By Aaron Delano-Johnson and Myles McCarthy

Introduction 

Sporting the distinctive racing stripe worn by many of the globe’s coast guards, the world’s newest polar-capable research vessel left the protected waters of the Gerlache Strait behind as it prepared to cross the Southern Ocean after completing its maiden voyage to Antarctica earlier this year. This cutting-edge vessel was not from a NATO country, Russia, or China, but Colombia, as it set sail from its homeport of Cartagena joining the ranks of South American countries operating ice-capable vessels and research stations on the seventh continent. As the United States and its allies struggle to project surface presence in the high latitudes, the ARC Simon Bolivar (PO-151) joins Chilean icebreaker CNS Almirante Viel (AGB-46) as the second domestically built polar-capable vessel to be commissioned in South America in the last 12 months. If the United States is serious about building capacity to operate at-sea in the high latitudes, it is time to look south. 

The challenge of building high latitude maritime capacity 

The National Strategy for the Arctic Region calls to expand the “U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker fleet to support persistent presence in the U.S. Arctic and additional presence as needed in the European Arctic.” Likewise, United States Policy on the Antarctic Region also identifies the need to expand the United States polar icebreaker fleet to maintain an active and influential presence in the region to support United States interests across the Antarctic Treaty System. 

The struggles to meet either goal are well-documented with critiques of the U.S. Coast Guard’s current icebreaker fleet, Polar Security Cutter program, and the broader state of United States shipbuilding continually in the news. What is not addressed in this debate about icebreaker capacity at-sea is that once the United States polar icebreaker fleet is recapitalized through new construction, or commercially procured stop-gap options, who will operate and maintain these ships in the harshest of environments?

Partnerships with traditional Arctic allies are a natural fit to build knowledge, skills and abilities of high latitude operations, but with a dearth of opportunities onboard both United States and NATO vessels operating in the polar regions, where else should the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy turn to learn from those with these skills and platforms? Look south.

South America’s Efforts in Antarctica

Stories of the Arctic and Antarctic studied in the United States tend to focus on the achievements of polar explorers from Shackleton to Amundsen, Soviet nuclear icebreakers, the indigenous peoples of the Arctic or perhaps the U.S. Antarctic Program’s work at McMurdo Station. Few are aware of the high-latitude capacity possessed by nations across South America, the same countries who are the closest partners of the United States in countering transnational organized crime, operating in the joint naval domain, and addressing illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing at sea.

Amongst them are upwards of 30 research stations, to include year-round presence at 12, a variety of aircraft launching from Chile and Argentina to support operations on Antarctica, and numerous icebreakers or polar research vessels by their navies or respective maritime services.

In a flurry of activity over recent years, the domestic construction or commercial procurement across South America’s polar fleet includes: Argentina will double its heavy icebreaker fleet with the construction of a second Polar Class 4 vessel set for the late 2020s to sail alongside ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5), the Peruvian Navy commissioned the BAP Carrasco (BOP-171) Polar Class 7 oceanographic and research vessel (2017), the Colombian General Maritime Directorate’s (DIMAR) ARC Simon Bolivar (PO-151) Lloyd’s Register Ice Class 1C FS (2023), the Chilean CNS Almirante Viel (AGB-46) Polar Class 5 was commissioned in July, while the Brazilian Navy awaits delivery of its next-generation, and domestically built icebreaker, dubbed the Antarctic Support Ship expected to be launched in 2025. Finally, Uruguay procured the R/V Mount Whitney, an ice-strengthened research vessel re-flagged in September as the Oyarvide (ROU-22), to reinvigorate support for scientific investigation and logistics for its Antarctic operations.

Polar expertise can also be found ashore. The School of Marine Sciences of the Argentine Navy hosts the International Maritime Organization (IMO) certified courses of Basic and Advance Navigation in Polar Waters while their Chilean Navy counterparts at the Maritime Training and Instruction Center offer a similar Basic and Advanced Polar Water Operations Course. Both courses are requirements for senior officers serving on their nations’ respective Polar Icebreakers, and each routinely welcomes international students, principally from Europe. 

While the United States’ ongoing attempt to recapitalize the ice breaking fleet languishes with delays, it is clear that United States Allies, partners, and adversaries continue, with greater frequency, to put ships into the ice.

Icy Operations: How U.S. Forces Are Engaging the Polar South

Collaborating with South American partners allows the United States to take advantage of a simple fact of geography: when summer precludes cold weather training in the Northern Hemisphere, opportunities abound south of the equator.

