/theorists include La Jeune École, John and Philip Colomb, Herbert Richmond, and Hyman G. Rickover. However, due to the nature of maritime combat, naval theorists are as much technologists as strategists.

Air and Space Domains

Douhet, John Boyd, and John Warden arose in the 20th century with the advent of air power and had the difficult task of describing a rapidly shifting air domain. Douhet recognized the game-shifting application of air power in WWI and addressed the future of strategic bombing campaigns, which would shape Allied strategy in WWII. Boyd and Warden penned their concept of Strategic Paralysis in the aftermath of the precise bombing campaign of the Gulf War. Unsurprisingly, Boyd and Warden recognized the value of striking critical command and control centers; however, despite this leap in targeting capabilities, the priority of tactical versus strategic bombing remains in question, and both are seen in the current Ukraine War.15

Other prominent air theorists include Hugh Trenchard, William Mitchell, Thomas C. Schelling, and Robert J. Aumann. Unlike other domains, air power exists on an exponential technological curve, representing a formidable challenge for an air theorist to stay ahead of innovation.

Cyber and Informational Domains

Newest to the fight, these domains remain up for grabs for a future military theorist. The recently published Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 8-10 made a significant leap forward in informational doctrine, recognizing the new dimension of social media and access to information witnessed in the current Ukraine and Israeli Wars. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 8-10 must become required reading for all military members, regardless of position or rank, as it concisely captures a new aspect of modern warfare.

In culmination, the warfighting domains encapsulate the entirety of warfare, each with unique doctrines, responsible organizations, and history. Participants in these domains must endeavor to comprehend their battlefield and dissect their associated theorists to gain situational awareness to develop a refined intuition.

Strategic and Tactical Proficiency

Unlike standard military history, theorists exist in the realm of application, deducing principles from precedents. Mahan cautioned against mistaking precedent with principle, “a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success.”16

Principles of war guide the development and refinement of TTPs. For example, understanding the “economy of force” principle can help officers allocate resources more effectively during operations.17 By grasping the theoretical foundations of their TTPs, officers can enhance their tactical proficiency and make more informed decisions in the heat of battle. TTPs ultimately reflect the handed-down knowledge from competent predecessors, thus representing an ever-changing chain of lessons learned.

For example, at the Battle of Midway, Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky intuitively understood the Mahanian principle of a decisive naval battle enabled by his superior coup d’œil. Dangerously low on fuel, he continued the search for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers, putting his squadron into fuel extremis, knowing that he had to break his TTPs for the chance of decisive victory. McClusky’s actions at Midway demonstrate the practical application of Mahanian principles, underscoring the value of understanding military theory for effective decision-making. The IJN were strict adherents to Mahanian theory, and they forced Midway to become a decisive battle, just not in the manner they expected.18

Leadership and Decision-Making

Dominant battlefield methodology develops directly from technological innovation, and the rate of change increases the complexity of battlefield TTPs. Consequently, TTPs serve as a lagging indicator of technological progress. Increased complexity has downstream effects; as Clausewitz would say, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”19 The increased situational awareness gained by studying timeless military principles gives officers the required perspective in a fluctuating scenario to make critical decisions. “Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.”20

When becoming an aircraft commander, pilots are expected to learn their systems in and out—limits, emergency procedures, and TTPs—which become second nature through study. The end state of this learning profile enables the aircraft commander to understand when and how to break procedures as McClusky did. This analogy applies to learning domain warfare—by understanding the domain paradigm—junior officers have the foundational knowledge to understand the cause and effect of sometimes necessary TTP rule-breaking in warfare decision-making.

Beyond domain comprehension, some theorists provide critical insight into the decision-making process. Boyd’s OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) exemplifies how theoretical frameworks can enhance rapid decision-making, a crucial skill for junior officers in dynamic combat situations. For instance, during aerial combat, pilots who quickly observe the enemy’s actions, orient themselves to the situation, decide on the best course of action, and act swiftly are more likely to succeed. When internalized and practiced, this process can significantly enhance an officer’s ability to make rapid and effective decisions under pressure.

Case Studies and Practical Applications

Theory provides the realm of possibility, the domain’s boundaries, enabling a scenario-driven decision point. One example of a scenario-driven event is the Decision Forcing Cases (DFC) model used in the United States Marine Corps. DFCs represent a valuable tool for training cadets, midshipmen, and young officers. These scenarios encourage situational learning and critical thinking and facilitate stress through time restrictions and real-time instructor feedback.

