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Anna palaa!

Fiction Week

By Ben Plotkin 

/ˈɑnːɑ pɑˈlɑː/ — Finnish, idiomatic interjection

Literal: let it burn” (anna = give/let,” palaa = burns”).

Idiomatic sense: go for it,” “bring it on,” “hit it,” “keep it coming.”

Raahe
West Coast Finland
The near future

Seppo took a long inhale from the gilt vape pen and felt the immediate adrenaline rush from the custom blend of nicotine, amphetamine and menthol spreading its barbed tendrils pleasantly through his body.

Anna palaa!

The loud drum beats from the old Killers song throbbed through his oversized headphones, enveloping him in an aural bubble.

Time to get to work.

Outside was Arctic winter. The cold that went to the bone, to the marrow. Freezing, bleak, and forever dark.

Inside the dark room, the wall was covered with a bank of glowing monitors. A single metal-framed window provided a view of the small harbor. A two-toned grey corvette lay at berth, lit by the orange glow of a sodium-vapor dock light.

On the monitors Seppo tracked the approaching flight. They thought they were undetected as they crossed the border and flew low over the Finnish countryside, but Seppo had been tracking them since they had left Murmansk. Thanks to a well-placed asset, Seppo knew their route and loadout.

They were a trio of coaxial Ka-97 “Bereza-M” assault helicopters (NATO: HAG), designed for stealth and deep penetration assault missions. Each could be piloted by a single human, or capably controlled by the internal AI node. It was standard practice to have at least one human pilot in nominal command of a flight, although this was redundant. The HAGs were equipped to carry an interchangeable mix of men, machines, and weapons. This flight carried an offensive and defensive drone mix: 72 Skvoret and 36 Sapsan.

The Skvoret were assault drones. They carried a small charge and had just enough brain power to operate independently although they were more effective when mesh-linked with the command node aboard their HAG mothership. The Sapsan were interceptor drones. They handled short-range air defense with a small warhead, flechette guns, and a micro-EW suite. In addition to the drones, each HAG carried two Kh-86U “Rusalka” light air-launched anti-ship missiles.

Seppo knew they were dangerous creatures.

The custom keyboard off to his side was marked with a series of brightly color-coded buttons. He queued the kill-macros and waited. It wouldn’t be long.

Seppo leaned back in his chair and took a sip of now cold coffee from the black and red Robert’s Coffee cup.  He didn’t notice the taste. The red blips on the screen got closer.

Seppo looked out the window. The Kemi-class corvette, Oulu, was tied at the quayside.

A tangle of umbilical lines linked ship to shore. Protective RF-mesh anti-drone netting tented the ship. A quintet of interceptor drones languidly patrolled the perimeter of the harbor.

Kemi-class corvettes were built for surveillance and interception in the narrow Arctic skerries and confined Baltic waters. They hit Russian intruders so hard that their patrol boxes turned to ghost zones. Moscow prioritized their destruction.

Seppo finished the last of the cold coffee, cracked his knuckles, looked at the screen and readied himself.

________________________________________

 

The three HAGs approached from the northwest. After crossing Lapland they tracked southward along the Bothnian coast weaving around the small rocky islets. The AI nodes precisely flew each craft within 15 meters above ground level, occasionally popping higher to avoid poles and the trees.

Chameleon composite IR damping nanotiles coated the HAGs, morphing and mirroring the bleak winter palette. The coaxial rotors ran individual blade control—piezo flaperons twisting each blade to kill harmonics at the source—while higher-harmonic control flattened the acoustic lobes. Their rotor signatures muted to a murmur. Skimming the frozen flats, the three helicopters were almost invisible and unnervingly quiet.

Five kilometers out from their targets, the HAGs slowed and deployed their drone swarms. The Sapsan fanned out in an equidistant shield covering the frontal aspects of the attack formation.

The Skvoret formed up near the center awaiting their targets.

The Raahe harbor lay quiet. An ephemeral fog flitted across the shore. The darkness broken only by a few streetlights.

The starboard side of the corvette Oulu was dark, mirroring the blackness of the bay. Its superstructure obscured by tarps, the port side dully reflected the orange glow of the lone quayside lamp, its protective netting nearly invisible in the winter night.

Pavel was a veteran. This was his 13th deep penetration raid. Lucky number, he thought. He checked his displays to ensure all was as it should be, then took the controls and began the assault run. He reflexively glanced to either side for his autonomously piloted wingmen. The other two HAGs were barely visible in the dark winter night. He locked onto his target, one of the hated corvettes, and tapped his screen, designating targets and issuing commands. There was little left to do but watch. He thought about smoking, but decided he would save it for the long dark flight home.

The assault drones divided into three wings and each began their attack run. One group had been designated to take out harbor defenses while the other two would approach the corvette from bow and stern.

The small group of defenders rose from the harbor to meet the attacking swarm, but Pavel’s briefing had assured him their numbers were limited and only a single reserve Maakuntajoukot defense platoon was tasked with providing security for the corvette. They would pose no trouble.

The flight of five Finnish Kotka drones formed up and headed toward the attackers. Each was armed with short range micro-rockets, miniguns, and self-detonating charges. Ukrainian designed, Finnish built, workhorse general purpose defense drones.

Five against a hundred and eight. The Finns were used to those odds. They rather liked it that way.

A continuously undulating screen of mesh-linked Russian drones awaited the small band of Finnish attackers. Pavel smiled. Too easy, he thought. All too easy.

The Finnish Kotka drones pressed forward. They flew straight into the cloud of defenders, penetrating toward the high value HAG targets. The Kotkas launched a swarm of guided micro-rockets. Scores of rockets gyrated, twisted, and exploded as they found their marks.

Dozens of Russian drones fragmented and fell into the waters of the icy bay. The center of the swarm fell back, allowing the Kotka drones to penetrate further toward the massed assault drones and the controlling HAGs.

Flechette rounds filled the sky. The armored Kotka drones shrugged off most of the impacts, motors were sliced away, but built-in redundancy kept them flying forward, in a constantly charging erratic jig of evasive maneuvers.

The defensive screen thinned, creating a pocket through which the Finnish drones pressed on. The Kotkas penetrated further into the defensive cloud, pushing through a disintegrating storm of defending Russian drones. Then the two flanks of the Russian interceptors closed around them. The Kotkas were surrounded and trapped as the flanks of the Russian drone shield completed their encirclement. Using short range peroxide micro-thrusters, the interceptors surged toward the rear of the penetrating Finnish wing. Small talons emerged and they impaled themselves into the flanks and rear of the Finnish drones before detonating.

Shards of metal, plastic, and smoke filled the dark night sky.

A lone Kotka survivor surged forward, its target HAG almost within range. Three guided missiles locked on its rear, accelerated, closed and detonated. The Kotka disintegrated in debris and flame.

Pavel smiled, and rolled the cigarette between two fingers. If that was all, he might just light up now.

An alert flashed on his screen. He dropped the cigarette and silently swore. Pavel’s sensor-fusion display bloomed with range rings from his six, counting over a hundred tracks. The camera panels and EO/IR feeds showed only snow and dark, yet the millimeter-wave radar painted menacing tracks.

Where had they come from?

Overriding the AI node, Pavel swung his HAG around to face the threat. His two AI-controlled HAG wingmen followed pirouetting in a perfect pattern. The HAGs’ front-mounted minigun unleashed a wall of lead into the dark night sky targeting the cloud of new threats.

From the pylons of each HAG shrapnel-filled rockets fired and detonated in clouds of lethal metal. When the minigun ammunition had been nearly depleted, Pavel ordered the drones forward to mop up the survivors.

Pavel glanced down at his display. The Finnish attackers looked to be pressing forward undeterred. Not a single one seemed to have been hit. The range was closing quickly and they would soon be a threat. Pavel didn’t understand. He scanned the night sky with his goggles, but could see nothing. No attacker. No contacts.

His defensive drone swarm buzzed angrily ahead but found nothing to engage. Pavel cursed, and suddenly realized he had been deceived. It was too late.

In his small room Seppo watched and smiled. His hack had perfectly spoofed the sensors of Pavel’s HAG. The ghost contacts vanished, they had done their job.

The four stealth missiles fired from a concealed rooftop cell now rapidly approached the HAG trio, precisely aligned along their aft sector blind spots. Two targeted the lead HAG, the others split, each targeting one wingman. Nearly simultaneously they closed and detonated. From outside his window Seppo grinned as he saw two fireballs bloom in the dark sky.

