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Indo-Asia-Pacific

Quality from Quantity: The PLAN’s Road to Achieve American Skill via Size

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By Matthew Hipple

The United States Navy holds up quality as the firebreak against the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) dominant fleet size and overwhelming industrial capacity. But the development and maintenance of professional skills to fight wars, build ships, and maintain fleets requires material, time, and people – in a word, quantity, for which the PLAN holds the undeniable advantage. The cliché that “quantity has a quality all its own” improperly frames the advantages conferred upon America’s PLAN adversary by the size of its navy and its various supporting enterprises. Quantity is not merely an attribute with which to bury one’s opponent; quantity pragmatically applied provides individuals and entire professional classes the opportunity to cultivate and cement quality. Without the opportunity afforded by scale, the U.S. Navy will fall behind an adversary with a world of opportunity to explore new skills, new systems, and grow its force-wide professionalism. The potential qualitative impact of quantity shows at every level – from the shipyards to fleet training for individual sailors.

The Maritime Industry and a Nation’s Maritime Character

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) recently assessed that the China’s shipbuilding industry fields 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, representing almost 50% of total global shipbuilding capacity. To stark quantitative differences like these, the U.S. Navy responds, “in many ways our shipbuilders are better shipbuilders, that’s why we have a more modern, more capable, more lethal Navy.”

An unclassified slide from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) highlighting differences between U.S. Navy and PLA Navy shipbuilding capacity, ship count, and overall tonnage. (U.S. Navy graphic)

Unfortunately, these snapshots of quantitative position fail to account for the rate of qualitative improvement required for China to achieve this feat of material and professional development – from backwater to backbone. China’s modern shipbuilding behemoth is only 20 years old, the result of a deliberate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) campaign of maritime expansion begun in response to the US Navy’s Summer Pulse 2004 exercise when China represented only around 10% of global ship production. In the time between LCS program initiation in 2004 and the final mission package reaching initial operating capability in 2023, the CCP revolutionized an entire industry and supporting professional class. Meanwhile, 20 years of mismanaged shipbuilding plans – have left American shipbuilders without the demand needed to sustain itself, its professional community, or meet naval demand. John Konrad of GCaptain estimates that making “an American shipyard professional takes about 3-5 years.” Although the communal professional improvement of China’s shipyard workers will take longer due to their extreme individual specialization compared to more broadly skilled Western shipyard workers – the China’s shipbuilding cadre have that opportunity to improve with the scale of their enterprise. And ultimately, specialized workers who exist are superior to theoretically higher quality generalists who do not.

But shipbuilding is just a piece of that qualitative puzzle solved by the scale of China’s maritime industry. There is a maritime quality to China’s population that America has left behind. As Mahan notes, “in point of population, it is not only the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily available for employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval material, that must be counted.” Mahan goes on to say that this is a quality of,

“staying power… which is even greater than appears on the surface; for a great shipping afloat necessarily employs, besides the crews, a large number of people engaged in the various handicrafts which facilitate the making and repairing of naval material, or following other callings more or less closely connected with the water and with craft of all kinds.”

But even in front-facing maritime industries, America falls behind, as evidenced by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) finally sounding the alarm on mariners available for the ready reserve fleet in a war against a thoroughly maritime nation with a maritime militia and weaponized commercial fleet.

These maritime qualities expand beyond mariners and their supporting maritime industry. From commercial electronics to drone manufacturing, China fields vast and ever-improving professional communities in pursuits related to the development, sustainment, and operation of a modern Navy. Mahan recognized that “such kindred callings give an undoubted aptitude for the sea from the outset.” Even industries unassociated with naval warfare provide those with the character and skill needed to support the fleet. Mahan notes a particularly canny English mariner, Sir Edward Pellew, who, “when the war broke out in 1793… Eager to get to sea and unable to fill his complement otherwise than with landsmen, he instructed his officers to seek for Cornish miners; reasoning from the conditions and dangers of their calling… would quickly fit into the demands of sea life. The result showed his sagacity… he was fortunate enough to capture the first frigate taken in the war in single combat.” China’s multitude industries provides such individuals experienced in the conditions and wielding the skills sufficient to make useful mariners.

The U.S. Navy highlighting contemporary quality recalls Mahan’s unnamed French officer, who after “extolling the high state of efficiency of the French fleet… goes on to say: ‘Behind the squadron of 21 ships-of-the-line which we could then assemble, there was no reserve.’” China certainly displays Mahan’s qualities for a maritime nation’s industrial character and its relation to the sea. The CCP’s groundwork of capacity is now well laid to improve the qualitative muscles at sea, opportunities well in excess of the U.S. Navy’s.

Practice Makes Perfect – But How, When, and With What?

When faced with the ever-growing size of the PLAN, a common U.S. Navy response is that, “they script their people to fight, we actually train our people to think.” While valid, the United States Navy has had its own past struggles with training quality  and scripting. Meanwhile, the PLAN pursues improvements in the quality and accurate assessment of its combat exercises.

Only nine years ago the surface fleet founded the Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center (SMWDC) to repair decades of atrophy in tactical and operational training and expertise. Still, scripts and constraints continued to erode junior officers’ desire to command while early command opportunities decrease. From my own experience, experienced, post-command mentors wondered aloud if seeking command at sea was and is worth the ever-shrinking margin of actual command exercised against a sea of requirements.

Ship for ship, the U.S. Navy is still better than America’s PLAN adversaries. U.S. Navy waterfront leadership’s resentment of administrative leashes indicates they still strive for independence and know what right looks like. However, institutionally the U.S. Navy fails to detect the diminishing opportunities for excellence that its size and those leashes provide, and how the opposite opportunity is now offered to America’s principal adversary. The diminished size of the U.S. fleet against growing operational requirements requires leadership to impose ever greater oversight and ever smaller margins of independence, while the PLAN’s mere size allows broad new opportunities for autonomy and professional growth if they want to pursue it.

To demonstrate these narrow margins, during the roll-out of the 36-month Optimized Fleet Response Plan, my officemates and I at the Surface Forces Atlantic Commander’s Action Group did a loose internal analysis projecting the cycle over time. We determined that scenarios existed in which the margins imposed by the historically low fleet size in 2014-2015 were such that major exercises would suffer. Our limited quantity imposed clear potential limitations on our ability to generate quality – highlighting how a lack of capacity can force greater invasive or disruptive acts to ensure the fleet-level schedule meets basic requirements.

Those invasive acts further limit a commanding officer’s ability to exercise their own judgment and build trust with their crew, as exercised during “CO’s time” – the time underway free of outside direction where a ship’s captain independently sets the agenda and priorities for training or testing. There is no data I know of tracking the availability and use of “CO’s time,” but over the past decade I have heard its absence lamented in greater volume every year. As an operations officer (OPS), my CO tasked me with clawing back what little time I could for us to set our own destiny. Even after triple-stacking requirements just to meet our timetable, I cannot recall ever having succeeded. I have yet to meet a CO or a fellow OPS with a success story on this front. The fleet’s limited numbers often force condensation and scripting of training by necessity, precluding greater independent opportunities for teams to develop and exercise their tactical creativity.