However, instruction must include a deep dive into historical campaigns to maximize scenario-based theory learning and understand possibility boundaries. For example, an in-depth look at Napoleon’s conquest of Europe includes grand strategies such as logistical considerations and pairs them with tactical decision-making. Where do you apply force, and how?

Furthermore, what were the consequences of critical decisions made in the historical context? In 1812, Napoleon’s intuition failed him due to a lack of temperance. His Russian campaign provides a clear example of the importance of strategic decision-making. Initially aiming for a quick victory, Napoleon pressed on past his initial objectives, leading his troops deeper into Russia with Moscow in sight. This decision resulted in severe logistical challenges as supply lines stretched beyond their limits. The harsh winter compounded these issues, ultimately leading to an apocalyptic retreat where only 100,000 men of the 612,000 that crossed the border returned.21 Analyzing this campaign helps officers understand the critical balance between ambition and logistical feasibility in military strategy and should provide a warning to pair objectives with temperance.

A deep understanding of the continuum of change in war enables officers to identify truisms and trends, which expands their ability to anticipate further evolution—”Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war.”22 The current conflict in Ukraine has spotlighted the real-time evolution of drone warfare. Consequently, future drone theorists and AI integration arbiters are likely already in the service or will soon be joining. These fundamental changes to warfare outline a ripe opportunity to deliver the grammar of these technologies into doctrine, thus necessitating these future service doctrine-writing members to have a firm grasp on previous theories as they initiate the testing phase.

Conclusion: Preparing Junior Officers for Modern Warfare

Integrating military theory into early education—officer ascension programs, and training would equip junior officers with essential principles for effective leadership and decision-making— coup d’œil. Officer Candidacy School, ROTC, and the academies must strive to add the study of theorists to curriculums inside and outside the classroom. Furthermore, this instruction must continue into active units, which could be as simple as guided discussion groups led by unit commanders. Military theory provides a framework for understanding historical and contemporary conflicts by distilling complex concepts into coherent truisms. Effective decision-making lies at the heart of officership, and studying military theory refines and strengthens this critical skill. As the adage goes, “He who desires peace should prepare for war.”23

By incorporating military theorists into their early education, junior officers and officer candidates engage with the primary sources of war, which better prepares them to lead confidently in the challenges of modern warfare.

Lieutenant Jack Tribolet is Assistant Professor of Naval Science at the University of Southern California ROTC and is the course coordinator for Seapower and Maritime Affairs. He is a naval aviator.

References

1 Bret Devereaux, “The History Crisis Is a National Security Problem, Foreign Policy, March 10, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/10/the-history-crisis-is-a-national-security-problem/

2 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “coup d’oeil,” accessed July 8, 2024, https://www.oed.com/

3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 102.

4 Kevin Kinley, “Thumbing through the Napoleonic Wars: The Words of Napoleon and Others Who May Have Influenced His Methods,” The Napoleon Series, Accessed July 17, 2024. https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/napoleon/c_quotes.html

5 Clausewitz, On War, 11.

6 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W.K. Marriott, (New York: NY, Fall River Press, 2017), 62.

7 John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (Westminister: UK, Penguin Books, 2018) 110.

8 Clausewitz, On War, 193.

9 Clausewitz, On War, 4.

10 Michael P. Kreuzer, “Cyberspace is an Analogy, Not a Domain: Rethinking Domains and Layers of Warfare for the Information Age,” The Strategy Bridge, July 8, 2021. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/8/cyberspace-is-an-analogy-not-a-domain-rethinking-domains-and-layers-of-warfare-for-the-information-age

11 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008) 127.

12 James Holmes, “Everything You Know About Clausewitz Is Wrong,” The Diplomat, November 12, 2012. https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/everything-you-know-about-clausewitz-is-wrong/

13 Jomini, The Art of War, 77.

14 Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 66.

15 David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1995) 13, 23.

16 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Boston: Little Brown, 1902), 7.

17 Paul Murdock, “The Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force,” Parameters 32, no. 1 (May 2002): 86.

18 Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 215-216.

19 Clausewitz, On War, 119.

20 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, (New York: NY, Fall River Press, 2015) 69.

21 T. Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “French invasion of Russia,” Encyclopedia Britannica, July 11, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/event/French-invasion-of-Russia.

