By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The column discusses regional navies’ challenges, including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

While the Caribbean Sea is currently not as dangerous as the Black Sea or the Red Sea, from combating drug trafficking and illegal fishing to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations to a belligerent Nicolas Maduro regime in Venezuela, Caribbean naval forces have many daily missions and priorities. The United States, via US Southern Command and the US Coast Guard, and the armed forces of France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – which have overseas territories across the Caribbean – are all present across Caribbean waters and are critical partners of regional defense forces.

This commentary briefly summarizes the joint military Caribbean exercises scheduled for 2024 and other recent high-level meetings to understand the concrete actions regional armed forces are carrying out to tackle the region’s threats and challenges.

Exercises and Training…

Two major multinational military exercises will take place in the Caribbean. Later this year, the US-sponsored multinational military exercise Tradewinds 2024 will occur, with Barbados serving as the host. The Main Planning Conference (MPC) commenced in Bridgetown on January 29. “The main planning conference for Tradewinds 24 underscores our collective commitment to fostering regional security and stability,” said Maj. Angela Valcin, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) lead planner for Tradewinds 2024. The following “pivotal juncture” in the Tradewinds planning process will be the final planning conference in March, explained the Command.

Also this year, France will organize the multinational Caribbean exercise Caraibes 2024, which will take place on June 1-6. The January 23-24 planning conference held at the Joint Staff of the Forces Armées aux Antilles had representatives of the armed forces from the United States, Canada, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Netherlands, as well as numerous other state partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The maneuvers are focused “on a scenario involving assistance to the population following a natural disaster affecting the French Caribbean islands.”

Caribbean navies, along with several partners, also train via exercise Event Horizon, a multinational, multi-agency event aimed at strengthening the capacity of Caribbean and Central American countries in areas like maritime law enforcement, aeronautical and maritime research, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). The 2024 version of the exercise included troops and assets from the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), Cayman Island Coast Guard, Turk and Caicos Islands Regiment, the Dominican Republic Navy, and the Belize Coast Guard, in addition to the Colombian Navy and Canadian Armed Forces.

Bilateral maneuvers also occur with regularity, including passing exercises (PASSEX). The French patrol vessel La Combattante trained with the Colombian Oceanic Patrol Vessel ARC Victoria as part of exercise Royal Tucan in January 2024. A Colombian aircraft of undisclosed model and ships assigned to the Colombian Coast Guard also participated in the Caribbean exercises. “Operation Toucan Royal is part of a strategy to combat drug trafficking by sea and its related crimes;” the two navies are engaged in “operational and naval training activities… to enhance the capabilities of the two institutions and improve interoperability,” explained the Colombian Navy. Royal Tucan 2024 was the second iteration of the exercise.

In other words, there is plenty of year-round training across Caribbean waters. The three major Caribbean-focused multinational maneuvers are Tradewinds, Caraibes, and Event Horizon, but there are several bilateral exercises, such as Royal Tucan. (While a land-based exercise, it is also worth mentioning exercise Red Stripe between the JDF and British Army, which took place in January 2024.)

….And Meetings

Finally, while summits between Caribbean presidents and prime ministers with their US and European peers do not occur often, there is robust communication between these militaries. Just this past January, the 4th United Kingdom and Caribbean Heads of Defence Conference took place in Guyana to discuss issues including regional security.

As for the US, Southern Command’s commander, US Army General Laura Richardson, participated in the Caribbean Nations Security Conference 2023, co-organized by Southern Command and the Jamaica Defence Force, last June 2023. A total of 16 nations from across the Caribbean, plus the United States, participated. More recently, the 2023 Caribbean-US High-Level Security Cooperation Dialogue took place last November. A dialogue statement announced how the participating governments pledged to cooperate on issues like maritime law enforcement and maritime security and defense. Specific topics addressed included commencing the implementation of the Caribbean Maritime Security Strategy “to advance sustainable and complementary defense and law enforcement cooperation, improve maritime operational capacity and security,” and also to “employ Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) technology to identify and disrupt illicit networks and more effectively detect illicit maritime activity throughout the Region.”

The examples above highlight constant communication, apart from training, between Caribbean defense forces and their partners.

