Tag Archives: US Navy

Asia-Pacific, Current Operations

Why the US Navy’s first South China Sea FONOP wasn’t a FONOP

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By Timothy Choi

The eagerly-anticipated Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) by the United States Navy (USN) in the South China Sea was initially viewed as a strong demonstration of the United States’ resolve that the waters surrounding China’s artificial islands and claimed reefs are high seas. China’s attempt to establish a de facto 12 nautical mile territorial sea around these features is, as most readers of CIMSEC will know, in direct contravention of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS clearly specifies that man-made islands and underwater features like reefs are not eligible for the 12NM zone granted to more robust geographic features, such as rocks or naturally-formed islands capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life; the latter of these are also eligible for the prized 200 NM Exclusive Economic Zone.

Acknowledging implicitly that their features are not legally entitled to any kind of territorial sea, the Chinese instead have attempted to establish a normative regime aiming to make other actors treat the waters surrounding their features as though it were a territorial sea. Under customary international law, consistent behavior towards a particular issue can result in the practice becoming legally binding, either through generally agreed norms of behavior or a gradual solidification it into written law. Thus, for countries wishing to prevent the high seas around the Chinese features from becoming a territorial reality, it is crucial for interested parties to halt the norm-creation process before it can gather steam.

To do this, the USN thus carried out its first FONOP, sending the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Lassen within 12 NM of the Chinese build-up on Subi Reef. However, simply sailing within 12 NM is not sufficient to demonstrate American resolve that the waters are high seas.

Rather, the Lassen had to have behaved within those 12 NM in the same manner allowed on high seas. Under UNCLOS, a warship on the high seas may carry out its whole array of activities including launching helicopters, turning on fire-control radars, and carrying out arms exercises. However, these and other activities (including fishing and research) are all prohibited when sailing in another country’s 12 NM territorial waters – a condition known as “innocent passage”, detailed under UNCLOS Part II, Article 19.

USS Lassen's crew carries out a medical training exercise with an airborne MH-60R Seahawk helicopter in the South China Sea some time before the FONOP. (credit: Navy.mil) -Had this been done within 12 NM of Subi Reef, America's commitment to Freedom of Navigation would be unambiguous.
USS Lassen’s crew carries out a medical training exercise with an airborne MH-60R Seahawk helicopter in the South China Sea some time before the FONOP. (credit: Navy.mil)
-Had this been done within 12 NM of Subi Reef, America’s commitment to Freedom of Navigation would be unambiguous.

Thus, in order for the USN to send the unequivocal message that it saw the 12 NM around Subi Reef as high seas, it had to have carried out at least one of those activities. Else, its transit would have been identical in form to that of an innocent passage, which is only required for territorial waters. Carrying out such a transit would therefore legitimize, or at least be viewed as legitimizing, the Chinese claim that Subi Reef has a 12 NM territorial sea. In so doing, Lassen’s voyage, far from contesting the Chinese position, would actually reinforce it by behaving in the same way it would have to in an actual territorial sea.

So how did Lassen actually behave during its transit? It appears more and more likely that Lassen in fact behaved exactly as she would in territorial waters. Sam LaGrone’s post on USNI News quotes US defence officials and sources as stating that Lassen carried out an innocent passage, though claiming it did not mean a recognition of the Chinese position. Lassen’s transit, then, was not any more a FONOP than any regular transit through another state’s territorial waters under the articles of UNCLOS. 

If the United States wants to demonstrate its resolve on the issue, its FONOPs need to not only sail within 12 NM of a Chinese feature, but also involve activities prohibited under “innocent passage” conditions while in the area. Such activities can be as mundane as lowering a fishing lure over the side, or as visually impressive as launching a Seahawk or UAV.

