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Industrial Base

Ready for War: A Way Forward for Industrial Preparedness

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By Doug Orsi

The results of a 2023 wargame simulating a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan showed that the combined forces of Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. successfully denied Chinese objectives and defeated the invasion. However, multiple aircraft carriers and dozens of cruisers and destroyers were lost. Additionally, critical munitions needed to defeat Chinese forces were rapidly depleted due to limited magazine capacity and delayed logistics support. Current events in Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East have confirmed the wargame’s conclusions as prescient, revealing the U.S. defense industrial base struggles to support the nation’s military commitments and policy goals. As a result, although the country still produces advanced systems and munitions, it lacks the capacity to replace material losses and expenditures during prolonged combat. The country must promptly address these issues by expanding policies, authorities, investments, and partnerships with like-minded nations that foster co-manufacturing, maintenance, and knowledge sharing in the construction of combat platforms to compensate for existing industrial base deficiencies.

Atrophy and Sounding the Alarm

The health of the defense industrial base is vital to the success and sustainability of military campaigns. In 2024, a bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy found that the defense industrial base “is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the U.S. and its allies and partners.” Through inattention, flawed policy, and poor strategic decisions, the U.S. allowed its defense industrial base to atrophy. The decline of the defense industrial base also included years of neglect of government-owned facilities, which served as the purveyor for the military’s higher-end modernization priorities.

An examination of current shipbuilding capacity highlights the challenge: a country’s ability to produce commercial ships also enables it to build warships. In the 1970s, the nation constructed 5% of the world’s commercial ocean-going vessels, but today that figure has fallen to less than 0.2%. Currently, the U.S. Navy relies on seven shipyards to build large warships and is decommissioning ships faster than it commissions new ones. This situation, along with rising costs for new warships and delays in production, indicates an impending crisis due to insufficient capacity to expand the fleet and quickly repair ships damaged during wartime. 

Previous administrations recognized the challenges posed by China and Russia and took steps to revitalize manufacturing. In 2017, President Trump signed an executive order calling for a health assessment of the defense industrial base. This was followed by the Biden administration’s review of ways to strengthen supply chain resilience and U.S. manufacturing. The war in Europe prompted the U.S. to accelerate plans to address issues in the industrial base. 

Responding to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Army quickly increased funding to boost the production of 155mm artillery ammunition. Although these efforts demonstrated that the country could accelerate production, the pace was still insufficient to meet demand during large-scale combat operations. Another challenge to munitions replenishment is the expansion of U.S. weapon systems and munitions acquired through Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and Presidential Drawdown Authority. While these authorities and sales benefit the industrial base over the long term, potential short-term supply shocks, such as allied and partner use in Ukraine exceeding production capacity for 155mm artillery munitions, are concerning. One way to address these shortages is by expanding existing authorities, policies, and strategies. 

A Means Forward

The Defense Production Act of 1950 is a tool for Presidents to prioritize, expand production, and protect private companies from foreign mergers and takeovers to bolster national defense. The Act’s Title III authorities support production capacity by funding critical materials, technology, and workforce development. However, years of neglect and offshoring will require significant capital investments to reverse deindustrialization in steel production, manufacturing, and mining.

One approach is to increase the amount of Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III funds, focusing on specific areas of the defense industrial base that support large-scale combat operations. This includes funding for workforce development, munitions facilities, mines for strategic and critical materials, and expanding shipyards. A recent example is the Title III award to two companies that enhanced the capability and capacity of solid rocket motors, a critical component of precision-guided munitions. In 1992, Title III was amended to include Canada as part of the domestic industry, enabling the allocation of funds. Further expansion of Title III occurred in 2024, with the addition of the United Kingdom and Australia. 

Current and future administrations must keep expanding relationships with allies and partners to strengthen the defense industrial base. Considerations should include their capabilities, capacity, and strategic location. For example, Indo-Pacific ally New Zealand is modernizing its military through its existing industrial base and “closer defense relations” with Australia. New Zealand’s efforts align with the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance and the National Technology and Industrial Base framework. Japan, another technologically advanced long-term regional ally, can assist and reinforce the U.S. through co-production enabled by recent defense investments and shipyard initiatives. Another longstanding ally, Norway, already co-produces the advanced Naval Strike and Joint Strike Missiles and is building another facility in the U.S. Including these nations among those eligible for Defense Production Act funding will improve the capacity to expand domestic and allied magazine depths in the Indo-Pacific and European regions. 

