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Analyzing Specific Naval and Maritime Platforms

Capability Analysis, Current Operations, Tactical Concepts

Distributed Lethality and Concepts of Future War

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By Dmitry Filipoff

Introduction

“One must be ready to change his line sharply and suddenly, with no concern for the prejudices and memories of what was yesterday. To rest upon formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.”-Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.1

Distributed lethality is a concept that was officially launched a year ago by Navy leadership to explore how dispersing forces would enhance warfighting. Traditionally, dispersion has been a cardinal sin in the highly decisive nature of naval warfare, but new threats and capabilities may have changed this principle that has long guided the employment of warships. This analysis aims to show how distributed lethality can offer versatile means for achieving political and military objectives in an era of lean budgets and evolving threats.

Warfighting Characteristics

“More ships with more firepower acting more independently will increase the planning complexity and resourcing of our potential challengers.”-Vice Adm. Tom Rowden, Commander U.S. Naval Surface Forces.2

Navy leaders assert that distributed lethality will “add battlespace complexity”3 and “complicate the calculus” of an adversary. How will dispersed surface action groups (SAG) accomplish this compared to traditional carrier strike groups (CSG), and how will dispersion affect operations in the electromagnetic (EM) domain?

Distributed lethality attacks left on the kill chain, meaning it intends to influence the earlier phases of the process by which targets are located, identified, targeted, engaged, and effects are assessed. Aside from increasing search volume, dispersion challenges intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through modularity. In a CSG centric navy, the detection of a large surface combatant increases the probability of learning the disposition of other warships, including valuable capital ships, and of knowing the operational unit they are arrayed in. The modularity offered by dispersed SAGs exacerbates the ISR challenge by reducing the certainty of what kinds of forces may be acting in concert with a potential contact, and what their capabilities and missions are. This will complicate prioritization of ISR and firepower, and increase the probability of expending precision guided munitions (PGM) due to forced error.4

However, distributed lethality will induce friction on the dispersed force. It is presumed that naval forces will employ emissions control (EMCON) techniques to frustrate the adversary in the EM domain. But EMCON exacerbates the challenges inherent to coordinating a dispersed force. Prior Navy experimentation discovered these challenges. Operations Haystack and Uptide revealed that dispersed operations under EMCON dramatically increase carrier survivability against submarines and land based bombers but at the expense of lengthened decision cycles.5 Under electromagnetic opposition, the degradation of confidence in the networking of a distributed force is easier because of additional variables to be accounted for and that can be influenced by enemy action. Aggregated forces can also more easily employ alternative means of communication compared to distributed forces.

Lengthened decision cycles for dispersed forces causes handicaps and presents dilemmas. Operations whose success is contingent upon careful coordination are less likely to succeed. The ability to mass capability on short notice amidst determined opposition is impaired. Planners must consider the extent that a SAG may be tied down by enemy action and its own tasking, and the resulting  impact on total force flexibility. Operations must have built in flexibility and consider myriad contingencies. Scenarios where SAGs may be called upon to support one another will pose a challenge given how the Navy’s offensive firepower may soon outstick its defensive firepower. These realities will place a premium on inclusive planning and the Navy’s command by negation tradition.

Dispersion will complicate the enemy’s ISR at the expense of reducing one’s own C2 agility. It is important to note that C2 is not just further left in the kill chain than ISR and targeting, but threads the entire process together. These realities may make distributed lethality inflexible under certain circumstances, and result in a higher echelon commander’s intent being articulated in broader terms and with more modest aims. Vice Adm. Ted N. Branch, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, pointedly reminded that “the assured C2 pillar touches almost everything we do.”6 The nature of modern conventional warfare has made the EM domain the battleground for superior decision making, and distributed lethality affects the kill chain of all parties.

Distributed Lethality versus Anti-Access/Area Denial 

“As they seek greater influence, we confront states that seek to compromise freedom of the seas, where conflict and coercion are increasingly common.“–Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John. M Richardson.7

The Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment is the threat environment dominating the thinking of senior Navy leaders. What advantages does distributed lethality offer in meeting the A2/AD challenge?