________________________________________

The blast that blew in the front door nearly knocked Seppo from his chair. Even through his music-filled headphones it was deafening. The alarms sounded. Useless, thought Seppo, after someone had just blown a hole through the front.

Quickly recovering his composure, Seppo jabbed at the specially colored keyboard enabling a series of defensive mechanisms. From under his workstation he pulled his old Glock and chambered a round. As he did, he saw that to his exasperation one of the HAGs had survived and was still pressing forward with its swarm of drones.

“Vittu,” he muttered. Must be damaged though, he thought, but he didn’t have time to worry about it. Seppo had shot his bolt. It was all he had, his ambush had only been partly successful.

Three heavily armed operators rapidly entered the main entry room in staggered formation.

The leader rolled a stun grenade through the far doorway.

Seppo’s control room lay off an L-shaped corridor from the main entry. He saw the flash and heard the bang, but now he was ready.

Seppo knew they were a deep infiltration Spetsnaz team. They had been a constant bane, targeting equipment, individuals, and command centers across NATO’s rear areas. How had they found him?

Another grenade rolled through the corridor with a flash and blast. Seppo didn’t have time to figure out where he had screwed up. Survive first, then assess. Glancing up at a monitor he saw the three Spetsnaz operators slowly clearing the room. Three against one. I like those odds, he thought.

The lead Spetsnaz operator stepped forward and edged into the corridor. Seppo watched. The operator crouched and swung into the corridor. The small autonomous defense unit fastened to the ceiling fired an aimed cloud burst of jagged fragments into his head. Seppo saw a quick mist of flesh and blood and the operator crumpled to the ground.

The remaining two fired into the corridor, wildly spraying rounds from their short-barreled assault rifles. The small defense node’s last shots harmlessly impacted the body armor of the second Spetsnaz operator as he attempted to cross the corridor to the adjoining room. He fell backward, stunned but unharmed. His companion rapidly aimed and fired a long controlled burst toward the ceiling shredding the defense node and gouging huge holes in the ceiling. Two small drones hovered into the corridor spraying restraining foam. The compressed foam when released, instantly expanded in an explosive exothermic reaction creating a hardened cocoon nearly impossible to escape.

The drones were quickly dispatched, but not before one of the Spetsnaz had his foot tacked to the floor immobilizing him. He cursed loudly in Russian and called for his comrade. The other operator continued down the hall toward Seppo’s control room, constantly firing controlled suppressing bursts as he advanced.

Outside, the surviving swarm of assault drones spread out across the harbor and detonated around adjacent infrastructure and defense points.

The last Spetsnaz operator rolled a grenade down the hallway detonating astride the door to Seppo’s command center. The blast was deafening in the narrow confines, and the room filled with smoke, but the ballistic walls prevented any major damage.

Well, this is it, thought Seppo. He balled up into a compact shooting crouch and pivoted around the doorjamb. The acrid smoke caused him to cough and he had difficulty sighting the advancing Spetsnaz—a blurry dark form in the chaotic hall. He emptied the magazine, trying to maintain control and discipline as he fired each round.

Click. The magazine emptied.

He tried to retreat into his control room but a well-aimed shot slammed into his left shoulder and knocked him backwards against the wall. He dropped his Glock and let out a reflexive cry. The more rational part of his mind continued with an internal damage assessment—not good, not fatal but clearly fractured.

Before he could react, the operator was standing over him, his black rifle aimed at Seppo’s head, the targeting laser barely bobbing. His face was masked. Seppo yelled the worst Russian curses he could.

The operator pulled one hand away from his rifle and pulled off his mask. He had short-cropped blond hair, and an incongruous young face, almost like a model.

Seppo flipped him off.

The operator’s finger tightened on the trigger. There was a series of sharp concussive cracks.

Seppo closed his eyes. A loud thud. Seppo looked up—the man lay sprawled across the floor, a pool of blood leaking from a well-placed headshot.

At the end of the corridor stood another figure, rifle held at ready.  The figure lowered the rifle and stepped forward. Seppo could see the man stuck to the floor by the foam was dead, bent against the wall at an unnatural angle, one leg still planted to the ground.

She wore the uniform of the regional defense forces. She was young, long blonde hair wrapped tightly back in a series of braids. Soot and smoke smeared her face—her eyes were wide with fear.

Seppo smiled at her. Her face remained a tightly controlled mask. An explosion from the quayside rocked the building. Seppo ran back into the control room and looked out the window. Where the ship had been was now a burning conflagration.

The soldier followed him. Seppo saw the flames mirrored on her pale face—a face plainly writ with anxiety. He smiled at her again. She seemed confused.

Seppo picked up the vape pen from his desk and took a long inhale.

“Decoy,” he slowly said. “Not the real ship, dressed up old barge. Just bait.”

It took a moment for the soldier to understand, then finally she smiled too.

The surviving AI-piloted HAG began its egress from the flaming quay accompanied by its remaining drones. Thick black smoke belched from its wounded rotor hub.

On a rooftop along the edge of Raahe, another young reservist stood and fired a MANPADS at the fleeing helicopter.

He watched in satisfaction as it spiraled into the sky and detonated against the HAG’s underbelly.

Anna palaa!

Ben Plotkin is a physician in Southern California. He can be reached at phaenon@gmail.com.

Featured Image: Art created with Midjourney AI.

Task Force Rust Bucket

Fiction Week

By Tyler Totten

February 5th – 0340
Amphibious Strike One
Palanan Bay, Philippines

“Handshake confirmed,” Lieutenant Parodi reported from the copilot seat, his voice low.

“Relax Juan, the drones won’t hear us. Let’s get on the deck.” Commander Valerie Cunningham smirked. Still her own nervousness caused her to glance at the weapon status, seeing green across the board on the defensive systems. While appreciated, she missed the offensive role.

When this was an offensive platform…

“Yes ma’am,” his seriousness remained but his tone level. “Petrel Six, One. Follow us down.”

Cunningham kept further comments to herself. Looking to port, she could see their destination. The base looked half abandoned but she knew better.

“They’ve taken some hits since while we’ve been gone.”

“Docks are holed, yeah.” Cunningham saw impact points in the floating concrete piers, blackened gouges. One broken cargo ship sat on the gravelly bottom. She highlighted it in their joint augmented reality environment. “That wasn’t there before.”

“Most of the spare sections have been slotted in.” Parodi likewise highlighted only two of the floating concrete pre-built sections remained moored off to the side.

They touched down gently and taxied to their mooring point, keeping at least 200 meters of separation from each other and the base itself, dispersing to remain as unattractive a target as they could. An automated small boat was there to collect both aircraft’s crew before their engines even wound down. The tender with fuel and provisions was moving up to Petrel Six as the boat whisked them across to the entrance.

“Welcome, ma’am, sirs.” The ensign saluted them as they stepped inside, their identification read by base security system as they crossed the threshold. “Admiral Stevens is waiting for you.”

“Lead on Ensign.” They all followed him in and below the waterline, feeling the air change as they moved deep underwater. The base’s protection came from its section replaceability and from using tens of meters of water as armor. Stepping quickly into the briefing room and exchanging another round of salutes, Admiral Stevens waved them to their seats.

“Let’s get started.” Stevens was direct and liked to get down to business. Cunningham couldn’t blame him, most of the stiff, stand-on-ceremony flags had either been removed from command or killed. There wasn’t time to be inefficient, the war moved too fast. They had barely sat before Stevens began speaking, gesturing to his aide to bring up the AR briefing.

“As you are aware, losses among manned surface combatants have been heavy. Even with the dispersed approach and pairing each with three or four autonomous surface vessels, the PLA has proven adept at targeting the manned assets specifically. The stealthy command frigates have had better success, but are in short supply. Until that is rectified, we must improvise.” The aide zoomed in, the theater ship loss map fading, replaced by the waters of northeast Luzon and three groups of ten small ships.

“These autonomous squadrons are inbound for strike operations. The PLA has been picking at them for the last four days but they are still 60 percent combat effective and carrying 80 percent of their strike package. You will be providing human-in-the-loop command and control in lieu of manned ships.” An overlay appeared, showing two plane flight with infiltration and exfiltration routes and alternates. Mission time stamps showed their tanking points and flight profiles. “Low and on the deck all the way in, land and establish control of your squadron, wait for the targeting data. Approve the shots, get out. Questions?”

“Are we expecting to pull out our squadron?” Cunningham asked, considering the timings and geometry against known PLAN coverage.