The National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) exists to support a “more robust domestic defense industrial base” through “dual-use research and development (R&D), production, maintenance, and related activities.” Established from experience in World War II and codified into law in 1993, the initial agreement between the U.S. and Canada has now expanded to include the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Extending the NTIB to other countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and European allies like Norway, can bring benefits, including increased production and maintenance efforts, especially in areas where the U.S. faces shortages, such as munitions and shipbuilding. This may involve more joint production projects, overseas and within the U.S. The upcoming National Security Strategy should also highlight the importance of strengthening the defense industrial base, which will help guide Congress and the Department of War’s budget priorities.

The U.S. also needs to address domestic tool and machinery manufacturing to support the defense industrial base. For example, the U.S. purchased production equipment from Turkey to expand its 155mm munition manufacturing. Five-axis CNC machines used in advanced manufacturing are now mostly foreign. Investments in precision machinery are expensive, and their return on investment depends entirely on the amount of work expected. A way to improve this is to incorporate more multi-year contracts into defense deals to motivate the industry to invest in its factories and modernize, thereby stabilizing demand and revenue. 

Ford Motor Company’s B-24 assembly line at Willow Run during World War II. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

The 2023 National Defense Industrial Strategy promoted risk reduction by increasing cooperation with allies and partners in areas such as sustainment, supply chain management, maintenance, repair, and overhaul, and by enhancing interoperability through sharing science and technology. The strategy’s Implementation Plan included “co-development and co-production of priority defense systems” with allies and partners as a key effort. The Department of War’s recently published Acquisition Transformation Strategy calls for the Department to “engage with allied Nation’s Industry partners for technology assessment, integration, and procurement, driving research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditure reductions and worldwide supply chain diversification.” The U.S. government should not delay implementation and must start working with key stakeholders to advance this initiative and achieve improvements in industries. A crucial initiative should create more opportunities for non-defense domestic companies and allies to help address industrial base deficiencies. For example, America’s latent automotive industrial strength was once tapped to build aircraft and armor.

Allies & Partners

The U.S. has historically relied on allies to address its deficiencies in domestic mining, processing, and refining of raw materials essential to national defense. In 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. established an “enhanced trilateral security partnership,” more commonly known as AUKUS. It aims to “promote deeper information sharing and technology sharing; and foster closer integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains.” AUKUS Pillar One enables Australia to develop nuclear-powered attack submarines. Pillar Two ensures interoperability through technology sharing, including artificial intelligence, hypersonics, electronic warfare, and command-and-control systems. Recent remarks by President Trump reaffirm his ongoing support for this partnership and the need to expedite deliveries. However, without substantial investments from all three partners, submarine production will not accelerate enough to meet the required timelines. The U.S. needs to expand Pillar Two to strengthen workforce, supply chain, and infrastructure capacities that affect current submarine, joint platform, and munition production. 

President Biden discusses AUKUS with Australian and British leadership. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Expanding joint production overseas with allies and industrial partners is a way to reduce current capacity strain on combat platforms and munitions manufacturing; however, how it is implemented is crucial. For example, the F-35 Lightning II program shows poor use of allied co-production. The program is hindered by the aircraft’s complexity and by production delays caused by parts shortages, stemming from supply chains optimized for efficiency rather than capacity. Also, manufacturing was spread globally to encourage partner cooperation and sales. This model of co-production is a poor example to follow for similarly complex systems. A better approach is to focus on smaller programs and simpler systems, such as infantry fighting vehicles or munitions, prioritizing redundant capacity over efficiency. The joint ventures between Raytheon and the European missile manufacturer MBDA to produce Patriot munitions in Germany, and between Lockheed Martin and Thales Australia to produce Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System missile components, are excellent examples. These show how leveraging local industrial capacity can help ease near-term strain on high-demand platforms, munitions, and combat components.