Who has looked south to expand opportunities for gaining proficiency in extreme conditions? The U.S. Army’s storied 10th Mountain Division, the 1st Marine Division, U.S. Special Operations Command South, and U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School have all attend the Chilean Mountain Warfare School while U.S. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center instructors have trained alongside the Argentinian Marines in Ushuaia practicing cold weather tactics and exchanging experiences. Likewise, troops from the Argentinian Mountain Warfare School and Chilean Marines have trained with their U.S. Army counterparts at the Northern Warfare Training Center and the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center. In addition to ongoing activities in Chile, recent key leader engagements with Argentina have advanced discussions on additional cold weather operations subject matter exchanges. 

The U.S. Coast Guard of course does have partnerships and conducts international engagements across the region from exercises to Security Cooperation. But for as much success as USCGC James’ had during its recent port visits along the east coast of South America as the ship conducted illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing operations in the South Atlantic, efforts by the U.S. to bolster polar cooperation in the region have been much more limited.

Most recently, while returning from their annual mission to re-supply McMurdo Station during the 2023 Antarctic season, USCGC Polar Star deviated from their normal trans-Pacific route to visit Punta Arenas and Valparaiso, Chile. These were the first visits to Chile by a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in over seven years and the first to Punta Arenas since 1987, and though the ship enjoyed a warm reception by their Chilean hosts including bilateral engagements, no repeat visit to the continent was made during the ship’s 2024 deployment. 

How to Build High Latitude Bench Strength at Sea

What would polar partnerships in South America offer to the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy? To begin, the need for added bench strength of operators with high latitude experience is real. Currently the U.S. Coast Guard’s high latitude efforts focus on preparing the heavy icebreaker USCGC Polar Star and medium icebreaker USCGC Healy for annual missions to Antarctica and the U.S. Arctic respectively. Healy and Polar Star represent the only two platforms in the United States’ combined fleet capable of training ice pilots, the essential qualification for operating ships in ice. On average, each qualifies just four to five new ice pilots a year, and given the rate of attrition in the U.S. Coast Guard’s Cutterman community, this leaves a very small candidate pool from which to fill current command cadre needs. And projected forward, this trajectory will leave the service critically short of the crews necessary for the nation’s envisioned future icebreaking fleet of Polar Security Cutters.

Since 2018 the U.S Coast Guard has looked to the Afloat Ice Breaking Training Program to help fill these gaps. However, the program is imperfect, and proposals to expand it are stymied by a critical factor: in an average year the United States only has one ship breaking international ice at a time, limiting space for trainees. So why not look to the rapidly expanding South American polar fleet for assistance? Precedent already exists for personnel exchanges in the region. Currently, the U.S. Navy has Surface Warfare Officers participating in two year exchange programs in Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, and Chile, with some calling to expand the program even wider. 

And personnel exchanges should work in both directions, as the U.S. Coast Guard can offer invitations to join icebreaking deployments to officers from South American countries in the same way these opportunities are currently extended to their NATO, Australian, and New Zealand counterparts. Similarly, the U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet recently concluded Operation Nanook, a Canadian led multinational exercise that while focused on the Arctic and NATO partnerships would certainly offer many lessons learned to South American nations with Antarctic interests. Put another way, polar officers need to know more than just the mechanics of how to operate a ship in ice, they need to understand the interests, ideology, and capabilities of all partner nations in the rapidly evolving high-latitudes. 

Potential opportunities to build bench strength are not just limited to expanding the Icebreaking Training Program. Junior officers aboard Healy and Polar Star could take advantage of their ships’ lengthy annual maintenance periods to seek temporary duty opportunities either aboard a ship or even by attending the aforementioned polar navigation courses in Argentina or Chile.

Finally, it takes herculean efforts in logistics to keep the aging U.S. icebreakers on mission. Forging mission support partnerships is often an afterthought that operational commanders scramble to expedite in times of crises. Establishing strategic logistics relationships with partner maritime services that can facilitate spare parts deliveries, conduct at highly capable shipyards across South America, and streamlined agreements for diplomatic clearances should all be a priority for engagement in the region. 

Conclusion

Afloat operations in the polar regions are fraught with risk. The United States needs to come to the region with not just capable ships, but with strong international partnerships and well-trained crews. With an icebreaking fleet that has historically relied upon on-the-job training to qualify the next generation of polar explorers, the U.S. Coast Guard’s “red hull” community currently struggles to support that model due to a lack of assets and opportunities with traditional partners. But polar force projection is of growing national significance, and the United States needs to look at the White Continent with a wide aperture lens. Logistics, memorandums of understanding, alliances, and certainly world-class ships and crews will all be essential in achieving future high latitude goals.