“Negative, these are one-way assets. They have tasking if they survive to launch but it will not be your concern.”

“No on-call support from loitering assets?” Lieutenant Commander Bulan, Petrel Six inquired.

“Not this run. The PLAN has finally pushed substantial numbers of UUVs and that little underwater dogfight has become vicious.” Stevens frowned at that, not mentioning the SSN losses that had come with that surge.

A few additional questions around the room before the admiral dismissed them. Less than 2 hours after landing, both powered up and headed east for the first leg of their route. Behind them, the base’s air raid siren sounded and the base braced for another round.

February 5th – 0720
Dawn Seas Field Team
Houma, Louisiana, USA

Tim Masson stepped across the gangway, the first morning rays cutting through the light fog and creating glistening outlines across the handful of supply vessels tied up along the piers. This was his first vessel of the day, the hour drive from New Orleans having delayed his normally early start.

“Susan, pilothouse. Mark, topside. I’ll take engineering.” His two engineers nodded, having already known this would be the plan.

“Bet you’ll still be done first,” Susan joked.

“Only if you keep sandbagging,” Tim quipped back.

They parted ways and Tim noted how rough of shape this vessel was in. Not that any of the ones tied up to this set of piers were beauty queens, rusting and covered in flaking paint. It was clear they had not received much maintenance in the two years they had sat idle. Tim was honestly surprised they hadn’t been scrapped altogether, but that had a cost as well.

“Better just get on with it…” He grumbled to himself. Setting his small pelican case down he opened it and extracted his augmented reality glasses. Settling them into place but not energizing the system yet, he opened the hatch and made his way down into the main engineering space. Once firmly on the deck plates he turned the AR glasses on and allowed them to go through their few seconds of boot cycle.

It had taken him some time to get used to them, still feeling he was entirely too old for learning new tricks, much to the bemusement of Susan and Mark, both twenty years his junior. Tim grumbled and complained about the systems yet he wasn’t too much of an old man yet to deny their utility. Even just a quick glance around the space and the computer-vision system was measuring the space and identifying key systems. Much of the basics, like the main engines, were more confirmatory of what limited data they already had. For others, like vales, pumps, and electrical panels, the algorithms got to work matching them and identifying compatibility. Where the system struggled, he helped find the right component. Sometimes he needed to wipe off a greasy label plate or fill in the blanks on a name when it ran up against the CV algorithms’ limits. He still prided himself on knowing most of the systems almost as fast as the system could match them.

As with the dozens of vessels they had already worked on, these old rust buckets were destined to be turned into rapidly automated platforms. His team, and others like them, catalogued their status and systems. The AR glasses of each team member rapidly formed work orders, 3D models, and queued purchases or pulls from existing supply to outfit the vessels. This vessel would take more than most, many of its systems manual or had broken equipment so old that they were obsolete and could not be replaced with a form-fit-function replacement. Even still, he was confident they could meet the deadline. Twenty minutes later he had finished in the engineering spaces and climbed back to the working deck. Susan was already there, confirming the alterations for the bridge systems on her tablet.

“Better,” Tim remarked in jest. “Mark?”

“Here.” Mark said coming down the ladder behind him. “She’s in rough shape, don’t you think?”

“These will be one-way drone ships for sure but that’s still something, if they can launch their missiles before they break.” He considered his data for a moment, AR glasses letting him look back down into the engineering spaces and the work out diesels contained there. He shook his head slightly. “My bet is four days, assuming all the parts can get here on time. Last shipment was delayed by reported drones over Highway 51. Nothing came of it but still snarled traffic.”

“Do you blame them after Long Beach?” Susan shuddered, mentally replaying the footage of an entire bridge span full of cars and trucks collapsing into the water under the surprise drone swarm.

“Fair enough, still destroys our schedule.” Tim shook his head again, trying not to dwell on things beyond control. “Let’s get over to the next vessel.”

Almost 98 hours later, Tim watched six boxes land on the freshly automated OSV. Each housed a variety of missiles, though he didn’t know which types. He suspected these were strike weapons, given the one-way nature of the old rusty wrecks. One express routing through the Panama Canal and they’d be in the war.

Everything west of Panama is “in the war.” He snorted to himself. Shaking his head he turned and walked to his truck. There were still a few more vessels to salvage. He could only hope all that reported new construction was about to start launching. They were running out of wrecks.

February 5th – 1450
Amphibious Strike One
20 nm north of Farallon de Pajaros

The engines thrummed with power, the comforting sound louder and more in Cunningham’s chest than usual. Her two-plane flight was on the deck and the engines were working hard, having left their buddy tankers behind three hours ago. The run was at a bare 300 meters, staying well below the anticipated radar horizon. It was expected they would even avoid detection by the over-the-horizon systems thanks to their small form factor. The only real risk was getting spotted by a visual or infrared satellite pass. For that, they had to make use of a regular window in which PLA overhead birds would be blinded. The Navy had been keeping a regular-as-clockwork blinding campaign since the war’s start, typically doing nothing in the window. The hope by this point was that the PLA largely ignored the window other than to recheck the locations of the three prowling CSGs that threatened but did not move west from their racetracks around Midway. Further west of that had…unfortunate outcomes.

Cunningham shivered at the thought, remembering their search-and-rescue sortie to recover who they could from the burning ocean around the remains of the Big E. Her stern hadn’t quite slipped below when secondary explosions erupted from her hull as they struggled to pull a few dozen from the dark waters. The surviving escorts had already fled, protecting the wounded Ford running for Midway’s air cover.

“Coming up on initiation point,” Parodi noted. “Confirming Petrel Six in green.”

The laser pulse hit Six precisely on its flank array, the beam tight even at one kilometer. The return pulse was instantaneous.

“Six confirms.” Parodi checked the automated navigator system for their position. “Still good positional fix, within acceptable GPS-denied bounds.”

With that final perfunctory check, the computer would have flagged any issues, Cunningham gripped the controls again and toggled off the autopilot. The computer could fly this alone but she wanted to at least start the run herself.

“Powering up, Six to follow.” Cunningham advanced the throttles, bringing her aircraft up to full power. Like its predecessor, they were capable of a Mach 0.9 sprint. On this lightly loaded run, with only a few defensive weapons, her Seamaster II easily advanced across Mach 0.9 to Mach 0.94. The only change was a small shudder in the stick.

February 5th – 1635
Task Force Romeo Bravo 15 (TF-RB15)
15 nm south of Taiwan

Self-elected commander of TF-RB15 noted the new command node come online, linking up with one of the task force’s UAVs maintaining a line-of-sight (LOS) laser communication net over the entire group. Having departed Hawaii with 16 ships, the surviving nine pressed on with the same undaunted progress that came with being automated. The command unit had been lucky, positioned mid-group and carrying a majority offensive payload. It had directed the defense against a half dozen raids on the group. Several, mostly outer pickets, had fallen to enemy fire.

As valid command codes filtered in from the new arrival, the command unit transmitted a task force status update. It also added a positional fix, pulling from the collective task force’s GPS-denied positional assessment. A combination of inertial, star fixes, and tracking known satellites in orbit all coordinated with triple-redundant atomic clocks. The result was remarkably accurate, at least for open-ocean navigating.

Receiving a simple acknowledgement of the update but no orders, it continued as before. Launched UAVs passively searched for threats with cameras and radio-direction-finding sniffed for radars. And onward they sailed.

Amphibious Strike One

“Command Unit confirms no contacts,” Parodi reported for the third time in the hour since arrival. Out there somewhere, their brethren should have linked up with the other two Romeo Bravo task forces, more SeaMasters bobbing on the wavetops near the ships plowing west.

“Wow, these things are struggling. Rust Bucket task force indeed.” Parodi looked over the updates, driven by boredom rather than need. The system would flag anything they needed to review. “Half these ships are down an engine. Two only have half power and are running flat out. Lucky if they survive past launch, enemy or not.”

“They just need to launch.” Cunningham checked the time. “Any minute now.”

As if having willed it into existing, a soft trill announced the satellite orders. They saw it simultaneously as it was decrypted.

“Full salvo,” Parodi noted.

“As expected, probably going to get jumped as soon as we light off anyway,” Cunningham said casually as she confirmed the proper codes had been transmitted. She waited, though only a few seconds, for the command unit to provide proposed strike package edits.

“Light edits,” Parodi highlighted, the command unit providing modifications to reflect the latest inventory and positions of the task force.

“I see no issues, let’s get Six’s concurrence,” Cunningham ordered.