Growing Fleets

The shortage of U.S. shipyards and repair facilities presents a dilemma should a kinetic conflict with China occur in the Pacific. Although the U.S. prevailed in the wargame, the heavy losses in personnel and resources made it a Pyrrhic victory. The decline of shipbuilding in the U.S. is well documented and not the focus here. While this situation is concerning, there is some reassurance that many allies and partners, including Japan, South Korea, and Italy, maintain strong shipbuilding industries. The challenge with leveraging allies’ capabilities is that current law prevents the nation from purchasing warships from foreign shipyards. Title 10 USC 8679 states:

“Except as provided in subsection (b) [Presidential Waiver for National Security Interests], no vessel to be constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may be constructed in a foreign shipyard.”

Although Japan and South Korea have strong commercial and naval shipbuilding abilities, they are close to China and its vast arsenal. European countries, such as Italy, also have domestic shipbuilding capabilities that the U.S. could leverage to address this issue.

The President, members of Congress, and key stakeholders are doing their part to develop policies and legislation to address the shipyards issue. The recent executive order, “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” directs actions to “ensure the Security and Resilience of the maritime Industrial Base,” including the use of Defense Production Act Title III and other investments to support the commercial and defense shipbuilding industries. Other congressional efforts include the bipartisan Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security for America Act (SHIPS Act), which aims to improve the nation’s ability to produce commercial ships and their related infrastructure. The bill “calls for the U.S. to add 250 ships within the decade to the international fleet of U.S.-flagged vessels…” Congressional support is crucial for expanding shipyard capacity and introducing new innovative manufacturing capabilities that allies possess. Reinvigorating commercial shipbuilding is a positive step that can create more jobs, which can then be used for military construction. 

The shortage of qualified workers is affecting the nation’s shipbuilding and submarine-building industries. An example of these challenges is the Gulf Coast region’s 5,000-worker shortfall needed to support new Navy contracts. Similarly, the Navy indicated that “workforce challenges and material shortfalls” are causing scheduling issues for refitting nuclear aircraft carriers. This lack of capacity now prevents the repair or production of ships at the speed and scale needed during wartime. The Biden administration and Congress sought to leverage the strengths of regional allies and partners to bridge these gaps.

Expand Overseas Maintenance

The Department began making some headway in addressing maintenance operations for ships and systems serving overseas. The 2024 Regional Sustainment Framework, which advocates forward maintenance, repair, and overhaul operations in allied nations rather than at home, is a first step toward addressing maintenance downtime. In the past, a damaged ship was brought back to a stateside government or commercial repair facility. Under this new framework, five regional sustainment centers will conduct maintenance and repair work in the Indo-Pacific, with European yards also considered. This is a positive first step that acknowledges modern capabilities and increased capacity of allies and partners, and can serve as a stepping stone to increase readiness rates, especially in the area of deferred maintenance by the U.S. Navy. The challenge with the recent maritime executive order, which focuses on rebuilding America’s naval and commercial shipping, is that it will take years to implement before stateside facilities can increase capacity to improve fleet readiness and expansion.

The U.S. readily acknowledges that Japan, South Korea, and Europe design and produce excellent warships. The development of the U.S. Navy’s Constellation-class Frigate Program is off plan, but the idea of using a mature, existing allied frigate design and modifying it slightly has merit, regardless of its implementation woes. Despite the program’s multiple challenges, the need for modern allied capabilities and capacity, especially in shipyards, remains.

The Next Steps

There is a compelling case for the country to involve allies and partners in co-production with direct investment and potential purchases of subsystems and components, given America’s current inability to recover from wartime losses. Recent comments from the White House show that the time may be right for this approach. According to media reports, President Trump stated, “…we may buy some ships from other countries that we’re close to and do great jobs with ships.” Recent analysts have proposed purchasing Arleigh Burke-class destroyers from allies to expand the Navy’s fleet while rebuilding its own shipbuilding infrastructure. This is a politically sensitive position, as American shipyard workers, their advocates, and citizens would argue it is harmful to the U.S.

A Japanese Mogami-class frigate. Japan recently began exporting the design, with Australia signing a deal to acquire them. (JMSDF photo)

There are valid reasons for protecting the nation’s shipbuilding industry and its workforce. There is also the fear that foreign security services are gathering intelligence on technology, tradecraft, vulnerabilities, and the sabotage of overseas production. Times have changed, and if the nation were to face large-scale combat operations as described earlier, the ability to reconstitute losses must be realistic and viable. The U.S. government must lean forward and assist new domestic companies interested in entering the defense industrial base, while expanding existing critical infrastructure and cybersecurity programs for allies who can rapidly enable gains in weapon production, shipbuilding, and repair. Intelligence sharing—an Achilles’ heel in coalition environments—must also be streamlined and expanded to assist our allies and partners and capitalize on their existing strengths.