Aaron Delano-Johnson is an active duty officer in the U.S. Coast Guard. A ship captain and international affairs officer, he has served across Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Myles McCarthy is an active duty officer in the U.S. Coast Guard and an Olmsted Foundation Scholar completing a master’s degree at La Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. A ship captain, he hopes to return to sea upon completion of his studies.

The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or the U.S. government.

Featured Image: ARC ship “Simón Bolívar” conducts Antarctic operations. (Colombian Navy Photo)

By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The column discusses regional navies’ challenges, including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

While the Caribbean Sea is currently not as dangerous as the Black Sea or the Red Sea, from combating drug trafficking and illegal fishing to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations to a belligerent Nicolas Maduro regime in Venezuela, Caribbean naval forces have many daily missions and priorities. The United States, via US Southern Command and the US Coast Guard, and the armed forces of France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – which have overseas territories across the Caribbean – are all present across Caribbean waters and are critical partners of regional defense forces.

This commentary briefly summarizes the joint military Caribbean exercises scheduled for 2024 and other recent high-level meetings to understand the concrete actions regional armed forces are carrying out to tackle the region’s threats and challenges.

Exercises and Training…

Two major multinational military exercises will take place in the Caribbean. Later this year, the US-sponsored multinational military exercise Tradewinds 2024 will occur, with Barbados serving as the host. The Main Planning Conference (MPC) commenced in Bridgetown on January 29. “The main planning conference for Tradewinds 24 underscores our collective commitment to fostering regional security and stability,” said Maj. Angela Valcin, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) lead planner for Tradewinds 2024. The following “pivotal juncture” in the Tradewinds planning process will be the final planning conference in March, explained the Command.

Also this year, France will organize the multinational Caribbean exercise Caraibes 2024, which will take place on June 1-6. The January 23-24 planning conference held at the Joint Staff of the Forces Armées aux Antilles had representatives of the armed forces from the United States, Canada, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Netherlands, as well as numerous other state partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The maneuvers are focused “on a scenario involving assistance to the population following a natural disaster affecting the French Caribbean islands.”

Caribbean navies, along with several partners, also train via exercise Event Horizon, a multinational, multi-agency event aimed at strengthening the capacity of Caribbean and Central American countries in areas like maritime law enforcement, aeronautical and maritime research, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). The 2024 version of the exercise included troops and assets from the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), Cayman Island Coast Guard, Turk and Caicos Islands Regiment, the Dominican Republic Navy, and the Belize Coast Guard, in addition to the Colombian Navy and Canadian Armed Forces.

Bilateral maneuvers also occur with regularity, including passing exercises (PASSEX). The French patrol vessel La Combattante trained with the Colombian Oceanic Patrol Vessel ARC Victoria as part of exercise Royal Tucan in January 2024. A Colombian aircraft of undisclosed model and ships assigned to the Colombian Coast Guard also participated in the Caribbean exercises. “Operation Toucan Royal is part of a strategy to combat drug trafficking by sea and its related crimes;” the two navies are engaged in “operational and naval training activities… to enhance the capabilities of the two institutions and improve interoperability,” explained the Colombian Navy. Royal Tucan 2024 was the second iteration of the exercise.

In other words, there is plenty of year-round training across Caribbean waters. The three major Caribbean-focused multinational maneuvers are Tradewinds, Caraibes, and Event Horizon, but there are several bilateral exercises, such as Royal Tucan. (While a land-based exercise, it is also worth mentioning exercise Red Stripe between the JDF and British Army, which took place in January 2024.)

….And Meetings

Finally, while summits between Caribbean presidents and prime ministers with their US and European peers do not occur often, there is robust communication between these militaries. Just this past January, the 4th United Kingdom and Caribbean Heads of Defence Conference took place in Guyana to discuss issues including regional security.

As for the US, Southern Command’s commander, US Army General Laura Richardson, participated in the Caribbean Nations Security Conference 2023, co-organized by Southern Command and the Jamaica Defence Force, last June 2023. A total of 16 nations from across the Caribbean, plus the United States, participated. More recently, the 2023 Caribbean-US High-Level Security Cooperation Dialogue took place last November. A dialogue statement announced how the participating governments pledged to cooperate on issues like maritime law enforcement and maritime security and defense. Specific topics addressed included commencing the implementation of the Caribbean Maritime Security Strategy “to advance sustainable and complementary defense and law enforcement cooperation, improve maritime operational capacity and security,” and also to “employ Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) technology to identify and disrupt illicit networks and more effectively detect illicit maritime activity throughout the Region.”

