Tag Archives: UAS

Building Resilient Killchains for the Stand-In Force

October 14, 2024 Guest Author 3 Comments

By Aaron Barlow, Patrick Reilly, and Sean Harper

Introduction

As the Marine Corps prepares to contest the regional superiority of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific alongside the Navy and the joint force, the service must strengthen its organic killchains and ensure that each new capability acquisition aligns to the concepts that the service must execute. While joint integration will rightfully remain critical to successful campaigns, the Marine Corps – as the isolatable forward edge of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific – must ensure that its presence adds credible theater combat capability even when joint sensing, communication, and fires cannot support the stand-in force. The Marine Corps should therefore focus on acquiring platforms that present a different risk profile than the joint force; prioritize organic ownership of all components of certain killchains from sensor to shooter; value resilient, risk-worthy platforms over the highly capable but expensive; and focus on diversity and depth in the types of munitions it brings to the fight.

Strategic Context

Over the past five years, the Marine Corps has confidently and rapidly altered its force structure to meet changing national strategic priorities. As articulated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and echoed in its 2022 sequel, the United States must meet the 2020s as a “decisive decade” and defend U.S. national security interests by effectively deterring its adversaries, using the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a benchmark to measure the pace of advancement. In an August 2024 report, the Commission on the 2022 NDS charted the Marine Corps’ modernization progress to date, stating “The service deserves high marks for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves.” The report further lauded the Marine Corps’ Force Design efforts as a “coherent way for the Marine Corps to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.”

However, the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance recently reinforced that modernization remains a “righteous” but incomplete journey. Using the service’s Concept for Stand-in Forces as a yardstick, recent acquisitions overestimate and over-rely on the availability of joint and national capabilities in the highly contested environment in which they must perform. Equally, other acquisition and force design decisions seem fundamentally misaligned to stand-in force imperatives like footprint, signature, and risk minimization.

The value proposition of stand-in forces best manifests in the context of a hypothetical PRC campaign to achieve reunification with Taiwan by force, in which the PLA will leverage its significant regional firepower advantage to assert all-domain superiority well East of the first island chain. Confronted by an adversary capable of devastating maritime precision strikes, the joint force will likely withdraw the preponderance of its high-end capabilities beyond the range of PRC threats. Further, Chinese capabilities will be focused on disrupting the long-range communications networks necessary for these high-end capabilities to close killchains from safer distances.

Nonetheless, the joint force will still require the ability to contest Chinese all-domain control in the first island chain. Enter the stand-in force, positioned on forward locations throughout the battlespace. Fighting as an extension of the fleet and joint force, the stand-in force will leverage disaggregation to create reconnaissance and targeting dilemmas for adversaries reliant on precision strike regimes. Stand-in forces will employ asymmetric capabilities and tactics to hold adversaries at risk in multiple domains, ultimately preventing the accumulation of regional superiority.

The Marine Corps’ perspective on how to execute A Concept for Stand-in Forces has evolved since the project began in 2020. The services Force Design annual updates allow us to trace this evolution. Foundational Force Design guidance initially prioritized the development of “smaller but better-connected formations that organically possess a complete killchain appropriate to echelon.” However, the 2022 Force Design Annual Update walked back this vision “from an initial focus on generating organic lethal capabilities…to a more balanced focus that includes persisting forward in a contested area to win the [reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance] battle and complete joint kill webs.” The 2022 annual update also raises unresolved questions about what this balance might look like, reiterating that “certain capabilities must be organic to our Stand-in Forces, such as organic sensors and long-range precision fires to close kill webs when external capabilities are not present or available.”

Based on this guidance, the stand-in force’s risk of isolation from the joint force clearly persists. How intensely should the Marine Corps hedge against this risk, and how should the service define the balance it seeks? Recent service acquisitions suggest that the Marine Corps has overinvested in capabilities that are inappropriate for a stand-in force, at the expense of building robust organic killchains that provide a guaranteed capability baseline in the event of isolation.

The Value Proposition of Organic Killchains

The disaggregated nature of stand-in force formations and the tyranny of distance imposed by the littoral operating environment combine with the nature of the PRC threat to illustrate the value proposition of organic killchains. For example, consider the dependence of the combined joint all-domain command and control (CJADC2) concept on the resilience and availability of joint information networks. Under CJADC2, the joint force and partners seek to project all-domain effects by seamlessly closing killchains comprised of national and joint sensors, processors, and shooters. CJADC2 represents a legitimate integration challenge, and to date the services have been inching towards minimum viable capabilities.