America’s ability to incorporate non-defense businesses into the war industry was a crucial factor in winning the production effort during WWII. Encouraging firms that can weld, cast, stamp, direct-mold injection, or produce glass to shift into supply chains for combat vehicles, missiles, munitions, drones, optics, and shipbuilding will quickly boost capacity. A racing company that specializes in Motocross can make parts for defense aerospace. An automotive dashboard supplier can adapt their direct-mold injection process to produce drone housings. Because of limited space, many U.S. shipbuilders are utilizing outside facilities to manufacture ship components and then transport them to shipyards for final assembly. This approach can be further improved by involving more non-traditional firms in the production of shipbuilding modules or components, and transporting these modules or components to shipyards for final assembly. Instead of bringing skilled labor to the shipyards, as was done during WWII, distributed manufacturing and on-site installation will expand U.S. shipyard capacity by leveraging dispersed resources. Such efforts can help revive a U.S. industrial core devastated by decades of deindustrialization, transforming Rust Belts into ‘Gold Belts.’

The way forward is to continue seeking direct investment from allies in areas where they have excess capacity. South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean’s recent purchase of Philly Shipyard and its projected $5 billion investment are positive steps toward revitalizing a moribund commercial shipbuilding market and could lead to naval repair opportunities. Additionally, the Department must collaborate with the government and key stakeholders to secure a Presidential waiver to purchase ship components from important allies, such as Japan, South Korea, or Italy. 

A logical next step is to seek assistance in building Navy fleet auxiliary ships. The outcomes of this initial step could lead to further agreements to purchase components for warships from allies and transfer them to U.S. facilities, where they would be fitted with the necessary weapons, information, and cyber systems to make the ships operational and secure. This assistance is a more acceptable option for the nation and would help speed up current delays in domestic naval shipyards. The Department could mitigate risk by deploying inspectors and personnel at overseas production facilities to help ensure security and maintain the integrity of the manufacturing process. 

Allies and partner nations play a crucial role in helping the U.S. quickly regain its ability to produce combat platforms and essential munitions. The Commission of the National Defense Strategy advised “allowing the Department of Defense to supplement defense production with procurement from allies and partners with advanced manufacturing capability and capacity.” The Department must follow this approach until U.S. industries can meet the country’s needs. China’s shipyards and factories far surpass U.S. capacity to mass-produce both weapons and commercial and military ships, and they are advancing in both sophistication and quality. 

Conclusion

The U.S. defense industrial base has limited capacity to rapidly increase production in the event of large-scale conflict against a peer competitor, and global commitments further widen these gaps. The U.S. should consider seeking allied assistance by expanding DPA Title III funding and NTIB membership, thereby strengthening the industrial base both domestically and internationally through increased overseas joint munitions production. Production priority must focus on munitions with the highest demand signals during kinetic conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, ongoing conflicts in Europe, and in the Middle East. These steps will give the nation time to scale up its production capacity to a sustainable level. Not only will allied and partner facilities improve readiness and keep systems forward-deployed during hostilities, but their investments and expertise will also support the expansion of U.S. shipyards and maintenance facilities. Targeted procurement of components from key allies with superior capabilities and capacity will rapidly grow the fleet, facilitate victory, and reduce combat losses. Without these measures, the U.S. risks being unprepared if deterrence fails, jeopardizing American ideals and way of life.

Doug Orsi is a retired Army Colonel serving as an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army War College with research interests in the defense industrial base, mobilization, and industrial preparedness. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of War.

Featured Image: Virginia-class submarine, USS Arkansas, under construction. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Podcast

Sea Control 589: Non-state Special Operations with Craig Whiteside

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By J. Overton

Lt. Col. Craig Whiteside, (Ret.) PhD., joins the program to discuss the new book he co-authored with Ian Rice, Non-state Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects. Dr. Whiteside shares how to define and apply terms like “non-state” and “special operations, historical examples of this type of operation, their use by contemporary actors, and how the maritime domain plays a critical role in their success or failure.