“Six confirms.”

“Lock them in, clear task force to fire by the numbers.”

Task Force Romeo Bravo 15 (TF-RB15)

The command unit received the confirmation of its recommended plan and disseminated launch authorization and final timing, syncing the group. Within seconds, each ship was executing at pre-launch. Across the waves in the fading dusk light, containers opened to reveal racks of cruise missiles. A few red and yellow lights came back, weapons not waking or showing partial faults. While there was nothing to be done about unresponsive weapons, the command unit authorized the launch of any partially responsive weapons. Its mission parameters allowed for maximum risk to launch platforms, no self-preservation was required. They sequenced flagged weapons to fire last to mitigate possible damage.

With a minute left to launch, a UAV picket flashed an alert, processed in a microsecond. Inbound missiles, skimming the surface at subsonic speeds but closing fast.

With only seconds to respond, the command unit ordered an interceptor salvo. Though low on interceptor inventory, the outer picket also had few offensive weapons to preserve. The command unit ordered it to maximize its electronic emissions and deploy radar reflectors, making itself a large target. The inbounds may not care but any advantage was worthwhile.

Calculating the closure rates, the command unit ordered an early and immediate launch from all ships. It provided the update to the human-in-the-loop with two seconds to countermand. The weapons could still make their trip, the change in launch distance trivial, but a deviation was a deviation. Command must be allowed a countermand opportunity. The time passed, slowly, and confirmation to deviate was received.

All across the task force, rusty ships were momentarily lit up and then disappeared under billowing clouds of rocket exhaust as each disgorged its deadly cargo into the night.

Amphibious Strike One

“Inbounds!” Parodi didn’t yell but he was still loud. Cunningham set that aside and examined the threats on screen. “Command unit is moving to immediate launch, providing for override.”

“Allowing,” Cunningham confirmed.

She noted the likely enemy launch positions were flagged, well beyond their own engagement range. She queued a prosecution request and set to transmit from one of their task force’s SATCOMs. Those ships were already exposed, she wasn’t risking her position.

“Sub-launched, old YJ-82s.” Cunningham noted. “Must be a UUV, no way they’re loading that trash on a manned sub.”

“We’re clear of all twelve inbounds, definitely targeting the task force.” Parodi’s calm had returned.

Better, she thought.

They watched the task force’s defensive fire, downing five of the approaching weapons. Four more, lacking any in-flight collaboration, slammed into the decoying ship nearly in unison and massive overkill. A final missile was intercepted in terminal by a last-ditch launch, the interceptor not even getting up to speed. Even still, shrapnel ripped into the converted commercial ship and she lost all power.

The last two missiles spread to either side of the stricken ships and found their own targets, slamming into one each as they launched the last of their own missiles. On one, it found a container with two missiles that had failed to launch and added their fuel and warhead to the conflagration that quickly consumed the ship. On the other, the midship strike was mortal but less spectacular. Still under power but with flooding it could not contain, the ship continued forward and prepared to scuttle itself.

“Well, that’s it.” Cunningham turned away from the screen, glancing only momentarily at the horizon where she could just make out two of the burning ships of her temporary task force. “We’re out of here.”

“Yes ma’am. Powering up.” Parodi worked the abbreviated pre-flight and within 90 seconds they were pointed into the wind and starting their take-off run.

“Another successful hurry up and wait for the fearless Amphibious Strike One,” Cunningham remarked, eliciting a snort from Parodi.

“You just want another splash twelve moment. War’s moved on with that sort of opportunity. It’s all drones, drones, drones nonsense now.”

“I can dream, can’t I?”

Tyler Totten is a naval engineer working on autonomous systems, including autonomous surface vessels, in the maritime domain. Previous roles have included supporting several Navy and Coast Guard programs including LCS, DDG(X), and PEO Ships Futures Directorate. He has a strong interest in international and maritime security. He is also an amateur science fiction writer published on Kindle. He holds a B.S from Webb Institute in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering and can be found on Bluesky at @azuresentry.bsky.social and X/Twitter at @AzureSentry.

Featured Image: Art created with Midjourney AI. 

The Optimum Pathway for Building Nuclear Submarines with South Korea and Japan

By Brent D. Sadler

Introduction

Riding a wave of success during his Asia tour, President Donald Trump triumphantly announced the U.S. would be working with South Korea to build nuclear submarines.1 To those familiar with the AUKUS (Australia-U.K.-U.S.) deal, this may seem a repeat of that effort to build nuclear submarines with Australia. By all accounts, this is not what is at hand.

South Korea’s growing investment in American shipbuilding could foster the development of ships capable of using next generation small modular nuclear reactors (SMNR), to include their use on modified South Korean submarines appropriate to their operational needs. This likewise has applicability to Japan, who should be included should the effort proceed.

Given the unique naval needs of South Korea and Japan, their decades of experience in building conventional submarines, and the U.S. need for allies in reviving its maritime industry – this deal could be very opportune. That said, it will not be AUKUS and to succeed it must also contribute to a revival of America’s shipbuilding to best serve America’s national interests. 

South Korea’s National Security Situation

South Korea’s capital, Seoul, is within range of hundreds of North Korean artillery pieces. For them danger is always near, and has focused their military to the threat ever since the armistice paused the Korean War.2 Adding to the dangers, the North has in recent years accelerated development of its own nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile – the Pukguksong series that began testing in 2015 and now has six iterations.3 Given this at-sea nuclear threat, as in the Cold War, there will be a necessity of locating and keeping track of North Korean submarines with nuclear-armed SLBMs, like the SSB 841 Hero Kim Kun Ok launched in September 2023.4

An Oct. 2, 2019 North Korean Pukguksong-3 SLBM test. (Rodong Sinmun photo)

Beyond the North Korean threat, China has also encroached into its waters and strong-armed the South. Most notably, the Chinese Communist Party was the hand behind political interference and public agitation in 2017 over the placement of the THAAD missile defense system.5 Keeping its economy free of coercion will require a Navy able to keep the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in check in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea. Should war break out in Asia over the fate of Taiwan, critical shipping routes through the South China Sea and potentially across the North Pacific will need to be guarded. 

Unlike the Australian strategic challenges that drive them to pursue a nuclear submarine in the AUKUS initiative, South Korea’s maritime threats are closer to home. This operational situation prioritizes stealth and on-station endurance with the ability to conduct high-speed sprints without needing to come near to the surface to recharge submarine batteries. These operational requirements inform South Korea’s submarine program, today led by production of its 3,600 ton KSS-III Batch-2 submarine with 10 vertical launch cells and torpedo tubes built by shipbuilder Hanwha.6 SMNRs offer a way to enhance the lethality on a potentially modified South Korean submarine like a future batch of the KSS-III.

October 22, 2025 – Hanwha Ocean launches the first KSS-III Batch-II submarine, Jang Yeongsil ship (SS-087) (ROK Navy photo)

A Brief History of SMNRs Backfitted on Conventional Submarines

Twice in the recent past have navies attempted to extend the undersea endurance of existing conventional submarines with small modular nuclear reactors. The first was in the mid-1980s, when the Soviet Navy installed a 600kWh VAU-6 600 nuclear power plant on a project 651 (Juliett-class) diesel submarine and greatly extended its range.7 The implications of this development were never felt in the West, as the Cold War was coming to a rapid end by the time this was completed.

The idea of greatly increasing the tactical capabilities of existing conventionally-powered submarines has surfaced again. For the past several years, experts looking over satellite images of China’s sole naval nuclear shipyard at Huludao have noticed the expansion of production lines and what appeared as components of a new class of nuclear-powered warship. The answer would be clear in September 2024 following months of speculation that a new larger Yuan-class conventional submarine was being readied for sea with a new type of propulsion.8 That month, reports of its pier side sinking drew a subsequent U.S. Department of War response that confirmed it was a variant being fitted out with an auxiliary nuclear power plant. And so the Soviet idea was reborn with Chinese characteristics.

Given China’s large and modern conventionally powered submarine fleet, its use of SMNRs to complement air independent propulsion would have severe ramifications for the U.S. and its allies. Already fairly stealthy, the latest Yuan-class Chinese submarine would see its endurance greatly extended and survivability improved with the ability to sprint at high speeds to evade hostile contacts without having to come to the surface to recharge its batteries soon afterwards. Moreover, the limited nuclear construction capacity at Huludao could be augmented by numerous conventional submarine shipyards, with SMNRs being produced and backfitted on Yuan-class submarines in shipyards like Wuchang and Jiangnan.