The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance articulates how the Marine Corps sees its contributions to CJADC2: “Marines will act as the ‘JTAC of the Joint Force’ – sensing, making sense, and communicating to the rest of the Joint Force with an ‘any sensor, any shooter’ mindset.” Until recently the Marine Corps has followed in the wake of other services’ initiatives through participation in the Navy’s Project Overmatch and the Army’s Project Convergence, both of which have sought to develop and exercise the interconnectedness and interoperability required for the joint services to share information and close killchains. The Marine Corps has successfully exercised acquiring and maintaining custody of targets with organic sensors while passing this information to joint command-and-control applications, recently at Exercise Valiant Shield, which included an Indo-Pacific Command-level exercise of its Joint Fires Network. These initiatives and exercises represent obvious technical progress, but as demonstrations of concepts, they risk overestimating the reliability and availability of joint information networks in a way that unbalances the Stand-in Force in favor of brittle kill webs.

This imbalance becomes especially evident in the context of how the PLA plans to prosecute future conflicts. The PLA believes that modern warfare is not “a contest of annihilation between opposing military forces, but rather a clash between opposing operational systems.” The PLA’s derived concept – Systems Destruction Warfare – prioritizes attacking “the flow of information within the adversary’s operational system.” Under this paradigm, if the joint force envisions CJADC2 as a fundamental center of gravity that enables hard-hitting joint killchains, the PLA must view the same system as the joint force’s critical vulnerability and deploy proportional operational resources to target and disrupt it. What is the value proposition of the stand-in force if joint information networks must be available to unlock its contribution to potent joint capabilities?

A U.S. Marine Corps AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar is deployed during exercise Resolute Dragon 24 in Okinawa, Japan, July 31, 2024. The radar was deployed to support training with enhanced sensing and targeting data between the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment and the JSDF during RD 24. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Matthew Morales)

To deliver on its value proposition, the stand-in force must retain the capability to hold the adversary at risk with credible killchains in contested environments when the rest of the joint force cannot. When CJADC2 is uncontested and operating at its peak it will make extensive use of C2 platforms in the air and space domains. However, the questionable survivability and persistence of these platforms is in part the impetus of the stand-in force concept. Thus, reliance on these high-end joint networks introduces a contradiction in the stand-in force’s conceptual framework.

A potential overestimation of the resilience of emerging commercial, proliferated low-earth orbit constellations also underpins the Marine Corps’ conceptual reasoning. Systems such as SpaceX’s Starlink may indeed enable a more robust space-based command and control architecture compared to legacy systems. However, these constellations have increasingly been touted as a communications panacea, especially after Starlink’s success in Ukraine. Meanwhile, adversaries are rigorously searching for effective counters, hunting for exploitation opportunities, or developing options to remove the space layer altogether. Though a credible 21st-century force cannot ignore emerging space layer technologies, the Marine Corps should not overestimate the resilience of commercial P-LEO solutions at the expense of organic spectrum-diverse information networks.

Earlier this year, the Marine Corps initiated Project Dynamis as a service bid to gain initiative in shaping contributions to CJADC2. The Marine Corps should leverage this opportunity to refocus command and control modernization to better align the service’s balance of information capabilities with the stand-in-force concept. The service should specifically refine robust, diverse information capabilities that enable the stand-in force to contest adversary all-domain control in ways that multiply combat power through the availability of joint networks, but crucially do not require them. Further, the end-to-end organic ownership of certain critical killchains by the stand-in force has the dual benefit of providing a credible means of contesting all-domain control when the joint force cannot be present and providing an alternative information path for the joint force inside contested areas.

An Organic and Asymmetric Munitions Mix

If spectrum-diverse information networks provide the connective linkages for an end-to-end organic killchain, a deep and varied arsenal of service-owned munitions must provide the kinetic edge. Though the Marine Corps has long constructed capabilities around a variety of indirect fire munitions, the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance prioritized the service’s first ever acquisition of a ground based medium-range anti-ship missile. The service’s portfolio has since grown to include Naval Strike Missiles, long-range anti-ship missiles, and Tomahawk cruise missiles, each in different phases of acquisition and with varying concepts of employment. While these munitions will provide the stand-in force with the capability to hold high-value targets at risk, they also represent relatively high-cost, low-density investments. Deriving estimates from total program acquisition costs published in the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request, the Naval Strike Missile (90 units), Tomahawk (34 units), and long range anti-ship missile (91 units) carry units costs of $2.32M, $3.09M, and $7.02M respectively.¹

The per-shot expense of these munitions raises questions about whether the Marine Corps will have the magazine depth to necessary to sustain a protracted sea denial campaign. Additionally, the many lower-tier maritime targets that the stand-in force could easily hold at risk may not rise to the threshold of significance necessary for engagement with low density munitions; if the stand-in force cannot engage these targets it forgoes opportunities for credible sea denial contributions. The acquisition of exquisite medium-range munitions should not be abandoned, but greater diversity and depth in the Marine Corps portfolio of munitions could enable the service to operate more effectively as a stand-in force.