Dr. Craig Whiteside is Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College resident program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is a research fellow at George Washington University’s Program on Extremism and the International Centre for Counterterrorism-The Hague. Whiteside’s current work focuses on the leadership succession and military doctrine of the Islamic State militant group, and he co-authored The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement. His latest book is Non-State Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects. He is the 2022 winner of the U.S. Naval War College Excellence in Research Award. 

Sea Control 589: Non-state Special Operations with Craig Whiteside

Links

1. Non-state Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects, Ian Rice and Craig Whiteside, Routledge, 2025.

2. The Isis Reader Substack.

3. @CraigAWhiteside on X.

4. @craigwhiteside@bsky.social on BlueSky.

5. Craig Whiteside personal site and publications.

J. Overton is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Podcast

Sea Control 588: Outsourcing Security at Sea with Pieter Zhao

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By J. Overton

Pieter Zhao joins the program to discuss his article, “Outsourcing Security at Sea—The Return of Private Maritime-Security Companies and Their Role in Twenty-First-Century Maritime Security.” He discusses the growing role of private maritime-security companies in the modern world and situations where they could provide maritime security.

Pieter W.G. Zhao is a PhD Researcher and Junior Lecturer at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, focusing on history and international relations in the maritime domain. He is also a Nonresident Fellow at the Irregular Warfare Initiative. His doctoral research analyzes the changing dynamics in the 21st-century maritime warfare and security environment from an applied historical perspective, focusing on non-state actors and irregular warfare at sea.

Download Sea Control 588: Outsourcing Security at Sea with Pieter Zhao

Links

1. “Outsourcing Security at Sea—The Return of Private Maritime-Security Companies and Their Role in Twenty-First-Century Maritime Security,” by Pieter Zhao, Naval War College Review, Winter 2024.

2. Irregular Warfare Initiative.

3. Pieter Zhao LinkedIn.

4. Pieter Zhao BlueSky.

5. Pieter Zhao Contact Page.

J. Overton is co-host of the Sea Control podcast and editor of the essay collection, “Seapower by Other Means: Naval Contributions to National Objectives Beyond Sea Control, Power Projection, and Traditional Service Missions.” Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Jonathan Selling edited and produced this episode.

Acquisition

MOSA Redux: Modular Acquisition is New Again

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By Jason Thomas

What is old is new again, and Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) is no different. MOSA is an acquisition and design approach consisting of a technical and business architecture that supports using system interfaces compliant with widely supported and consensus-based standards, to the extent that standards are available and suitable.1 Despite being a concept and approach important for defense systems for decades, adoption and implementation have been sporadic at best. There are many proposed benefits of implementing a MOSA, but program teams are often left with more questions than answers, including starting counts, what to include, and does it apply to their program. There needs to be a better understanding of the history of MOSA, and some common program challenges deserve to be addressed in detail. Forthcoming guidance from the Department of the Navy can help show the path forward.

The first use of “open standards” in defense acquisition was when the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology formally established the Open Systems Joint Task Force in 1994 via a memorandum.2 The memorandum highlighted the commitment to use performance and commercial specifications and standards, and wanted to further emphasize that commitment by using “open systems” specifications and standards in acquisition to the greatest extent practical.

A decade later, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5000.1, which provides management policies and procedures for managing all acquisition programs, had language included for MOSA.3 The directive stated that “Acquisition programs shall be managed through the application of a systems engineering approach that optimizes total system performance and minimizes total ownership costs. A modular, open-systems approach shall be employed, where feasible.” The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2017 is where MOSA was formally established in law as a requirement for defense weapons systems. The language defined which systems were affected and at which acquisition milestones, the purported benefits of including MOSA as part of program development, sustainment, and fielded operations, and the important technical and business considerations.

The law also made an important wording change, namely that MOSA would be applied “where practicable” instead of the earlier guidance of “practical.” Practicability is not about want, desire, or whether it applies, but more on the feasibility of implementation. In 2019, the Service Secretaries jointly published a memo directing their respective Service Acquisition Executives to “publish specific implementation guidance” for acquisition programs, because victory in future conflict may heavily depend on sharing information across systems using standard interfaces.4 

A Recent Resurgence?