Schematic of Soviet Juliet-class submarine equipped with a VAU-6 small power plant. (Graphic via Global Security.org)

Shared Allied Interest in SMNRs

As news broke of President Trump’s announcement on building nuclear submarines with South Korea, Japan also got interested.9 Japan is no stranger to maritime nuclear propulsion with its own Mutsu launched in 1969 and retired in 1992.10 This ship was a flawed attempt at exploring the commercial potential of nuclear power, with unacceptable radiation leakage dooming the ship. Recently, there have been calls by Japanese politicians to pursue developing a nuclear submarine – a call first triggered by the AUKUS initiative in 2021 and now with a potential U.S.-South Korean project.

Like South Korea, Japan too has a robust, successful, and longstanding conventional submarine program. The latest addition to the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) is the 3,000 ton Taigei-class.11 However, Japan’s operational needs are more extended than South Korea’s, given its expansive archipelago that stretches deep into the Pacific Ocean and critical shipping lanes threatened by Russia, China, and North Korea. This threat is in part why Japan began a military modernization during the later Cold War to protect its shipping lanes 1,000 miles from Japan – a mission that lives on today. As such, the added endurance and survivability offered by SMNRs as an augmented power source for existing conventional submarines would be welcome.

A comparison of speed and endurance characteristics between conventional, SMR, and nuclear subs. Click to expand.

Additionally, both Japan and South Korea are today the only viable rivals to China’s shipbuilding colossus. As such, both are looking to invest in the U.S. as a means of expanding market share, which could be amplified by harnessing the potential of SMNRs to cleanly power the next generation of commercial ships and revolutionize the maritime industry. However, only the U.S. has the experience (thanks to its naval nuclear program) and capacity (based on existing nuclear research and development) to bring this new nuclear technology quickly to market with confidence.

Recent developments have the hallmarks of a potential consortium of investors forming to bring SMNRs to sea and soon. Already two South Korean shipbuilders have invested in the U.S. and Japan has signaled investments are coming. What especially stands out is the investments since December 2024 in Philadelphia Shipyard by South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha. The proverbial canary in the coal mine is how well Hanwha will be able to turn a profit in the long term when taking orders for commercial ships at its new American shipyard.

Newer to the scene is Hyundai, another South Korean shipbuilder, who has joined into a partnership with American naval ship and submarine builder Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII).12 The scope of this new partnership is relatively undefined as of November 2025, but signals an intent to deeply integrate into domestic American naval shipbuilding. The most explicit expression of this is a commitment of $150 billion by the South Korean government to back investment in American shipbuilding.13 On the other hand, Japan has only recently signaled its intent to move into the American market, with $4 billion of government backing to $2.5 billion of private investment.14 Focusing some of this foreign investment in what could be a market-setting technology can leverage the shipbuilding capacities and expertise of allies, while mitigating the risks in getting SMNRs to sea.

Key submarine bases and operating areas in the western Pacific. (Heritage Foundation graphic)

Proliferation and Compromised Supply Chain Concerns

In the case of both Japan and South Korea, there are grounds for concern regarding the potential for compromised maritime industrial supply chains and information security. Less of a concern is the threat of proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear material in the SMNRs under development. This is due to the use of lower enriched nuclear fuel (approximately 5% compared to weapons grade above 90%) and the fuel assemblies that complicate the separation and refinement of the fuel to weapons grade.

Nonetheless, memories of Brazil’s past attempts to develop a nuclear submarine as pretext for a nuclear weapons program are informative and cautionary.15 Putting a check on such possibilities are counter-proliferation protocols enshrined in the so-called “123 agreement” named for the section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. These agreements are conditional by the U.S. prior to entering into any agreed transfer of nuclear technology or materials. Both Japan and South Korea have active 123 Agreements.16

Regarding maritime supply chains, however, both Japan and South Korea conduct significant shipbuilding related activity in China.17 This is primarily in the prefabrication of sections or modules and supply of components like pumps or solenoids that are then assembled outside China. Should either nation enter into a new SMNR developmental project and associated shipbuilding endeavor with the U.S., exposure to associated Chinese supply chains must be addressed, especially as it relates to military use in South Korean and Japanese submarines.

A sunken Chinese submarine at a shipyard near Wuhan, China, on June 15, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC photo via AP)

Finally, tight information security, such as done with Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI) addressed for AUKUS, will be a necessity. A complicating factor for allies will be the dual-use applicability of SMNRs and how to ensure associated high information security for both military and commercial programs. Thankfully, the U.S. has current information-sharing agreements with both Japan and South Korea that includes industrial security. In 2025, memorandums of understanding signed with both South Korea and Japan make clear an intent to bolster supply chains as the three nations progress and work together in reviving America’s maritime industry.18 However, statements of intent are not enough to ensure the sensitive next-generation nuclear power technology behind SMNRs remains an American comparative advantage.

The Optimum Pathway for American Maritime SMNR

Developing SMNRs and then putting them to sea on commercial and backfitted allied conventional submarines will be a multifaceted task. First, the technology needs to be perfected in a way that makes it compatible for use in commercial shipping and scaled for use as an alternative power source for today’s conventional submarines built in Japan and South Korea. Second, trust in sharing sensitive nuclear technologies for SMNR will be needed, to include their safe operation and maintenance. Third, an industrial plan will need to be implemented for building SMNRs that can be installed on commercial ships and on allied conventionally powered submarines. To preserve American investment in developing next generation SMNR and foster an American comparative advantage in the global maritime market space, construction and installation should be initially confined to occur at U.S. shipyards. Much of this can be accomplished taking a similar approach used for the AUKUS optimum pathway and as advocated in an earlier Heritage Foundation report.19

Almost two years after its September 2021 announcement, the Australian government, in concert with U.K. and the U.S., announced the “optimum pathway” to deliver a domestic nuclear submarine capability.20 This plan addresses developing domestic nuclear industrial competencies, training a cadre of nuclear-certified shipyard workers to sustain this nuclear fleet, and begin the nuclear training of the crew of these future boats. Unlike AUKUS, development of overseas SMNR construction would not be a goal. Nonetheless, bringing a SMNR forward with allies like South Korea and Japan will require a similarly multifaceted approach to ensure it is viable and safe.

Recommendations

The U.S. and its allies should form a private-public consortium to inform and oversee development of a naval SMNR. There are several designs all progressing to working prototypes with initial criticality (first time nuclear fission) tests before the end of the decade.21 This consortium would be critical in accelerating the testing and maturity of viable designs currently being planned at the federal nuclear test labs in Idaho (i.e. INL). Given the commercial and potential military use, the effort should be led by U.S. Department of Energy with technical support from Naval Reactors (design), Coast Guard (regulatory), and Maritime Administration (commercial use).

Putting an operational SMNR on a commercial ship or submarine is likely at least seven years away. Waiting until that time to develop the demand for commercial shipping would guarantee its failure or worse, cede dominance of this capability to hostile competitor China. As such, orders for new commercial ships (i.e. ultra large container ships, LNG carriers, etc.) today should be of designs that are forward-compatible for installation of SMNRs.22 This would also guarantee those ships meet stringent International Maritime Organization (IMO) carbon requirements while removing uncertainty that has delayed ship orders over which green energy will be embraced by the market. As the second and third largest shipbuilders, Japan and South Korea are best placed to ensure uptake of this new technology. Moreover, information security amongst members of this consortium will be paramount, especially as variants of the SMNR are installed on allied submarines. For AUKUS, this was an early achievement given the bedrock of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing program.23 A similarly structured approach, but narrowly focused on SMNR use, would be warranted with allies Japan and South Korea.

Today there is one U.S. shipyard owned by a South Korean shipbuilder. Philadelphia Shipyard, owned by Hanwha since December 2024, is a natural choice to base this new endeavor and future SMNR installations. Already Hanwha is continuing the U.S. Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) third of five National Security Multi-mission Vessel (NSMV) and making a $5 billion capital investment to upgrade the shipyard for orders of 10 new medium-range tankers and bulk carriers.24 Doing nuclear shipyard work here will require added investments to attract future SMNR builders to locate fabrication and installation facilities nearby. In the meantime, future upgrades should be done with an eye to nuclear certification of the yard.