As the US plans for further, more regular FONOPs in the South China Sea, America’s willingness to challenge China on the issue will manifest not in dramatic debates at the United Nations or stern press releases, but in the minute activities of the ships and sailors involved. Photographs and videos of such activities would go far to prove the United States’ unwillingness to compromise on Freedom of Navigation and gain the confidence of its regional allies. A strong and unambiguous message now can nip a problem in the bud before it can fester to point where actual violence may break out. To paraphrase Sun-Tzu, it is much better to defeat an enemy’s strategy than to defeat them in battle. Heading off the Chinese at their own norm-creation game now will decrease the opportunities for misunderstandings leading to violence in the future – but only if the message cannot be misinterpreted.

Timothy Choi is a PhD student at the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military & Strategic Studies. Interested in all areas of maritime security and naval affairs, he struggles everyday with the fact that he studies at an institution located hundreds of kilometres away from the nearest ocean. When not on Twitter (@TimmyC62), he can be found building tiny ship models and headbanging to some kind of northern European folk metal. 

Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis

Irregular Forces at Sea: Not “Merely Fishermen”—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia

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By Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy

Maritime militia, dead ahead! In a just-published Defense News article, Chris Cavas has made an important contribution to our understanding of the operations and applications of China’s irregular maritime forces. The forces he describes are almost certainly neither ordinary merchant ship operators nor random fishermen, but rather militiamen operating in pre-planned roles in conjunction with USS Lassen’s Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea (SCS) on 27 October 2015.

Cavas cites a U.S. Navy source: “‘There were Chinese merchant vessels present that were not as demure as the Chinese Navy. One came out of its anchorage in the island and crossed the destroyer’s bow but at a safe distance, and the Lassen did not alter course as the merchant ship circled around.’ Fishing vessels in the area added to shipping traffic in the immediate area, the source said, but the ship did not have to maneuver around them. But the extra craft seem to have been present, the source noted, ‘because they anticipated the Lassen’s transit.’”

In what follows, the authors trace maritime militia involvement—in close coordination with other Chinese maritime forces—to a variety of important incidents at sea. It is thus not surprising to see these forces active near such China-occupied Spratly features as Subi Reef. But greater awareness is needed to address this vital but too-long-understudied issue. To that end, we offer the following major points:

  • China’s maritime militia is understudied, but it is important for understanding Beijing’s maritime strategy, especially in the SCS.
  • The militia work with other instruments of Chinese sea power—the military and the coast guard—to defend and advance China’s position in its disputes. They may also support military operations in wartime.
  • They allow China to vigorously pursue objectives without risking military conflict or creating an image of gunboat diplomacy.
  • This article series will profile four of the most important militia units operating in the SCS.

While Russia has employed “Little Green Men” surreptitiously in Crimea, China uses its own “Little Blue Men” to support its outstanding island and maritime claims in the East and South China seas. These maritime militia forces have participated in some of Beijing’s most important military and paramilitary operations in the SCS. They will be directly involved in future Chinese efforts, possibly including the direct harassment of U.S. and allied FONOPS. By “sending civilian, rather than military, ships to track or confront U.S. Navy vessels,” explains Huang Jing of the National University of Singapore, “China can issue a firm response to the U.S. while signaling that they don’t want to escalate the situation militarily.”

No ordinary civilian fishing boats, these! They are operated by members of China’s maritime militia (海上民兵). These irregular forces are recruited from a local fishing community or other maritime industry and remain employed there while being trained and available for government tasking. China’s modern maritime militia building dates to the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, when a rudimentary People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) faced Nationalist blockading of mainland ports and depredations against merchant vessels. As a stopgap measure, the nascent PRC trained and equipped its fishermen militias, both for their self-defense and to support ground and naval operations. Within today’s maritime militia, a small but growing set of elite units are the ones most likely to be deployed on more sophisticated operations that involve monitoring, displaying presence in front of, or opposing foreign actors. They frequently operate in concert with China’s navy and coast guard.