For example, a large arsenal of relatively low-cost loitering munitions will provide the stand-in force with an asymmetric advantage against littoral targets, since a single operator can control multiple munitions that cooperatively overwhelm adversary air defenses. Practical munitions trade-offs could also reduce the volume of information exchange necessary to execute killchains. For example, capabilities imbued with a layer of autonomy, such as kamikaze drones and suicide surface and sub-surface vehicles may reduce the required frequency and fidelity of sensor and operator inputs compared to traditional munitions, unburdening limited network resources. The Marine Corps should therefore intentionally balance its high-cost fires systems with deep magazines of effective yet relatively inexpensive loitering and one-way attack munitions.

Matching Capabilities to Concepts

As the Marine Corps considers the appropriate balance of organic and joint investments, the service should also consider how well its future platforms align to the concepts the service must execute. The 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance clearly defined the types of platforms appropriate to future amphibious and stand-in forces: “We must continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future amphibious portion of the fleet.” Equally, stand-in forces must “confront aggressor naval forces with an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms and payloads.” The latest 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance suggests that the service has not wholly altered this philosophy, reiterating that the service must “not design our own exquisite low volume platforms.” However, considerations of affordability and riskworthiness do not receive explicit mention.

The Marine Corps should not compromise on cost and risk here. As the service constructs killchains, it should avoid the pattern of investing in expensive, exquisite, and excessively overengineered platforms that directly mirror or present the same risk profile as existing joint capabilities. The service should instead focus acquisitions on platforms that diversify the risks faced by the joint force. Marine Corps platform attributes should closely resemble the original value proposition for Force Design and A Concept for Stand-in Forces: highly expeditionary, risk-worthy, operationally and logistically supportable in protracted conflict, and respectful of the fiscal realities faced by the service.

As an illustrative example, consider the Marine Corps’ recent acquisition of the MQ-9A Reaper platform, part of a service unmanned aerial system strategy that actually preceded Force Design. Now integrated into air combat element formations, the MQ-9A provides the service with a credible organic long-endurance airborne surveillance and command-and-control capability in competition. However, recent battlefield evidence suggests that the Reaper may not be survivable when targeted in conflict without additional supporting capabilities. Iranian proxy groups, most notably Yemen’s Houthi rebels, appear to have downed at least four MQ-9s since October 7, 2023 (and possibly far more, with acknowledged numbers increasing frequently). If affected today, these losses would halve the Marine Corps’ current fleet of MQ-9A platforms, or quarter the projected fleet in 2025. Unmanned aerial system operations in Ukraine also offer insights into the utility and survivability of large, loitering unmanned platforms in peer conflict. Though used to great effect at the outset of the war, recent reports have suggested that Ukraine has significantly curtailed the sorties flown by their Turkish Group 5-equivalent Bayraktar TB2 drones, due in part to the deployment of a more sophisticated Russian integrated air defense network along the front. Further, a platform with a 3000-foot runway requirement and a unique maintainer MOS arguably does not conform to Force Design and stand-in force principles like footprint and signature minimization. Finally, though not a novel and exquisite platform, the service’s MQ-9s do not seem fiscally risk-worthy at the current rate of acquisition, especially considering recent shoot-down rates. In FY2024, the Marine Corps paid an effective unit cost of $37.5M each for five MQ-9A platforms, which would provide a Houthi-equivalent adversary with several months of target practice. The PLA is likely another story, and the MQ-9A will almost certainly be a priority target based on the platforms’ potential value as killchain enabler.

General Atomics, perhaps sensing that the service lacks compelling alternatives, appears ready to upsell the Marine Corps on the more capable but likely far more expensive MQ-9B in the near future. At present, while the MQ-9A may serve as an invaluable enabler in competition, the platform appears too rare, too capable, and too imminently targetable to persist and survive as the stand-in force transitions to conflict.