Ships and More Ships

Apart from the importance of training and high-level meetings, several Caribbean defense forces are in the process of obtaining new vessels to modernize their fleets: the Guyana Defence Force is awaiting to receive a patrol vessel purchased from the US shipyard Metal Shark; the Royal Bahamas Defence Force has purchased four craft from Safe Boats International; and the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) commissioned its new offshore patrol vessel, HMJS Norman Stanley, in November 2023. While acquisition programs are not as splendid as those of global naval powers or regional powers like Brazil, which is domestically manufacturing submarines and frigates, Caribbean militaries are slowly revamping their naval fleets. With that said, regional militaries require more (modern) ships at sea to properly patrol their vast territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

The limited size of Caribbean fleets means that regional and extra-regional partners are critical partners. SOUTHCOM, via the US Fourth Fleet and the US Coast Guard, already carries out continuous operations across the Caribbean. (In previous analyses for CIMSEC, the author had proposed that SOUTHCOM should be permanently assigned a hospital ship and one, if not two, littoral combat ships.) Similarly, the three European states with Caribbean territories deploy assets to the region. The Netherlands, for example, has a rotating offshore patrol vessel in the Dutch Caribbean, in addition to the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard. In January, the Dutch military’s General Atomic MQ9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles flew their final surveillance missions across the Dutch Caribbean before their new deployment in Romania. 

Analysis

While the Caribbean does not receive the attention it deserves in Washington, militaries and coast guards have been active across these waters in January 2024 alone, with several important maritime operations: the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard deployed a Metal Shark patrol vessel and a helo to intercept a small speedboat between Little Curacao and Curacao islands; aboard were packages totaling over 218 kilograms of cocaine. Similarly, The JDF Coast Guard intercepted a vessel transporting “2,600 pounds of ganja;” the operation represents “a major dent against the drug-for-guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti.” As the violence and instability in Haiti will not improve anytime soon, it is important for Caribbean navies and coast guards to have larger, and more modern, maritime and air assets to patrol their own waters to combat crimes related to Haiti.

Also in January, the US Coast Guard Cutter Resolute (WMEC 620) docked in Saint Petersburg, Florida, completing a 60-day mission. The Cutter unloaded “approximately $55 million worth of illicit narcotics” during its operations as part of Joint Interagency Task Force-South. The same month, the Coast Guard Cutter Margaret Norvell (WPC-1105) “offloaded more than 2,450 pounds of cocaine with an assessed street value of approximately $32.2 million” in two separate missions. Drug trafficking continues to be rampant across the Caribbean waters. Hence, Navy and Coast Guard vessels voyaging the seas, not to mention maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs serving as a vital eye in the sky, are necessary to crack down on this never-ending crime. Vessels and supporting aircraft are essential to combat other maritime crimes, such as illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, piracy, or smuggling of weapons or human trafficking.

Moreover, HADR operations are vital during the annual hurricane season in the summer months. Past hurricanes like Irma in 2017, Dorian in 2019, and Eta and Iota in 2020 devastated Caribbean islands and Central America. As this article was being written, the international media reported that scientists are proposing hurricanes have a Category 6 (the current maximum is Category 5), given that climate change will increase their strength and destructiveness in the coming years. Cooperation and experience to work jointly will be critical when, inevitably, Category 6 hurricanes hit the Caribbean and militaries, including extra-regional partners, are deployed to the frontlines of HADR operations.

While inter-state conflict remains unlikely, the Maduro regime in Venezuela remains a security concern, certainly not for the United States, with threats to neighboring military-weaker Guyana especially concerning. The collusion between the Maduro regime and drug-trafficking cartels makes the regime even more of a regional and global concern. In late 2023, the British patrol vessel HMS Trent voyaged by Guyanese waters to support Georgetown against controversial and belligerent statements and actions by the Nicolas Maduro regime, including a December 2023 referendum.

This year is already shaping up to be full of capacity training and joint interoperability training for Caribbean naval forces, given exercises Tradewinds, Caraibes, and Event Horizon, not to mention several bilateral exercises. While the situation across the Caribbean is not as dire as the Black Sea or the Red Sea, its geographical proximity to the US, the plethora of regional allies, the ever-present drug trafficking (among other crimes), and upcoming natural disasters mean that Washington should provide relevant agencies and partners with more assets and resources.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: Belize Defense Force, Meixcan Marines, and US Marines conduct culminating exercises including vehicle takedown, search and seizure, arrest, riot control, and building raids May 19, 2022 at Belize Police Training Academy for Tradewinds 2022 (Belizian government photo by Spc. Emiliano Alcorta). 