Combating an A2/AD adversary could involve operations spanning multiple areas including blue water sea control, power projection into the littoral and across land. While the CSG is a formidable asset against the warships of a near peer adversary, a salvo competition between a CSG and A2/AD forces, especially land based forces, would be suicidal. The A2/AD model is attrition based. Its predominant advantage over expeditionary forces is the logistical sustainment of PGM, ensuring victory in a salvo competition if accurate targeting is sustained. By denying commons, A2/AD reduces freedom of maneuver and raises the probability of attrition based operations, forcing expeditionary forces into the A2/AD’s strength.

Distributed lethality counters A2/AD’s attrition model through maneuver warfare’s intent to probe for weakness and influence psychology. Dispersion facilitates multiple points of entry into theater, allowing for more sea control and maneuver. This in turn strains the anti-access mission and forces the adversary into executing area denial simultaneously. Distributed forces can probe more areas of the A2/AD envelope to gain intelligence on the opponent’s ISR capabilities and discover the true extent of their maritime domain awareness (MDA), setting the stage for follow on operations. Complicating ISR and targeting offsets logistical superiority by injecting uncertainty.

Platforms and Capabilities

“The Navy must be able to access any domain – and possess the mix of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons necessary to prevail today and tomorrow.”-Rear Adm. Mathias W. Winter, Chief of Naval Research.8

Distributed lethality will benefit from the numerous capabilities the Navy is developing to maintain its edge. The concept seeks to employ platforms in different ways, and promote versatility to make the most of limited resources. How could the Navy employ its warships differently and which capabilities should be prioritized?

In a 2014 CIMSEC article Admiral Tom Rowden, then director of Surface Warfare Directorate OPNAV N96, articulated a concept of dispersed lethality and asserted a distributed force will not be dependent on the air wing.9  While distributed lethality deemphasizes carrier strike missions, the air wing will be a critical enabler for the distributed force. A distributed air wing can provide rapid response anti-submarine warfare capability and function as communications relays for maintaining a responsive decision cycle while the dispersed force operates under EMCON. The air wing’s screening and early warning functions will be indispensable for enabling commanders on the scene to exercise initiative and engage on their own terms. The air wing will refocus from the right side to the left on the kill chain. 

Much has been made of a recent memo issued by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus on the Navy’s programs. The most significant directives include cutting procurement of the littoral combat ship (LCS) from 52 hulls to 40, and procuring 31 additional F-35C aircraft.10 It is important to note that distributed lethality was born from a wargame at the Naval War College where a LCS equipped with a long range surface to surface missile “added stress and complexity to the red force commander, who had to spend precious ISR resources trying to find these upgunned ships.”11 If aircraft and fast frigates/LCS are mutually exclusive investments in the near term, the Navy should explore whether it needs more shooters in the form of additional warships or air wing enablers performing the aforementioned missions.

USS Fort Worth. Rolls-Royce Photo.
USS Fort Worth. (Rolls-Royce Photo)

A payload that has been wisely distributed across the Navy’s warships is the AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare (EW) system. The Block III increment of the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP)  will provide common electronic attack capability to surface combatants.12 Not only does the CSG focus large surface combatants on the defensive application of anti-air warfare (AAW), it does the same for EW. A distributed force equipped with an offensive EW capability could cause great disruption to an adversary’s ISR picture, reinforcing distributed lethality’s intent to attack left on the kill chain. As a part of a proposed acquisition fastlane, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson has singled out EW capabilities as “candidates for this kind of rapid acquisition, rapid prototyping”13 which will benefit distributed lethality enormously.  