22 Giulio Douhet, The Command of The Air, trans. Dino Ferari (Eastford, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2020), 30.

23 John Clarke, “De Rei Militari by Flavius Vegetius Renatus” in Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time, edited by Thomas R. Phillips, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 124.

Featured Image: Painting “Rescue of the crew of Achille during the Battle of Trafalgar,” by Richard Brydges Beechey, 1884. (Via Wikimedia Commons)

Interviews

Iron Leadership – A Conversation with RADM Mike Studeman, USN (Ret.)

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By Commander Christopher Nelson, USN

I recently had the opportunity to correspond with Rear Admiral Mike Studeman (Ret.), who retired after over 35 years of distinguished service as a naval intelligence officer. He has authored a compelling book on leadership entitled, Might of the Chain: Forging Leaders of Iron Integrity. What stood out to me was how he skillfully wove personal experiences into his leadership lessons. The book not only offers valuable insights into leadership, but also provides a rare, humanizing glimpse into his personal journey. Our discussion explores both the practical advice and the personal stories that have shaped him, offering a deeper understanding of the leader behind the lessons.

Your book is rich with memorable quotes and epigrams. It is also full of short, interesting stories about past experiences. Why write this book, and do you journal? How do you capture in writing what matters to you for later use?  

Thank you for the positive feedback on my leadership book. I wrote the book out of concern for growing dysfunction in American society and the failures of some in positions of power to lead properly—in principled, enlightened, and inspiring ways grounded in character, accountability, and fundamental decency.

I have been writing in personal journals since I joined the Navy (so for over 35 years now), making entries once or twice a month to record something worth remembering about family or life’s adventures. I have also kept separate professional journals to capture the wisdom of the world as I encountered it, no matter what the source. I found that manually copying quotes or insightful intellectual tidbits into a separate journal served as a form of memory reinforcement. Keeping information all in one handy place also facilitated ease of retrieval. The payoff over the years has been awesome, and I am glad I stay disciplined in using this expansive journaling practice.

What is the most underrated leadership quality in your opinion? And what is the most overrated?

I think authenticity is the most underrated leadership trait. Hollywood has created an impression that ideal leaders are hard-charging, independent, charismatic, and fearless individuals. In fact, leaders come in all forms and shapes—each can be highly successful in using their own combination of strengths to inspire others and achieve amazing results. The best leaders are always learning from others, but they know that their journey is a honing, not a disowning process. They are comfortable in their own skins. Being authentic is being true to you, taking pride in your origin story, and using it as a source of supreme foundational strength for continuing growth and impact.

The most overrated leadership quality may be extroversion. Over the long haul, I have seen a greater number of more effective introverted leaders than extroverted ones. I think this might be because extroverts sometimes try too hard to be everything to everyone. Introverts usually tend to be truer to themselves, which ultimately earns more trust from followers.    

If your actions caused someone to lose trust in your leadership and you were aware of this, what steps would you take immediately to begin rebuilding that trust? What advice would you give to others in a similar situation? 

If a leader is acting at all times in an ethical, caring, open, and constructive way then the likelihood of losing people’s trust is substantially lower. Trust can erode for any number of reasons. If people suspect the leader may not be well-intentioned, if they are not given an opportunity to understand the “why” behind directed actions, if the method for achieving a given outcome is questionable, the list goes on.

If I encountered such a situation, I would seek to understand the grievance and address it forthrightly with the people concerned. Many trust issues can be nipped in the bud by a leader simply showing up to listen to their people face-to-face and demonstrating an ability to factor in their concerns. Ignoring subordinates’ concerns, viewing complaints as illegitimate, and cutting off opportunities for healthy dialogue is the quickest way to fall off the trust cliff.

How do you differentiate between intuition and bias in your decision-making process? 

I love this question. All experienced leaders intuit to some degree and grow to trust their instincts over time. However, this can be a double-edged sword as you imply. Leaders can grow overconfident, even arrogant, about what they think. The key to guarding against bias is subjecting ideas derived from individual intuition to the scrutiny of truthtellers in one’s circle of confidants, colleagues, and friends. The more diverse and widely experienced that circle, and the greater the willingness of a leader to take advice, the less likely bias will take root. At a minimum, a leader listening to the inputs of others will become more sensitized to second or third-order impacts and find themselves better equipped to anticipate dangers along any chosen path.

Can you share a time when your intuition proved right, but had to defend it against perceptions of bias? 