By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez and Ryan Markey

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” –General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

The United States Navy has announced plans to decommission two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) in 2024. The Independence-variants USS Jackson (LCS 6) and USS Montgomery (LCS 8) will be decommissioned and then available for foreign military sale (FMS) for U.S. allies and partners around the world. At the same time, new LCSs continue to be constructed; the 16th and final Freedom-variant LCS, the future USS Cleveland (LCS 31), was launched in mid-April.

The LCS program has offered mixed results for the U.S. Navy. That said, the LCSs have proven valuable for U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and its naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet, for operations across the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. SOUTHCOM deserves permanently assigned LCSs to help make the most of these ships and to better fulfill the missions within the region.

The Situation 

The problems with the LCSs have been well-recorded, including major issues with the structure of some hulls, engines, and other systems. Arguably, the U.S. Navy made necessary adjustments to the LCS program, which mitigates sunk costs. For example, manning is scaled back to one crew per vessel, and starting with USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul (LCS 21), the ships are delivered to the fleet with a combining gear fix. Nevertheless, the LCS fleet has been sharply criticized, and often for good reason. In an April 2023 commentary for Proceedings, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Anthony Carrillo aptly summarizes the problems with the LCS, including risks to the aluminum hulls.

On the other hand, across Latin American and Caribbean waters, the LCSs have been quite effective. To summarize, U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operations across these waters feature patrol operations, freedom of navigation operations, and exercises with regional partners – including exercise UNITAS, Tradewinds (which will occur in Guyana in July 2023) PASSEX, among others. Moreover, vessels from these services help regional partners with humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, search and rescue, and surveillance operations. Perhaps, the most well-known application of surface operations in SOUTHCOM’s waters is the combination of USN and USCG assets cracking down on maritime crimes, particularly smuggling, IUU fishing, and drug trafficking, carried out by the infamous go fast-vessels and narco-submarines. Ships from both services work alongside Latin American and Caribbean naval and coast guard platforms to combat a large variety of maritime crimes.

Fourth Fleet does not have any permanently assigned ships, making the fleet responsible for the Panama Canal devoid of ships. Since SOUTHCOM has historically been the lowest priority Combatant Command of the U.S. military, the assets and platforms made available to SOUTHCOM are tightly limited in quantity and duration. Generally speaking, LCSs and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGs) have operated in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibilities (AOR) in recent years. Case in point, SOUTHCOM announced on April 6 how “USS Farragut (DDG 99) offloaded approximately 2,314 kilograms of cocaine and 1,986 pounds of marijuana worth a combined $69 million in Port Everglades, Florida,” The offloaded drugs were seized from four go-fast smuggling vessel interdictions by the Farragut crew “with an embarked Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) 406 and Navy Combat Element (CEL) One from the ‘Jaguars’ of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron Six Zero (HSM-60).” Farragut’s operations took place across the Eastern Pacific Ocean in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

LCSs that have been assigned to SOUTHCOM include Freedom-variant USS Milwaukee (LCS 5), Freedom-variant USS Billings (LCS 15), and Freedom-variant USS Sioux City (LCS 11). These ships have engaged in bilateral exercises and missions to combat transnational organized crime, demonstrating the versatility of the LCS in partnering with regional maritime forces for these missions.

Analysis

One of the authors has written about the operations carried out by the Mercy-class hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) across Latin American and Caribbean waters and why the Comfort, or a future hospital ship, should be permanently assigned to SOUTHCOM (See CIMSEC’s “Hospital Ships: A Vital Asset for SOUTHCOM and South American Navies,” and “U.S. Southern Command needs a Permanently-Assigned Hospital Ship”). The same argument can be made for the LCSs.

Rather than decommissioning Jackson and Montgomery, the Navy, the Department of Defense, and Congress should seriously consider increasing SOUTHCOM’s budget to operate these two ships permanently, or at least long-term. Unlike other theaters where the U.S. Navy operates, the maritime operations carried out by SOUTHCOM and potential threats are best suited for LCS capabilities.