Despite the previously posited benefits of MOSA, defense leaders find themselves reaffirming MOSA as a priority across the services.5 Recently, MOSA or its elements have been called out in recently proposed legislation. The Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense (FoRGED) Act identifies key sections for removal and modifications to facilitate the department’s ability to meet the intent of MOSA.6 Similarly, the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery (SPEED) Act discusses modularity and faster acquisitions to meet emerging threats and address mission needs.7

In SecWar Pete Hegseth’s confirmation hearing, he emphasized the importance and need for modular system designs to address evolving threats, and emphasized the importance of having modular systems and the advantages they provide in upgrading and fielding capabilities quickly.8 With the recent announcement of the Air Force’s newest fighter aircraft, the F-47, the President, Secretary of War, and Air Force Chief of Staff all made comments about the adaptability of the platform throughout its service life.9

The benefits of MOSA are also being realized through the evolutionary tactics by Ukrainian forces in their ongoing war with Russia, where modular, open designs are enabling rapid adaptation on the battlefield.10 Lastly, the acquisition community is observing contract protests favoring requirement to include MOSA in proposals and contracts.11 Clearly, MOSA is not going away and appears to be growing in importance and popular backing.

Misconceptions Against Adopting a MOSA

If something is objectively better, then ideally there is little to prevent it from becoming the new standard way of doing business. But with any ‘new’ concept, some level of pushback is to be expected, particularly when the change is not well understood. There are common arguments and concerns on the applicability of implementing MOSA that need to be settled.

“Lifecycle Phase”

A common argument is related to the lifecycle phase the program is in or the size of the program, therefore saying MOSA is not applicable or practicable. “I’m too late in the lifecycle to implement a MOSA” is a common argument for a program to raise when discussing MOSA, and it is a fair one in certain cases. How does a program manager, engineering team, or other stakeholder inject a MOSA once the system is completed, tested, and fielded? What about the contract structure or negotiated data rights? The program must consider the mission objectives of their system, the technology improvements relevant to their system, all missions the system contributes to joint operations, and the contractual and sustainment posture over the course of the remaining life of the system.

The discussion surrounding this argument can be summarized in the “practical” vs “practicable” distinction. If a weapon system is complete and fielded, it should have a system-level architecture. The architecture will highlight key interfaces internally or externally. Analysis will report on how system requirements were verified and satisfied via measures of performance from testing based on that architecture. These are all fundamental building blocks for MOSA adoption because they each describe the system, the behaviors of the systems, and what is expected from each component. The program team should know the system well enough to anticipate when the inevitable service life extension or obsolescence challenges will arise.

Historical experience suggests that weapon systems are usually required to remain fielded beyond their initially intended service lives. The decision to extend the service life of a weapon system is dependent on the material condition of the system, its effectiveness, supportability, and the external resource constraints such as budget or personnel. Traditionally, each program or program office has a technology or capability roadmap that details capability enhancements from science and technology initiatives that are being tracked or planned to support growth and modernization. Service life modernization or pre-planned program improvements are an opportune time for the original fielded system to take advantage of a MOSA during those requirement engineering efforts. The laws surrounding budgets and continuing resolutions make MOSA more attractive since the inability to initiate new start programs plays a key role in system acquisition and ultimately delivered capability. Even if the program is late in its lifecycle, MOSA is often still practicable.

“MOSA will add cost to the Program”

The total cost of a major acquisition program is measured as either Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), which is the total procurement cost of a program divided by the number of units procured, or the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) which adds in the costs of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) for the program. Adopting a MOSA will not only drive down costs from reuse of the non-recurring engineering (NRE) design and development costs, but also the laboratory, integration, and operational testing. This can allow a program to separate functions into specific modules, and if they are reusing the technical details or the technical version is unchanged, there is a significant reduction in costs. Furthermore, by leveraging commercial technologies through the use of open, common standards, programs would be postured to be more proactive rather than reactive in how they plan for upgrades. One needs to consider the full lifecycle costs of how a program is managed, including contract actions, development timelines, and testing, and the burden they can put on resources if operating in a more reactive approach.