The PLA’s official newspaper states, “putting on camouflage they qualify as soldiers, taking off the camouflage they become law abiding fishermen.” Make no mistake: when national needs dictate, maritime militia are used as frontmen trolling in support of territorial claims. You can read our analysis to date here, here, here, and here. Now, with the potential role and impact of China’s maritime militia growing, it’s time to document their precise nature before Beijing is able to mischaracterize or selectively portray an interaction or incident as simply involving random civilian fishermen or other marine workers motivated by spontaneous patriotism unfairly oppressed by foreign forces.

The concept of deputizing civilians to perform state functions is not novel to China. The United States, for instance, has Naval Militia, as well as Coast Guard Auxiliary and a Craft of Opportunity Program—but they serve vastly different purposes. Many states’ naval militias, such as the Rhode Island Naval Militia, are not currently active. Only the New York Naval Militia has remained continuously active since its founding. The few that have remained active post-World War II or recently (re)activated assist with law enforcement, evacuations, disaster recovery, anti-terrorism, and defense of undisputed American territory and port facilities against mines and other hazards. Importantly, U.S. Naval Militias, like the U.S. Coast Guard, do not harass foreign vessels or conduct other assertive activities to further contested island or maritime claims. In fact, the United States has very few contested claims, and has a track record of adhering to international law to manage or resolve them. It does not resort to harassment or threats of force against foreign vessels regarding disputes; hence there is no need for its Naval Militias to do so.

By contrast, such “maritime rights protection” activities are important responsibilities for China’s leading irregular maritime forces. Selected elite Maritime Militia units prepare for the most advanced missions, in part by receiving training from the PLA Navy (PLAN). As the first article in our series will explain, Vietnam, one of the few other countries with a Maritime Militia similar to China’s in purpose, knows about their efforts only too well. Chinese maritime militia capabilities are poised to grow still further as Beijing’s desire for calibrated SCS operations grows and demobilized military forces may be offered as a result of Xi Jinping’s 300,000-troop downsizing to make the PLA, literally, leaner and meaner.

To challenge future U.S. and allied FONOPS, in addition to verbal challenges and conspicuous monitoring and tracking, Beijing will attempt to further portray itself as the victim of foreign predations, forced to respond “defensively.” In addition to close, ambiguous approaches by China coast guard vessels or aircraft, which—unlike naval warships—are not subject to the bilaterally-accepted Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) or the associated air annex, it may entail closer, even more ambiguous approaches by maritime militia forces. The vast majority would likely operate trawlers, but some may employ other marine economic assets as well, such as the “merchant vessel” that cut in front of USS Lassen. Beijing may attempt to mischaracterize or selectively portray an interaction or incident as simply involving random civilian fishermen or other marine workers and “island residents” unfairly oppressed by foreign forces motivated by spontaneous patriotism—when in fact these are irregular selectively-uniform-wearing forces controlled by the PLA through land-based military People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs). It will also require proactivity and getting out ahead of Beijing’s narrative. Among other things, the U.S. government should document to the world the nature of China’s maritime milita and its government-controlled deception and harassment activities. That will be far easier and more effective before Beijing orchestrates any militia-related confrontation.

To better understand these important dynamics and their strategic, operational, tactical, and policy implications, the authors will therefore offer a series of five articles on the vanguard militia forces of Hainan Province, most relevant to SCS disputes. Four of the leading militias will be surveyed in depth.

  • Located on Hainan’s west coast, the Danzhou Militia of Baimajing Harbor played a significant role in China’s operation to seize the Crescent Group of islands from Vietnam in the January 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands.
  • Established in 1985, the Tanmen Village Maritime Militia Company of Qionghai County on Hainan’s south-southeast coast has long delivered supplies and building materials to China’s Spratly outposts. It was directly involved in the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff, with the boats of Chen Zebo and another Squad Leader likely summoning Chinese coast guard intervention when boarded by Philippine Navy forces seeking to confiscate a diverse harvest of endangered marine species. The Tanmen Militia benefited greatly from a visit by Xi himself on 8 April 2013, after which Tanmen Village was declared a model village and received further government investment.
  • Learning from the model set forth by the Tanmen Militia, the Sansha City Maritime Militia was established in its new, eponymous municipality in 2013. Given its location, it promises to play an important role in future Paracel affairs.
  • Last but not least, based in Sanya City near the center of Hainan’s southern coast, is the Sanya maritime militia built out of entities like Fugang Fishery Co. Ltd., which was established in 2001. Given its status as the militia perhaps most likely to be used for near-term frontline operations, such as harassment against U.S. or allied FONOPS, it is the subject of this first article in our series.