In his commentary, Lieutenant Carrillo argues, “Ships should fit a purpose, and the purpose of ships should fit into the vision of how the fleet fights,” and suggesting that “considering the lack of useful employment for LCSs in retirement, the best option is to cannibalize them for parts.” But there are other options for these ships. Focusing solely on fleet combat operations is counterproductive by asserting the LCSs are useless if they cannot be effective in major combat. This may generally be valid for the Indo-Pacific region, among others, but what makes SOUTHCOM unique is that the challenges found in Latin America and the Caribbean waters are dissimilar to other regions.

Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. Navy lacks maritime competitors. Moreover, SOUTHCOM is fortunate because most Latin American and Caribbean governments have cordial, if not robust, diplomatic and defense relations with Washington. Realistically speaking, only Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have openly hostile governments towards the U.S. (Bolivia has a navy but the country is landlocked). However, none of these countries have strong naval capabilities – even the Venezuelan Navy is no Kraken of the Caribbean. Hence, if Jackson and Montgomery were transferred to SOUTHCOM, there would be less of a concern or demand to heavily arm them (such as with complex mission modules) for an impending confrontation with a regional navy’s warships, which is more the case in other regions. Virtually all maritime operations in the SOUTHCOM region occur below the threshold of armed conflict, and the focus on countering crime and illegal fishing is highly complementary with the broader U.S. national security goal of enhancing rules-based order by defending the global commons.

Moreover, occasionally ships from states with whom Washington shares an adversarial relationship travel to the region, most recently the Iranian base ship IRIS Makran and the frigate IRIS Dena – whichdocked in Brazil in late February. A permanent U.S. naval presence could serve as a deterrent and competing actor to the potential presence of maritime forces from nations such as China, Iran, and Russia.

Additionally, permanently assigned LCSs would give the commander of U.S. Southern Command much-needed mobile staging assets in the wake of a natural disaster or any other crisis. However, authorizing the deployment of a previously unassigned surface vessel takes too long for many crises. Add the time for a ship to steam from the homeport to the point of incident and the crisis may already be over. Thus, SOUTHCOM requires enough ships to be assigned so it can maintain consistent presence in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific, which would require ships homeported on both U.S. coasts.

Finally, if enough LCS are transferred, their ability to bring organic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets for time-sensitive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection will give the SOUTHCOM Commander improved situational awareness and decision-making space. General Laura Richardson, SOUTHCOM’s current Commander, and Admiral Craig Faller, her predecessor, publicly expressed their concerns concerning U.S. Southern Command’s lack of ISR capabilities. In her 2022 Posture Statement, Richardson noted “USSOUTHCOM employs less than 2% of DoD ISR resources to counter malign state and nonstate actors. To meet the mission, we are pushing the envelope with innovative techniques, integrating publicly available information, advanced analytics, artificial intelligence and machine learning, and open collaboration with allies and partners to disrupt threats.” They both testified to Congress that SOUTHCOM requires a significant increase in airborne ISR, and they require a quick reaction capability to gain situational awareness. If employed creatively, the LCS might not completely cover the ISR gap, but the ship and its organic aviation detachment will provide part of the solution.

Conclusion

Assigning permanent vessels to SOUTHCOM will require special funding so the combatant command can shoulder the burden of funding ships the Navy may not want to pay for. This funding is not only needed for fuel and maintenance of the ships, but also increased manning at Fourth Fleet and logistical support in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Navy, Department of Defense, and Congress need to take appropriate budgetary considerations in the upcoming fiscal years so the LCS(s) can operate under SOUTHCOM as permanently assigned assets. With its extremely limited resources, SOUTHCOM bolsters U.S. interests and supports U.S. allies across Latin America and the Caribbean. While no other combatant commands (or the Navy in general) appears that interested in the LCSs, imagine the outsized impact SOUTHCOM could reap with these permanently-assigned ships.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He is an analyst that monitors defense, geopolitical and trade issues across the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.

Ryan Markey is a retired Navy Commander and former Chief Maritime Strategist at U.S. Southern Command. He is the owner of Sarissa Solutions, a U.S. consulting firm with a permanent presence in Guatemala.

