Category Archives: Global Analysis

A Geographical Breakdown of What’s Going on in the World

Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean: A Contact Group is Needed

The Mediterranean is in crisis. The flow of migrants trafficked illegally by sea has reached the level of a humanitarian tragedy. It also places a heavy burden on the shipping industry. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recently convened a meeting to identify ways out of the crisis. As became clear, responding to the crisis requires new forms of coordination. Various actors ranging from humanitarian agencies to coast guards, navies and the shipping industry will have to start to act concertedly. Information on the launch and movement of migrant vessels needs to be shared, but also evidence on the criminal networks organizing the trafficking. At the meeting participants pointed to the parallels to another maritime security crisis: the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Escalating from 2008-2012, piracy in this area has since been successfully contained. Are there indeed useful lessons from Somali piracy? The results from the ongoing lessons learned project of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, led by Cardiff University, show, there are at least three:

Responding to crisis requires to build trust and reach political consensus among states, but also national and international agencies. The IMO meeting was a right step into this direction, but more will be needed. To fight piracy a contact group was created which worked in a flexible and inclusive manner. The group meets bi-annually and over 80 states and agencies concerned about piracy participate. The Contact Group has also dedicated working groups that meet more frequently and address specific issues, such as the legal situation, or the coordination of criminal investigations. This format allows for consensus building, information exchange and perhaps most importantly to develop shared understandings of the situation and what action is required. In such a format actors met as equals. None is on top, no one on tap. Political tensions and geopolitical disagreements can be circumvented. A contact group format allows for a close engagement with littoral states. Adopted to the migration crisis, it will allow to better integrate the North African states into activities. Creating specialized working groups on operations at sea, coordination with shipping industry, criminal investigations, and harmonizing law is promising to improve the response in the Mediterranean.

Tackling a maritime crisis requires efficient information sharing and coordinated operations. In addition to the Contact Group, in counter-piracy this was achieved through a regular shared awareness meeting, known as SHADE, and an Internet based information sharing network, called Mercury. Mercury is the Facebook of counter-piracy. It allows for speedy communication through online chat, and the voluntary reporting of the position of vessels, aircrafts and patrols. Surveillance can be optimized, rapid responses to incidents organized, and an overall division of labour facilitated. It is a system that has proven to deliver. Focused on operational coordination, it allows to avoid political tensions. SHADE and Mercury were initiated by the three major multi-lateral counter-piracy naval missions led by the EU, NATO and the US. These launched the process and soon handed over the chairmanship that became rotating. A similar system can easily and quickly be installed in the Mediterranean Sea. The two multilateral operations could take the lead, that is, the EU’s Frontex and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour. Given the significant presence of the U.S. navy in the region, also the US might assume a leading role.

The third major lessons from piracy is that long term solutions lie on land. Although we are facing a maritime crisis, vessels are launched from land and transnational criminal networks, whether it is pirates or human traffickers, require coastal infrastructure and anchorage. When counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden started Somalia was in a disastrous state. Back then no one believed that it could soon be on the way to a functioning state. Today, the villages that used to harbour pirates have stopped doing so. Somalia has a functioning government. Although it still has a long way to go, it is on the path to recovery. None of this would have been possible without the increased efforts of the entire international community. Today, it is Libya that requires a similar new deal, should there be any prospects to halt the trafficking of migrants.

What should be clear in the meantime: the migration crisis is no longer a European problem. Rightfully, international actors such as IMO and other United Nations agencies have started to engage. Concerted efforts by the entire international community are required. New frameworks of coordination are needed. With all the crisis talk, one should however not forget about long term consequences. Once the immediate crisis is over, the new mechanisms will have to be transferred to other organizations. There is a range of mechanisms in the Mediterranean that could play this role, such as the Union for the Mediterranean or NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Addressing the crisis will require new ad hoc solutions. But also a strategy of how the problem can be managed in the long run. This is yet another lesson from counter-piracy.

Further information on the Lessons Learned Project is available at http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net

Dr. Christian Bueger is Reader in International Relations at Cardiff University. He is the principal Investigator of the ESRC funded Counter-Piracy Governance project [ES/K008358/1] . He is also one of the lead investigators of the Lessons Learned Project of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and an Associate Editor of Piracy-studies.org – The Research Portal for Maritime Security. Further information is available on his personal homepage.

Sea Control 72 – Obangame Express, Gulf of Guinea

seacontrol2We interview CAPT Rinko, USN, and CDR Sune, Cameroon, about Obangame Express, the 23 Nation Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security exercise. We discuss the scope and purpose of the exercise, the challenges of building cross-organizational/ cultural/ national inter-operability, and lessons learned. For context on the ongoing expansion and conduct of Obangame Express,  CIMSEC Africa expert, Dirk Steffen assessed this exercise last year.

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 72:
Obangame Express 2015

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Host and Editing: Matthew Hipple
Music: Sam LaGrone

China’s Maritime Silk Road Gamble

This is republished from the Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute.