Additionally, the U.S. Navy’s often minimalist approach to procurement shows how limited quantity limits development of quality in arenas like tactical and technical development. As an example, the 10-years-behind-schedule LCS Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) Mission Package (MP) has still yet to certify Full Operating Capability. When I was OPS with LCS Crew 206 in 2020, when the package was only seven years behind schedule, we could only field a single unmanned surface vessel (USV) for limited periods to conduct basic testing – let alone tactical development. This was after the disastrous attempt to base the MCM mission package off the Remote Multi Mission Vehicle (RMMV) – a corner-cutting approach that tried to repurpose a program from 1999 for DDGs into an LCS minehunting system into the 2020’s.

Among numerous other programmatic issues, the paucity of resources always limited the speed of development. The U.S. Navy is making strides learning from that failure on the unmanned front with CTF 59 in Bahrain, USV DIV One in San Diego, and a new approach for 4th Fleet. Nonetheless, the US Navy remains well short of needed manned surface vessels. As the qualitative lag in the MCM MP caused by a paucity of USV assets demonstrates, the same applies to manned surface vessels. But unlike the U.S. Navy, the PLAN has nothing if not extra ships, ordnance, and unmanned systems to train and experiment with.

July 24, 2020 – The crew of USS MANCHESTER (LCS 14) conducts USV training. (Author photo)

Our Advantage Is Our People – If We Can Get Them To School

Finally, the ultimate advantage of the U.S. Navy against the PLAN is that its sailors are better on their feet. But to be better improvisers, they need training they can stand by – a lesson learned during the lost decade replacing in-person schools with CD-based SWOS-in-a-box and online GMTs. While the U.S. Navy has greatly improve the availability and quality of training today, getting to this training demands adequate capacity: enough ships to fulfill fleet requirements while giving COs and crews the space to learn and enough sailors to cover the watch while shipmates are at school. The lack of the former is discussed above, and the 22,000 gapped at-sea billets underscore the continuing lack the latter.

With overtasked, undermanned ships – a force cut to the bone against ever-increasing global demand for conventional maritime forces – ships are caught in a Catch-22: they need to send their sailors to school, but the persistent demands of security, engineering, maintenance, administration, domestic fleet tasking, and the like means there are very few sailors to spare. Here, LCS shows a world that could have been, had the fleet not hamstrung its future manning with the ill-conceived Perform-to-Serve cuts. For a time, the Blue-Gold model showed what a properly manned command could do- with time for sailors to attend school, watchteams available for a month to fight entire virtual wars in the simulator, opportunity to focus on personal and family health, and opportunities to assist other crews as necessary while training along the way. In our case, LCS Crew 206 sent 12 sailors to train on and test the USV with the prime contractor and Naval Sea Systems Command’s LCS Mission Modules program office (PMS-420) in Panama City. Properly resourced, these well-trained and well-practiced sailors achieve feats like USS Charleston’s 26-month deployment.

SAN DIEGO (March 5, 2020) – Sailors stand a simulated watch on the bridge of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Integrated Tactical Trainer (ITT)-2B at the Littoral Training Facility on Naval Base San Diego, March 5, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kevin C. Leitner)

Unfortunately, contemporary manning gaps have made proper resourcing of any manning model a challenge. Geography also exacts an asymmetric toll: While a San Diego-based warship takes a month to cross to the Western Pacific and another month to return, a PLAN vessel can steam around Taiwan to conduct a Restriction of Navigation Operation (RONOP) on a whim. Across the roughly 425 combatants of the PLAN, that home field advantage grants years of extra operating time, which then provides the PLAN greater opportunity for professional development at every level. Whether that opportunity is properly utilized is another question – but its potential must be recognized.

Quality is Molded From Quantity

Quantity may be a quality all its own but quantity is, in jargon terms, a “force multiplier.” Quantity is opportunity – exposure to new skills, repetition and practice of old skills, and chance to develop both. Quantity is bandwidth – the capacity to cover requirements while still supporting schools, training, technical and tactical development, and innovation. The U.S. Navy may field a relative advantage in quality today but the main adversary fields capacity that enables an opportunity to overtake.

The U.S. Navy’s historically diminished size combined with the constraints necessary to maximize that diminished force’s availability paves a path to relative diminished quality against a PLAN which is growing and improving every day. If the U.S. Navy is truly serious about honing a cognitive combat edge against its numerically superior opponent, then it must recognize, advocate for, and invest in the quantity necessary to cultivate quality. There are no silver bullets for the Navy’s most likely adversary; they are communists, not werewolves. The U.S. Navy is going to need, in laymen’s terms, “more” – not merely to fight the next war, but enough to keep cultivating in ourselves the skills and mindset to win it.

Matthew Hipple is an active duty naval officer and former President of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of any U.S. government department or agency.

Featured Image: October 2023 – Chinese Navy warships attached to a destroyer flotilla under the PLA Eastern Theater Command sail in formation en route to a multi-subject training exercise in East China Sea. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wei Chenping)

Force Development

Other People’s Wars: The U.S. Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts

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Sterling, Brent L. Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts. Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2021. 336 pp. $39.95 (soft cover). ISBN: 1647120594.

By LtCol Adam Yang, USMC

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has already raged on for nearly two years and continues to provide the US Department of Defense an incredible opportunity to derive insights on the changing character of war. Similarly, Israel’s offensive against Hamas terrorists in Gaza today may likely reveal new insights on urban and tunnel warfare in densely populated areas. 

Though it can be quite hazardous to draw definitive lessons for an ongoing conflict, there is a remarkable appetite across the defense community to extract preliminary lessons and implications from their unique vantages. For observer nations, the spectacle of a foreign conflict might reveal critical battlefield information on new capabilities and concepts and provide the critical information-edge needed to overcome an opponent in future battle. Why learn the hard way when you can learn from the wartime successes and challenges of others?

Though there is plenty of literature on learning and training processes, Brent L. Sterling’s book, Other People’s Wars, provides a structured academic view into the lesser-examined topic on how, specifically, the US military has served as third-party but direct observers to learn from foreign conflicts in the field. Sterling delves into four historical examples when the United States deployed some of its best military minds to learn up close battlefield lessons in a bygone era that lacked the information systems we enjoy today. The four cases are the Crimean War (1854-56), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), and the Yom Kippur War (October 1973). 

In each case, Sterling provides a snapshot of each respective conflict and answers four basic questions: 1) How did the US military attempt to identify lessons, 2) What lessons did the services identify, 3) How did the services apply those lessons, and 4) What were some of the implications of those applied lessons? As an overarching theme, Other People’s Wars is less about the specific lessons derived from each conflict and more about the leadership, bureaucratic, parochial, and cultural challenges military organizations face when they attempt to “learn” lessons and enact resource decisions based on foreign battlefield information.1

The academic foundation of Other People’s Wars blends literature from military innovation, information diffusion, and organizational learning and Sterling, thankfully, keeps much of his analysis away from academic jargon. Sterling rightly distinguishes the act of “drawing a lesson” and “learning a lesson.” The former implies the process of collecting, observing and deriving a valid insight from a foreign conflict. The latter idea of learning itself relates to how organizations actually apply observed lessons to improve their combat effectiveness.2 In other words, Sterling suggests that organizational learning does not truly occur unless there is actually change in organizational behavior based on related combat findings.

Across four cases, Other People’s Wars offers the gritty details how the US Army, Navy, and Air Force leaders strived to glean insights from foreign conflicts based on their unique political climates, budgetary constraints, and cultural lenses. The cases then show how military organizations enacted or failed to enact change after returning home with their troves of newly acquired tactical knowledge. The decision and authority to initiate such studies were almost exclusively top-down given the political sensitivities of their work and invasiveness with scrutinizing foreign armies in active combat zones. The ideal method to learn from foreign conflicts is to embed neutral observers with all belligerents to capture reciprocal perspectives of their engagements. However, at least in the Sterling’s cases, this standard was rarely met save for a few limited instances.