Featured Image: NAVAL STATION MAYPORT, Fla. (Sept. 9, 2021) The Freedom-variant littoral combat ship USS Sioux City (LCS 11) departs Naval Station Mayport for a deployment, Sept. 9, 2021. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Aaron Lau)

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” –General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

The hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) has returned to Latin American waters, as the vessel carried out a medical assistance mission across the Caribbean from October to December 2022. This is the first time in years Comfort has been in the region since the pandemic begun. Other South American navies also have hospital vessels that carry out similar missions, primarily for their domestic populations. Hospital ships are some of the region’s most vital yet underappreciated assets, while also being one of the most tangible elements of how many regional populations interact with navies. The U.S. and regional countries should consider the benefits of hospital ship operations with a view toward potentially investing in more of these valuable vessels.

Comfort Returns

As part of Operation Continuing Promise 2022 (CP2022), organized by U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet, the 1,000-bed hospital ship commissioned in 1986 visited Colombia, the Dominican Republic (DR), Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras. The ship departed Naval Station Norfolk on October 19 and returned to Norfolk on December 21. As SOUTHCOM explained during the operation, “During these mission stops, Continuing Promise medical teams will focus on working alongside partner nation medical personnel to provide care on board and at land-based medical sites to increase medical readiness.”

Some medical services offered to Latin American and Caribbean citizens include preventive medicine, optometry screenings, general surgery, eye-wear distribution, and public health training. Comfort’s crew for CP2022 had military personnel from U.S. partners, including “Canada, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and more than a dozen non-governmental organizations.”

General Laura Richardson, who took command of SOUTHCOM in 2021, personally participated in the humanitarian mission. She traveled to Colombia when Comfort was there and visited the Dominican Republic to observe “the #USNSComfort’s #ContinuingPromise humanitarian mission & meet with security officials to discuss the USUS-#DominicanRepublic partnership,” SOUTHCOM tweeted on November 29.

The CP2022 was Comfort’s eighth deployment to the region since 2007. Since 2007, Continuing Promise medical personnel have treated more than 582,000 people, and conducted more than 7,000 surgeries, SOUTHCOM notes.

Hospital Ships in South America

Comfort is not the only hospital vessel that operates in Latin American waters. A quick perusal finds several of these invaluable assets across regional navies.

Peru is a good example. The country’s shipyard SIMA has built a fleet of medical and social service ships (Plataformas Itinerantes de Acción Social: PIAS) that operate throughout Peru’s various rivers, with one platform, PIAS Lago Titicaca I, exclusively assigned to sail in Lake Titicaca, which Peru shares with Bolivia. The ships provide medical and state services, like issuing national IDs, and bank services. For example, Lago Titicaca set sail on November 14 from Puno port to assist the populations of Moho, Yunguyo, and Puno with 14 stops. This was the ship’s fourth tour in 2022 alone. 

The Brazilian Navy operates several hospital ships (Navios de Assistência Hospitalar: NAsH): Doutor Montenegro (U16), Oswaldo Cruz (U19), Carlos Chagas (U19), Soares de Meirelles (U21), and Tenente Maximiano (U28). A new vessel, Anna Nery (U170), is currently in construction. Like Peru’s PIAS, these ships regularly sail through Brazilian rivers, providing medical assistance to isolated riverine communities.

Andrea Resende, Ph.D., an Associate Professor at the University Center of Belo Horizonte (UNIBH), explained to the author, four vessels operate in the Amazonian region, comprised by the 4th and 9th naval districts, and the NAsH Tenente Maximiano operates in the 6th District, the pantanal region. Doutor Montenegro carried out Operation Acre XXII in 2022, visiting indigenous and riverine communities in Acre and Amazonas states. With a crew of 85 military personnel and 29 health experts, the vessel provided a variety of services, like X-ray tests, surgeries, mammograms, testing for HIV, dengue, and malaria, and also providing vaccines.

Resende highlighted the importance of this fleet – “They are the main source of medical support for indigenous people and the ‘Riberinhos,’ a traditional population in Brazil… Considering that the Pantanal and the Amazonian region have large masses of water but low demographic distribution, the NAsH fleet is the only source of medical assistance that can reach those populations.” Helicopters can reach these communities with vital equipment and supplies, but the ships carry more personnel and capacity to provide services aboard.

Resende noted that humanitarian operations carried out by the Brazilian Navy also rely on partnerships: “The Navy performs operations with the Unified Health System (SUS – the public health care system) and NGOs. For example, in November 2022, the NAsH Carlos Chagas operated with the NGO Operation Smile, bringing a multidisciplinary crew to treat patients with cleft lips/palate in the Amazonian Region,” she explained.