Distributed lethality aims to add more firepower to the fleet, potentially even equipping logistics vessels with missiles as a part of the maxim “if it floats, it fights” issued by OPNAV N96 chief Rear Adm. Peter Fanta.14 However, the Navy should reexamine prioritizing anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capability and consider focusing on land attack. While putting modern anti-ship missiles on more surface combatants would reinvigorate the Navy’s ASuW capability, enhanced power projection across land holds greater deterrence value. The Navy’s land attack proficiency is well honed and proven through recent experience. Thankfully the versatility of the tomahawk missile can enhance both mission sets, but presents the technical challenge of installing vertical launch cells on ships that may have little space and weight to spare.

Arguably no set of capabilities stand to enhance distributed lethality more so than Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA). These capabilities allow one platform’s sensors to provide a targeting solution to another platform’s weapons. This will multiply the lethality of a distributed force across vast areas of influence by allowing for the massing of payloads but not platforms. Distributed forces will be able to mitigate risk by mixing and matching whatever combination of sensors and shooters best fits an engagement while ensuring survivability.

Strategic Merit

“…it’s primarily about changing our ways and means right now and the operational concepts we use to achieve our objectives…”- Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work.15

An operational concept’s warfighting advantages are linked to its deterrence value. How does distributed lethality contribute to deterrence, and what options does it provide policymakers confronting crisis?

Distributed lethality enhances deterrence by influencing psychology through more than just kinetic means. It aims to degrade an adversary’s confidence in their weapons rather than through the threat of overwhelming force, a threat that is not as credible against an A2/AD adversary. Dispersion better allows for demonstrations within the EM domain, which may prove a less escalatory form of conveying resolve than deploying a CSG to a hotspot. The enormous creativity allowed by electromagnetic maritime deception allows for a more nuanced and flexible escalatory dynamic. Demonstration options range from temporarily confusing sensors to simulating strikes against strategic forces with impunity as the Navy did in NORPAC 82.16 Not only does threatening the destruction of networks constitute escalation, it attacks the channels by which deception conveys deterrence.17 During crisis, distributed lethality’s modularity allows for more options in terms of what and how many assets are committed to posturing, giving policymakers a more flexible means for adjusting the “temperature.” Distributed lethality not only has more to offer for maneuver in the military sense, but also politically.

As the threat environment evolves, reassessing the CSG’s deterrence value should occur in tandem with reevaluating its warfighting applications. Captain Robert C. Rubel (ret.) makes the excellent point that “If a lucrative target loaded with potent geopolitical symbolism is on scene, with more on the way, it could precipitate a dangerous “window-of-opportunity” mindset in the opposing government.”18 Sending a CSG to a hotspot could “catalyze as deter” and threaten nightmarish devastation or monumental loss of face as carriers are hurriedly withdrawn for the sake of preservation at the outbreak of war. During the initial phases of conflict, failing to deceive ISR through nonkinetic means could quickly escalate into attempting their physical destruction, up to and including strikes on mainland installations, which is more likely if a carrier’s survival is at stake.

Distributing forces will lower a first strike’s potential for success, which is especially important for deterring an adversary employing A2/AD. Jon Solomon points out an adversary’s maritime domain awareness “will never be as accurate and comprehensive at any later point in a conflict as it is during peacetime’s waning moments.”19 A patrolling, dispersed force would provide a more complex targeting picture, and would reveal more indicators and warning of an impending attack across a larger geographical area. These advantages would be realized by having forward deployed forces already operating in a dispersed manner at Phase 0, or otherwise face the uncomfortable process of transitioning into a dispersed force in the midst of crisis or at the onset of conflict.

Final Thoughts

“It will be orange and it may look kind of odd put together and won’t have the nice slick red/gray paint and it won’t be totally tested and it might fail, but we’ve got to get it out there and see what we can do with that.”-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert.20

There are additional lines of inquiry that must be explored in order to flesh out distributed lethality. For example, what does it entail for amphibious forces? These forces are more likely to face the littoral arena, and their objectives are set upon fixed geography which limits their freedom of maneuver. The history of naval warfare has shown time and time again that key naval engagements precipitated in relation to developments and objectives on land. Scenarios commonly envisioned today such as a Taiwan contingency or a defense of the Strait of Hormuz demand that the Navy examine distributed lethality in a fixed geographical context. The concept will also challenge the ability to wage coalition warfare, as the careful planning and execution demanded by dispersed operations under EMCON will require ample cooperation and true interoperability.