U.S. Marine Corps Captain Joshua Brooks, an unmanned aircraft system representative, and Master Sergeant Willie Cheeseboro Jr., an enlisted aircrew coordinator with Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1, prepare to launch and operate the first Marine Corps owned MQ-9A Reaper on Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

Consider instead the application of a different solution paradigm to the same problem: the acquisition of high numbers of comparatively low-cost medium-size semi-autonomous unmanned aerial systems (UAS) like Shield AI’s V-BAT or the Platform Aerospace Vanilla UAS to support surveillance, command and control, and targeting missions. Distributed throughout contested areas, launched from austere locations under vertical/short takeoff and landing regimes, and operated in swarms with a different payload on each airframe, these platforms could support or heavily augment large, low-density systems like MQ-9A in conflict. In one-to-one comparisons, medium UAS clearly cannot match the capability of larger systems like MQ-9A. However, when operated at scale and especially when integrated with other long-range littoral sensors, medium UAS platforms can provide an acceptable solution to the stand-in force’s surveillance and command and control requirements while presenting an asymmetric cost and targeting dilemma to adversaries.

While we have focused on the MQ-9, the Marine Corps portfolio is replete with platforms that carry similar contradictions when examined through the Force Design and stand-in force lens. Instead of replicating the acquisitions of the past, Marine Corps should specifically develop capabilities around diverse, risk-worthy, high-density, and relatively low-cost platforms and consider reducing investments in highly capable but overly precious and concentrated capabilities that mirror those in the joint force.

The Future of Force Design

The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance reiterates that “Force Design remains our strategic priority and we cannot slow down.” Force Design provides the Marine Corps a unique opportunity to differentiate itself from past operating concepts and acquisition decisions while building an asymmetric value proposition in the joint fight against peer adversaries. The Marine Corps cannot afford to own every node of every kill web, but selective end-to-end ownership of specific killchains will enable relevant and credible service contributions to the joint force in competition and at the onset of a protracted conflict. Moreover, a Marine Corps with enhanced magazine depths and a plethora of affordable, risk-worthy platforms operating forward in first island chain will challenge adversary all-domain control and set conditions for US domination in the later stages of any maritime campaign. Likewise, any improvements that the Marine Corps makes in the alignment of its expeditionary capabilities to threat-informed concepts will concurrently prepare the service to effectively fulfill its role as a crisis response force, primed for contingencies in support of national mission objectives in accordance with the shifting realities of modern war.

Major Aaron Barlow, Captain Patrick Reilly, and Major Sean Harper are currently serving as operations research analysts assigned to the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration in Quantico, Virginia.

These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government entity.

Notes

1. Data reported for USN. USMC specific data not available for FY2024.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Terrell Chandler, left, and U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Melvin Monet, both low-altitude-air defense gunners with 3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, set security with an FIM-92 Stinger during Marine Littoral Regiment Training Exercise (MLR-TE) at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Jan. 28, 2023. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Israel Chincio)

Current Operations, Drones

Drones for Maritime Activisim

June 21, 2013 Guest Author Leave a comment

Phase 1: Stop illegal driftnet fishing in the Med. Phase 2: Keep those pesky children out of my flowerbeds. — First we stop driftnet fishing in the Med, then we get those pesky children out of my flowerbeds.

The Black Fish is a non-governmental organization (NGO) “working for the oceans that has integrated the use of unmanned air vehicles in support of its marine wildlife protection operations. Blackfish’s UAS were provided by Laurens De Groot’s organization ShadowView, which supplies UAVs to non-profits for conservation projects. The group flew initial demonstration sorties with a quad-rotor over a harbor and is looking to improve their UAS capabilities to fly longer-range missions over the open water in an effort to expose illegal driftnet fishing in the Mediterranean

The Black Fish joins the ranks of a growing number of NGOs using drones for maritime activism, specifically UAVs for surveillance operations, including Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Earthrace Conservation, and Greenpeace.

This article was re-posted by permission from, and appeared in its original form at NavalDrones.com.

Future Tech, New Initiatives

MFP 6: The Fleet of the Future

January 16, 2013 Guest Author Leave a comment

What will your Navy/Coast Guard look like in 5/10/25/50 years, and how is it different from today?

This is the sixth in our series of posts from our Maritime Futures Project. For more information on the contributors, click here. Note: The opinions and views expressed in these posts are those of the authors alone and are presented in their personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of their parent institution U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, any other agency, or any other foreign government.

LT Drew Hamblen, USN:
In 25 years we will not use aircraft carriers. Manned jets will also be obsolete. Helicopters will be manned for logistical flights only. Pods of “gamer-like” unmanned aerial system (UAS) operators will rotate out for round-the-clock patrol and surveillance.