“We don’t have the resources to design MOSA in”

During the design and development of any weapon system, requirements definition, decomposition, and architectural design work are required. As a design matures, test events are conducted, planning and product support crystalizes, and these same skills are used whether a program adopts a MOSA or not. The first key difference is the level of engagement across the program team in executing a MOSA. Those adopting a MOSA benefit from a stronger alignment between the various disciplines, resulting in a more robust solution. Another added benefit is the enhancement of the skillsets developed by the workforce due to more rigorous design work and sustainment planning. Teams are required to evaluate more options, think more deliberately and understand the impacts of the various courses of action where they may not have had to consider if they were not adopting a MOSA.

The second main difference comes from the level of resources required after initially fielding the system due to capability needs, mission performance, obsolescence, or as other pressures manifest. Fundamentally, the analysis and work are no different if MOSA is “designed in” or not, and therefore a MOSA does not require additional resources. If a MOSA is adopted, resources are postured for efficient and effective use when upgrades or enhancements are sought or present themselves due to an active demand signal to the industrial base to address mission needs.

“My system architecture isn’t based on modularity”

This argument typically follows a presumption of not using one of the MOSA “enabling standards” such as the Future Airborne Combat Environment (FACE), Open Mission Systems (OMS)/Universal Command and Control Interface (UCI), Sensor Open Systems Architecture (SOSA), or something similar. Every system is developed with some level of architecture that identifies and articulates the system components, how they are organized, and how they relate to one another. Architectural views of a system and their artifacts for weapon systems are mandated in law and required for various technical and acquisition reviews to assess the maturity of the system as it develops Modularity, or components of a system built on modules, is inherent in nearly all systems. Circuit cards, avionics boxes, sensor components, software algorithms, wiring bundles, and more are all modular components within a system. Modularity is critical when failure analysis or supportability analysis are conducted and have a direct impact on system safety and maintainability. If a given system is not designed with open standards, that is a different argument, and one that must be supported in a business case analysis.

Affordability and capability over the lifecycle of a program are assessment criteria in technical and acquisition reviews and should be documented and well-reasoned. If a system is not modular today, it does not mean that will remain the case into the future. MOSA practicability must be addressed throughout the lifecycle.

“MOSA will delay my program”

When asked about how he would accelerate program timelines and reduce costs during his confirmation hearing, then-nominee Hegseth said he would focus on investing in the industrial base, understand the threats we are going to face in the future, and use “off-the-shelf technologies or standard designs [and] modular designs.” This “acquisition churn” is the result of many factors, but it is inherently easier to address with the proactive posture MOSA offers. Having a MOSA incentivizes the program to more proactively focus resources on delivering relevant and timely outcomes for the force. That focus prevents delay, rather than adds to the risk of it. Absent modular, open designs a program is more likely to become subject to frequent scrutiny from oversight bodies, which in turn requires the program team to spend more time justifying the program’s initial requirements and planning for how the program will address oversight concerns.

“MOSA is another unfunded requirement”

This argument and its cousin, “we didn’t generate a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for it,” are arguably red herrings. MOSA is in law as a requirement for defense acquisition programs for consideration and assessment for practicability. The requirements are further codified in technical and acquisition assessment criteria as a weapon system matures and advances through the acquisition process. The perception that MOSA is something that is added onto the system to make it more expensive, instead of a fundamental design approach that ensures the program remains relevant, is a misconception that needs to be clarified with better awareness and education.

The Navy’s Approach to MOSA

MOSA is a strategic imperative for the Navy. As such, it is taking a holistic and enterprise view in strategy, planning, and implementation. The Navy has several focus areas for implementation and execution, including Education and Training, a Collaborative Digital Environment, Updating Policy, Processes, and Guidance, and Outreach and Engagement. These areas will culminate in a Department of the Navy MOSA Guidebook v2, expected to release in the coming months.

Updating Policy, Processes, and Guidance

The Navy is reviewing and making changes to all policy and guidance where MOSA is either identified or ought to be included to ensure programs are supported in their MOSA journey. While MOSA is identified in multiple acquisition and technical documents, the Navy is taking additional steps to provide better traceability and consistency across policy, and also in technical disciplines across the entire lifecycle and acquisition pathways. The Navy is ensuring that regardless of where a program is in its lifecycle, the discipline (i.e. engineering, logistics, program management, testing, budgeting, etc.), or the acquisition pathway (Major Acquisition Program, Middle Tier Acquisition, Software Pathway, etc.) the available guidance and support is consistent and understandable. Furthermore, by aligning the Department’s MOSA strategy with acquisition policy, the Navy will align the enterprise and maximize efficiency and effectiveness.