The examples above highlight constant communication, apart from training, between Caribbean defense forces and their partners.

Ships and More Ships

Apart from the importance of training and high-level meetings, several Caribbean defense forces are in the process of obtaining new vessels to modernize their fleets: the Guyana Defence Force is awaiting to receive a patrol vessel purchased from the US shipyard Metal Shark; the Royal Bahamas Defence Force has purchased four craft from Safe Boats International; and the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) commissioned its new offshore patrol vessel, HMJS Norman Stanley, in November 2023. While acquisition programs are not as splendid as those of global naval powers or regional powers like Brazil, which is domestically manufacturing submarines and frigates, Caribbean militaries are slowly revamping their naval fleets. With that said, regional militaries require more (modern) ships at sea to properly patrol their vast territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

The limited size of Caribbean fleets means that regional and extra-regional partners are critical partners. SOUTHCOM, via the US Fourth Fleet and the US Coast Guard, already carries out continuous operations across the Caribbean. (In previous analyses for CIMSEC, the author had proposed that SOUTHCOM should be permanently assigned a hospital ship and one, if not two, littoral combat ships.) Similarly, the three European states with Caribbean territories deploy assets to the region. The Netherlands, for example, has a rotating offshore patrol vessel in the Dutch Caribbean, in addition to the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard. In January, the Dutch military’s General Atomic MQ9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles flew their final surveillance missions across the Dutch Caribbean before their new deployment in Romania. 

Analysis

While the Caribbean does not receive the attention it deserves in Washington, militaries and coast guards have been active across these waters in January 2024 alone, with several important maritime operations: the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard deployed a Metal Shark patrol vessel and a helo to intercept a small speedboat between Little Curacao and Curacao islands; aboard were packages totaling over 218 kilograms of cocaine. Similarly, The JDF Coast Guard intercepted a vessel transporting “2,600 pounds of ganja;” the operation represents “a major dent against the drug-for-guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti.” As the violence and instability in Haiti will not improve anytime soon, it is important for Caribbean navies and coast guards to have larger, and more modern, maritime and air assets to patrol their own waters to combat crimes related to Haiti.

Also in January, the US Coast Guard Cutter Resolute (WMEC 620) docked in Saint Petersburg, Florida, completing a 60-day mission. The Cutter unloaded “approximately $55 million worth of illicit narcotics” during its operations as part of Joint Interagency Task Force-South. The same month, the Coast Guard Cutter Margaret Norvell (WPC-1105) “offloaded more than 2,450 pounds of cocaine with an assessed street value of approximately $32.2 million” in two separate missions. Drug trafficking continues to be rampant across the Caribbean waters. Hence, Navy and Coast Guard vessels voyaging the seas, not to mention maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs serving as a vital eye in the sky, are necessary to crack down on this never-ending crime. Vessels and supporting aircraft are essential to combat other maritime crimes, such as illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, piracy, or smuggling of weapons or human trafficking.

Moreover, HADR operations are vital during the annual hurricane season in the summer months. Past hurricanes like Irma in 2017, Dorian in 2019, and Eta and Iota in 2020 devastated Caribbean islands and Central America. As this article was being written, the international media reported that scientists are proposing hurricanes have a Category 6 (the current maximum is Category 5), given that climate change will increase their strength and destructiveness in the coming years. Cooperation and experience to work jointly will be critical when, inevitably, Category 6 hurricanes hit the Caribbean and militaries, including extra-regional partners, are deployed to the frontlines of HADR operations.

While inter-state conflict remains unlikely, the Maduro regime in Venezuela remains a security concern, certainly not for the United States, with threats to neighboring military-weaker Guyana especially concerning. The collusion between the Maduro regime and drug-trafficking cartels makes the regime even more of a regional and global concern. In late 2023, the British patrol vessel HMS Trent voyaged by Guyanese waters to support Georgetown against controversial and belligerent statements and actions by the Nicolas Maduro regime, including a December 2023 referendum.