Nonetheless, distributed lethality offers numerous benefits. It will make the most of what the Navy has today, while maximizing the value of investments that will achieve fruition both in the short and long term. It provides means for confronting the A2/AD challenge, and fulfills Air-Sea Battle’s intent to ensure U.S. forces can “assure access, maintain freedom of action, conduct a show of force, or conduct limited strikes.”21 Ultimately, it provides political and military leadership more flexibility to maneuver within crisis and conflict. The Navy must call upon its rich history of innovation and experimentation to turn distributed lethality into a credible warfighting construct that will deter foes, reassure allies, and make the greatest Navy the world has yet seen greater still. 

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. He can be contacted at [email protected].

[1] Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. US Naval Postgraduate School address (16 March 1954). 

[2] Vice Adm. Tom Rowden. “Distributed Lethality: The Beginning of the Beginning,” Navy Live (January 20, 2015).

[3] Vice Adm. Thomas Rowden et. al. “Distributed Lethality,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2015).

[4] Solomon, Jon. “Guided Munitions Inventory Management, Producibility, and their Effects on Strategy (Part 1 of 2),” Information Dissemination (November 3, 2014).

[5] Angevine, Robert G. “Hiding in Plain Sight: The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations Under EMCON, 1956-1972,” Naval War College Review (Spring 2011).

[6] Vice Adm. Ted N. Branch. “A New Era in Naval Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (July 2014).

[7] Chief of Naval Operations  Adm. John M. Richardson. “The Growing Importance of the Maritime,”10th Regional Seapower Symposium, Venice, Italy (October 22, 2015).

[8] The Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request United States House of Representatives, 114th Cong. Statement of Rear Admiral Mathias W. Winter, United States Navy Chief of Naval Research. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities (March 26, 2015).

[9] Rear Adm. Thomas S. Rowden. “Surface Warfare: Taking the Offensive,” Center for International Maritime Security (June 14, 2014).

[10] U.S. Navy. “Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP),” United States Navy Fact File (November 15, 2013).

[11] Freedberg Jr., Sydney J. “CNO Richardson Urges Fast-Track For Cyber, EW & Drones,” Breaking Defense (December 7, 2015).

[12] Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. “Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy,” United States Department of Defense (December 14, 2015).

[13] Eckstein, Megan. “Navy Studying Implications of Distributed Lethality in Wargames Series,”U.S. Naval Institute News (July 9, 2015).

[14] Freedberg Jr., Sydney J. “ ‘If it Floats, It Fights’: Navy Seeks ‘Distributed Lethality’,” Breaking Defense (January 14, 2015).

[15] Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O’Work.  The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies, Center for a New American Security, Washington D.C. (January 28, 2015).

[16] Pico, Andy. “How to Hide a Task Force,” Navweaps ( June 2, 1999).

[17] Solomon, Jonathan F. “Maritime Deception and Concealment Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance Reconnaissance-Strike Networks,” Naval War College Review (Autumn 2013).

[18] Capt. Robert C. Rubel (ret.), “Cede No Water: Strategy, Littorals, and Flotillas” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 2013).

[19] Solomon, Jon. “Parrying the 21st Century First Salvo,” Information Dissemination (October 16, 2014).

[20] Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert. Speech given at Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo, (February 4, 2015).

[21] Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges, United States Department of Defense (May 2013).

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis, Current Operations

The Cabbage and the Submarine: Why Fears of Chinese Control of the Seas are Overstated

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The following piece is cross-posted from our partners at the CDA Institute as part of an ongoing content sharing relationship. You can read the article in its original form here.

CDA Institute Analyst Ariel Shapiro comments on the proliferation of submarines and issue of sea denial in the Asia-​Pacific.