Education and Training

People are our number one advantage. The top priority is ensuring our talented workforce has a firm understanding of what a MOSA is, the planning and implementation considerations, and how it informs the way they design and deliver capabilities. This requires a review of current MOSA education coursework, professional material, and other media that support the DON’s desired end-state for a MOSA-savvy workforce. The DON is developing new methodologies for business case analysis for a MOSA to facilitate conversations across disciplines supporting our programs, as well as resource sponsors, policymakers, industry, and academia. Furthermore, education will cover opportunities for overlapping topics such as Intellectual Property and Data Rights, Right to Repair, Interoperability, Digital Engineering, and Reference Architectures.

In his book Legacy, James Kerr wrote, “the best teams have a culture of accountability.”12 Accountability surrounding MOSA will be enabled when all the requisite disciplines are involved, share the same understanding and playbook, have defined expectations, and are supported throughout the process.

Collaborative Digital Environment

The Navy has established a Collaborative Digital Environment to serve as the authoritative source for the Department of the Navy approach to MOSA. The environment sources policy and guidance documents, training content, terminology, standards, a repository for modular system interfaces, and other references to support programs so they can achieve their objectives relative to MOSA. This site is accessible to anyone with a common access card to facilitate learning and dissemination. The site is hosted in the same environment used for the Naval Integrated Modeling Environment, an enterprise service to enable integrated modeling.

Conclusion

MOSA can increase combat capability, mission effectives, and mission readiness. The Department of the Navy is taking an enterprise-wide, systems engineering view of modular open systems, where each program is better positioned because of the strategic investments made from those who came before. By adopting a modular open systems approach, we can rapidly field emerging technologies, enhance our industrial base, interoperate with our allies and partners, and strengthen deterrence. When a program adopts a MOSA, our adversaries must consider a wider range of capabilities they need to address. When multiple programs adopt a MOSA, U.S. collective strength increases supporting our goal of peace through strength.

The Navy is making a concerted effort to communicate with the myriads of stakeholders regarding its MOSA strategy. Regardless of their footprint in the industrial base, there is a place for them at the table. The message is clear – the Navy is fully embracing modular open systems in its weapons systems as a warfighting imperative.

Jason Thomas serves as lead for Systems Engineering for the Department of the Navy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test and Engineering. He is the Department’s lead for MOSA and is leading efforts across the service, and partnering with other services, OSW, and other stakeholders. 

These views are presented here in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views of the DOW, its components, or the DON.

References

1. Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, “Implementing a Modular Open Systems Approach in Department of Defense Programs,” February 2025.

2. Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Acquisition of Weapon Systems Electronics Using Open Systems Specifications and Standards,” November 29, 1994.

3. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “DODD 5000.1: The Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003.

4. Spencer R., Esper, M., Wilson, H., “Modular Open Systems Approaches for our Weapons Systems is a Warfighting Imperative.” January 9, 2019.

5. Briggs, Connie, “Prominent Leaders Queue for MOSA Summit 2025.” August 21, 2025. https://navalaviationnews.navy.mil/Editorial-Staff-Tools/Article-Submission/Article/4281635/prominent-navy-leaders-queue-for-mosa-summit-2025/

6. Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense Act of 2025, 118th Congress (2025). https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/5618/text/is

7. Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery Act, 118th Congress (2025). https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/speed_act_full_text.pdf

8. Confirmation hearing transcript of Peter Hegseth, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 14, 2025, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01-14-25_nom-transcript.pdf.

9. “Air Force Awards Contract for Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Platform, F-47,” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, March 21, 2025, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4131345/air-force-awards-contract-for-next-generation-air-dominance-ngad-platform-f-47/. 

10. Bondar, K. (2025). Ukraine’s future vision and current capabilities for waging AI-Enabled autonomous warfare. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-future-vision-and-current-capabilities-waging-ai-enabled-autonomous-warfare

11. U.S. Army. (2025). Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA). In CRS Reports. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12771/IF12771.7.pdf

12. Kerr, J. (2013). Legacy. Constable & Robinson.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Dec. 6, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) conducts a replenishment-at-sea with the Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO 187). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joey Sitter)