This shipyard should not be the only place where this type of commercial nuclear maritime installation will occur. Given the national security aspects of backfitting SMNRs on submarines, shipyards with history in naval shipbuilding make the most sense. In this case, the expertise of HII and its budding partnership with Hyundai makes a natural fit for backfitting operations of SMNRs. Caution is warranted in this case, as the U.S. submarine industrial base is tardy in growing its capacity to meet U.S. orders for nuclear submarines.25

As such, HII and Hyundai, to include Japanese submarine builders Kawasaki and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, with American submarine shipbuilders HII and Electric Boat, should look to set up facilities favorable to shipyards not involved in building American or AUKUS nuclear submarines. A logical choice is the former naval nuclear shipyard at Mare Island, which has dry docks, warehouses, and pier space ready to be upgraded to the purpose. Moreover, there is ongoing Navy and Coast Guard maintenance being done on cutters and naval logistic ships, providing ample workload to justify the investment until SMNRs become operational.

Designing, building, and installing SMNRs on commercial ships and allied submarines is one thing, operating them is another. For AUKUS, this was addressed by embedding Australian sailors on U.S. and U.K. nuclear submarines and sending Australian shipyard workers to American shipyards to learn the nuclear trades. It is too early to know if this will succeed, but the goal is to create the institutional culture and expertise to securely maintain and safely operate nuclear-powered ships. Unlike AUKUS, this new SMNR endeavor will have a commercial aspect which will mean the U.S. Maritime Administration and its Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point will need to resurrect its defunct nuclear training program. This program was begun to crew and conduct associated shipyard nuclear work for the first and only U.S. nuclear powered commercial ship in 1964 – the Savannah, subsequently retired in 1972. The U.S. Coast Guard, the lead agency for regulating maritime credentials in the U.S., too must revisit its certification programs to include standards for crew and shipyard workers on SMNR-powered commercial ships. Given that allies will be involved, associated programs will have to be opened for their training and certification. 

NS (Nuclear Ship) Savannah, the first commercial nuclear power cargo vessel, en route to the World’s Fair in Seattle in 1962. (Photo via National Archives and Records Administration)

Initial Steps

There will be a lot of work ahead should the President’s words prove prophetic, and a new national endeavor is launched with allies to build nuclear-powered commercial ships and backfit allied conventional submarines. When AUKUS was announced an 18-month assessment and planning phase was begun before actual work was undertaken. A similar planning effort will be critical, though need not be as long as 18 months. Given this, a potential optimum pathway for SMNRs should take the following steps.

Establish a White House-Led Planning Cell. The President of the United States should formally invite both Japan and South Korea to send delegates to a planning cell to formulate a pathway to developing and operating SMNRs for commercial shipping and backfitting their conventionally powered submarines. The primary goal of this group is to produce an agreed regulatory framework, credentialing program, and industrial plan with associated investment strategy. This in total would represent the optimum pathway for this endeavor.

Reestablish Civilian Nuclear Training and Credentialing Programs. The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Maritime Administrator to re-establish the nuclear program at the Merchant Marine Academy and seek funding from Congress. This should be accomplished within two years to ensure adequately credentialed crew and shipyard workers ready when the first SMNR installed and operated by early 2030s. Additionally, the Maritime Administrator must further direct these programs be open to participating allies, staff, and students to ensure a coherency amongst participants and assist in rapidly standing up an SMNR-powered commercial fleet. Lastly, the U.S. Coast Guard must conduct a review and as needed update to its credentialing and regulatory standards appropriate for operating SMNRs at sea and associated shipyards and port operations.

Create an SMNR Information Sharing Framework. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations should direct the development and approval of a dedicated information sharing classification and handling standard that can be agreed to by all participant nations. This would be similar but distinct from Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information that Australia was allowed to gain access to as part of AUKUS. The goal is to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive design and operational details regarding SMNR in both commercial and military uses.

Designate and Certify American Shipyards for SMNR Work. The Secretary of Energy should seek and act on the recommendation of Naval Reactors and the Maritime Administration to designate shipyards for work on maritime SMNRs. Initially two shipyards should be named – one focusing on the commercial uses and a second suitable for naval installation on conventional submarines.

Establish SMNR Support Facilities in Participant Nations. The Secretary of State, with the advice of Submarine Forces Pacific and the Maritime Administrator, should update existing nuclear agreements and establish support facilities overseas. Initially, the only participants to consider should be major shipbuilders and treaty allies South Korea and Japan. As such, commercial and military facilities should be established in both countries to support future SMNR operations. For the time being, all major refueling and maintenance should be conducted in the U.S. Importantly, both Japan and South Korea (re-negotiated in January 2025) already have “123 Agreements” with the U.S. for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Conclusion

President Trump’s comments may have preempted and even accelerated what has been a slowly developing effort – joint development and operation of at-sea SMNRs. Done right, advanced SMNR technology will offer an avenue to develop a new American maritime industrial comparative advantage while rapidly making allied conventional submarines many times more lethal against competitors.

Captain Brent Sadler (Ret.) joined the Heritage Foundation as a Senior Research Fellow in 2020 after a 26-year naval career in nuclear submarines and as a foreign area officer. He has extensive operational experience in the Western Pacific, having served at Seventh Fleet, Indo-Pacific Command, as Defense Attache in Malaysia, and as an Olmsted Scholar in Tokyo, Japan.

References

[1] Paul McLeary and Phelim Kine, “Trump Will Arm South Korea with a Nuclear Submarine,” POLITICO, October 29, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/29/trump-south-korea-nuclear-submarine-00629402 (accessed November 9, 2025).

[2] Terence Roehrig, “South Korea: The Challenges of a Maritime Nation,” NBR, December 23, 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/south-korea-the-challenges-of-a-maritime-nation/ (accessed November 9, 2025).

[3] Sam-man Chong, “The Implications of North Korean SLBM for KSS-III Submarines,” Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, January 27, 2024, pg. 2-3, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dYb2_ui_BaLe4rC8VhuDmeMuI309OBJH/view?pli=1 (accessed November 9, 2025).

[4] Josh Smith and Soo-Hyang Choi, “North Korea Unveils First Tactical Nuclear-Armed Submarine,” Reuters, September 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-launches-new-tactical-nuclear-attack-submarine-kcna-2023-09-07/ (accessed November 9, 2025).

[5] Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova, “China’s Response to U.S.-South Korea Missile Defense System Deployment and Its Implications,” July 26, 2017, pg. 7-10, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Report_China%27s%20Response%20to%20THAAD%20Deployment%20and%20its%20Implications.pdf (accessed November 9, 2025).

[6] Chen Chuanren, “South Korea Launches First KSS-III Batch 2 Submarine,” Asia Military Review, October 28, 2025, https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2025/10/south-korea-launches-first-kss-iii-batch-2-submarine-foc/ (accessed November 9, 2025).

[7] “VAU-6 Auxiliary Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) Dollezhal eggs – Submarines,” Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/reactor-vau-6.htm (accessed November 9, 2025).

[8] Brent Sadler, “China’s Great Submarine Sinking: What We Know and Why It Matters,” National Security Journal, October 9, 2024, https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/chinas-great-submarine-sinking-what-we-know-and-why-it-matters/ (accessed November 9, 2025).

[9] “Japan Eyes Nuclear Subs After U.S. Gives OK to S. Korea,” Asahi Shimbun, November 7, 2025, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16143129 (accessed November 9, 2025).

[10] Kaoru Ohno, “Nuclear Powered Ship Mutsu Designated as Special ‘Ship Hertiage’,” Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Inc., https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/news/4725 (accessed November 9, 2025).

[11] Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan Launches Sixth Taigei-class Submarine,” Naval News, October 14, 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/10/japan-launches-sixth-taigei-class-submarine-for-jmsdf/ (accessed November 9, 2025).

[12] “Huntington Ingalls, HD Hyundai Sign MOA to Expand US-Korea Shipbuilding Cooperation,” WorkBoat, October 27, 2025, https://www.workboat.com/huntington-ingalls-hd-hyundai-partner-to-expand-u-s-korea-shipbuilding-cooperation (accessed November 9, 2025).

[13] Chris Panella, “White House says South Korean shipbuilding giants are going to pour billions into reviving America’s shipbuilding industry,” Business Insider, October 29, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-south-korean-shipbuilders-will-invest-billions-into-us-industry-2025-10 (accessed November 9, 2025).

[14] “Report: Japan and U.S. to Sign Memorandum on Shipbuilding Cooperation,” The Maritime Executive, October 26, 2025, https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-japan-and-u-s-to-sign-memorandum-on-shipbuilding-cooperation (accessed November 9, 2025).