Bryan McGrath, Director, Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis:

I will take on only the 50-year horizon, and I will start by saying that YES, the aircraft carrier will still be in existence. Not just because they last for decades, but because of their continuing utility. At some point in the next two or three decades, we will collectively make the switch to a predominately unmanned carrier air wing. This will then lead to the construction of a totally new aircraft carrier, one built from the keel up to project unmanned power. In essence an assembly line whose product is combat power, this vessel would launch (primarily) unmanned platforms on missions, recover them, harness them to an assembly line in which the aircraft receives required maintenance, fuel, new mission planning and new armament—and is then redeployed almost immediately. Diagnostics would pull aircraft off the line at pre-programmed locations for maintenance that would remove them from the immediate flight cycle. These aircraft would essentially be a wing, a bomb, fuel, and a computer. Manned aircraft would fill C2/ABCCC (airborne battlefield) type missions, to include flight following/control of unmanned aircraft of all types. More combat power will be submerged. The U.S. mastery of the undersea domain will continue and increase. Hybrid warships will operate both on and beneath the ocean’s surface.

CDR Chris Rawley, USNR:
I’m bullish on unmanned systems, which will become increasingly pervasive in the U.S. Navy over the next few decades. Within 10 years, virtually every surface platform from patrol boats to CVNs (aircraft carriers) will carry one or more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAVs in the inventory will likely become more numerous than manned aircraft in the next half-century. Over a decade of combat has demonstrated that unmanned aircraft are capable of conducting a great many of the missions that have traditionally been performed by manned aircraft, especially scouting and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Strike will be the next mission-area to benefit from long-endurance UAVs, then airborne electronic attack (AEA), and eventually air-to-air combat. The impediments to these changes are more cultural than technical.

The outcome of two programs, in particular, will be critical determinants of whether unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) are introduced into the fleet to the same extent as unmanned air systems. On the surface side, SAIC’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) is an interesting concept, which if successful, will reverse some of the asymmetry associated with the proliferation of quiet diesel submarines. On the undersea side, the Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Innovative Naval Prototype (LDUUV INP) will demonstrate whether the physical limitations inherent in unmanned submersible propulsion and endurance can be overcome to produce a useful and flexible combat capability.

Unmanned systems are not a panacea and will never replace the dedicated, capable Sailors that make our navy the most powerful in the world. These systems and their associated concepts are untested, and it remains to be seen if they can take over, or at least complement, the roles of manned platforms. Even so, unmanned naval systems will reduce the risk to our Sailors in many mission areas, and if acquired smartly, will realize savings in defense.

LT Scott Cheney-Peters, USNR:
0-5 Years: Pretty much the same fleet. More drones and hybrid-electric drives. It will be interesting to see what direction the U.S. Navy goes with upcoming design selections on new amphibious ships, and even more so with what capabilities they – and the next batch of destroyers – must have. Most likely the nation’s economic crunch will place the emphasis on modernized versions of what we already know works, but hopefully not at the expense of finding ways to facilitate cheaper upgrades in the future (for example through modularized components).

5-10 Years: Early afloat experimentations with directed energy/electric weapon systems (DEEWS), especially for ships’ self-defense. More ships reach the fleet with drone use integrated into their designs.

10-25 Years: DEEWS starts to be incorporated into ship design. Drones increasingly play a greater role, not only performing ISR, but many other forward missions. If battery capacity and non-traditional energy-generation development trends continue, a lot more widely dispersed, self-sustaining drones that can loiter for months or years deploy on and below the waves. Specialized Arctic drones and Arctic modifications for manned vessels are developed for operations in the opening and warming, but still harsh, far north due to climate change.

25-50 Years: Drones start to factor into presence requirements in ship numbers at the beginning of this time frame as manned vessels (surface or subsurface) become primarily motherships/command and control (C2) network nodes. Additive manufacturing (3D printers) capabilities are integrated into a number of vessels that serve as mobile production facilities. These might either be larger manned auxiliaries or dispersed aboard the motherships to facilitate drone production.

The large networks of naval drones increase the Navy’s MDA capabilities to an almost unimaginable level during this time, but the missions of maritime interdiction (boarding) operations, ballistic missile defense, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and of course, showing the flag (good news for waterfront bars worldwide), remain the domain of manned vessels – but they are empowered by their naval drone and mobile production facility capabilities.

In the latter part of this timeframe and beyond, key nodes of unmmaned drone production facilities are located at naval bases and maritime hotspots around the globe and aboard mobile and themselves unmanned and automated. Some of these may be based on, or tethered to portions of the sea bed that can be exploited using new mining techniques to support the production activities (as well as those aboard vessels with the facilities). Most manned naval aviation will be over by the end of this timeframe.