Another example is the Chilean Navy, which operates a medical patrol boat (Patrullero Médico Dental-74), Cirujano Videla. The vessel was commissioned in 1994 as a patrol vessel but was modified by the Chilean state-run shipyard ASMAR. In 2006, it was renamed and tasked with carrying out medical duties, in addition to other missions. From November 15-19, Videla assisted communities in Quellón and Queilen, Southern Chile. Since its recommissioning over a decade and a half ago, the vessel has provided “over 80,000 medical services ” to assist the population of Chile’s Chiloé archipelago.

Mario Pedreros, a retired officer of the Chilean Navy and vice president of the Washington DC-based The Georgetown Consulting Group, explained to this author that the Chilean Navy and the Chiloé health service signed a cooperation agreement via which Videla sails the archipelago composed of some 50 islands to assist local communities that can range from 20 to 200 people each. “The medical services provided in the Chiloé archipelago by PMD Videla are the only option residents have” to access medical services, Pedreros noted. Hence Videla’s deployments are “essential and an operation only the Navy can provide, and that is recognized and appreciated by residents.”

Sailing Forward

Having hospital ships in a fleet brings obvious advantages during times of war. However, the navies of Brazil, Chile, and Peru utilize their hospital ships to routinely assist their fellow citizens. Similarly, Comfort is a significant expression of the U.S. desire to help people in need throughout the hemisphere. But more can be done to leverage these platforms and capitalize on the goodwill they have earned.

In a previous commentary, this author argued that SOUTHCOM should have a permanently-assigned hospital vessel. A similar argument can be made for Latin American navies. For Brazil and Peru, more riverine hospital ships are certainly welcome. It is a positive development that the PIAS fleet in Peru is fairly modern, as it was built over the past decade (an idea of former President Ollanta Humala), while Brazil is building Anna Nery – the first of the active fleet to have a female name, another positive development. Therefore, it is not unthinkable that Peru’s SIMA and a Brazilian shipyard could team in a joint venture to design a new model of riverine hospital ships. Similarly, as the Chilean Navy looks to upgrade its fleet of transportation vessels by domestically building new platforms at the Chilean state-run shipyard ASMAR, constructing an additional hospital ship is an idea that should not be overlooked. 

That said, regional navies indeed have multipurpose vessels that can be utilized for HA/DR operations or medical assistance. Peru has the Landing Platform Dock BAP Pisco (AMP-156), and its sister ship BAP Paita was launched on December 9. Similarly, Chile has other logistical platforms like transport vessel Aquiles (AP-41), Sargento Aldea (LSDH-91), Chacabuco (LST-95), and Rancagua (LST-92); “these are all logistical vessels with medical capabilities of varying degrees,” Pedreros noted. “Even the icebreaker [which local shipyard ASMAR is currently building] also has medical facilities,” the retired naval officer added.

When asked by the author if the Chilean Navy should invest in another hospital vessel like Videla, Pedreros noted, “nowadays, logistical vessels have various roles… and the new vessels of project Escotillón IV [a shipbuilding project also carried out by ASMAR] will have the capacity to carry medical beds for patients, and also medical equipment onboard, therefore increasing their [medical] capabilities.”

Building a hospital vessel is a complicated matter from a budgetary standpoint. Each Latin American Navy must consider its area of responsibilities and debate the requirements for hospital ships, including whether a single vessel is sufficient for distant operations. For Peru, having a fleet of PIAS is beneficial to cover the country’s vast Amazonian territory and Lake Titicaca, but multipurpose vessels are arguably sufficient for coastal HA/DR operations. The Brazilian Navy is in a similar situation. Nevertheless, acquiring at least one single but modern hospital ship that is capable of open-water operations could be vastly beneficial for several countries and fleets.

The work carried out by hospital ships throughout the Western Hemisphere has proven invaluable and delivered tangible humanitarian benefit. SOUTHCOM and Latin American navies should consider supporting the construction of more of these assets. The many civilians whose ailments will be addressed by the medical personnel aboard these vital maritime assets will undoubtedly thank them.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. He is the President of the new consulting firm Second Floor Strategies. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: Brazilian Navy Hospital Assistance Vessel Doutor Montenegro (U16) (Photo via Wikimedia Commons).