[15] Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, August 1997, pg. 6, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/22239/14_Military_Program_Brazil.pdf (accessed November 19, 2025).

Carlo Patti, “Origins and Evolution of the Brazilian Nuclear Program (1947-2011),” Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, November 15, 2012, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/origins-and-evolution-the-brazilian-nuclear-program-1947-2011 (accessed November 19, 2025).

Shane Ward, “The Strategic Rationale for Brazil’s Nuclear Submarine Does Not Hold Water,” Georgetown Security Studies Review, https://gssr.georgetown.edu/the-forum/topics/defense/the-strategic-rationale-for-brazils-nuclear-submarine-does-not-hold-water/ (accessed November 19, 2025).

[16] “123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation,” U.S. Department of Energy, July 11, 2025, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/123-agreements-peaceful-cooperation (accessed November 11, 2025).

[17] Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) has significant operations in China across various business segments, including shipbuilding, robotics, hydraulic equipment, and environmental systems, primarily through joint ventures and local subsidiaries: https://global.kawasaki.com/en/corp/sustainability/creation/rd.html (accessed November 11, 2025).

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) does not have wholly-owned shipyards building complete vessels in China, but it has several joint ventures, licensing agreements, and service operations in the country related to marine machinery, engines, and engineering services: https://www.mhi.com/group/mhimsb/company (accessed November 11, 2025).

Hanwha Shipbuilding has operations in China, specifically a shipyard in Shandong province that builds ship components for final assembly in South Korea. These components are critical to the company’s production and supply chain: https://www.hanwhaocean.com/en/whoweare/gn/aff/ (accessed November 11, 2025).

[18] “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Drives Forward Billions in Investment from Japan,” The White House, October 28, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/10/28195/ (accessed November 11, 2025).

“Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea regarding the U.S.-ROK Technolgy Prosperity Deal,” The White House, October 29, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/10/u-s-korea-technology-prosperity-deal/ (accessed November 11, 2025).

[19] Brent D. Sadler, “AUKUS: U.S. Navy Nuclear-Powered Forward Presence Key to Australian Nuclear Submarine and China Deterrence,” The Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2021, pg. 7-9, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/BG3662.pdf

[20] “Pathway to Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine Capability,” Australian Submarine Agency, March 14, 2023, https://www.asa.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2024-10/Nuclear_Powered_Capability_Fact_Sheet_0.pdf (accessed November 9, 2025).

[21] “Advanced Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), U.S. Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/ne/advanced-small-modular-reactors-smrs (accessed November 9, 2025).

[22] Brent D. Sadler and Peter St. Onge, “Regaining U.S. Maritime Power Requires a Revolution in Shipping,” The Heritage Foundation, May 15, 2023, pg. 18-20, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2023-05/SR272.pdf (accessed November 9, 2025).

[23] Adam Broinowski, “AUKUS Pillar 2,” Parliament of Australia, August 15, 2024, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/Research/FlagPost/2024/August/AUKUS_Pillar_2 (accessed November 9, 2025).

[24] “Hanwha Announces $5 Billion Philly shipyard Investment as Part of South Korea’s Commitment to US Shipbuilding Growth,” Hanwha, August 25, 2025, https://www.hanwha.com/newsroom/news/press-releases/hanwha-announces-5-billion-philly-shipyard-investment-as-part-of-south-koreas-commitment-to-us-shipbuilding-growth.do (accessed November 9, 2025).

[25] “U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Is Consistently Over Budget and Delayed Despite Billions Invested in Industry,” GAO, April 8, 2025, https://www.gao.gov/blog/u.s.-navy-shipbuilding-consistently-over-budget-and-delayed-despite-billions-invested-industry (accessed November 9, 2025).

Featured Image: The JMSDF submarine Taigei (SS-513) (JMSDF photo).

Increase Collaboration with South America to Protect U.S. Antarctic Interests

By William Muntean and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

The United States has significant national interests in Antarctica, but it currently lacks the maritime capacity to secure them. The United States sent more commercial vessels (42) and citizens (over 50,000) to the Southern Ocean than any other country during the 2023/2024 season. The United States, unlike many other nations, can also conduct unannounced inspections of stations and equipment in the region. However, the U.S. government is reducing its icebreaker capacity in the region by removing two vessels from service, continuing to rely on one heavy icebreaker that is beyond its expected service life. As of this writing, the United States has yet to take concrete steps to design and build appropriate vessels to ensure continued access in the region.

While Washington has acted to eventually address icebreaker shortcomings in the Arctic, it has not taken similar steps to protect its Antarctic interests. Therefore, as it starts the lengthy process of planning and building Polar Security Cutters for Antarctic operations, the United States should increase its collaboration with South American countries. Doing so will strengthen already-positive relations with key South American countries, protect American citizens and economic interests, and help the United States leverage Antarctic Treaty provisions to maintain peace in the region amid growing geopolitical interests. 

Antarctic Governance: Like Nowhere Else in the World

Antarctica, which lies south of 60°S, has been governed since 1961 not by countries acting as sovereigns across different territories, but by international cooperation across the entire region through the Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty freezes unrecognized conflicting territorial claims and their resulting maritime claims, prohibits military activity (except for peaceful purposes), and encourages international collaboration to advance scientific research. As the map shows, seven countries claim territory in Antarctica—Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom—and Argentina, Chile, and the UK overlap. The Treaty is widely recognized as the first Cold War arms control and inspection regime, largely due to its two-tiered compliance-monitoring process, which includes unannounced inspections anywhere in the region.

A map of Antarctic territorial claims. (Graphic via DiscoveringAntarctica.org.uk)

Antarctic Treaty members have negotiated additional binding agreements, including the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and its Annexes (Protocol), which entered into force in 1998. The Protocol establishes environmental standards, such as limiting waste and pollution and prohibiting non-scientific mining in the region and makes recommendations that are considered at the annual Antarctic Treaty meeting. As of November 1, 2025, there are 29 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties that make consensus-based decisions on the governance of the region including on issues that originate under the Environmental Protocol. Another 29 countries have ratified the Treaty but cannot participate in its decision-making.

A separate but related agreement is the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR Convention), which entered into force in 1982. The Convention establishes rules that conserve Antarctic marine ecosystems and use an ecosystem-based management approach that allows fishing so long as it is done in a sustainable manner. The Convention establishes by consensus the rules for catching krill and toothfish, which is likely called Chilean Sea Bass, on your menu, and has established two marine protected areas in the region. Similar to other regional fishing arrangements, there are a variety of at-sea and port tools to verify compliance with its decisions, including vessel licensing and monitoring, the Catch Documentation Scheme for toothfish, and an inspection system. There are 27 members of the Convention that participate in its decision-making process, of which all but Namibia and the European Union are Parties or Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.

Antarctic Capabilities: Land and Water

There have never been any indigenous people in Antarctica, so the only human presence are government-sponsored stations or maritime commercial activities. As noted earlier, seven countries have territorial claims “frozen” by the Treaty, which serve as incentives and justification for domestic funding to maintain stations in the region.

Overall, twenty-eight countries have established 75 stations to support scientific research, although their mere presence has geopolitical implications, which include tacitly supporting those frozen claims (by the seven claimants) or denying those frozen claims (by all other countries, including the United States, which has denied the possibility of any country claiming sovereignty in Antarctica for over one century). Per the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP), roughly 5,000 staff and scientists could work at these stations during the height of the austral summer, while less than 2,000 remain during the Antarctic winter. To date, the stations are not integrated into commercial operations—meaning there are no hotels for tourists, ports for fishing vessels, or hospitals for medical emergencies—but their facilities and equipment could provide limited assistance in case of emergencies.

The U.S. Antarctic Program (USAP) has the largest presence on the continent, with three stations that house approximately 1,400 people. The United States has the sole station at the South Pole, which is the continent’s single most geopolitically and symbolically important property. It also has the largest station, McMurdo on the Ross Sea, with approximately 1,200 beds, and the 46-person Palmer Station on the Antarctic Peninsula. Per COMNAP, the only other countries that reported more than 200 beds on the continent are Argentina (11 stations, almost 600 beds), Australia (six stations, less than 300 beds), Chile (13 stations, almost 400 beds), China (five stations, 300 beds), and Russia (10 stations, 340 beds).