For example, during the Crimean War in June of 1855, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis dispatched three trusted Army officers to Crimea via Russia. However, though acting as neutral observers, these officers were blocked by both sides (France and Britain on one side and Russia on the other) and lost valuable observation time waiting in neutral areas because local commanders did not want any distractions amidst active battle. Later, during the Russo-Japanese War, the US War Department’s General Staff dispatched eight observers to observe both Japanese and Russian forces with greater success. Those observers gained enough access to observe the aftermath of the Japanese siege of Port Arthur in December 1904, and directly monitor the Battle of Mukden on the front lines in February 1905 – two of the most decisive battles of the entire conflict.

When the United States could not gain direct access to a foreign battle, it leveraged third-party observers for direct reporting of critical capabilities and systems. Sterling shows how the US military frequently leaned on its network of defense attaches. During the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, US defense attaches in Spain, Germany, Italy, and Russia, developed a dense network of local contacts and foreign officials to help collect.3

The Pitfalls and Perils of Learning from Others

For US military personnel attempting to learn from foreign conflicts, Sterling draws a clear line between their observations, drawn lessons, and reports back to senior military and political leaders. However, it is the process of stateside reception and critique and of those lessons that complicates the learning process in each historical case. In some instances, the US Army or Navy enthusiastically adopted lessons from the front lines that would trigger systematic doctrinal and capability changes across their Services.

To illustrate this point, Sterling describes how the Army dispatched Major General Donn A. Starry – a future Commanding General for the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (1977-81) – to capture lessons from the Israelis shortly after the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In turn, the Army would transform Starry’s findings, particularly those related to combined arms and the need for greater air-ground coordination, to guide the development of its famed Air-Land Battle doctrine over the next ten years. Yet, this example tends to the be exception rather than the norm in terms of bureaucratic change. Sterling identifies at least five recurring challenges the US military faced when learning from others:

Preexisting Preferences. A recurring culprit in this book, prior organizational preferences shape every aspect of a learning process, including what data to pursue, how to interpret such data, and whether any “lessons” are relevant to the service. The Navy believed that the Russo-Japanese War validated Alfred Thayer Mahan’s core idea that “concentrating capital warships was the key to winning fleet engagements” and that defense-oriented alternatives were a losing proposition for any great navy.4 Though this lesson may be have been “correct,” the Japanese never allowed US Navy personnel directly near the waters of Port Arthur and forced the Navy personnel to interpret battle information from Japanese liaisons and foreign attaches that had first-hand accounts of the battle.5

Failure to Identify What Happened. The inability to access relevant battlefield information undermines the entire learning process. Surprisingly, the act of sending multiple observers to document different battlefield phases and stages tended to generate contradictory and conflicting reports, which buried important lessons under the noise and weight of lesser observations.

Application of Disputed Lessons. Senior leaders with bureaucratic power can build “artificial consensus” and use ambiguous lessons to muscle through preferred programs. Sterling cites how Secretary Davis and some Army leaders used the Crimean War to justify the development of more masonry fortifications after claiming this is what allowed Russia to repel the assaults by the Allies, rather than focusing on the failure of Allied coordination during the assault.

Rejection or Ignoring of Lessons. This pitfall occurs when military forces ignore or write off important observations because they do not directly apply to their current activities. Sterling shows that in the 1930s the Army Air Corps failed to take notice of German close air support tactics because they were primarily focused on the effects of strategic bombing.

Identifying Contradictory Guidance. Another common challenge includes the identification of two or more relevant lessons that signal contradictory behaviors and investments. After the Yom Kippur War, the Army observers separately noted that it was more beneficial to boost the “tooth” (i.e. combat power) versus “tail” (sustainment) ratio – and vice versa – to generate the greatest utility from its armor formations. Consequently, the Army diluted its limited resources for several years as it experimented with both courses of action.

A Modern Context

As the conflict in Ukraine nears the end of its second year, the Department of Defense and other foreign militaries will continue to capture what they believe to be relevant information on the conflict inform resource decisions. Modern information technologies provide military experts and researchers incredible access to information and individuals at incredible rates, however, an on-the-ground investigatory approach even today would yield incredible insight and knowledge that one does not get from distant observation. Even Carl von Clausewitz recommended that military leaders “should be sent to observe operations and learn what war is like.”6

Sterling’s book offers a historical gateway into this phenomenon and provides remarkable insight into the benefits and challenges of learning from foreign conflicts from an American point of view. Other People’s Wars mostly focuses on the challenges with institutional learning and, admittedly, does not attempt to detail how to overcome such issues. Sterling writes that there are “no easy remedies;” but stresses the need for organizations to build complete and objective histories of events, and to disseminate findings widely to solicit a broad assessment of findings. For a different view on this subject, readers can also explore John Nagl’s dissertation turned book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, as he elucidates how organizational culture skews organizational learning by comparing the US Army and British Army experience with counterinsurgency.

Overall, Brent Sterling does a remarkable job illuminating the benefits and challenges of organizational learning in the US military. Though this subject has been written on in other forms, Other People’s Wars captures the US military’s historical experience methodically and with great clarity, purpose, and evidence. While these cases are historical, the stories related to leadership, hubris, and bureaucratic slow-walking are timeless and seemingly reminiscent to the strategic churn that occurs today. This book is a must-read for military professionals, educators, and those interested in organizational change.

Lieutenant Colonel Adam Yang, PhD is a Marine Corps strategist assigned to the Strategy Branch in the Plans, Policies, and Operations directorate of Headquarters Marine Corps.

References

1. Brent L. Sterling, Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021).

2. Sterling, 6.

3. Sterling, 138–39.

4. Sterling, 74.

5. Sterling, 62.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1989), 122.

Featured Image: Ukrainian troops participate in a military exercise. The main task of this brigade is to shoot down Shahed-136/131 drones used by Russia to attack Ukraine. (Photo via the “Rubizh” Rapid Response Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine)

Strategy

Top Issues Facing the U.S. Navy: A Compendium from The Madison Sea Power Workshops

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By Capt. Gerard D. Roncolato (ret.), Capt. Scott Mobley (ret.), and CDR Paul Giarra (ret.)

Introduction

This paper presents the collated opinions from participants in the Madison Sea Power Workshops, an informal gathering of navalists whose purpose is to explore key issues facing American sea power as we shift to an era of great power competition.

The challenges facing our Navy and its Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) are legion, stemming from the long post-Cold War era, a 20-plus year focus on terrorism, the wars in Southwest Asia, and perhaps more fundamentally, the lack of active naval combat against a peer competitor since 1945.

We intend these issues to serve as a springboard for developing specific, actionable recommendations that would help the Navy and the CNO put the rudder hard over to get the ship’s head moving, relying on the system to refine the course downstream.

We asked our members: “What are the top issues facing the U.S. Navy today?” In answering the question, members submitted their top five issues. We then binned their responses and ranked them in order of most feedback to least. This yielded the following rank-ordered discussion of the survey results.