By Captain Steven Arango, USMC

Americans hear about countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran on a frequent basis, and for good reason. All have been intertwined in global affairs, politics at home, or both for most of this century so far. But in stark contrast, the United States has treated Latin America with “benign neglect.”¹

Although Russia and Iran have exploited Latin America for their purposes and to the United States’ detriment—China’s inroads into the region are among the most significant threats to U.S. national security.² China’s actions in the region reveal short and long-term plans to become the predominant superpower in the region.³ To do so, China’s influence has sowed its roots in two main areas: military and economic.⁴ But most importantly, this influence is not superficial—China’s actions seep through all levels of Latin American governments, even down to city halls.⁵ China is not simply a regional challenge; it is a global challenge as demonstrated in Latin America.⁶ To ignore Latin America is to ignore the critical inroads being developed by the United States’ chief competitor in its own backyard.

Military Influence

China’s military influence in Latin America is mainly through soft power, not physical presence.⁷ China has fostered significant military relationships through arms sales, exchange programs, and training engagements.⁸ China has found a fruitful market for arm’s sales in Latin America; in roughly the last eight years China has sold more than $615 million in weapons to Venezuela.⁹ Military sales may have started as simply small arms, but China’s expansion in this market now includes “aircraft, armored vehicles, and radars.”¹⁰ But these sales are not simply about the equipment; the sale is just the beginning of a relationship. Opportunities for training and maintenance follow each transaction—leading to greater interaction between these countries, their militaries, and China.¹¹ As these deals continue to grow, Chinese personnel and military bases in the region could follow.

China has also made major inroads with Latin American militaries through professional military education (PME) programs and exchange officer programs of significant scale. These programs steep Latin American servicemembers in Chinese military and political doctrine and anti-U.S. sentiment, while creating stronger relationships between the respective country and China.¹² To attract military talent to these programs, China has also offered perks to Latin American military personnel. China will pay for business-class travel for exchange students, provide five-star hotels, and pay for other expenses while they live in China.¹³ Since 2015, China has “trained more Latin American military officers than the United States, and the difference has grown every year since.”¹⁴

Recent SOUTHCOM commander Adm. Craig Faller noted in Congressional testimony that China was sending five times as many Latin American military officers to its war colleges compared to the United States.¹⁵ According to John Kreul, who was acting deputy secretary of defense for the Western Hemisphere, the feedback on these professional military exchange programs suggested they were “straight up recruitment and propaganda 24/7.”¹⁶ Once these personnel are educated in China and establish professional connections with China’s military, the United States may have to be weary of working with these personnel because of the potential operational security risks.¹⁷

Chinese Influence—Economic

Economic influence in Latin America is China’s main focus in the region. In 2000, China’s total trade value with Latin America was $12 billion. Today it is roughly $450 billion, and economists predict it could exceed $700 billion within the next 15 years.¹⁸ China is South America’s top trading partner and second only to the United States for all of Latin America.¹⁹ Underlying this trade is the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s ambitious $1 trillion trade and infrastructure program spanning across the globe.²⁰ One portion of this program is a proposed transcontinental railway that can link South America’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts from Brazil to Chile.²¹

As it does elsewhere, trade naturally builds relationships and influence in the countries China builds in.²² China can then use its powerful economic leverage in pursuit of political goals, such as persuading regional countries to withhold recognition of Taiwan—which it has.²³

China also engages in debt-trap diplomacy. Through deceptive trade and loan practices, China can manipulate and coerce countries that are unable to repay their loans.²⁴ For example, China uses contractual language that allows it to cancel and demand repayment on one loan when a country defaults on a separate loan from a “different lender,” which is unusual for government loans.²⁵ These contracts also allow China to cancel the loan if the “debtor country undertakes policy changes adverse” to China’s preferences.²⁶

Loans from China have penetrated significant sectors of Latin America, including energy and mineral sectors, port infrastructure, and telecommunications.²⁷ China is also willing to offer cheaper credit even to countries with poor track records of paying off debt, raising the likelihood that Latin American countries choose Chinese loans over competing loans from other countries.²⁸ And with the acute economic and domestic pressures in the region, many developing countries may not effectively consider the long-term consequences that may stem from these loans.²⁹