One key variable will be whether the militarization of space occurs. If it does, there will be more emphasis placed on the subsurface drones and undersea production facilities outlined above, as well as a greater push for acceptance of increasing levels of drone autonomy. In the event of satellite communication disruptions, the network-node motherships can disperse new relay drones to regain control of their network of drones. For those drone unable to relink to the network the level of autonomy automatically increases upon loss of the connection, allowing the dispersed platforms to continue to carry out their missions.

Rex Buddenberg, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School:
Reread my answer to question 4 – the best clues to a 50-year-ahead question may be found by looking back an equal amount of time. A lot of the ‘maritime domain awareness’ data exists already. I’ve seen the yammer about sensors over the years too. But the extant data is tucked away in some stovepipe. The big change is that this awareness will increase through integration of information systems.

Sebastian Bruns, Fellow, Institute for Security, University of Kiel, Germany:
“It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” (Attributed to, among many other people, Yogi Berra)

The Optimist

2018: The last of the four new Baden-Württemberg-class frigates is delivered on time and on budget. Plans for three more frigates are in the making. The versatile K-131 (MKS 180) corvette is being put into service since 2015. Eight instead of the planned six vessels are procured. A marked rise in maritime awareness throughout Germany has led to an increased budget and the establishment of a coordinating position in the Office of the German Federal Chancellor (head of government). The new, lean German Navy is strongly integrated in international operations and mandates. It plays a crucial role in regional stabilization operations and actively and visibly supports NATO missions.

2023: The first of the new Joint Support Ships is already in service, the second is on the building ways. Plans for the replacement of the F-123 and F-124 frigates are on schedule and on budget. Seapower has been officially recognized as a key tool for German foreign policy by way of a Quadrennial Defense and Security Strategy. The new, lean German Navy is strongly integrated in international operations and mandates. It plays a crucial role in regional stabilization operations and actively and visibly supports NATO missions.

2028: The Joint Support Ships and Germany’s strong leadership role in NATO’s Pooling & Sharing Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) project have allowed Germany to play a wider role in international expeditionary operations. Although the threat level for Germany and German maritime units has steadily increased over the past 15 years, no warship has been lost to enemy action. The new, lean German Navy is strongly integrated in international operations and mandates. It plays a crucial role in regional stabilization operations and actively and visibly supports NATO missions.

2063: The German Navy has been fully integrated into a larger North-Central-European Maritime Force. It plays a crucial role in regional stabilization operations and actively and visibly supports NATO missions. The effects of climate change have long been added to the toolbox of naval forces.

The Pessimist

2018: The F-125 frigates will be delayed by years. Budget cuts and the sudden demise of the German shipbuilding industry have led to a dramatic loss of building capacity. Politics demand a very isolationist approach to international politics, and the last of the four Baden-Württembergs is subsequently cancelled. After more than a decade of development, plans for a corvette of the K-131 (MKS-180) class are scrapped. Only one unit of the planned eight ships has been delivered. Facing increasingly scarce resources and questionable political priorities, Germany continues to support a Common European Security and Defense policy, or what is left of it.

2023: Not a single Joint Support Ship has been delivered after inter-service rivalry and broader political trends have torpedoed the whole program. Facing a dramatic loss of reputation after years of dragging its feet in dealing with the Euro crisis, Germany has lost all of its influence within NATO. The F-124 and F-125 are pulled out of ballistic missile defense (BMD) roles in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. The effects of climate change wreak havoc on many countries and regions of the world.

2028: The German Navy increasingly returns to being a coastal force, integrated with what remains of an ambitious project to organize a German Coast Guard much like the U.S. model. The North and Baltic Sea with occasional visits to European allied nations are the major operational tasking. Germany has pulled out of NATO SNMG-1 (-2). International maneuvers and exercises largely by-pass Germany.

2063: In the interest of not ending up writing fictional absurdity, I will choose not to answer this question. My major fears have all been mentioned in the other three pessimist predictions.

Felix Seidler, seidlers-sicherheitspolitik.net, Germany:
In 5 and 10 years, our navy will not look different from today. However, the known unknown is the impact of the Euro Crisis. Ever-more pressure on our federal budget could lead to the cancellation of projects like the Joint Support Ship or the de-commissioning of several surface vessels. In terms of operations, nothing will change. Germany will continue to contribute to maritime UN, NATO, and EU missions as it does now, because it is the most palatable way for Germans to show themselves as an active ally. Contributing ground troops to missions is highly unpopular over here; hence, sending ships is more comfortable for our decision makers.