Ever since Xi Jinping announced the creation of a Maritime Silk Road in an October 2013 speech to the Indonesian parliament, China’s vision for “one road” running through Southeast and South Asia has driven a significant portion of Chinese foreign policy in its periphery. This has led to both the controversial Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (announced in the same speech) and complementary investment funds such as the Maritime Silk Road Bank, as well as high-level diplomatic visits by Chinese leaders to countries in the region. In addition, China sees its “Silk Road Economic Belt” among its Central Asian neighbors as indivisible from the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” as seen by China’s slogan 一带一路 (“one belt, one road”) and its public diplomacy effort to promote both policies together. All of this indicates that, like many Chinese foreign policy initiatives, the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” is multi-pronged: it is intended to serve diplomatic, economic, and strategic purposes.

First and foremost, the Maritime Silk Road is designed to pacify neighboring countries threatened by China’s aggressive territorial claims in the South China Sea. Curiously, China has attempted to both aggravate tensions among its Southeast Asian neighbors and soothe them at the same time, contrary to its normal pattern of swinging back and forth between aggressive brinksmanship and diplomatic rapprochement (such as in China’s relationship with Taiwan or its cutting off and then reestablishing of military to military ties with the United States). Despite the idealistic claims of ‘peaceful economic development absent political strings’ made by Chinese leaders and state media about the Maritime Silk Road, China has continued unabated to strengthen its unilateral claim to vast maritime territory in the South China Sea, turning reefs and other undersea maritime features into full-fledged islands, complete with airstrips that could be used by the People’s Liberation Army.

Conversely, the Maritime Silk Road is also designed to cement relationships with countries that are tacitly friendly to China such as Malaysia, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. This will be accomplished primarily through economic incentives like infrastructure development and trade deals. In this sense, the Maritime Silk Road not only stands side by side with the Silk Road Economic Belt, but also as part of a historical continuum that includes China’s past investment in maritime-related infrastructure, which has been referred to by some as a “String of Pearls” policy. If one wants to know what kind of infrastructure projects China will fund in the future, look to what it has done in the past: oil and natural gas links to Myanmar’s port in Sittwe, ports in Sri Lanka such as the Hambantota and Colombo Port City projects, and the Pakistani port in Gwadar. Indeed, China and Malaysia have already announced a joint port project in Malacca. Meanwhile, China, which is already the largest trading partner for most countries in Southeast and South Asia, is also signing new free trade agreements with countries such as Sri Lanka.

Chinese infrastructure investment, intended primarily to strengthen China’s energy security and increase trade between China and its neighbors, will now get a huge boost with the creation of both the AIIB and more specialized investment vehicles such as the Maritime Silk Road Bank and the Silk Road Fund. While the AIIB has had the flashiest rollout with China contributing $50 billion USD to a planned $100 billion USD in capital, the other two funds are no slouches: the Silk Road Fund has plans for $40 billion USD in capital, while the Maritime Silk Road Bank hopes to attract $100 billion RMB in investment.

Finally, unmentioned in authoritative Chinese sources is that the Maritime Silk Road, and especially Chinese infrastructure investment, is implicitly intended to facilitate more frequent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployments in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The PLAN needs reliable logistics chains across Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) throughout Southeast and South Asia; ships cannot go far without a reliable supply of fuel, food, and armaments. But for the foreseeable future, China is at a serious disadvantage in this regard: the US Navy and allied navies have such a preponderance of force and ability to project power throughout the region that the PLAN is ill-equipped to compete. Given the PLANs current capabilities, China’s logistics capacity would only be dependable during peacetime; they would not survive in a contested environment, particularly if the US decided to close off key chokepoints like the Malacca and Sunda Straits. Therefore, the first step to strengthen the PLAN’s capabilities is to build reliable logistical infrastructure in key friendly states, such as the aforementioned projects in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. These logistical links would still be quite vulnerable in a conflict scenario, given the tenuous relationship China would have with even putatively friendly countries if China went to war. Therefore, the primary benefit for the PLAN is to demonstrate presence in peacetime, and to show that it can operate far from its own shores.

The Maritime Silk Road, along with the attendant Silk Road Economic Belt, is truly a multi-headed dragon, so large that it is difficult to disaggregate its many parts. The most difficult challenge for China, however, will not be building infrastructure and signing trade deals—these are no doubt massive undertakings, but they are fundamentally instrumental tasks that will not receive much opposition from countries in the region. The more difficult objective for China is translating investment and trade into building a coalition of states in the region that align their values and foreign policy goals with those of China, and indeed identify with China at the expense of competitors like the US. China will likely find this kind of bandwagoning hard to pull off—when it comes down to it, the Maritime Silk Road may wash away like sand.

William Yale is the Director of Operations at CIMSEC, an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project, and a Research Associate at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute.