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Warfighting Development

Warrior Spirit and the Time Tax: A Letter from a SWO Captain

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The following is republished with permission.

By Jan van Tol

Dear Admiral,

Astonishingly, I find myself at the end of my time in OBRIEN already. At the risk of being too forward, I will take the opportunity to enclose a few thoughts from a serving CO’s perspective on a couple of issues in the same spirit as my earlier comments on the Tactical Training Strategy.

Not surprisingly, my time in OBRIEN has flashed by. Things have gone quite well by and large. I have done well in the FITREP sweepstakes, so I very much hope to do this again in a couple of years. Our March-August MEF deployment received good reviews from what I have heard. I have had a great crew and wardroom throughout the tour, high morale and retention, few disciplinary problems, good tactical execution. In short, within the lifelines, it has been great! As you told me during a visit to GATES years ago, it is a gratifying thing to be able to make life a bit better for three hundred people and their dependents.

But, while this tour has been immensely satisfying professionally and personally, I have to say that much of it has not been particularly enjoyable – and that this view is common among my fellow COs out here. I have spent entirely too much of it angry professionally for reasons I will note. In many ways, I have found myself as CO being not much more than a glorified janitor, carrying out a multitude of tasks and requirements imposed by various staffs and outsiders with little input asked or tolerated. In many cases, some staff O3 or O4 has more influence on my ship than I do as CO. I say this even having worked for a pretty good commodore.

Yet, were this only personal frustration, I wouldn’t have the temerity to bother you with it. However, I am very concerned about how junior officers are looking at our profession. What I hear them saying on the Yokosuka waterfront is that most of their time and effort is not spent working on “naval things” – shiphandling, tactics, leadership – but on an ever-growing cancer of administrative requirements. Every inspection and assist visit seems to have a longer and longer “checklist” of micro-things (all equally important, of course) that must be just so, or else an area is unsat or “ineffective.” Reporting requirements and the care and feeding of staff databases grow inexorably.

The problem is that this kind of administrative minutiae is much closer to that found in many civilian occupations than it is or should be to the profession of arms. So, say many JOs in conversation, why do essentially the same thing for less money and the opportunity to be separated frequently from home and family? It is this – the defining downward of what constitutes the naval profession – that in my view underlies the JO retention problem. It is not about SWO bonuses or more medals. It is about whether there is meaning in what we ask our people to do.

A related problem is that this de facto changing of the substance of what it means to be a naval officer has also concomitantly placed a fast-growing time burden on JOs and crews. One day early during my time on BRISCOE, you and I discussed “smart scheduling” and the fact that many things could be done simultaneously since not everyone onboard was involved in every evolution. I have used that notion in OBRIEN and mostly been able to keep our work hours down to about 8 hours/day (except during preps for specific evolutions like E-CERT or certain TTS events) inport for the crew. But our system requires major planning/scheduling efforts which have placed heavy demands on CO/XO/DHs since slippage anywhere has rapidly cascading effects due to the overwhelming burden of inspections and preps. I have found that a large part of my personal energy has gone to just keeping this whole mechanism going over the last 18 months. I simply don’t remember you or any of my other COs having to devote nearly so much time to this kind of thing as my peers and I have had to.

This, coupled with the growing manning problems, is also driving another kind of vicious circle. As the manning levels go down and the time demands rise, many ships are still able to get most of the work done through various efficiencies and longer workhours. Since the work is still ostensibly getting done, one of the more pernicious effects, namely reduced training of junior personnel, has been relatively obscured. As an example, we just finished a rather mediocre Mid-Cycle Assessment right after standdown (a price paid for maintaining faith with the crew on a real standdown after a brutal year). One of the weaknesses turned up was that junior engineers weren’t getting enough training on the basics because the reduced number of senior personnel were too busy keeping things running during deployment. The senior personnel themselves don’t have the time they need to remain current on new information or pub revisions. Worse, as some of the seniors reach PRD, the experience level is notably falling.

As a numerical measure, OBRIEN had 51 pers assigned to M-division for her E-CERT two years ago. I had 31 at CART II the next year and, after a bump-up in numbers leading up to deployment, am once again back down to 31 today. Yet the inspection and engineering standards remain the same. Higher authority can do all the screaming they want, but ultimately there are only so many manhours available. I have been able to have my wardroom spend several hours a week on tactical training inport and underway (since the tactics part is one of my particular professional interests). Each of the JOs have fired the guns (including 5-inch) and driven the ship around in tactical scenarios. Not surprisingly, that’s the stuff that grabs them, and we need much more of it.

This letter has been a long time in gestation. On the positive side, after I started writing it, there have been a couple of things which seem to initially address some of the above concerns. I felt a shot of relief and hope from two recent messages. The first was your message on “Warrior Spirit,” the second the CNO’s message on lowering the ITDC “time tax” on our crews. I see the two as quite related – when the time burden of professionally irrelevant admin burdens is greatly excessive as it is today, it is almost impossible to inculcate “Warrior Spirit.”

Today it is too obvious to JOs that reward and punishment incentives for COs are greatly skewed towards getting the admin and inspection requirements done rather than fostering a psychological spirit of combat readiness on the part of officers and crew. It seems to me that there is no way out of that bind other than to rigorously carry out the ITDC reductions described in CNO’s message. And yet, one already hears the “yeah buts” on the part of various constituencies. As a current CO, I can’t urge strongly enough the pressing need to continue the thrusts contained in both messages – that is what will start staunching the outflow of JOs, and squadron and ship COs who might otherwise happily have stayed a lot longer after 20 years.

One other comment on “Warrior Spirit,” based on what I saw in the Gulf. When we have been out on our own (i.e., not under the TTS burden), we have tried to train hard and as realistically as possible with the idea that we might have to go to Korea at any time – because it could be a life-or-death issue not to. We kept the same attitude in the Gulf. I can honestly say that my guys and I gave our MIO and other ops our best shot. We were aggressive in doing night-time non-compliant boardings, even in very shallow waters – and, I think, tried to maintain the traditional U.S. Navy offensive spirit of taking reasonable risks in order to carry out our mission.

A couple of other ships out there had the same spirit, but others, it seemed to me, were unwilling to take many risks at all because of the potential consequences of making mistakes. I wonder if the subtle apparent changes in what it means to be a naval officer these days – i.e., the focus away from “naval matters” – is not contributing significantly to a sort of “psychological disarmament” of some of the officer corps. If so, your “Warrior Spirit” message is especially on the mark.

All that said, I would happily do this all over again. I have constantly told my JOs that there is no satisfaction like it and that what we do is important, and some of them believe me. I have also told them that there is growing awareness at the senior levels about much that disturbs them and that things will get better. But there is also a high level of wary cynicism on the waterfront which practically shouts, “Show me!”

I am certain, Admiral, from reading some of your recent interviews, that you are aware of most of these points. But, again, I don’t want to be part of the problem by not speaking up.

Very respectfully,

Jan van Tol
1 November, 1998

Jan van Tol served over 28 years as a naval officer. Assigned to several different kinds of warships, he was successively captain of a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a largedeck amphibious assault ship. While on sea duty, he deployed extensively throughout the Mediterranean Sea, the Western Pacific, and Southeast Asia, and made several deployments to the Persian Gulf. In his shore assignments, Mr. van Tol was employed in multiple strategic planning positions, including at the Naval War College (NWC), the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel (CNOEP), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSDNA).

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Oct. 7, 2020) Fire Controlman 2nd Class Steven Shoemate, from Lansing, Kan., right, fires a .50-caliber machine gun and Gunner’s Mate 2nd Class Cameron Howard, from Houston, maintains communication with the bridge during a Small Craft Action Team (SCAT) live-fire exercise aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

How China’s Expanded Operations in the Sea of Japan are Troubling Tokyo

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By Andrew Orchard

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) response to Taiwan President Lai’s inauguration highlighted Beijing’s regional assertiveness and military capabilities. That same week, China’s ambassador to Japan implied that the Japanese would be “brought into the fire” over their support for Taiwan’s independence. Both activities underscore why Japan is worried about a potential Taiwan contingency, and Tokyo’s unease is not limited to Beijing’s threats to Taipei.

Recurring PLA operations and increased bilateral training with Russian military forces constitute a challenge backed by military threats close to Japan’s territorial waters. One challenge is the PLA continuous East China Sea patrols and regular exercises near Japan’s Southwest Islands, demonstrated by the March 2024 PLA Eastern Theater Navy patrol adjacent to the Southwest. Type 052C guided missile destroyer Changchun and Type 054A guided missile frigate Changzhou operated south of the islands from March 25 until March 27, 2024. On the last day, a Y-9JB reconnaissance aircraft flew a mission near the patrol, illustrating the well-known risks of escalation to the Southwest Islands during an East China Sea or Taiwan contingency.

Tokyo, in response to these challenges, has taken proactive measures by significantly increasing its Self-Defense Force (JSDF) presence and actively planning to enhance shelter preparedness in the islands to ensure safety and security of its territories.

Japan’s Maritime Boundaries according to the Cabinet Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty.

Beyond East China Sea operations, the PLA also conducts operations in tandem in the Sea of Japan¹. Recent development and operations by the PLA underscore the severity of the challenge faced by Tokyo. In late March 2024, PLA forces operated in the Sea of Japan for two weeks. Four Northern Theater ships operated in the Sea of Japan from March 17 to March 31. The patrol included Huainan , a Type 52D guided missile destroyer of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla and Daqing, a Type 054A guided missile frigate. The operation consisted of a composition similar to past exercises, leading to speculation that the force possibly conducted training analogous to a “Long-Distance Exercise.” 

Upper Left and Bottom: Japan Joint Staff publicly released WZ-7 UAV image and observed flight route on 26 March. Upper Right: WZ-7 at 2022 Zhuhai Airshow.

Notably, the Northern Theater reported the first mission of a WZ-7 UAV in the Sea of Japan in March 2024, which coincided with the naval operations. Some Japanese media speculated that the WZ-7 transited to the Sea of Japan through North Korean or Russian airspace. The possibility for future WZ-7 Sea of Japan intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions troubled retired JSDF officers. The UAV’s endurance and sensor capability could enable additional PLA collection during JSDF Sea of Japan operations. Moreover, the PLA’s enhanced monitoring capability in the Sea of Japan, demonstrated by the operation of the WZ-7, along with ISR platforms and intelligence collection ships that could force the JSDF to expend more resources in response and “potentially halt training while the PLA collected.”

A timeline of key exercises and operations in the Sea of Japan. (Source: Japan Joint Staff and Global Times.)

Initially, the PLAN conducted irregular operations in the Sea of Japan and focused on gaining out-of-area experience, likely attributed to prioritization of counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and limited at-sea logistics capacity. Two months before deploying the PLAN inaugural counter-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN expeditiously sailed a four-combatant task group through the Sea of Japan in October 2008, enroute to the Western Pacific Ocean. This move and the PLA’s first Sea of Japan exclusive training mission as part of the 2011 cadet training cruise foreshadowed PLA interest in Sea of Japan operations.

After the first China-Russia Joint Sea exercise in 2013, PLAN activities in the Sea of Japan continue to rise. The increased frequency of operations can be attributed to the improved at-sea logistics capability and the inclusion of such exercises as part of distant seas deployments. Milestones in this progression include the unilateral “Sea of Japan Confrontation Exercise” conducted by PLAN naval forces returning from RIMPAC 2016, and the expanded joint air and naval exercise in the same area in January 2017. The 2019 annual bilateral bomber patrols with Russia marked a significant step in their collaboration, which transitioned to biannual bomber patrols in 2022 and 2023, leading to growing unease.

In a broader sense, Tokyo is deeply concerned that the continued intensification of these operations could pose a significant challenge to Tokyo’s naval capabilities. These capabilities, historically developed for maritime chokepoint control, play a pivotal role in reducing foreign threats to shipping during a contingency, underlining the strategic importance and vulnerability of Japan’s maritime chokepoints. The harsh lessons of the Second World War profoundly influenced Japan’s development of naval capabilities and the associated strategy. Loss of control over Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) led to the devastating sinking of over 1,500 merchant ships during the war. Some Japanese experts view this failure as a causal issue that helped seal Japan’s fate and highlights the importance of historical lessons in shaping current challenges to avoid similar fates. This issue also demonstrates the strategic significance of Japan’s SLOCs and the need for robust naval capabilities to protect them. These historical lessons shaped Japan’s current defense strategy that emphasize the importance of controlling their SLOCs and the need for a strong naval force to protect its maritime interests. 