How our navy looks in 25 years (2037) and in 50 years (2062) depends on the success or failure of European integration. If the EU handles its economic crisis and, thereafter, pursues a track to deeper integration, our armed forces will gradually integrate further with those of other European countries. The more European integration in politics, the more integration follows among European armed forces. However, the huge question mark is the political will among European governments to pool sovereignty on such a level. At this time it is highly unlikely.

If European integration fails and Europe turns back to the nation state, Germany is likely to give up all blue water ambitions and focus on coastal defense in the North Sea and the Baltic. In 2060 Germany is projected to be only the 10th largest economy in the world with a population of around 65-70 million (1/3 older than 60). Thus, due to its demographic and economic decline, Germany is likely to pursue a much-less ambitious foreign and national security policy, and may even be reluctant to use force abroad. In this scenario, the German Navy may spend most of the time in its shipyards.

CDR Chuck Hill, USCG (Ret.):
Unfortunately the U.S. Coast Guard will not look different enough, if the relatively low level of capital investment continue. Ships being planned now will not be built for 5-10 years. The last of the Offshore Patrol Cutters, expected to replace our medium endurance cutters, will not be fully operational until approximately 2029, and all will likely still be in the fleet in 50 years. The oldest of them will only be 44 years old, younger than ships we are replacing now.

I do believe we will see less distinction between search aircraft and rescue aircraft. Other systems are likely to replace the pure search functions of our fixed wing aircraft, while rescue aircraft will gain greater speed and range as they employ newer technology. Hopefully in 25 years we will see a new generation of rescue aircraft that have sufficient range and speed to eliminate the separate requirement for long-range search aircraft.

There will also, hopefully, be more information-sharing with other agencies, including comprehensive vessel tracking.

LTJG Matt Hipple, USN:
I can’t imagine. Drones and missiles versus potential laser-based kill systems and airborne reflectors for over-the-horizon (OTH) interception or deflection. Ships of increased size due to fuel and power draws for laser systems, if they work, coupled with a mass of smaller automated ships. Autonomy all depends on what our level of acceptance is for the independence of the machine versus the level of risk we’ll accept from interference, interception, and hijacking. Of course, perhaps it’ll merely be a pile of rusting LCSs hiding in Singapore.

YN2(SW) Michael George, USN:
I see the U.S. Navy as a little more contracted from what it is today. With other country’s navies growing, they will want to control their own waters surrounding their country and not as easily permit the United States to do so. This will impact the size of our fleet overall.

LCDR Mark Munson, USN:
If I’m being cynical, I’m not really sure that the future U.S. Navy won’t just be an incrementally better version of today’s fleet (probably smaller due to fixed/smaller budgets and cost growth, and without any major changes in strategy calling for a drastically different kind of fleet). The current focus on Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) will hopefully bear fruit in a fleet that is stealthier, capable of striking from greater range, and has a better ability to detect threats and manage that command and control/threat data within an afloat task force.

LT Jake Bebber, USN:
The signs are clearly pointing to a smaller U.S. Navy, despite the growth in worldwide maritime commitments. We are already at our smallest point in the last hundred years and show no signs of reaching our goal of a 313-ship Navy anytime soon. The Navy faces a choice on force structure: we can attempt to mitigate our smaller size by improving the quality of our limited number of platforms (which are becoming ever more expensive), or we can rethink how we fulfill our maritime mission by producing more platforms with more limited capabilities. A smaller force demands that we will not have a presence in many areas of the world, and our influence there will wane. We have to accept that. Or we can rethink our platforms’ design and mission to mitigate costs and allow the U.S. to maintain a maritime presence in regions critical to national security. We will have to accept the commensurate risk associated with platforms with more limited (and less costly) capabilities.

Anonymous, USN:
The U.S. Navy will be smaller and weaker at the rate that budgets and policies are going. Just the other day I openly questioned whether or not we’ll be able to call America’s Navy the finest Navy in the world in 10, 25, or 50 years.

Drones

Drones of the Navy SEALs

December 16, 2012 Guest Author Leave a comment

The mystique of Navy SEALs has been heavily celebrated in the media and films due to recent real-world exploits. Yet Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Sailors have been heavily engaged in combat operations for more than 11 consecutive years. Warfare is still a decidedly human endeavor, and America’s naval special warriors are quick to embrace the truth that “humans are more important than hardware.” Nevertheless, today’s SEALs, Special Warfare Combat Crewmen, and other supporting personnel in the NSW community have benefited greatly from technology, which increasingly includes unmanned systems.