Our membership includes longstanding navalists and non-navalists interested in national security and the U.S. Navy. It includes a diverse group of intellectual and academic backgrounds. 27 of the 58 members responded. The demographics include (some members fit into more than one category):

  • Serving/Served Navy: 19
  • Interservice and Interagency: 4
  • PhDs: 7
  • Academics and Analysts: 10
  • Retired Flag/Senior Officer/SES: 14
  • Active Duty: 5

In short, we feel this effort offers a fresh and diverse voice to the tough issues facing today’s Navy. Just as importantly, we note the order of the bins, with “Logistics” near the top and “Material” at the bottom. This is somewhat the inverse of what one might expect and reflects a unique result of this survey.

Though our original paper included recommendations and “issues,” the decision was made to separate the two into the issues themselves, how they were gathered, and how they broke out in the rankings, which are of value on their own. Next, we intend to provide an analytical document that focuses on recommendations. This separation of products allows us to report on the membership’s priorities and then analyze the recommendations in a logical sequence.

Survey Results: Top Issues for the U.S. Navy

As we reviewed the issues provided by our participants, we found that they naturally organized themselves into nine broad categories (i.e., “bins”). The bins are ranked in order from most feedback to least. It should be noted that the focus of the group fell largely into two categories: (1) issues deemed fundamental and (2) issues receiving less attention in the navalist community and the press.

1. Strategy

The need for a naval (or maritime) strategy that drives programmatic decisions, doctrine, and training is a frequent topic in academia, media, and navalist circles. Yet, despite years of debate, such a strategy remains elusive. The reasons underlying this situation are beyond the purview of this paper. However, Madison Sea Power Workshop participants provided numerous responses on this issue. The issues fall into several broad sub-categories, including deficient national and naval strategies, inadequate or missing strategic planning skills and processes, and incoherent and unbalanced force structures—including our Foreign Military Sales system. Some argued that the Navy has surrendered its strategic planning to other organizations like the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, or combatant commanders. At the same time, there is general agreement that the Navy, the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in particular, must articulate the importance and the nation’s need for sea power.

A common theme was the apparent absence of an explicit concept of what kind of competition and war could and should inform procurement and doctrinal decisions, including any concept of war termination or victory conditions. A recent article on unmanned systems asks: A fleet to do what?1 Related to these comments was the argument that such a gap in the Navy’s strategic framework hinders building a realistic operational context for judging and using technological developments. In the interwar period, War Plan Orange provided such a context. While its contents constantly shifted as conditions changed and as the Navy learned through education, wargames, and exercises, the solid presence of the plan served as a foundation for decisions.

Finally, it was noted that the lack of an overarching U.S. maritime strategy fosters a narrow focus on technology and, for lack of a better term, kill chains or webs. While the latter are a necessary element in preparing for a future war, they alone are insufficient. The overly narrow framework that drives current naval thinking and joint thinking also avoids hard issues that emerge when one considers the broader aspects of a great power war with a heavy maritime component. The defense of shipping, ports, logistics lines to forward-deployed forces, homeland infrastructure, and impeding Chinese trade or economic activity all fall outside the scope of kill chain logic.

It has been argued that sea power is all about movement: enabling ours while impeding that of the enemy.2 This is a radically different frame of reference from ground-centric or even air-centric strategic concepts. It is uniquely maritime and hence, uniquely naval in character. For this reason alone, the participants saw developing a broad yet focused maritime strategy as key, even foundational, in preparing for the next great power war.

2. Logistics

Based on additional input following the September 20th, 2023, hybrid workshop session at the U.S. Naval Institute, the logistics bin received the second most responses. This is due in part to the broad definition of logistics used. It also suggests the deep concern many participants have with the neglect of the Navy’s logistics capabilities. Finally, members’ concerns underscore the need to rethink logistic concepts in the face of a future great power war in the western Pacific against a capable and determined adversary with superior industrial capacity. As used here, logistics covers the full spectrum, including factory assembly lines, naval supply depots, distribution systems, and ultimately our combat forces—the “last tactical mile.” There was significant concern over what was perceived as a deficient industrial base, particularly for shipbuilding and repair. This was complemented by perceptions of a shipbuilding plan overly focused on high-end combatants for confrontation with enemy fleets and power projection ashore at the expense of other missions like convoy escort, sea lines of communication defense, mine countermeasures, and logistic support.

Many respondents perceived that logistics networks are brittle and insufficient for sustaining a joint campaign in the western Pacific against China. This includes woefully inadequate merchant sealift. This capability and capacity gap is exacerbated by the vulnerabilities of air and sea lines of communication and their associated depots in a great power war.3

Several participants added concerns about the “last tactical mile” of logistics support. Specifically, the long-known inability to rearm vertical launch system (VLS) weapons at sea was seen as a critical shortcoming. Likewise, planning and capacity for logistics support of dispersed formations, whether Marine Corps or Navy, was seen as inadequate. In all cases, concern for capability gaps was amplified by a sense that there seems to be little urgency in effectively addressing those gaps.

A related concern expressed by a few of the Madison Sea Power Project participants is the seeming lack of questioning long-held logistics operational concepts. Specifically, there was concern that in the post-Cold War era, naval logistics had returned to the hub-based structure of the pre-World War II era. The concern is that reliance on in-theater logistics hubs introduces vulnerabilities and operational rigidities when employed in a great power conflict. World War II development of a mobile logistics force concept was necessary in sustaining combat operations against a very capable and mobile area denial enemy.4,5 The answer cannot be that such a situation would never happen when one asks, “What happens if our in-theater depots are compromised?”

Finally, there was concern that the abandonment of organic maintenance and repair (along with commensurate manning, onboard tools, and parts) had compromised ship self-sufficiency at exactly the time the Navy was placing increased emphasis on dispersed operations. It is noted that the Navy is changing course on this last issue, but greater urgency is recommended.

3. Training and Education

This bin covers accession, tactical/system training, and professional education. Key concerns from our members included deficient personnel recruitment, reliance on antiquated techniques for training, inadequate officer education on war, history, and warfighting, and insufficient wargaming at all levels as a tool for training and experimentation. There is continued concern with crew maintenance capability and capacity at the shipboard level. Specifically, design compromises that impair the ability of crews to effect emergency battle damage repairs intended to keep the ship in the fight or allow it to withdraw. For example, the shipboard 4160 VAC electrical distribution system requires depot-level repair that the ship’s crew cannot affect at sea.

Perhaps the most significant concern expressed by participants was the apparent neglect of building an officer corps capable of dealing with the inevitable surprises that combat in a great power war will bring. While related to the Culture bin discussed next, comments in this bin emphasized the role of training and education in building the desired skills. One participant made the case for an increased emphasis on command. Reflecting on the uncertainty surrounding combat and the incredible speed with which events can unfold, he noted:

“I think command—as a concept and a role—needs more emphasis. Training and education should be oriented to creating officers who can think independently, assess multiple factors quickly, and act strategically, even in tactical situations. That’s what the Naval War College did in the 1930s.”

Finally, several participants noted that tactical training in today’s Navy is inadequate. It is, they argue, focused largely on systems alignments and checklists. While these are important building blocks to tactics, they are not themselves tactics. Even in a highly technological service like the Navy, the human element in combat remains significant. In a great power war, the side that adapts effectively first will prevail. Many factors influence this capability, but true tactical education and training are seen as of primary importance.

4. Culture

Our members submitted a significant number of responses on the issue of service culture. In some cases, members argued that changing the culture is the first and most important step in addressing the issues facing the Navy today. On the other hand, some members argued for deleting the Culture bin since a changed culture is the product of other changes across the institution. In the context of this paper, the concept of Navy culture was of sufficient concern to our members that we include it here—primarily as a statement of issues facing the Navy. Subsequent products from Madison Sea Power Workshop will focus on recommended actions where the relationship between culture and change will be explored.