In 2013, Major General Zhang Zhaozhong, an outspoken senior official in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, described China’s strategy in the South China Sea by referring to a cabbage. In regards to the Scarborough Shoal, a group of rocks disputed by China and the Philippines, the Chinese strategy is to inundate the area with a large fleet of military and commercial ships of all sizes, to surround the contested rocks like the layers of a cabbage. What essentially amounts to a blockade, disguised by friendly vegetarian metaphors, is a manifestation of the more assertive Chinese foreign policy undertaken by President Xi Jinping. In this post, I will discuss how the recent build-​up of regional naval fleets in Asia is a response to China’s increasingly assertive policy – and why this is cause for concern for China.

In recent years, there has been a buildup of military submarines in the Asia-​Pacific, which Michael Wesley at the Australian National University refers to as a “bonanza.” Despite multiple changes in leadership over the past few years in Australia, the massive project to replace the Royal Australian Navy’s six aging Collins-​class submarines with 12 new state of the art diesel submarines is still well underway (as a point of comparison, Canada currently has four Victoria-​class submarines, three of which are operational, and all of them several years older than the submarines Australia is replacing).

The Australian submarine procurement process brings to the forefront the changes that are happening in another key player in the Asia Pacific region: Japan. For the first time since the 1960s, new legislation in Japan permits the country’s world-​renowned industry to export military technology. The top contender for the contract to replace the Australian submarines is the Soryu-​class, developed by Japanese giant Mitsubishi. The Soryu-​class diesel submarine is notable for its air-​independent propulsion technology, which allows the vessel to remain underwater without surfacing for significant periods of time compared to other diesel submarines. Japan, of course, is not only developing the submarine for export; it is in the midst of increasing its total submarine fleet form 16 to 22.

Australia is not the only country in the region increasing its submarine fleet. In September 2015, the Indonesian House of Representatives announced a plan to purchase two Kilo-​class submarines from Russia; the nation comprises 17,000 islands, and senior military planners estimate that the country needs at least 12 submarines to adequately patrol its territorial seas. Across the Strait, Lieutenant-​Colonel Aaron Beng of the Singapore Armed Forces analyzes submarine procurement in Asia from his country’s perspective. He notes Singapore’s recent acquisition of two Vastergotland-​class submarines from Sweden, bringing the fleet’s total to six; the refurbishment of two French Scorpèné-​class submarines by Malaysia; and the ongoing purchase by Vietnam of six Kilo-​class submarines from Russia. One can also include the new Thai ruling military junta decision to purchase submarines from China. Not to be outdone, the first of India’s six new Kalvari-​class diesel electric attack submarines, based on the French Scorpèné, are currently undergoing sea-​trials.

What is the motivation for this submarine acquisition? The submarine is, in terms of dollar-​per-​value, the best tool for sea denial. This maritime strategy is an asymmetric one. Instead of great powers building up fleets to fight for control of the seas, as was the case in the lead up to the First World War, sea denial is a strategy used by weaker powers to deny access to their coastal areas by larger powers; the maritime equivalent of guerilla warfare. Essentially, a small, stealthy, relatively inexpensive submarine can pose a serious threat to an advanced aircraft carrier or major surface combatant.

For example, Singapore’s submarines will add to its defence posture of the “poison shrimp”; while the Republic has neither the ambition nor the capacity to control the seas, it does indeed have the capacity to cause significant damage to a larger power that would attempt to threaten its vital interests (which, due to its small size and the global nature of its economy, include shipping), much like eating a poisoned shrimp can make a much larger animal very ill. As Peter Briggs at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute notes, navies have submarines not only to serve in a potential war, but for “situations short of conflict” – their mobility, endurance, stealth, and payload make them an essential tool in preventing conflict through deterrence.

This brings us back to China and the cabbage strategy. In the South China Sea, despite the unresolved nature of competing claims over various small islands, China is continuing with its policy of reclaiming land and building infrastructure. Last week, tensions flared as the USS Lassen, an American destroyer, sailed in what Washington claims are international waters but which China considers within its territorial sea. While the US Navy (USN) remains the most advanced and important navy force in the Pacific Ocean, China’s growing fleet of advanced surface and undersea ships gives it a sea denial capability against America’s more formidable force – especially when combined with its on-​shore anti-​access and area denial (A2/​AD) assets.