China has used these practices around the globe. Similar contracts forced Sri Lanka to hand over a major port to Beijing in 2017 when it could not pay off its debts.³⁰ There is also concern that countries with Chinese debt could be pressured into denying support to U.S. forces, including logistical infrastructure, staging areas, and ports.³¹ In fact, China has loans attached to “three [of the] largest projects of port construction by cost” in Latin America.³²

China’s focus and investment in telecommunication technologies in Latin America poses a major issue, too. Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, have created networks for governments and private sector telecommunications companies, while integrating local government staffs with Chinese personnel who have ties to the Chinese government.³³ These companies are willing to accept lower profits for greater access in Latin America because of the access it provides the Chinese government and vice versa.³⁴

To be sure, these countries do receive the benefit of modern technology and creating networks that can reach underserved rural citizens. However, China may use this new infrastructure to surveil and undermine Latin American citizens and apply its authoritarian philosophies on personal privacy against populations outside of China.³⁵ Indeed, one nation has asked the United States “for assistance in disassembling and disinvesting in the Huawei Smart City program because of excessive Chinese monitoring.”³⁶ But the more Latin American governments adopt this technology, the more difficult it will be for the United States to engage with them on national security issues.³⁷

Conclusion

Latin America is critical to U.S. national security and great power competition. Not only is it the geographic neighbor of the U.S., but the U.S. also has strong economic, political, and cultural ties to the region. According to the White House’s recently released National Security Strategy, the “Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region,” which is predominately Latin America.³⁸ But China is in Latin America to pursue long-term interests, and to ignore this reality threatens the stability of the region and the United States.

The Middle East has attracted most of the United States’ attention for the past two decades. Now, Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific have its attention. But the chief competitors in those regions are moving in next door. The muscular policies and military engagements that have been the hallmark of recent U.S. operations in the Middle East will not effectively compete in Latin America. The U.S. must use multifaceted soft power to combat China’s influence for the purposes of ensuring strong democratic governments and stability in the region.

Captain Steven Arango is a deputy staff judge advocate at Training and Education Command and currently working toward his LL.M. in national security and cybersecurity from the George Washington University School of Law. He was selected as a Regional Affairs Officer for Latin America. Prior to his time on active duty, Steven worked for the U.S. House of Representatives, the Department of Defense in the Office of General Counsel, International Affairs, and served as a federal law clerk for U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, who presides on the southern border.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

References and Links

1. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html; https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/strat-monograph/latin-america-2020.pdf

2. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

3. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

4. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

5. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

6. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

7. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

8. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri#chapter-title-0-5

9. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri

10. https://www.businessinsider.com/southcom-4-ways-china-is-growing-influence-in-latin-america-2019-12

11. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-security-engagement-latin-america

12. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

13. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

14. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

15. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html 

16. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-is-watching-chinese-influence-with-latin-american-militaries-2020-12

17. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

18. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri#chapter-title-0-3

19. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri#chapter-title-0-3

20. https://time.com/5936037/us-china-latin-america-influence/

21. https://time.com/5936037/us-china-latin-america-influence/

22. https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109459/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA07-Wstate-FonsecaB-20190509.pdf

23. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

24. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASOR/Journals/Volume-1_Number-2/Choquette.pdf

25. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_1_Section_2–Chinas_Influence_in_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf

26. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_1_Section_2–Chinas_Influence_in_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf

27. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

28. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-17/china-is-south-america-s-top-trading-partner-why-can-t-the-us-keep-up

29. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-17/china-is-south-america-s-top-trading-partner-why-can-t-the-us-keep-up; https://www.csis.org/analysis/case-positive-us-agenda-latin-america

30. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASOR/Journals/Volume-1_Number-2/Choquette.pdf

31. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

32. https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109459/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA07-Wstate-FonsecaB-20190509.pdf

33. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA800/RRA847-1/RAND_RRA847-1.pdf

34. https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109459/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA07-Wstate-FonsecaB-20190509.pdf

35.  https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA800/RRA847-1/RAND_RRA847-1.pdf

36.  https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA800/RRA847-1/RAND_RRA847-1.pdf

37. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA847-1.html

38. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

Featured Image: Army commander of the Lanzhou Military Region of China Liu Yuejun shakes hands with Venezuelan defense minister Gen. Vladimir Padrino 17 April 2015 during a visit in Caracas, Venezuela. (Photo by Boris Vergara/Xinhua/Alamy Live News)