This year is already shaping up to be full of capacity training and joint interoperability training for Caribbean naval forces, given exercises Tradewinds, Caraibes, and Event Horizon, not to mention several bilateral exercises. While the situation across the Caribbean is not as dire as the Black Sea or the Red Sea, its geographical proximity to the US, the plethora of regional allies, the ever-present drug trafficking (among other crimes), and upcoming natural disasters mean that Washington should provide relevant agencies and partners with more assets and resources.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: Belize Defense Force, Meixcan Marines, and US Marines conduct culminating exercises including vehicle takedown, search and seizure, arrest, riot control, and building raids May 19, 2022 at Belize Police Training Academy for Tradewinds 2022 (Belizian government photo by Spc. Emiliano Alcorta). 

By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez and Ryan Markey

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” –General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

The United States Navy has announced plans to decommission two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) in 2024. The Independence-variants USS Jackson (LCS 6) and USS Montgomery (LCS 8) will be decommissioned and then available for foreign military sale (FMS) for U.S. allies and partners around the world. At the same time, new LCSs continue to be constructed; the 16th and final Freedom-variant LCS, the future USS Cleveland (LCS 31), was launched in mid-April.

The LCS program has offered mixed results for the U.S. Navy. That said, the LCSs have proven valuable for U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and its naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet, for operations across the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. SOUTHCOM deserves permanently assigned LCSs to help make the most of these ships and to better fulfill the missions within the region.

The Situation 

The problems with the LCSs have been well-recorded, including major issues with the structure of some hulls, engines, and other systems. Arguably, the U.S. Navy made necessary adjustments to the LCS program, which mitigates sunk costs. For example, manning is scaled back to one crew per vessel, and starting with USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul (LCS 21), the ships are delivered to the fleet with a combining gear fix. Nevertheless, the LCS fleet has been sharply criticized, and often for good reason. In an April 2023 commentary for Proceedings, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Anthony Carrillo aptly summarizes the problems with the LCS, including risks to the aluminum hulls.

On the other hand, across Latin American and Caribbean waters, the LCSs have been quite effective. To summarize, U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operations across these waters feature patrol operations, freedom of navigation operations, and exercises with regional partners – including exercise UNITAS, Tradewinds (which will occur in Guyana in July 2023) PASSEX, among others. Moreover, vessels from these services help regional partners with humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, search and rescue, and surveillance operations. Perhaps, the most well-known application of surface operations in SOUTHCOM’s waters is the combination of USN and USCG assets cracking down on maritime crimes, particularly smuggling, IUU fishing, and drug trafficking, carried out by the infamous go fast-vessels and narco-submarines. Ships from both services work alongside Latin American and Caribbean naval and coast guard platforms to combat a large variety of maritime crimes.

Fourth Fleet does not have any permanently assigned ships, making the fleet responsible for the Panama Canal devoid of ships. Since SOUTHCOM has historically been the lowest priority Combatant Command of the U.S. military, the assets and platforms made available to SOUTHCOM are tightly limited in quantity and duration. Generally speaking, LCSs and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGs) have operated in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibilities (AOR) in recent years. Case in point, SOUTHCOM announced on April 6 how “USS Farragut (DDG 99) offloaded approximately 2,314 kilograms of cocaine and 1,986 pounds of marijuana worth a combined $69 million in Port Everglades, Florida,” The offloaded drugs were seized from four go-fast smuggling vessel interdictions by the Farragut crew “with an embarked Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) 406 and Navy Combat Element (CEL) One from the ‘Jaguars’ of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron Six Zero (HSM-60).” Farragut’s operations took place across the Eastern Pacific Ocean in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

LCSs that have been assigned to SOUTHCOM include Freedom-variant USS Milwaukee (LCS 5), Freedom-variant USS Billings (LCS 15), and Freedom-variant USS Sioux City (LCS 11). These ships have engaged in bilateral exercises and missions to combat transnational organized crime, demonstrating the versatility of the LCS in partnering with regional maritime forces for these missions.

Analysis

One of the authors has written about the operations carried out by the Mercy-class hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) across Latin American and Caribbean waters and why the Comfort, or a future hospital ship, should be permanently assigned to SOUTHCOM (See CIMSEC’s “Hospital Ships: A Vital Asset for SOUTHCOM and South American Navies,” and “U.S. Southern Command needs a Permanently-Assigned Hospital Ship”). The same argument can be made for the LCSs.

Rather than decommissioning Jackson and Montgomery, the Navy, the Department of Defense, and Congress should seriously consider increasing SOUTHCOM’s budget to operate these two ships permanently, or at least long-term. Unlike other theaters where the U.S. Navy operates, the maritime operations carried out by SOUTHCOM and potential threats are best suited for LCS capabilities.