McMurdo Station in 2013. (National Science Foundation photo)

While the globe enters a new era of international tensions and a shake-up of the international system, international cooperation among national programs in the form of emergency responselogistical support, and scientific collaboration has been the norm throughout the region since the mid-1950s and shows no sign of slackening. France and Italy operate the only jointly managed station, called Concordia, but many stations operate near and collaborate with each other to increase efficiency and safety in the most remote and challenging portion of the globe. A few examples include King George Island (which has stations by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Poland, Russia, and South Korea), Larsemann Hills (which has stations by Australia, China, India, and Russia), Queen Maud Land (which has stations from Germany, India, Japan, Norway, Russia, and South Africa) and the Ross Sea (which has New Zealand and U.S. stations next to each other, as well as stations from China, Italy, and South Korea around 200 miles away). In this light, the Chinese-Russian plan to collaborate in the particularly challenging West Antarctic region is not unusual and is certainly not prohibited, although it is worth monitoring.

Twenty-four countries notified fellow-Treaty members of the operation of 50 vessels, both traditional and icebreakers, to conduct and support the terrestrial stations. (There is no widely accepted definition of what constitutes an icebreaker.) During the 2023/24 season, the United States operated in five vessels in the Southern Ocean, three of which were icebreakers of varying capacity. Despite the well-known icebreaker deficit, the United States has since declared that it will not operate two of those three icebreakers, the R/V Laurence M. Gould and R/V Nathaniel B. Palmer, which leaves only the USCGC Polar Star, the sole U.S. heavy icebreaker, to fly the U.S. flag in the region. This means the United States will need to rely on foreign-flagged vessels to conduct its operations in the region.

Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star (WAGB 10) visited Palmer Station, a United States research station on the Antarctic peninsula, March 3, 2023, after completing a successful deployment in support of Operation Deep Freeze 2023. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Aidan Cooney)

Argentina and Chile would be the natural partners for such U.S. activities. The Chilean Navy operated seven vessels in the Southern Ocean during 2023-24, making it the country with the largest government maritime capacity in the region, including the domestically built icebreaker, Almirante Viel. During the same period, Buenos Aires deployed four vessels to the region. Argentina and Chile regularly conduct joint surprise inspections to verify Treaty compliance and rescue patrols in a vast maritime region.

Their Antarctic “gateway” cities, Ushuaia, Argentina, and Punta Arenas, Chile, compete for investment in Antarctic activities. However, competition does not mean a lack of cooperation, as both navies have for decades collaborated on an annual Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol that monitors maritime traffic and assists in emergencies. Future U.S. icebreakers could benefit from training alongside navies with extensive experience operating in the Southern Ocean.

Other South American countries are also heavily investing in expanding their presence in the Southern Ocean. Brazil annually deploys two icebreakers to Antarctica —the Ary Rongel and the R/V Almirante Maximianoand is domestically building another vessel to replace the Ary Rongel. Additionally, Peru operates a relatively new icebreaker, the BAP Carrasco. Non-South American countries are active in the Southern Ocean but deploy fewer government vessels there. Notable icebreakers active in the region are operated by Australia (RSV Nuyina), France (FNS L’Astrolabe), Germany (RV Polarstern), Italy (RSV Laura Bassi), Japan (R/V Shirase), South Korea (RV Araon), New Zealand (HMNZS Aotearoa), and the UK (RRS Sir David Attenborough).

As for Washington’s global competitors, China has the Xue Long and Xue Long 2 icebreakers, as well as four krill-fishing ships. Russia has six vessels: two for tourism, one for fishing—the Yantar 31, a vessel NATO countries closely monitor due to suspicions of intelligence operations—and three for government operations, including the Akademik Fedorov and Akademik Tryoshnikov icebreakers. Additionally, Russia’s Akademik Aleksandr Karpinsky, which is under U.S. sanctions and accused of spoofing, regularly goes to the region. As in the United States, these vessels are in high demand by their national Antarctic programs to meet operational needs in the region. 

China’s Xuelong-2 icebreaker. (Photo via School of Oceanography, Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

However, the majority of vessels operating in the Southern Ocean do not support the above terrestrial government operations but are commercial vessels conducting tourism and fishing activities. Sixteen countries reported 110 commercial tourist vessels operating in the region, led by the United States (42) and followed by France (16). Per the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO), over 122,000 tourists went to Antarctica during 2023-2024, almost all of whom did so on a cruise ship. Over 54,000 (44%) of the tourists were U.S. citizens, by far the most of any single nationality visiting the region. It is worth recalling that tourism in the Southern Ocean is not without risk, as demonstrated by the deaths of four American citizens in three different events during the 2022/23 season and the sinking without loss of life of the Explorer in 2007. However, despite the known risks, the vessels, even those carrying considerable numbers of American citizens, are not generally reviewed by the U.S. Coast Guard to meet safety and operational standards.

As for fishing, 11 countries reported 45 vessels operating in the Southern Ocean during the 2023/24 season, with South Korea reporting the most (11), followed by Ukraine with 5. European fishing fleets captured by far the largest share of krill and the two subspecies of toothfish, with Norway catching 67% of krill and France catching 40% of the toothfish. It is important to note that commercial mining for hydrocarbons and other minerals is prohibited south of 60°S, a restriction that does not expire or require renewal, so no specialized commercial drilling vessels have been reported in the Southern Ocean.

Beyond commercial and U.S. citizen security interests, U.S.-flagged vessels are important for conducting the unannounced in-person inspections authorized by the Antarctic Treaty, since the vast majority of stations in Antarctica are coastal. The United States has conducted the most inspections—15—but the most recent one was in 2020 and relied heavily on the Polar Star to inspect three stations, including the Chinese Qinling station. Australia (11), the UK (7), and Argentina and Chile (each with 6) are also leaders in conducting these inspections. The Treaty’s inspection provision allows for aerial inspections, but in-person inspections are more effective at identifying actions that could threaten U.S. national interests and deterring countries from taking those steps in the future.

Conclusion: Act Now Before Luck Runs Out

Due to decades of neglect, the United States lacks icebreaking vessels for the two polar regions, a deficit that will take years to reverse. The situation could change, though. President Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act in July that allocates almost $8 billion to build icebreakers “to ensure timely presence of the Coast Guard in the Arctic and Antarctic regions,” and in October, an agreement with Finland’s President to expedite building Arctic icebreakers. Additionally, the U.S. National Science Foundation has initiated the long bureaucratic process to design and build a vessel to replace the Palmer. However, none of these vessels will be available anytime soon, and little progress has been made to build the Polar Security Cutters required to operate in the Southern Ocean. This means the United States will need to rely on good luck and its partners rather than U.S. vessels to advance its maritime interests in the Southern Ocean and the Antarctic mainland.

While Washington and agencies like the U.S. Coast Guard develop plans to (eventually) design, build, and deploy Polar Security Cutters, South American countries are the ideal partners for advancing U.S. interests in Antarctica, including keeping the region peaceful through the Antarctic Treaty system and protecting U.S. citizens. As for operations in Antarctica and surrounding waters, Washington’s top priority will continue to be the annual breakout of McMurdo station on the Ross Sea, which is necessary to support the geopolitically vital U.S. South Pole station and activities in the Ross Sea region. Another priority is scientific operations to advance our polar knowledge and the United States’ ability to influence Antarctic governance. Moreover, the United States must continue to conduct periodic unannounced inspections of coastal stations operated by other countries to verify compliance with the Antarctic Treaty and advance U.S. national interests. The United States should also develop new strategies to increase protection of U.S. citizens in the region, including how best to prevent or manage emergencies in the environmentally challenging Antarctic region.

To achieve the aforementioned goals, icebreakers and polar-capable vessels need to be deployed. To remedy the lack of icebreakers operated by the United States, Washington can increase U.S. collaboration with some South American countries – namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. These partnerships would support the Antarctic Treaty system, support U.S. interests in Antarctica, and improve bilateral relations with critical regional partners that are very active in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Finally, increased U.S.-South America engagement within the Antarctic Treaty system would further reinforce the peaceful and open nature of the region. Ultimately these partnerships would provide the support needed until the United States eventually addresses its deficit in Polar Security Cutter icebreakers in the Antarctic.

William Muntean is the former Senior Advisor for Antarctica at the U.S. Department of State and regularly lectures and comments on Antarctic geopolitics. He is a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program in the non-partisan Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank and runs the Antarctic Intelligence consulting firm.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star (WAGB 10) transits through pack ice in the Southern Ocean, Dec. 28, 2022. Polar Star was en route to Antarctica in support of Operation Deep Freeze, a joint service, inter-agency support operation for the National Science Foundation, which manages the United States Antarctic Program. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Aidan Cooney)