Smaller countries in the region are eager to build up their own deterrence and sea denial capacity to protect their shipping lanes and vital interests in an era where the United States can no longer underwrite global maritime security, and submarines are perhaps the best way to do so. While this strategy is aimed primarily against China, Beijing, in turn, is building up its own fleet towards a strategy of sea denial against the more powerful USN. However, China has also increased the responsibilities placed on its forces and has turned otherwise uninvolved actors into maritime rivals. In addition to asserting its primacy over its coasts and capacity to dominate Taiwan, which remains at the core of China’s security policy, it now also actively seeks to assert Chinese freedom of maneuver over the South China Sea and eventually rival American control of wider areas of the Pacific Ocean.

While much has been written about the Sino-​American rivalry in the Pacific, the role of smaller Southeast Asian countries is too often forgotten. The USN is still far superior, for the time being, to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. Yet any assessment of the strategic balance must take into account other important players in the region, such as Australia, Japan, Singapore, India and Vietnam, all of which are showing a tendency to bandwagon with the United States – making any potential Chinese dominance even less foreseeable.

At a recent conference at the University of Ottawa, Professor Jean-​Pierre Cabestan, one of the foremost French experts on China, noted how Chinese President Xi Jinping’s success in making China more assertive on the world stage has only provoked a “rebalancing” of the United States and its allies towards China. Indeed, if the cabbage strategy continues to cause horizontal proliferation (the number of countries building up military capacity) as well as vertical proliferation (pre-​existing powers increasing their capacity, such as the development of new missile systems on littoral combat ships in the United States), China’s aggressiveness may have caused it to lose more influence than it has gained.

Ariel Shapiro recently graduated from McGill University in political science and economics and is currently an Analyst at the CDA Institute. 

Capability Analysis, Cyber War

Towards A National Cyber Force “Department of the Air Force – US Cyber Corps”

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By Don Donegan

The US needs a Cyber Corps as a new Service to successfully meet challenges in the cyber domain, but almost as importantly, to harvest military talent in an innovative manner. And we have a blueprint in front of us.

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The emergence and evolution of “cyberspace” as a warfare domain on par with the air, land, maritime, and space domains presents one of today’s fundamental military challenges – although cyberspace is somewhat awkwardly qualified as being “within the information environment.”[1] A new “front” in the cyberspace operations discussion continues to emerge as defense experts call for a separate cyber force, an idea raised notably by retired Admiral James Stavridis as one of his “heretical propositions on US defense policy[2]” and in recent Congressional testimony. With its own domain, acknowledged adversaries, and a continually increasing impact on warfighting, cyberspace should be the principal operating domain for a separate branch of the US Armed Forces, the US Cyber Corps (USCC).

To maximize the effectiveness of cyberspace operations (to include cyberspace attack and cyberspace counter-attack)[3], a service branch dedicated to and centered upon offensive cyberspace operations would lay the foundation to ensure warfighting success. The obvious historical analogy for the establishment of USCC is the evolution of the US Air Force (USAF), from its beginnings within the US Army to its designation as a service within its own department, including sharing responsibilities in the air domain with the other services. Post-World War II US military operations are difficult to re-imagine without the contributions of a military service primarily focused on the air domain – even if a separate air service seemed incomprehensible to military officers a century ago. However, USCC could have another historical precedent:  the Navy-Marine Corps relationship as two services within a single Department. Considering the evolution and broad nature of the cyberspace domain, the Department of the Air Force makes sense as the logical “umbrella” for both the USAF and USCC.