My intuition after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 was that a China led by the CCP would be the next major dissatisfied, powerful, and globally revisionist nation-state challenge after the fall of the Soviet Union. That proved correct. During my career, I faced repeated perceptions of Indo-Pacific bias as I tried to articulate emerging dangers. It was hard to watch China’s rise remain largely unaddressed except by the excessively wishful thinkers in the engagement crowd while America remained embroiled in the Middle East. China used 20 years of American distraction in the Global War on Terror to gain incredible levels of power and global influence to undermine the West and the current international order.

What is the best book about leadership you have read – but it was not explicitly a leadership book?  

I am a fan of Alfred Lansing’s Endurance, describing Sir Ernest Shackleton’s trans-Antarctic expedition gone terribly wrong and the leadership he demonstrated to save his crew against incredible odds.

If you were a member of an interview panel, what is one question you would ask about someone’s leadership style that could lead to three distinct reactions: being immediately dissuaded from hiring them, feeling neutral or unimpressed, or being instantly impressed?

“Describe your greatest leadership success.” You can quickly tell by someone’s answer whether they focus on their individual efforts or a team’s. Do they make themselves the hero of their own story or do they humbly take pride in the collective contributions of a group and describe how acts of togetherness overcame a great challenge? You will get your answer in the first two sentences of the reply.

Senior executives in the private sector often work with leadership or skill coaches to refine their abilities. Atul Gawande, surgeon and writer for The New Yorker, wrote a compelling piece a few years ago about his experience using a retired surgeon as a coach. This coach observed him in the operating room—how he led his team, conducted surgeries, and interacted with nurses. DoD seniors do engage with “senior mentors” – retired flag officers, generals, and civilians. But this is often done in specific venues, not say, someone spending a week shadowing a senior. What are your thoughts on coaching and mentorship? 

I agree that quiet shadowing during a leader’s day-to-day activities over the course of many days can yield important insights into how someone operates. I say this with caution, however. Sometimes it can be misleading if a shadowing period occurs during a period of quiescence when the leader is not facing high-pressure moments or a crisis where a leader’s behavior might alter in significant ways. This is one of the reasons why retired senior coaching in the military is normally done during exercises, which induce stress and thorny situations that can be a better test of a leader’s full range of capabilities.

Superb leaders know that personalized coaching is a rare luxury and therefore encourage their personal staffs to provide unsolicited advice on their performance. If, as a leader, you can build psychological safety for those around you and encourage them to speak truth to power, they can create an omnipresence of collective coaching that can benefit everyone.   

You have been married to your wife for over 30 years and raised two boys. How do you think about being a husband and a father, and how leading at work might differ from how you think about leading – and following – at home? 

Lynne and I have been happily married for almost 33 years. We started dating in college when we were only 19. I trust her implicitly and she is the most caring and intelligent person I know. She was selected into the Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society at William & Mary—I was not. Because Lynne is also an incredible mother, I usually follow her lead on the home front. Her intuition and instincts are impressive and I continue to learn from her in how she employs her high emotional quotient to navigate a wide range of intra-family issues. What I learned through active followership at home, if you want to put it that way, I added to my kitbag of skills at work. I think fatherhood and marriage can make you a better leader if you remain mindful of continually learning from all those roles.

How do you think people best adopt leadership principles and tools that fit their style or personality?  

People should pay attention to the lessons of other leaders in their midst and experiment with techniques to see what works for them. Biographies of impressive leaders and books on leadership are helpful. In my book, I advise putting your own imprint on any borrowed advice. People should follow their instincts in this respect, but always pay particular attention to how their different approaches affect other people. Maintaining a sense of awareness of others and about yourself, without being overly self-conscious, can provide the right sensory inputs to enable fine tuning. Add your own stylistic stamp to anything you learn and apply, because in the end people still want your authenticity to shine through.

RADM Mike Studeman, USN, retired in 2023 after 35 years in the Navy. He led thousands of intelligence professionals at sea and ashore. He commanded a Global Communications Center, the Cyber Intelligence Center, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. He was also Intelligence Director for the Indo-Pacific and South America regions. In 2005 he was presidentially appointed as a White House Fellow, the nation’s premier program for leadership and public service. He currently consults, speaks, and is a National Security Fellow for the MITRE Corporation. He and his college sweetheart, Lynne, have two sons and live in Virginia.