The overarching concern of the Madison Sea Power Project Workshop members was a perceived lack of focus on warfighting. This includes a lack of realistic tactical training, over-focus on inspections, which consume the majority of time for operational forces, and a perceived zero-defect culture. A warfighting culture, by contrast, focuses primarily on warfighting imperatives, placing the study and practice of tactics above other concerns, and recognizes the importance of ship and squadron ownership of their tactics. Finally, such a culture recognizes and acts upon the precept that combat is a chaotic human endeavor where surprise is ever-present and, consequently, where only the agile and most highly trained can prevail.

The perceived inability of the Navy to foster such a culture has many causes, per the responses. These include career paths that allow little deviation and even less time for personal study about war and tactics. Ship/squadron schedules afford little time for units to ponder and execute effective training for warfighting. Respondents see tactical training as overly focused on technical procedures and system alignments, neglecting the dynamics of actual wartime tactics. Also, a heavy focus on the material aspects of warfighting while neglecting the human elements. The heavy inspection culture has created an organizational dependency on outsiders to define ship and squadron success, fostering a persistent zero-defect culture focused on passing inspections rather than preparing for war. Several members commented on the need to enhance Navy leadership: rebuild “committed, engaged leadership (from work center to fleet command).” A final set of responses emphasized the challenges of our existing peacetime promotion and selection process that seems to value conformity and management over warfighting knowledge and proficiency.

Taken together, these responses emphasize the importance of shifting Navy culture to one that extols frank feedback at all levels, emphasizes lower-level initiative, and, in general, evolves into a fast and agile organization well-versed in the profession of warfighting. Such an organization can absorb war’s inevitable surprises and quickly develop corrective measures. In short, the group sensed that developing a culture focused on warfighting would entail rebuilding an organization with critical thinking and adaptability at the forefront. This is the learning culture about which Trent Hone so effectively writes.6

5. Organization

The Navy’s organization and its place within the broader Department of Defense and governmental framework garnered a significant number of inputs, half of which were received in response to the initial draft of this paper. Comments were wide-ranging and focused on three principal areas: Internal Navy organization, the Navy’s relationship with the government, and the Navy’s engagement within and beyond the institution, including with the American people.

At its core, the Navy organization must align with a dramatically different geo-strategic environment. Members remarked upon outdated Navy roles and missions, the lack of an effective strategic planning arm of the Navy staff, and a long-range (30-40 years) planning office focused more narrowly on the Navy’s roles and requirements for a U.S.-Peoples Republic of China competition. Additionally, Madison Sea Power Workshop members were concerned with the bureaucratic inertia evident in Navy staff (as well as other government bureaucracies). This retards action, values deliberate (and thus slow) planning, distorts the value of the enterprise approach to decision-making, and tends to centralize decisions at high levels with a resultant dampening of lower-level initiatives and innovation.

The members’ greatest concern was the Navy’s external relationships. Decades of “small” land wars in Southwest Asia encouraged focus on ground-centric operations in a relatively benign environment. The Navy’s (and the Nation’s) long heritage as a maritime nation reliant on sea power for its security and prosperity faded into the background. In its place, a more homogenized concept of jointness emerged, particularly in the wake of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). Members noted a perceived Army dominance in our joint doctrine, where service perspectives have been shoe-horned into a one-size-fits-all type of jointness. This is at odds with the Navy’s experience in the Pacific Campaign of World War II, where Admiral Nimitz developed a heterogeneous framework for joint campaigning that harnessed the unique perspectives of the various services to build a highly effective integrated force. As the Nation shifts focus toward what will largely be a maritime campaign versus China, such a heterogenous and agile doctrinal approach will become increasingly important.

This perspective applies as well to the U.S. military’s current combatant command structure. Several members noted that the regional combatant commands evolved to their current state during the post-Cold War era. It was noted that regional combatant commands may not be well suited to countering an increasingly global power, China, or a global coalition of disruptive powers—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. What is missing is a single military command or organization empowered to develop deterrence, warfighting strategies, and doctrine on a global level. A nuance of this command is developing a global maritime combatant command. This combatant command would be like existing ones, such as Space Command, Cyber Command, etc., charged with harnessing and employing US maritime forces around the great global commons.

Beyond the joint military arena, members were also concerned with our civilian leaders’ perceived lack of knowledge and understanding of military affairs. When combined with our political processes, this general lack of knowledge more often yields what one member called “policy mayhem.” This perspective naturally leads to a recognition of the Navy’s weakness in the public relations domain. Several members reiterated concerns over the Navy’s poor engagement with Congress and the American people. The perception is that the Navy tends to tell the people, through Congress and the press, that all is well and under control, but the details are classified.

This approach, akin to circling the wagons, will no longer work. The challenges faced by the Navy, internally as well as externally—are readily apparent to the attentive public. And not only are deep problems perceived, but a lack of progress over time is also apparent. Central to this issue, as reported by our members, is the lack of an effective maritime strategy that aligns internal Navy efforts and makes the case for American sea power to the public, Congress, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This links back to the earlier discussion of strategy above.

Viewed as a coherent whole, the issue of the Navy’s organization will play out within the context of a challenged U.S. civil-military relations framework. Increasingly discussed in the open press, civil-military relations must be strengthened and revamped to pave the way for effective whole-of-government solutions to the emerging crisis. This is a broad issue that the Chief of Naval Operations alone cannot fix but can drive into the agenda.7

6. Doctrine

This is another broad bin with a wide diversity of responses from Madison Sea Power Workshop members. Persistent interoperability challenges topped the concerns—interoperability within the Navy, in the joint force, and with allies and partners. Related to these concerns, members emphasized the need to look at the Pacific campaign through a joint lens. Several noted that while geography dictates that the fight will be maritime in nature, it will not be won by naval forces alone. Innovative approaches to the joint fight and its associated doctrine will be essential. There is a perceived lack of Army-Navy cooperation in developing a unified operational concept that maximizes and integrates the unique contribution of each service to the fight.

A significant part of the problem, as articulated by the members (and as mentioned in the Strategy section above), is the absence of a consensus on the character of a maritime war against China, how the U.S. will define victory in such a conflict, and what ways and means will be needed to accomplish that victory. The perception is that the military continues to prepare for a war with China through the lens of the past thirty years rather than accepting that such a war will be large, likely long, and that a peacetime military will be unable to win against the People’s Liberation Army. Members felt that the military had yet to fully align with new realities, specifically fighting against a determined and highly capable enemy thousands of miles from home in a contested maritime environment with an adversary that enjoys the home-court advantage. Moreover, the sense is that the current doctrine fails to account for the industrial advantage enjoyed by China and the challenges our military will face in replacing losses and sustaining high rates of weapons consumption.

Flowing from these issues is the broader one of what might be called a doctrinal echo chamber. The Navy and Marine Corps are developing doctrines such as Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) in response to current fiscal realities. Yet, the war they are being asked to fight presents demands far in excess of what the government is funding today. We face the potential of developing an eloquent doctrine based more on fiscal constraints and less on warfighting realities. The disconnect can prove disastrous.

Finally, the Navy’s doctrinal development suffers from self-imposed cultural and organizational challenges: cumbersome, unresponsive, centralized, and inadequately tested.