JMSDF Frigate JS Tatsuta at her commissioning ceremony. (Japan MOD photo)

After the Second World War, Japan relied upon the United States to secure its SLOCs as the nation rebuilt. The relationship shifted with the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense, a significant turning point that outlined sea control in the Sea of Japan and East China Sea as a JMSDF mission. Leveraging its surrounding chokepoints, Tokyo built a maritime force that could limit the freedom of Soviet naval activities against Japan, marking a significant step in developing Tokyo’s naval capabilities.

A February 2024 Nikkei Shimbun article (in English and Japanese) highlighted the growing Japanese apprehension over PLA activities in the Sea of Japan. The article stated that PLA unilateral and bilateral operations with Russia indicate Beijing’s desire to maintain a constant presence in the Sea of Japan. An unnamed former Japanese Defense Ministry intelligence officer cited in the Nikkei article stated that the PLA could deploy strategic forces to the Sea of Japan in the future. This article provides valuable insights into the current perceptions and concerns of the Japanese government and defense experts regarding the PLA’s activities in the Sea of Japan.

Japanese government officials and experts also think the PLA will expand Sea of Japan operations, although Tokyo has not publicly speculated on the future composition of force deployments. Instead, there is a focus on the scope of these activities, including China-Russia bilateral exercises for strategic messaging. Japanese sources cite the 24 May 2022 China-Russia bomber patrol during the ‘Quad’ Tokyo Summit as a prime example of such messaging. The messaging is assessed as part of both nations’ efforts to challenge the status quo in East Asia and pressure Tokyo. This strategic messaging, if successful, could undermine Japan’s regional influence and security, and consequently impact the broader geopolitical implications of the PLA’s activities in the Sea of Japan. 

Furthermore, the use of each Beijing and Moscow airfields during bomber patrols signifies an increase in interoperability and government relations, causing growing unease in Tokyo. The prospect of further enhanced China-Russia logistics cooperation, to include port access, could enable sustained Chinese pressure on Japan and its SLOCs during a contingency, posing a significant threat to Japan’s security and economic stability. The Japan Forum for Strategic Studies 2023 Taiwan Policy Simulation emphasized this issue and addressed that similar pressure can complicate Tokyo’s decision-making in future contingencies.

The Japan Ministry of Defense believes countering this challenge requires not just individual efforts, but a collective commitment to foster a security environment that is unwilling to tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo. Active military engagement with like-minded countries that emphasize the importance of collective action and cooperation in maintaining regional stability and security will help ensure continued stability. 

These engagements, like the recent Australia-Japan-Philippines-U.S. South China Sea patrol, often occur outside the Sea of Japan. Despite the physical geographic separation, the exercises are essential for Japan’s security because these exercises showcase defense capabilities and demonstrate a public display of the willingness of nations to stand up for shared principles. Mr. Iida at the National Institute of Defense Studies noted:

“Demonstrating to China and Russia the will and ability to maintain the status quo by force through joint exercises with many countries that share interests in maintaining the existing international order will lead to the stability of the regional order through deterrence.”

The recent patrol, which involved multiple countries, demonstrates the collaborative efforts of like-minded nations as they seek to counter the PLA’s activities and maintain the regional order. Regional relationships and engagements will need to pace the growth of the PLA Navy, and keep up with its expanding operations.

¹ The name of the Takeshima Islands are contested and known as Dokdo Islands in South Korea, and internationally as the Liancourt Rocks.  The Sea of Japan is alos a name in dispute and is referred to as the “East Sea,” “Sea of Korea,” “Sea of Joseon” in Korea.

Andrew Orchard is a U.S. Navy Officer and former Mansfield Fellow. This article was written in Spring 2024 as part of the author’s research on Japan’s maritime security policy during his Mansfield Fellowship.

The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.

Featured Image: Guided-missile frigates Bayannaoer (Hull 551), Dali (Hull 553) and Tongliao (Hull 554) attached to a naval flotilla under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command sail in formation during a maritime combat training exercise in late September, 2025. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Yu Chuanjun)

Maritime Law

Invisible Criminal Commodities in the Caribbean

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Dr. Ian Ralby, Dr. David Soud, and Sophie Podrog

On 7 July 2021, Jovenel Moïse, the President of Haiti, was assassinated in his own bedroom, sending Haiti into a constitutional crisis from which it has not recovered. While there remain conflicting reports around the circumstances of his murder, one credible consideration was that he may have been killed to prevent him from exposing individuals involved in criminal enterprise. While drugs and arms are the main illicit commodities associated not only with Haitian organized crime but with the Caribbean region more broadly, they may not have been the only illicitly traded goods with which Moïse was concerned – his other major interest was in criminality surrounding the trade in eels.

The Imperative For Vigilance

As little-known and seemingly bizarre commodities begin to fetch higher and higher values in global illicit markets, law enforcement officers must become more vigilant in identifying and responding to new trends. This need is becoming particularly acute in the maritime domain, as the out-of-sight nature of marine life makes the illegal trade in living marine resources particularly attractive to criminal actors. High value marine species are ideal commodities for pursuing illicit profits and laundering money at the same time. The general lack of familiarity with aquatic life reduces the likelihood of being caught either on paper or in person, and the inability to trace the origin of these commodities can make accountability an even more elusive challenge.

Why Eels?

Indeed, the eel trade is an excellent example of this growing problem for law enforcement officials in the Caribbean and beyond: the illegal movement of “invisible commodities” that no one recognizes as the instruments of crime. Eels may not seem to go together with guns and drugs, but they can be as profitable as cocaine with hardly any of the risk. While terrestrial commodities – including gold, timber, fuel and wildlife – have been part of this phenomenon for a while, the dynamic becomes more extreme when it involves marine species that are typically so unfamiliar to most people as to go unnoticed. This aspect of fisheries crime and exploitation of the maritime domain demands closer attention. Its implications are not only environmental and economic, but closely tied to both the rule of law and the ability to govern, as Moïse’s death painfully illustrates.

While eels are by no means the only invisible commodity in the Caribbean, they present a revealing case study. The world’s eel population originates entirely from the Sargasso Sea in the North Atlantic Ocean near Bermuda. Eels begin their lives as leaf-like larvae that drift in different directions from their spawning site in the Sargasso Sea towards estuaries and rivers. Within 55 days of their arrival to estuaries, they turn into glass eels- small, transparent organisms whose value soars while they are in this clear state. As they progress through estuaries, rivers, and ecosystems, they eat what is available to them. What they consume literally colors them as they grow into elvers. Elvers are still adolescent eels, but their color signifies their loss of value. The elvers continue to grow before transforming into adult yellow eels within a year. These adult eels remain in the yellow eel phase for several years, before European and American eels mature into their final phase, silver eels. Towards the end of their life, silver eels will return to the Sargasso Sea to spawn before their death.

Staggering Value

Regardless of how eels may or may not appeal to palates in different parts of the world, the economics around the marketplace are telling. At source, glass eels from the Caribbean fetch around $4,000 per kilo, making them four times more valuable than a kilo of marijuana at origin and roughly the same as cocaine at first point of sale. While the glass eels do increase in value across the supply chain, they reach a maximum figure of about $8,000 per kilo in transit and $12,000-$15,000 at destination. That does not keep pace with the supply chain of drugs, as cocaine reaches a range of about $28,000 to $70,000 at destination. The thing about living organisms, however, is that they grow. A patient purchaser of glass eels can raise those eels to full adulthood, at which point their value can hit as much as $35,000 per kilo, putting them back in the same range as cocaine. At scale, as in the case of the vast eel farms in parts of Asia, this “bio-arbitrage” can generate profits into the billions of dollars. There is nothing intrinsically illegal about this process – unless the eels were sourced or shipped illegally or used as a means of turning criminal cash, used to buy glass eels, into legitimate profits on the global seafood market. Those forms of illegality have become big business, and led to eels being officially declared endangered. In the EU, the export of eels has been banned outright since 2010, but illegal trade persists, and eel fisheries have been almost completely depleted to the point of being “critically endangered.” The Caribbean, where eels flourish but no such restriction exists, is already being exploited and is exposed to grave risk.

Whether it is eels, sea cucumbers, turtles, lobster or other sea creatures, maritime commodities are attracting more criminal actors. With their advantages of high values, bio-arbitrage, and limited interdiction risk, they present an appealing alternative to trafficking drugs, weapons, humans, or other contraband that features on the radars of law enforcement and customs agencies. And the informal and cash-intensive upstream markets for eels are an ideal venue for money laundering. What this means is that there is a need for increased vigilance.

Turning the Tide on Invisible Criminal Commodities

Disrupting the harvesting and sale of these invisible commodities requires three main approaches. First, there needs to be rigor in identifying the commodity trends. To accomplish this, both governmental and non-governmental actors need to work together. Various entities outside of government – from fishers to civil society organizations to businesses – are likely to see some of the initial trends in new maritime commodity harvesting and trading, which will leave traces in market activity and trade data. There needs to be a relationship between them and the governmental actors to then be able to make sense of what is going on and what can be done about it. Within governments, the challenge is of interagency cooperation. Too often, one ministry or agency will have some insight but not share it, and thus constrict what can actually be done. In this case, for example, it may be that the fisheries agencies spot the activity, but if that is not shared with the police, coast guard and customs, there may be little means of effectively interdicting it.

Second, coast guards and other maritime law enforcement agencies need not only to know what is going on, but also what they should be looking for and what they can do about it. Without training, it is not easy to even make sense of eels being trafficked, and with each of the maritime commodities, different means of transport require different training for law enforcement. And even when the eels or other commodities are identified, understanding the legal basis for what action may or may not be taken is critical. This is where regional organizations – the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM), the Caribbean Community’s Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS) and the Regional Security System (RSS) – can all play a vital role both supporting information flow and ensuring standardized training across the region. Any jurisdiction that has a blind spot may become a magnet for the criminal activity.

Finally, prosecutors and judges must be clear on what can be done to stop those who engage in the illegal harvesting and trafficking of maritime commodities. If the law is not fit for purpose, legal professionals must also have a role in working with law enforcement to encourage a legislative or regulatory enhancement to address that state of affairs. In addition to having the right laws, the prosecutors and judges must be comfortable with them and willing to use them. So ensuring training in how to prosecute such cases is also a critical element that can be supported by regional organizations. 

What Next?

Criminals will always seek illicit profit with the highest reward and the lowest risk. Maritime commodities have become increasingly popular on account of their relative invisibility. Eels may be the Caribbean’s “flavor of the month,” but something else will come to take their place in the future. That means that the region – replete with sophisticated criminal organizations – needs to build collective resilience against this phenomenon by working together. First, to make invisible criminal commodities visible, and thereafter, to make the risk of getting caught outweigh the potential rewards of the crime.

Dr. Ian Ralby is President of Auxilium Worldwide, a charitable non-profit committed to global harmony. He is a globally recognized expert in maritime law and security and works around the world to help states and regional organizations identify and address maritime crime. Auxilium Worldwide has been working extensively with the Caribbean Community’s Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS) to uncover and counter overlooked illicit maritime activities, particularly in the fisheries sector. 

Dr. David Soud is Head of Resource Responsibility at Auxilium Worldwide. He specializes in tracking illicit flows, with particular expertise in the criminal exploitation of natural resources.

Sophie Podrog is an undergraduate at Yale University, majoring in Global Affairs with a certificate in Human Rights. While working for Auxilium Worldwide, she has specialized in researching eel trafficking along with other maritime crimes.

Featured Image: An apprehended vessels along with small skiffs used by fishermen which were apprehended on November 22, 2017. (Royal Bahamas Defense Force photo)

Middle East

Peace in Gaza May Not Mean Peace in the Red Sea

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By Matt Reisener

Since October 2023, the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group that seized control over much of the country over a decade ago, have waged a campaign against shipping vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, and Gulf of Aden, attacking over 100 commercial maritime vessels. The Houthis have long cited Israel’s war in Gaza as the raison d’être for its campaign, claiming that the attacks on Israeli ships or any vessels conducting business at Israeli ports are intended to punish Israel for its role in the conflict. However, in the wake of the recent ceasefire in Gaza, one might reasonably expect these attacks to end, particularly since there has already been a decrease in the number of attacks conducted since the Houthis’ May 2025 agreement with the US to avoid targeting American vessels in exchange for an end to US airstrikes on Yemen. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi reportedly ordered a cessation of attacks on ships flying the Israeli flag or docking at Israeli ports, and the group’s message to Hamas’ Qassam Brigades indicating that its campaign against Israel is on hold has been interpreted by some as a sign that the Houthis are shifting their focus away from the Red Sea.

An end to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea would be a welcome development given how disruptive the campaign has been to global commerce. Traffic through the Suez Canal has decreased by roughly 50% due to concerns that ships will be targeted in the Red Sea. Many vessels have instead chosen to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant time and expense to their journeys and contributing to global inflation. Given that as much as 15% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic transits the Suez Canal yearly, the global impact of the Houthi attacks cannot be understated.

However, the Gaza ceasefire may not herald the return of safe and stable maritime commerce in the Red Sea. The ceasefire remains tenuous in the wake of Hamas’ attempt to reassert control in pockets of Gaza City, both sides have already accused the other of violating the agreement. Countless potential pitfalls remain on the path to a permanent peace which could easily prompt the resumption of hostilities, including the return of the remains of the outstanding Israeli hostages, fate of Hamas, and Israel’s willingness to accept a Palestinian state. Even then, a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Gaza may be insufficient to permanently end the Houthis’ maritime attacks. The reason for this speaks to the Houthis’ underlying motivations behind their efforts to disrupt Red Sea commerce, which go beyond the group’s stated intent to destroy Israel and support the Palestinian cause.

The Houthis’ Red Sea attacks are primarily intended to address the legitimacy crises the group faces both domestically and abroad. While the Houthis succeeded in capturing Yemen’s capital city of Sana’a and forced the resignation of then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the group remains opposed by Yemen’s internationally recognized government and other armed groups such as the Southern Transitional Council and Yemeni National Resistance which control significant swaths of territory within the country. Within Houthi-controlled territory, the group remains unpopular with much of the population due to its imposition of restrictive social control measures, the poor state of Yemen’s economy, endemic government corruption, and the Houthis’ struggles to pay public sector salaries. Internationally, Iran is the only country to recognize the Houthis as the legitimate ruling government of Yemen, and the group has been diplomatically and economically isolated from most of the global community.

Through this lens, the group’s campaign in the Red Sea can perhaps best be viewed as an effort to strengthen the image of the Houthis as a fully functional governing entity and a powerful geopolitical force capable of waging war against regional and global powers and single-handedly disrupting global commerce. While Houthi attempts at striking the Israeli mainland have been largely unsuccessful, the group identified attacks against maritime vessels as a more achievable means of inserting themselves into the broader conflict against Israel while also elevating their global threat profile. This interpretation is further supported by the Houthis’ decision to offer “safe transit” waivers to ships hoping to transit the Red Sea without being targeted. To the Houthis, every shipping company that applies for such a waiver helps cement the perception of the Houthis as a legitimate governing authority. Similarly, securing a peace agreement with the United States served as a significant propaganda win for the Houthis, allowing them to portray themselves as a peer competitor of the Americans capable of inflicting enough damage on US interests to necessitate such a deal.

While the Houthis’ embrace of the Gaza War cause is consistent with the group’s prevailing pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli beliefs, the Houthis also had several strategic reasons to tie their Red Sea campaign to this conflict. First, Houthi involvement in the Gaza War is one of the few policies undertaken by the group that has been widely popular due to the Yemeni public’s widespread opposition to Israel. While 2024 polling from the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies shows that the Houthis themselves remain unpopular in Yemen, it also shows that the attacks themselves have produced positive feelings among Yemenis living in areas of Houthi, government, and divided control. These maritime attacks lend credibility to the Houthis’ claims that they are waging war in support of Palestine on behalf of the Yemeni people, while Yemen’s internationally recognized government has been largely unable to criticize the Houthi campaign since doing so would lend credence to the Houthis’ portrayal of this government as a Western-backed puppet that represents foreign rather than domestic interests. The attacks have also been a boon for recruitment to the Houthi cause. The UN estimates that the number of Houthi fighters increased from 220,000 in 2022 to 350,000 in 2024, and successful propaganda campaigns centered around the Houthis’ war against Israel served a major driver of this increased recruitment. Every successful strike and foreign retaliation against the Yemeni homeland in response to these attacks risks producing a rally-around-the-flag effect that engenders greater public sympathy.