Commander Christopher Nelson, USN, is a career intelligence officer and a regular contributor to CIMSEC.

The questions and comments here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Featured Image: Rear Adm. Mike Studeman assumed command of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and directorship of the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), during a ceremony in Suitland, Md., Aug. 1. (U.S. Navy photo)

Commentary

Navigation Plans Need Leadership and Resources to Get the Navy Truly Underway

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By Brent D. Sadler

Introduction

On September 18, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Lisa Franchetti released her Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN) laying out the course ahead for the Navy. The main takeaway is that the Navy must be ready to deter a militarily confident China by 2027. Achieving this is a tall order. NAVPLANs have been used by senior naval officers to provide guidance and caution against potential pitfalls along a course. CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert began using these documents in 2015 to inform the path to rebuilding the Navy. In recent years, the Navy’s NAVPLANs have taken on urgency to deter a rapidly expanding Chinese fleet.

That said, these plans have been ineffective for the better part of 10 years. The fleet has only grown from 271 warships in 2015 to today’s fleet of 295. This happens at a time the Navy, White House, and Congress have all committed to a fleet of 355 warships. But it took several years to even get a plan that could achieve that goal and by now should have delivered a fleet of 314 warships. Instead, the Navy is 19 ships behind.

Meanwhile the Chinese Communist Party has grown its Navy – the PLAN – by over 112 warships between 2004 to 2022, while the U.S. Navy’s size shrunk by three ships. Buoying the PLAN’s meteoric rise is a massive, modern commercial shipbuilding industry that is over 200 times the capacity of the U.S., giving China the ability to out-produce the U.S. fleet in a prolonged war. The challenge of growing the fleet is also hampered by inadequate munitions production and capability. In short, getting the Navy on course will require more than just building new warships.

Setting a Course

Given these challenges, in the NAVPLAN CNO Franchetti makes a clear preference for action focused on readiness by 2027. This framing provides needed urgency and focus to ensure a large organization of over half-million officers, sailors, reservists, and civilians act in concert with limited resources.

With limited warships and munitions, creative new ways of waging naval war are required. Enter the Navy’s almost decade-old concept – Distributed Maritime Operations. By dispersing the fleet across a wider area, China would have to deploy more sensors, platforms, and weapons to degrade the U.S. Navy. This concept assumes a high degree of connectivity across U.S. warships, submarines, and aircraft to work. Rightly, the new NAVPLAN embraces this concept and focuses effort on maturing critical enabling capabilities, including autonomous systems, big data analytics, and the maritime operating centers to fuse multiple data streams into actionable information for commanding officers at sea.

The rationale for CNO Franchetti’s update to the last NAVPLAN issued in 2022 by her predecessor is the more dangerous security environment today. To address this, and the most interesting aspect of the NAVPLAN, is Project 33. This refers to her core objectives as the 33rd Chief of Naval operations, and encompasses seven key targets:

1. Readiness – By 2027, achieve and sustain an 80 percent combat surge-ready fleet.

2. Robotics – By 2027, integrate mature autonomous platforms into every deploying carrier strike group and expeditionary strike group.

3. Warfighting Headquarters – By 2027, all numbered fleets will have fully functioning Maritime Operation Centers (MOC) to coordinate naval operations across the globe.

4. Manning – By 2027, achieve 100 percent active and reserve components manning, with 95 percent of authorized deployed billets filled.

5. Improved Quality of Life – By 2027, eliminate involuntary billeting onboard ship while in homeport, which is critical for sailors stuck in shipyards for prolonged maintenance with unsatisfactory onboard living conditions.

6. Better Fleet Training – By 2027, implement more realistic wartime exercising of the fleet for high-end warfare, especially through Live Virtual Constructive training (LVC).

7. Infrastructure – By 2027, act to address the Navy’s antiquated infrastructure and shipyard capacity to sustain the fleet.

Admiral Franchetti’s emphasis on 2027 is welcome given China has invested significant resources and political capital on being ready to persevere in a war with the U.S. by that year. Making a down payment alone on Project 33 will require growing the Navy’s budget three to five percent above inflation. Fully addressing the needs of the Navy will likely be a taller order.