7. Operations

Responses on this issue focused on the mutually reinforcing problems of high operational-tempo demands, poor readiness in terms of manning, material, and training, a perception of too many priorities for too little time, and too little force structure. One member succinctly stated the thoughts of the group regarding operations in the context of other Navy issues: “Chronically being stretched thin, generalist mentality, poor staying power of numerous initiatives, no white space to truly think and go deeper.”

The upshot of this situation is that the Navy lacks the time and operational availability for extensive, rigorous, focused experimentation. Traditional means of doing this, such as the well-known Fleet Problems of the interwar era, are constrained by high operational tempo and the ease with which adversaries can monitor exercises. The Navy is making use of virtual reality simulations to experiment behind closed doors, but much more is needed. In addition to that need, the speed and effectiveness with which doctrinal lessons are being learned and fed back into new doctrine is too slow. This is part of an overall need for speed across the organization.

8. Acquisition

Acquisition reform has been a topic of discussion for decades across the defense community. Results have been minimal at best. Madison Sea Power Project members cited two major components of the problem. First, the process remains broken. Procurement takes too long, systems are over-complicated, and operator input seems sporadic, resulting in the delivery of platforms that take years, if not decades, to make useful to the operating forces. Second, compounding the inefficiency with which the Department of Defense spends its money is the continued paucity of resources. The nation is lurching toward great power competition, if not war, without the needed funding. The Navy’s influence on these issues is limited to a degree. But changing course is possible and will depend on the Navy’s ability to argue an effective case for both a streamlined and agile acquisition process and the funding needed to build and sustain the kind of Navy needed to project power into the western Pacific against a capable and determined adversary.

9. Material

Material issues are numerous and difficult. Members largely avoided these issues, aware they are the most talked about challenges in our military-industrial complex. However, they raised several issues: too few ships to meet a growing spectrum of necessary wartime missions and peacetime commitments, the large percentage of ships tied up in maintenance for extended periods, the chronic issue of too few missiles and other weapons with an inability to rearm underway in-theater, and the continued tendency of the procurement system to seek solutions in emerging technologies without adequate testing or doctrinal considerations. In particular, members are concerned with the leap into unmanned or optionally manned platforms without rigorous and honest examination of the technical risks, intended operational concepts, and sustainability issues. Regarding the latter, an excellent article examining the challenges of relying upon unmanned systems to make numbers was published in mid-October 2023 after member responses were recorded. The reader is urged to consider its points.8

Conclusion

This paper has presented the consolidated input of 27 Madison Sea Power Workshop members—civilian, active duty, and retired. The process yielded issues and their priority ranking that differ from the usual listing of concerns in navalist circles. Hopefully, this unique approach will be useful to the Navy’s leadership and informative to the American public and its leaders.

As noted in the introduction, the decision was made to first offer a summary of the issues Madison Sea Power Workshop members identified in their responses. No recommendations have been included above. The intent is to produce a separate document that takes this paper as a point of departure, conducts a rigorous analysis of the issues, and then offers concise recommendations for action.

Taken as a whole, the two papers will present a compelling and holistic recipe for the radical course change needed to shape and prepare the Navy for a wholly new strategic environment.

CAPT Gerard D. Roncolato, USN (Ret), is a retired surface warfare officer with extensive experience in policy and strategy work. He commanded the guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) and Destroyer Squadron 26 at sea.

CAPT Scott Mobley, USN (Ret), commanded USS Boone (FFG-28) and USS Camden (AOE-2) and served as Reactor Officer in USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75). After retiring from the Navy, he earned a Ph.D. in History and authored Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873–1898 (Naval Institute Press, 2018). Dr. Mobley teaches international security and civil-military relations courses at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

CDR Paul Giarra, USN (Ret),is the president of Global Strategies & Transformation, a professional services firm and strategic planning consultancy. He was a P-3 pilot and served aboard two ships during his naval career. He was a designated naval strategic planner, a political-military strategic planner for Far East, South Asia, and Pacific issues, and he managed the U.S.–Japan alliance in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Acknowledgments

The Madison Sea Power Workshop is an informal gathering of navalists to explore key issues facing American sea power during the shift to an era of great power competition. Members represent a spectrum of professions, some with naval service and others without. All members share a deep-seated belief that American sea power is of the greatest importance to the nation and the world, that American sea power is challenged in unprecedented ways, and that sustaining it requires the action and commitment of the American public. We are indebted to our members, without whom this paper would not have been possible. 

References

1. Jonathan Panter, “Unmanned Ships: A Fleet to do What?” Center for International Maritime Security, October 17th, 2023.

2. This was the answer that then-CNO William D. Leahy provided to the question from Congress in 1938: What did he need a bigger Navy for? See Phillips Payson O’Brien, The Second Most Powerful Man in the World, (New York: Dutton, 2019), p. 118.

3. David B. Larter. “’You’re on your own’: US sealift can’t count on Navy escorts in the next big war,” Defense News, October 10th, 2018.

4. Trent Hone. “From Mobile Fleet to Mobile Force: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Logistics in the Central Pacific During World War II,” Journal of Military History, 87:2 (April 2023), pp. 367-403.

5. Dr. Salvatore Mercogliano. “Six Oilers,” YouTube Media, April 20th, 2023.

6. Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2018), and, most recently, Mastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2022).

7. Eliot Cohen recently penned an important exploration of the challenges facing U.S. civil-military relations and the decline of the study, understanding, and acceptance of war as an enduring phenomenon in the country. “Beware the False Prophets of War: Why Have the Experts Been so Persistently Wrong?” The Atlantic, September 11th, 2023.

8. Jonathan Panter, “Unmanned Ships: A Fleet to do What?” Center for International Maritime Security, October 17th, 2023.

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (June 12, 2023) An F/A-18E Super Hornet, attached to the Royal Maces of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 27, launches from the flight deck aboard the U.S. Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), in the Philippine Sea, June 12, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Eric Stanton)

History

The Life and Legacy of Admiral John Dahlgren

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By Dr. Rob Gates

When I give a tour of the Dahlgren Heritage Museum, I always start at the photograph of Admiral John A. Dahlgren. It’s not unusual to get questions like “Was he born around here?” or “When was he stationed here?” The answers to those questions are, respectively, “No” and “Never.” So, who was John Dahlgren and why are the Navy laboratory and town named after him?

John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren was born in Philadelphia in 1809. His parents, Bernhard and Martha Dahlgren, were well educated and on the edge – geographically and financially – of Philadelphia society and he knew the children of the top families. His parents insisted that he be given a proper education and he received top grades in mathematics, science, and Latin at a Quaker school.

Dahlgren’s world changed when his father died in 1824 and left the family in dire financial straits. He applied for an appointment as a midshipman in the Navy but was turned down. He worked for a time as a church secretary and then decided to reapply. This time, however, Dahlgren did something different and, following a pattern that he used throughout his life and career, used outside influence. In this case, that of prominent citizens of Philadelphia and family friends.

He was appointed as a midshipman in February 1826 and in April was ordered to serve on the USS Macedonian, originally the HMS Macedonian, on a cruise to South America. That was followed by a cruise to the Mediterranean on the USS Ontario. So far, his career was much like that of any Midshipman but things were about to take a turn. His cruise was cut short by illness and he was sent home on the USS Constellation, one of the original six frigates ordered by the US Navy. He used his three months leave to go to the Norfolk Navy School to study for his promotion examination.

Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, USN, standing beside a 50-pounder Dahlgren rifle, on board USS Pawnee in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, circa 1863-1865. He was then commanding the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. (Photo via Library of Congress)

He passed and was assigned to the USS Sea Gull, a receiving ship in Philadelphia, as a passed midshipman.1 There were some advantages to such an assignment. First and most importantly, it counted as an assignment at sea. In the 19th century, promotion was by strict seniority and there was no mandatory retirement age. So, in addition to waiting your turn for promotion, it was necessary to build a resume. The most important part of a personal record was time at sea and, eventually, command at sea. Other advantages included easy duty with time to pursue other interests and the opportunity to live (and spend time) on shore rather than on the ship. Dahlgren, for example, studied law by reading and making notes on Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, an influential law text from the 18th Century.

In June 1833, he got sick again and took an unplanned years leave to recover his health. When he was returned to active duty in 1834, he was assigned to the United States Geodetic Survey as an assistant to the Superintendent Ferdinand Hassler. This took advantage of his skills in mathematics and science and was a turning point in his career. Hassler believed in continuing the education of his assistants and Dahlgren received the equivalent of a graduate education in mathematics from him. He excelled in his assignments and, as his responsibilities grew, he took on additional duties as a leader of a survey team. He quickly found that he was being paid half that of the civilian members of his team and campaigned for a promotion or pay increase. Both were turned down and, as before, Dahlgren used influence outside of the Department of the Navy and wrote a letter to his senator, who pressured the Secretary of the Navy on Dahlgren’s behalf.2 Shortly after, he received his promotion to lieutenant.

Unfortunately, the close work he was doing damaged his eyes and in 1837 he was sent to the naval hospital in Philadelphia for treatment. When his eyes did not improve he requested leave to go to Paris – on full pay – for treatment. Dahlgren spent six months there but, again, there was little improvement. He was offered a choice – go to sea and possibly lose his sight or go on furlough at half pay. He objected to half pay on the basis that he had a service-related injury. After his proposal was rejected, he appealed to his congressman who had the decision reversed. He stayed on leave until 1842.

While his eyesight did not improve in Paris, it was another turning point in his career. He became acquainted with the work that Henri Joseph Paixhans was doing with the French Navy on a type of cannon that could fire an explosive shell. Dahlgren studied Paixhans’s work and wrote and self-published a translation of his work after returning from Paris. He distributed it to Navy officers which established his reputation as an ordnance expert. When he returned to active duty and was assigned to the USS Cumberland, he was a division officer and responsible for the Cumberland’s four shell guns. While on the USS Cumberland, he invented a simpler breech lock for the guns and an improved method for sighting guns, which added to his reputation as an ordnance expert. The cruise was cut short by anticipation of war with Mexico and he returned to Philadelphia in late 1846 and awaited orders. They came in January 1847 when Dahlgren was assigned to the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography at the Washington Navy Yard.

For the next five years Dahlgren applied the mathematics and science that he learned from Hassler to the development of ordnance. During that time, he established the Experimental Test Battery at the Navy Yard and he used the data that were gathered through testing in a scientific approach to designing naval guns.

The result was the famous soda bottle-shaped Dahlgren gun. He also assigned Navy officers to the foundries where the guns were made and applied his knowledge to develop a more rigorous approach to the acceptance of the guns by the Navy.

IX-inch Dahlgren Gun. (Photo from Naval History and Heritage Command)

In 1861, the Commandant of the Navy Yard, Captain Franklin Buchanan, a Maryland native, resigned his commission on the belief that Maryland would secede. When that didn’t happen, he offered to withdraw his resignation. His offer was turned down and he “went south” and joined the Confederate Navy.3

Buchanan’s logical successor was Commander Dahlgren, but Commandant was a captain billet and his promotion was not likely. Promotion to captain usually followed a command tour at sea and Dahlgren had not been to sea in several years and had never had a command tour. His friend President Abraham Lincoln intervened and convinced Congress to pass a Special Act to promote him over the Navy’s objections.

A similar thing happened seven months later. Dahlgren wanted command at sea and Lincoln used his influence to have Dahlgren promoted to rear admiral and assigned to command the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron off Charleston, South Carolina to replace Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont in 1863.

But it was not easy or without controversy. Dahlgren had been pushing Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles for assignment to sea duty for a year and Welles had resisted on the grounds that Dahlgren was more valuable in his ordnance assignment. When he was promoted and saw that DuPont was in disfavor because of his failure in Charleston, Dahlgren saw an opportunity. He approached Welles about replacing DuPont. Welles felt that Dahlgren’s selection would cause resentment within the officer corps but, at the same time, knew that it would please the president. Welles resented Dahlgren’s relationship with Lincoln and saw it as an opportunity to get Dahlgren out of Washington and away from the president. His compromise was to appoint Rear Admiral Andrew H. Foote to command the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron with Dahlgren in a subordinate role commanding the ironclads. Foote and Dahlgren prepared to take command and met with Brigadier General Quincy A. Gillmore, the newly assigned army commander in South Carolina, to discuss his plan to capture Charleston. Foote fell ill and when he died, Welles felt that because Dahlgren was familiar with Gillmore’s plan, he was the best choice to succeed him.

Dahlgren had three missions when he took command: (1) capture Charleston, (2) blockade the South Atlantic Coast, and (3) defend the fleet and base at Port Royal. However, he was given only one specific instruction by Welles – support the Army and General Gillmore in conducting his operations. When he took command, he found that Gillmore’s first operation was to take place in just a few days. Dahlgren jumped in to support him and, while he felt that the Navy performed admirably, he saw the first signs of the problems that were to trouble him for most of the rest of the war. Dahlgren supported Gillmore’s joint army-navy plan but thought there needed to be a single overall commander. Dahlgren commanded the navy force while Gillmore commanded the army. Each felt free to do what they thought was right and, as a result, coordinated effort was problematic.

Rear Admiral John Dahlgren (fifth from left) stands with his staff on board the sloop-of-war Pawnee off the Georgia coast in 1865. (Photo via Library of Congress)

There were also personality issues. Welles had long thought that Dahlgren’s push for sea duty was motivated by a search for the glory that he could not get in a shore assignment. Since that required protecting his reputation, he was reluctant to take chances and quick to avoid taking responsibility for failure. Unfortunately, Gillmore displayed many of the same characteristics. That eventually led to a feud that colored Dahlgren’s postwar years. The end result was a number of army operations that accomplished relatively little and, in any case, did not lead to the capture of Charleston.

In the fall of 1863, Dahlgren told Welles, who agreed with his assessment, that he could not undertake inner harbor operations at Charleston, as desired by Gillmore, with the forces at his disposal. He said that he could do so with additional ironclads. Welles agreed but noted that it would be several months before new ironclads would be available. However, by the end of the year, the War Department and the Navy Department both decided there were higher priorities and that there would not be any future efforts to capture Charleston.

Dahlgren’s focus the rest of the year was on blockading efforts and maintaining a stalemate in Charleston. During this time, he offered to resign three times. Welles attributed the offers to Dahlgren’s “glory seeking” and rejected all of them. He also saw possible political problems if he accepted Dahlgren’s resignation and still wanted to keep Dahlgren out of Washington.