Based on USAF responsibilities in three domains (air, space, and cyberspace) and its core mission of global strike, creating the USCC under the auspice of the Department of the Air Force is a bold and innovative yet natural evolution for the Department. Separating the cyberspace mission from the air and space missions creates an opportunity to fully focus on the unique challenges in cyberspace operations. Placing USCC within the Department of the Air Force capitalizes on USCC-USAF linkages and allows them to share key resources. The Navy-Marine Corps dynamic within the Department of the Navy provides an initial blueprint for the expanded Department of the Air Force.

The principal advantages of establishing USCC as a Service within the Department of the Air Force include:

  • Fully dedicating a Service’s resources to the cyberspace domain, with a particular emphasis on cyberspace operations as a global strike capability.
  • Leveraging existing support and relationships with its sister Service in order to maintain existing USAF capabilities and control costs. In addition, the Departments of the Army and Navy would cede some cyberspace responsibilities and associated funding to USCC, offsetting some costs.
  • Providing a principal Defense Department entity for cyberspace operations to execute and coordinate at the same level as the other Services, particularly with regard to POTUS/SECDEF tasking as well as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).
  • Developing the roles, responsibilities, and authorities required for cyberspace operations, particularly offensive cyberspace operations, in the manner today’s Services do for the other domains.
  • Creating a new paradigm for accessing, training, educating, retaining, and advancing the talent pool for cyberspace operations.

The new paradigm in personnel management presents perhaps the strongest argument for establishing USCC: providing this new service the latitude to recruit personnel using non-traditional methods and criteria, and then to develop them professionally to be, first and foremost, “cyber operators.” Specific opportunities include:

  • Capturing talent across the age spectrum by attracting and inducting experienced personnel, not just the 18-25 year old cohort, into the service.
  • Opening the aperture to include professionals who do not match the typical profile for recruits or officer candidates, including those who may not be world-wide deployable – since USCC would not deploy as other Services do.
  • Allowing US Air Force Academy graduates to select USAF or USCC as a service assignment and incorporating cyberspace in the Air University curriculum.
  • Inducting cyberspace/information professionals who have specialized and excelled in those areas within their own Service (inter-service transfers).
  • Growing true cyberspace professionals who compete for advancement, and thus leadership positions, on a level playing field with peers whose main focus is also the cyberspace domain.

As an alternative to establishing the US Cyber Corps, US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) could become more like US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), employing SOCOM’s unique model of Title X responsibilities and authorities mixed with service-supported personnel and acquisition systems.[4] Like SOCOM, CYBERCOM would exercise worldwide responsibilities, plan and execute its special mission sets in coordination with geographic Combatant Commands, and maintain strong roots in each of the Services. However, this enabling option would miss the key opportunity presented in the US Cyber Corps proposal; namely, recruiting, educating, training, and retaining skilled personnel outside the traditional military accession and promotion systems.

150125-N-PK678-032 PENSACOLA, Fla. (Jan. 25, 2014) Information Systems Technician 1st Class Kyle Gosser, an instructor at the Center for Information Dominance Unit Corry Station, mentors a local high school student participating in the inaugural Cyberthon competition at the National Flight Academy at Naval Air Station Pensacola during the weekend of Jan. 23-25. The Cyberthon competition tests student teams on their abilities to use the computer skills they learned in their classrooms to defend and defeat cyber attacks on websites. (U.S. Navy photo by Ed Barker/Released)
PENSACOLA, Fla. (Jan. 25, 2014) Information Systems Technician 1st Class Kyle Gosser, an instructor at the Center for Information Dominance Unit Corry Station, mentors a local high school student participating in the inaugural Cyberthon competition at the National Flight Academy at Naval Air Station Pensacola during the weekend of Jan. 23-25. The Cyberthon competition tests student teams on their abilities to use the computer skills they learned in their classrooms to defend and defeat cyber attacks on websites. (U.S. Navy photo by Ed Barker/Released)

A principal argument against US Cyber Corps is that today’s fiscal environment cannot support additional costs in terms of “bureaucracy.” However, some savings and efficiencies can be certainly be realized by other services divesting some cyberspace responsibilities. Additionally, USCC would need far fewer bases, much less equipment and logistics support, and fewer personnel that its sister services. Training, education, personnel support, and infrastructure can be shared with other services, with much of the support coming from within the Department of the Air Force.