Aside from specifics to remedy outdated shipyards unable to sustain today’s Navy, another issue not raised was the need to fuel the fleet. Since before World War II, the U.S. military had stockpiled fuel at the strategically important Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage facility in Hawaii. Due to years of neglect, that facility has been shut down, and no replacements have yet to been announced. Without adequate fuel reserves and the ability to move fuel to the ships and aircraft using it, the Navy is in a potentially precarious position. The DMO concept also depends on a robust logistical foundation that could outstrip the Navy’s current capabilities. Distributed logistics and robust fuel access are not effectively described in the NAVPLAN, an oversight that will need to be addressed in the near future by the CNO.

Without adequate manning and infrastructure the fleet will not grow to meet the threat nor can it be sustained. On this point the NAVPLAN’s details are too thin. It has been clear for many years that the Navy needs more shipyard capacity to build new warships and repair them. Yet no call for returning public shipyards to do nuclear maintenance on submarines nor calling for the building of new drydocks is mentioned. There is a political dimension to this of course, which is why leadership is required to get the Navy these needed resources from Congress.

Where the NAVPLAN is scant on details, it must not necessarily mean inaction. Seeking a new public shipyard is a herculean political and fiscal task, and would be a first since World War II. Congress in recent years has been willing to support larger budgets for getting the Navy needed resources, but the Department of Defense has been less willing. As such, leadership is required to propose a plan for a new public shipyard, which is well past due.

Another point that is caught between the bullet points of Project 33 is practicing for the next war. Standing up a maritime operations center (MOC) at each numbered fleet is past due, as is fully leveraging real-world exercises with virtual environments to most closely approximate wartime conditions. Yet to be truly ready, the fleet needs to be exercised in the harshest environment and threat conditions to persevere against a foe like China. Missing in the NAVPLAN is the value and urgency for exercising at the fleet-level to challenge planning assumptions, test systems performance, and validate crew competencies. With Congressional support, the Navy should evolve the current Fleet Battle Problem series of exercises into events similar in scale and design to the Fleet Problem series of exercises of the interwar period to prepare for modern naval warfare.

Finally, new approaches to recruiting and preparing sailors for the rigors at sea are urgently needed. Diversity, Equity and Inclusion was ostensibly intended to expand recruitment, but the record is far less than positive. That said, the Navy and the nation needs every physically able, patriotic citizen who seeks a life at sea to succeed. This means investing more in wider recruitment while not alienating traditional sources of recruits.

Getting the sailors the Navy needs means investing more in new recruits as well. This will of course add to the Navy’s budget and delay entry of these new sailors to the fleet. The Navy must accept that not everyone starts at the same point, but those giving their all are needed in these dangerous times. As such, more is needed to ensure new recruits are kept and brought up to meet and exceed technical training requirements. For this reason, programs like BOOST that were ended in 2008 need to be brought back and given an update. BOOST was intended to give promising enlisted sailors from disadvantaged education systems preparation for college and officer commissions. Today this is needed for able-bodied and driven recruits to prepare for not only commissions, but for highly technical specialties in short supply, like nuclear mechanics.

Conclusion

Admiral Franchetti clearly takes inspiration from her predecessor, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who was CNO from 1970 to 1974, during a tumultuous period for the Navy. As she more forcefully pushes the rudder over on a new course for the Navy, another Admiral’s words come to mind, Admiral William J. Crowe, “The CNO . . . can turn the helm, but the rudder doesn’t necessarily go with it, because there are a bunch of people down in the bowels pushing it the other way.”

A strategy or checklist will not deliver results alone. Bold leadership is called for, from the deckplate to the CNO. Admiral Franchetti’s NAVPLAN is welcome and needed, but its success will not be decided by how convincing the document is. She will need the support of forceful leaders throughout the organization who are driven by the vision of what is required, and who are held accountable beyond the limited tenure of their current assignments.

The consequences of further delays and procrastination only benefits the designs of rivals. The CNO has stated she intends to act vigorously and provide a stronger Navy for her successor. Hopefully there are more such leaders in the ranks with the backing required to finally bend the too-long downward trajectory of the Navy and get it on track for facing down today’s great power threats.

Captain Brent Sadler (Ret.) joined the Heritage Foundation as a Senior Research Fellow in 2020 after a 26-year naval career in nuclear submarines and as a foreign area officer. He has extensive operational experience in the Western Pacific, having served at Seventh Fleet, Indo-Pacific Command, as Defense Attache in Malaysia, and as an Olmsted Scholar in Tokyo, Japan.

Featured Image: Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 314 launch and recover F-35C as they work to renew their carrier qualifications onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by 1stLt. Charles Allen/Released)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.