Late in the year, General Sherman was approaching Savannah and Dahlgren saw an opportunity to support him through amphibious operations on the Georgia coast. Dahlgren had a longstanding interest in amphibious operations and had previously developed a small boat howitzer and the Model 1861 Navy (or “Plymouth”) rifle for shipboard and amphibious use. He also developed a manual for amphibious operations that included a fleet force of trained sailors and marines and incorporated artillery. Many of the elements of amphibious operations that he pioneered, tested, and revised are now widely accepted. He later supported Sherman’s move to bypass Charleston by providing a naval distraction. He occupied Charleston in February 1865 and spent the remaining months of the war removing obstructions in harbors and, finally, disbanding his squadron. He relinquished command in July and returned to Washington.

He spent some time in Washington before taking command of the South Pacific Squadron in 1866. He returned to Washington in 1868 and served as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for a year and then as Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard until his death in 1870.

In retrospect, some of Welles’s concerns were borne out. Senior navy officers respected Dahlgren for his work in ordnance but, as Welles suspected, resented his use of relationships and politics to get successes that they felt he had not earned. It should be said that he had some success while commanding the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron and, to one degree or another, he accomplished his three objectives. He also developed an understanding of joint operations and pioneered amphibious operations. He was a prolific writer and authored a number of books on ordnance and one on amphibious operations.

On the negative side, his conflict with Gillmore shaped his life from the end of the Civil War until his death. He spent much effort defending his reputation from charges from Gillmore and others and “refought” Charleston often during those years. As a result, his contributions to learning the lessons of the recent war and further contributions to ordnance were few.

Dahlgren’s Legacy Lives On

John Dahlgren left a rich legacy in the development, acceptance, and testing of naval ordnance. He established the Experimental Test Battery at the Washington Navy Yard for those purposes. His legacy was preserved after his death when the Naval Proving Ground (NPG) was established in Annapolis, Maryland in 1872 and then moved to Indian Head, Maryland in 1890. The focus of the NPG was on the same things that concerned Dahlgren although Indian Head branched out, especially during World War I, and produced smokeless gunpowder and tested rockets. However, technology overtook the capabilities of the Indian Head river range and by 1917, the need for a larger testing range for the Naval Proving Ground had become critical.

Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, championed the effort to relocate the range from Indian Head. In 1918 an auxiliary test range was created at Dido, in King George County, Virginia, that was called the Lower Station of Indian Head. Earle thought that an appropriate name was needed for the post office at the new site. He persuaded Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels to request the U.S. Postal Service to change the name of the existing Dido post office to Dahlgren to honor the “Father of American Naval Ordnance,” with the change happening in 1919. Most of the testing moved to Dahlgren and, in 1932 the Lower Station officially became the Naval Proving Ground and Indian Head became the Naval Powder Factory.

The site at Dahlgren was originally established to test large caliber naval guns but has tested all sizes and calibers of navy guns – from 18 inches down – and, more recently, the electromagnetic railgun. Testing peaked during World War II and again, but at a lower level, during the Vietnam years. Dahlgren was the only place to fire 16-inch guns when the battleships were reactivated in the 1980s. The Navy has said that nearly 350,000 rounds were fired at Dahlgren between 1918 and 2007, averaging 3,800 rounds fired per year.

A view of the U.S. Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division’s gun line in June 1989, where all gun barrels bound for service aboard U.S. Navy ships are tested. (U.S. Navy photo)

Dahlgren’s mission expanded from ordnance testing to research and development when Dr. L.T.E. Thompson came in 1923. It has continued and has included such things as work on laser-guided projectiles in the 1970s. Other things were also happening in Dahlgren. Aviation work came to Dahlgren in 1919 and stayed until World War II. Work included development and testing of unmanned airplanes, the Norden bombsight, and bombs. Dahlgren’s efforts in gunnery were computation-intensive and one of the most powerful computers of the day, the Aiken Relay Calculator, came to Dahlgren and, several years later, was replaced by the Navy Ordnance Research Calculator. Dahlgren’s computer capability led to new opportunities in ballistics, orbital mechanics, and missiles.

January 31, 2008 – A electromagnetic railgun test firing at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Va. (U.S. Navy photograph)

There have been challenges to both the Dahlgren site and the river range. Dahlgren met many of the challenges by broadening its mission to take advantage of its capabilities to meet emerging Navy needs, including in lasers and unmanned vehicles. Eventually, expertise in these new areas led to the current focus on systems engineering.

Through all of the changes and challenges, the Potomac River Test Range – “the nation’s largest fully instrumented over-water gun-firing range” – has remained an important part of Dahlgren’s mission. During each of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) studies, the range was a key element in Dahlgren’s responses and the cornerstone that preserved Dahlgren’s location.

The most recent challenge is a June 2023 lawsuit filed by environmental groups concerned with the potential pollution of the river from weapons testing. A settlement was reached in January 2024 when the Navy agreed to seek a “permit for discharges of pollutants” from the state of Maryland.

As capabilities and scope of work grew over the years, the name of the organization changed to reflect its changing mission. In 1992, the name was changed to the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division.

So, John Dahlgren was not born here and never served here but the Division is his legacy and, so, his name lives on.

Robert V. (Rob) Gates, a retired Navy Senior Executive, served as the Technical Director at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Indian Head Division, and in many technical and executive positions at NSWC, Dahlgren Division, including head of the Strategic and Strike Systems Department. He holds a B.S. in Physics from the Virginia Military Institute, a Masters in Engineering Science from Penn State, and a Masters and PhD in Public Administration from Virginia Tech. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College. Dr. Gates is the Vice President of the board of the Dahlgren Heritage Foundation.

Notes

1. A ship that was past its useful life and no longer seaworthy could be converted into a receiving ship. It would be permanently tied up at a harbor or navy yard and used for inducting (“receiving”) and training newly recruited sailors.

2. Seniority was a problem. A midshipman appointed in 1839 could expect to be promoted to lieutenant in 1870. Promotion also required assignment to a position that supported the rank. Dahlgren fell short in both regards.

3. Buchanan was commissioned a Captain in the Confederate Navy and commanded the CSS Virginia (formerly the USS Merrimack) against the USS Congress and USS Cumberland in the Battle of Hampton Roads. He was wounded and was not in command against the USS Monitor. He was later promoted to full admiral, the only one in the Confederate Navy.

4. The range of the 14 and 16-inch guns being developed for battleships could only be tested under limited conditions at Indian Head. In addition, there were some testing-related incidents. 

5. In 1914, Secretary Daniels issued General Order Number 99 which prohibited alcohol (for drinking) onboard navy ships. As a result, purchases of coffee increased and sailors reportedly referred to it as “a cup of Josephus Daniels” which was later shortened – and better known – as “a cup of Joe.” 

References

Browning, Robert M. Jr.  “The Early Architect of Amphibious Doctrine.” Naval History Magazine. April 2019.

Bruns, James H. “John A. Dahlgren: Lincoln’s Seasick Naval Genius.” Sea History. Autumn 2016, 20-25.

Craig, Lee A. Josephus Daniels: His Life and Times, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.

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Luebke, Peter C., Ed. The Autobiography of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren. Washington Navy Yard, D.C.: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2018.

Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, Water Range Sustainability Environmental Program Assessment, May 2013.

Rife, James P. and Rodney P. Carlisle. The Sound of Freedom: Naval Weapons Technology at Dahlgren, Virginia 1918-2006. Dahlgren, VA: NSWCDD, 2007.

Schneller, Robert J. Quest for Glory: A Biography of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996

Symonds, Craig L. Confederate Admiral: The Life and Wars of Franklin Buchanan. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

Taaffe, Stephen R. Commanding Lincoln’s Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Featured Image: A 14-inch gun fires a test round down range, during World War II. (Photo via U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)