Read Part One Here.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Editorial Board. He is an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and an expert contributor to the Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time Report. In 2013, while deployed in the Pacific as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard USS Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presentations. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Foundation, 2013). He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University. Erickson blogs at www.andrewerickson.com and www.chinasignpost.com. The views expressed here are Erickson’s alone and do not represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government.

Conor Kennedy is a research assistant in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA at the Johns Hopkins University – Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies. 

Members' Roundup

October Member Round-Up Part One

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By Sam Cohen

Welcome to Part One of the October 2015 Member Round-Up, covering the first two weeks of the month. Over the past two weeks CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including the U.S. South China Sea Initiative, Russian military operations in Syria and the Mediterranean Sea, the strategic importance of the Arctic and aspects of the U.S. Navy’s procurement strategy.

Beginning the Round-Up at The Diplomat, Ankit Panda discusses the changes made by the Senate to the National Defense Authorization Act 2016 (NDAA 2016). The bill’s new features include Taiwan among a list of countries that will receive financial and military assistance from the U.S. for operations in the South China Sea. Additionally, the NDAA 2016 outlines the new U.S. South China Sea Initiative, which aims to increase maritime security and maritime domain awareness for foreign countries in the region. Also for The Diplomat, Ankit Panda shares a second article where he discusses Chinese coast guard operations near the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. These operations have substantially increased East China Sea tensions as the Chinese coast guard continues to enter Japanese territorial waters to support their claim over the islands.

ADM. James Stavridis in an interview with Bloomberg Business discusses the U.S. government’s position towards the artificial islands being constructed in the South China Sea. ADM. Stavridis states that from the U.S. perspective the islands will not affect freedom of navigation (FON) considering the islands represent international sea and air space and not sovereign Chinese territory.

Leaving the Asia-Pacific, ADM. Stavridis speaks with Bloomberg News concerning Russian and U.S. operations within Syria and the Mediterranean Sea. He explains that both countries’ naval and air forces in the region have not established deconfliction processes meaning their local command structures are not communicating with each other. In addition, ADM. Stavridis states that the U.S. will need to prioritize ISIS over other security objectives in the region, a strategy that will consist of significant increases in ground force deployments in Iraq and eventually Syria.

Chuck Hill, for his Coast Guard Blog, discuses the recent cruise missile attacks launched by Russian naval forces from the Caspian Sea against targets throughout Syria. Mr. Hill identifies that these attacks demonstrate Russian surface combatant capabilities similar to that of a U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile being launched from a U.S. vessel. Further to this, Mr. Hill explains that the Russian vessels launching the attacks resemble less-lethal equivalents in the U.S. Navy, revealing that Russian naval forces are practicing distributed lethality while the U.S. Navy is still deliberating over its implementation.

Sam LaGrone, at U.S. Naval Institute News, also discusses the expanding Russian operations within Syria. Mr. LaGrone analyzes the deployment of a Black Sea-based Russian surface action group to the Eastern Mediterranean to provide an air defense bubble in support of Russian fighters striking targets in Syria. These deployments are in addition to the arrival of a Russian surveillance ship as well as several Russian amphibious assault ships in the region.