Returning to the historical analogy, the political and fiscal circumstances following World War II also presented a less than ideal time to create a new Armed Service. However, with opportunities and threats in the air domain, the National Security Act of 1947 created the US Air Force – a controversial step at the time that seems inevitable in retrospect. Today’s fiscal circumstances and operational threats echo those post-World War II concerns. Perhaps in 50 years the choice to dedicate a service to the cyberspace domain will also appear to have been self-evident.  

In conclusion, despite the importance of cyberspace operations as an operational enabler within and across the other domains, each service correctly focuses its acquisition and professional development efforts on winning the fight in its principal domain. A critical first step towards fully exploiting the potential of cyberspace operations is creating the foundation for a Service to “own” cyberspace as a warfighting domain. The formation of USCC would provide a unique approach, especially with respect to developing a professional cyberwarfare community, to enable the global, continuous reach of cyberspace operations.

Captain Donegan is a career surface warfare officer. A native of Hagerstown, MD, he graduated with merit from the United States Naval Academy in 1992 with a Bachelor of Science in History. He is also a graduate of both the American Military University with a Master of Arts in Military Studies (Naval Warfare) and the Naval War College. The views above are the author’s and do not represent those of the US Navy or the US Department of Defense.

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[1] JP 1-02, page 64.

[2] “Incoming: A Handful of Heretical Thoughts,” Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Signal Magazine, 01 Dec 2015.

[3] Delineation of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations is a fuller topic. This article focuses on the need to establish the foundations for offensive cyberspace operations by creating USCC. Each Service retains responsibilities for cyberspace defense of its systems and platforms (analogous to force protection requirements).

[4] USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified command subordinate to U. S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Service elements include: Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER); Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER); Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM); and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). Source: US Cyber Command Fact Sheet (Aug 2013), 

Capability Analysis, Current Operations, Tactical Concepts

New Wrinkles in Maritime Warfare

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This post originally featured on The Diplomat and was republished with permission. You may read it in its original form here. 

By Col Michael W. “Starbaby” Pietrucha

Last year, the Air Force achieved a little-noticed aviation milestone: the first-ever drop of a winged, precision guided aerial mine. Almost fifty years after Texas Instruments slapped a laser guidance kit on a M117 dumb bomb, the Air Force added a guidance kit to a dumb mine, and greatly expanded the potential for aerial mining. The late arrival of precision capabilities to the antiship mine is no less revolutionary than it was for the advent of precision bombs in the first place, allowing precise placement of mines and improving the survivability of the employing platform. This development has the potential to revitalize aerial mining and add immeasurably to joint countermaritime operations.

Figure 1: Flounder 004, an inert GBU-62Bv(1)/B Quick Strike ER awaits loading on a B-52H at Guam (Col Mike Pietrucha, USAF)
Figure 1: Flounder 004, an inert GBU-62Bv(1)/B Quick Strike ER awaits loading on a B-52H at Guam (Col Mike Pietrucha, USAF)

The Mines

Since Vietnam, the standard naval bottom mine has been a variation of the 500-lb. Mk-82 or 1000-lb. Mk-83 General Purpose bomb. The same bomb bodies are used for Laser Guided Bombs (GBU-12 and GBU-16) or JDAMs (GBU-38 and GBU-32). The change that turns a bomb into a mine is the replacement of the fuze (which detonates the bomb on or just after impact) with a target detection device (TDD), which detonates the mine when a ship passes within lethal range. Mine assembly is completed with the addition of a safe/arm device in the nose and a parachute-retarder tailkit in the back (see Fig. 2), turning a 500-lb. Mk-82 into the Mk-62 Quickstrike and the 1000-lb. Mk-83 into a Mk-63 Quickstrike. All Quickstrike mines are air-delivered.

Read the rest here.