Additionally, the Houthis’ embrace of the Palestinian cause as a justification for its Red Sea attacks has helped deepen its partnership with Iran. Despite the Houthis’ growing capacity to manufacture weapons domestically, Iran remains an invaluable patron for the Houthis which has continued to supply the group with munitions, as evidenced by the Yemeni National Resistance Force’s interception of over 750 tons of Yemen-bound Iranian weapons in July. Iran’s arming of the Houthis was originally intended to oppose the Saudi-led coalition’s efforts to topple the group and prevent Yemen from becoming a proxy state of Iran’s geopolitical adversaries. However, the Houthis’ willingness to wade into the Gaza conflict in opposition to another of Iran’s primary adversaries (Israel) has helped establish the Houthis as a reliable partner worthy of continued support at a time when Iran’s regional proxy network has been significantly degraded following its disastrous Twelve-Day War against Israel.

Furthermore, the Houthis have used the Gaza War as cover for their Red Sea attacks in part to undermine public perceptions of other regional Arab powers. While countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are ostensibly supportive of the Palestinian cause, the Houthis have repeatedly highlighted that these states have proven unwilling to match that support with military action, drawing favorable contrasts between this perceived inaction and the Houthis’ successful maritime campaign. In doing so, the Houthis have sought to weaken regional opinion of the countries which once actively worked to topple them after their capture of Sana’a.

While the Houthis’ embrace of the Palestinian cause has been largely successful for the group, there is reason to believe they will continue to target commercial shipping interests in the Red Sea even if the conflict in Gaza remains frozen. First, the Houthis could continue to shift the goalposts on their justification for targeting vessels in the Red Sea in opposition to Israel. The road to peace between Israel and the Palestinians will be full of stops and starts, and the Houthis can weaponize each roadblock as a sign of Israeli aggression and resume their Red Sea attacks.

Should the fragile peace in Gaza hold, the Houthis could also adopt the United States as the primary public face of its Red Sea campaign, drawing on the broad unpopularity of the US among Yemenis in the wake of America’s lengthy drone campaign against extremist groups in Yemen. The aforementioned US-Houthi détente may be insufficient to deter future attacks, as evidenced by the Houthis’ March 2024 attack on a Chinese ship despite making similar promises to avoid targeting their vessels. The Houthis’ decades of insurgency experience have made them adept at surviving airstrikes while preserving their ability to conduct maritime attacks. This is not to say that airstrikes against the Houthis have been wholly ineffective. The strikes launched by the US this spring inflicted over $1 billion in damage, killed several prominent Houthi figures, and played a role in bringing the Houthis to the negotiating table, and a recent Israeli strike succeeded in killing Houthi military leader Muhammad Abdul Karim al-Ghamari. However, the Houthis may calculate that they would gain more militarily from the increase in aid they would receive from Iran if they began attacking ships which have made port calls to the United States than they would lose as a result of retaliatory American strikes, especially since such strikes would further encourage more disaffected young men to join the Houthi cause.

Finally, the Houthis’ growing proficiency in carrying out Red Sea attacks may embolden them to continue these efforts. The Houthis have increased their coordination with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Somali extremist group Al Shabaab in recent months. Greater cooperation with these groups could allow the Houthis to extend the range of ships they are able to target in the region and add further risk to ships hoping to hug the coast of Africa to avoid attacks, while also providing the Houthis with additional sources of regional intelligence and material support. Rather than relying exclusively on long-range munitions to harass their targets, recent attacks have also shown the Houthis adopting a greater variety of tactics, including using a combination of both remotely operated ships and vessels crewed by combatants who boarded and planted explosive devices on ships. These tactics suggest that the Houthis can continue harassing ships in the region even if the group’s supply of missiles and drones begins to dry up.

While Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and adjoining waterways may wax and wane in the coming months, safe transit through the Red Sea is unlikely to become a reality in the foreseeable future. The Houthis’ Red Sea campaign is not intrinsically linked to the Gaza conflict and may therefore continue even if that war ends peacefully. The Houthis will likely continue to use these attacks as a leverage point to press for more favorable final-status peace negotiations with both Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s internationally recognized government to help secure them a more advantageous political position in Yemen moving forward. Only an end to the decades-long conflict between the Houthis and their enemies within Yemen will bring an end to the group’s efforts to disrupt maritime commerce in the region.

Matt Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor for the Center for Maritime Strategy. He previously served as Senior Program Manager for the Middle East and North Africa for the National Democratic Institute, where he managed international development programs in Yemen.
Featured Image: USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group Conducts PHOTOEX with ITS Cavour Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea (Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Kade Bise Carrier Strike Group Two)