Dave Majumdar, for The National Interest, discusses features of the U.S. Navy’s plan to acquire rail-guns, lasers and nuclear power across the entire future surface combatant fleet. Mr. Majumdar identifies that the future Navy warship will require large amounts of eclectic power to run advanced systems including power-hungry radar systems and energy weapons. Additionally, the current DD-51 and Ticonderoga-class hull-forms will need to be replaced to allow for developing guided-missile destroyers to be equipped with Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6 Air and Missile Defense Radar.

To conclude Part One of the October Round-Up, Chuck Hill for his Coast Guard Blog analyzes the U.S. Navy’s decision to commit to the selection of the Longbow Hellfire missile as a provisional weapon system to offer offensive capabilities for Littoral Combat Ships. Mr. Hill explains that the Longbow Hellfire missile system will be extremely effective against highly maneuverable and high speed fast-attack craft and if deployed in large volumes, can also be effective against larger surface threats.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the first part of October:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defense policy and management.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Members' Roundup

September Member Round-Up Part Two

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Welcome to Part Two of the September 2015 Member Round-Up, covering the last two weeks of the month. In the past two weeks CIMSEC members have analyzed several international maritime security issues, including the aircraft carrier’s future in the U.S. Navy, Russian military deployments in Syria and the strategic alliance between India and the U.S. regarding security in the Asia-Pacific.

Beginning the Round-up at The War on the Rocks, Bryan McGrath discusses the effectiveness the aircraft carrier brings to the U.S. Navy’s high-end warfare contingency planning despite the mounting number of threats the carrier faces in potential conflict zones. Mr. McGrath explains that in addition to retaining the important traditional contributions the carrier provides to U.S. surface operations, it will also be a primary element of American tactical airpower in any high-end conflict and therefore must remain at the center of the Navy’s force structure.

Focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, Ankit Panda for The Diplomat discusses China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier along with certain specifications including the ship’s length and width. Mr. Panda identifies that the carrier is significantly smaller than most U.S. carriers, however, it will certainly be able to provide the PLA-N with critical features for enhancing the country’s anti-access/ area-denial strategy. Also at The Diplomat, Mr. Panda examines the ability for the growing strategic and commercial bilateral relationship between the U.S. and India to increase regional stability in the Asia-Pacific by preventing piracy, terrorism and nuclear/ conventional weapon proliferation.

ADM. James Stavridis, for Foreign Policy, provides a geopolitical analysis on maritime Asia where he describes the artificial islands China has constructed as “unsinkable aircraft carriers” and considers their strategic ability to become long-term forward deployed airfields in the South China Sea. ADM Stavridis provides an explanation of how these unique airbases can alter the current dynamic of competing U.S. and Chinese forces in the region.

Leaving the Asia-Pacific region, ADM Stavridis speaks with Defense One regarding the deployment of Russian forces to Syria to assist the Assad regime. ADM. Stavridis explains that Syria has become a high-risk operation region considering Russian and U.S. forces have not established strategic or tactical levels of communication for deconfliction. Additionally, ADM. Stavridis identifies that the stationing of Russian missile-carrying ships as well as SA-22 air-defense systems on Syria’s coastline could limit U.S. areas of operation and add tension to an already hostile environment.

Staying in the Middle East, Chuck Hill for his Coast Guard Blog discusses the United Arab Emirates (UAE) acquisition of the SeaHake mod-4 Extended Range torpedo. Mr. Hill explains that the UAE acquiring the world’s longest-range torpedo will substantially increase their standoff capabilities in the Persian Gulf by allowing them to attack Iranian Kilo-class submarines inside their naval bases on the Iranian coastline in a potential conflict.

Also for his Coast Guard Blog and to conclude part two of the September Member Round-up, Chuck Hill discusses Poland’s acquisition plan to receive at least three Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) starting in 2017. Considering significant Russian-NATO tensions throughout Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, these “Czapla” OPC’s will resemble war ready Polish forces as the ships will have mine-countermeasure capabilities and a wide range of advanced weapon systems.

Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the second part of September:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.