In his commentary, Lieutenant Carrillo argues, “Ships should fit a purpose, and the purpose of ships should fit into the vision of how the fleet fights,” and suggesting that “considering the lack of useful employment for LCSs in retirement, the best option is to cannibalize them for parts.” But there are other options for these ships. Focusing solely on fleet combat operations is counterproductive by asserting the LCSs are useless if they cannot be effective in major combat. This may generally be valid for the Indo-Pacific region, among others, but what makes SOUTHCOM unique is that the challenges found in Latin America and the Caribbean waters are dissimilar to other regions.

Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. Navy lacks maritime competitors. Moreover, SOUTHCOM is fortunate because most Latin American and Caribbean governments have cordial, if not robust, diplomatic and defense relations with Washington. Realistically speaking, only Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have openly hostile governments towards the U.S. (Bolivia has a navy but the country is landlocked). However, none of these countries have strong naval capabilities – even the Venezuelan Navy is no Kraken of the Caribbean. Hence, if Jackson and Montgomery were transferred to SOUTHCOM, there would be less of a concern or demand to heavily arm them (such as with complex mission modules) for an impending confrontation with a regional navy’s warships, which is more the case in other regions. Virtually all maritime operations in the SOUTHCOM region occur below the threshold of armed conflict, and the focus on countering crime and illegal fishing is highly complementary with the broader U.S. national security goal of enhancing rules-based order by defending the global commons.

Moreover, occasionally ships from states with whom Washington shares an adversarial relationship travel to the region, most recently the Iranian base ship IRIS Makran and the frigate IRIS Dena – whichdocked in Brazil in late February. A permanent U.S. naval presence could serve as a deterrent and competing actor to the potential presence of maritime forces from nations such as China, Iran, and Russia.

Additionally, permanently assigned LCSs would give the commander of U.S. Southern Command much-needed mobile staging assets in the wake of a natural disaster or any other crisis. However, authorizing the deployment of a previously unassigned surface vessel takes too long for many crises. Add the time for a ship to steam from the homeport to the point of incident and the crisis may already be over. Thus, SOUTHCOM requires enough ships to be assigned so it can maintain consistent presence in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific, which would require ships homeported on both U.S. coasts.

Finally, if enough LCS are transferred, their ability to bring organic unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets for time-sensitive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection will give the SOUTHCOM Commander improved situational awareness and decision-making space. General Laura Richardson, SOUTHCOM’s current Commander, and Admiral Craig Faller, her predecessor, publicly expressed their concerns concerning U.S. Southern Command’s lack of ISR capabilities. In her 2022 Posture Statement, Richardson noted “USSOUTHCOM employs less than 2% of DoD ISR resources to counter malign state and nonstate actors. To meet the mission, we are pushing the envelope with innovative techniques, integrating publicly available information, advanced analytics, artificial intelligence and machine learning, and open collaboration with allies and partners to disrupt threats.” They both testified to Congress that SOUTHCOM requires a significant increase in airborne ISR, and they require a quick reaction capability to gain situational awareness. If employed creatively, the LCS might not completely cover the ISR gap, but the ship and its organic aviation detachment will provide part of the solution.

Conclusion

Assigning permanent vessels to SOUTHCOM will require special funding so the combatant command can shoulder the burden of funding ships the Navy may not want to pay for. This funding is not only needed for fuel and maintenance of the ships, but also increased manning at Fourth Fleet and logistical support in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Navy, Department of Defense, and Congress need to take appropriate budgetary considerations in the upcoming fiscal years so the LCS(s) can operate under SOUTHCOM as permanently assigned assets. With its extremely limited resources, SOUTHCOM bolsters U.S. interests and supports U.S. allies across Latin America and the Caribbean. While no other combatant commands (or the Navy in general) appears that interested in the LCSs, imagine the outsized impact SOUTHCOM could reap with these permanently-assigned ships.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He is an analyst that monitors defense, geopolitical and trade issues across the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.

Ryan Markey is a retired Navy Commander and former Chief Maritime Strategist at U.S. Southern Command. He is the owner of Sarissa Solutions, a U.S. consulting firm with a permanent presence in Guatemala.

Featured Image: NAVAL STATION MAYPORT, Fla. (Sept. 9, 2021) The Freedom-variant littoral combat ship USS Sioux City (LCS 11) departs Naval Station Mayport for a deployment, Sept. 9, 2021. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Aaron Lau)