Two primary realizations within the NSW community drove the rapid introduction of UAVs for combat operations in Southwest and Central Asia. The first realization was that even the best shooters in the world are ineffective if they are unable to locate their targets. Simply, UAVs are a force multiplier for SEALs and enable an exponential increase in their ability to find, fix, and finish targets. Secondly, as more and more small UAVs were added to the force, NSW began to understand that as valuable as these unmanned systems were, the skills required to operate and maintain them were a distraction for highly trained shooters. This epiphany led to the creation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Troops at Naval Special Warfare Support Activity (SUPACT) One in Coronado, California, and SUPACT Two at what is now Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia. According to Naval Special Warfare Command, each UAS Troop totals 35 personnel among three detachments of UAS operators, a group of instructors, and military and civilian maintenance technicians.

For some additional first-person historical perspective on the evolution of unmanned air systems (UAS) in NSW, former Navy SEAL UAS expert and current lighter-than-air unmanned systems entrepreneur John Surmount discusses the origins of unmanned air systems in Naval Special Warfare in Operation Enduring Freedom in this podcast. Since those early days, the breadth and depth of unmanned systems used by Naval Special Warfare Operators has expanded tremendously.

The exact tactics, techniques, and procedures for UAS use with NSW are a closely guarded secret (as well they should be), but in general, SEALs use drones to support the four core missions of NSW:

Direct Action (DA) – offensive missions to capture/kill enemy targets
Special Reconaissance (SR) – surveillance and monitoring of enemy activity and the littoral environment including beaches and ports
Counter-terrorism (CT) – conducting DA against terrorist networks
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) – assisting foreign military partners in developing their own special operations capacity.

UAVs are especially critical for finding and fixing the exact location of an enemy in DA and CT. They also support, and in some cases replace, the eyes of operators in SR missions. On a micro-scale, a demonstration the utility of UAVs can be seen in the film “Act of Valor” where a Raven UAV – launched by actual operators from Special Boat Team 22 – provides ISR over-watch of SEAL operators on a mission. A more-capable, marinized UAV, the Puma AE, is also part of NSW’s inventory.

The beauty of these rucksack-portable systems is that they can provide organic support to a platoon or smaller-size group of SEALs. The primary drawback is limited endurance. Enter the Small Tactical UAS (STUAS). NSW has embraced the ScanEagle for missions where long endurance ISR is a requirement. NSW ScanEagles can be sea-launched from vessels as small as a MK V Special Operations Craft or based ashore at expeditionary sites. Another example of the value of UAVs in the over-watch role was demonstrated in April 2009, when a ScanEagle provided a real time feed to assist SEALs in rescuing the Maersk Alabama’s Captain Richard Phillips from his pirate captors.

More recently, NSW has benefited from the Navy’s introduction of the shipboard vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) Fire Scout. Requirements for the next-generation VTOL UAS, the Fire-X MQ-8C, are also driven by special operations forces. Future developments in Navy UAS integration for NSW will undoubtedly include armed tactical UAVs providing fire support to operators on the ground and sea.

The same concept of ISR support and armed over-watch applies to more complex operations with larger UAVs. Land-based Air Force Predator and Reapers support NSW missions in Afghanistan and other areas. A low-signature RQ-170 drone reportedly assisted the SEALs who conducted the raid to kill Usama bin Laden in May 2011. NSW is also slowly progressing in the implementation of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV). These systems are used for missions such as hydrographic reconnaissance reducing the risk to operators and letting them focus on other core missions. Much as the Navy’s Explosive Ordnance community has embraced autonomous underwater vehicles to help them hunt and neutralize mines, SEALs will eventually find themselves reliant on robots to survey beach landing sites.

Along with other underwater assets such as swimmer delivery vehicles, UUVs fall under the auspices of Naval Special Warfare Group Three (NSWG-3). In 2010, Naval Special Warfare Command ordered some Iver2 autonomous undersea vehicles for experimentation. NSW has also purchased 18 Semi-autonomous Hydrographic Reconnaissance Vehicles (SAHRV) outfitted with side-scan sonar and an Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler. SAHRV is an adaptation of the REMUS 100. On the USV side, earlier this year, Naval Sea Systems Command’s Naval Special Warfare Program Office sponsored a test of a Protector USV armed with Spike missiles. The application of such a capability in support of NSW missions is unclear.

The combination of the world’s most proficient naval special operators enhanced by modern technology will continue to produce powerful strategic effects through tactical actions.