Tag Archives: South China Sea

10 Things You May Have Missed in DoD’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy

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This post originally appeared on Navy Grade 36 Bureaucrat. It can be found in its original form here.

At first glance, the recently released Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy looks like a rehash of a lot of old points about the US’ position on Pacific matters.  But upon closer examination, there is a key shift in language that those of us who watch the region will take note of.  Here are ten things you might have missed:

1. It calls out the Senate directly on UNCLOS, but doesn’t address ISA.

Normally DoD publications don’t delve too much into policy matters with Congress.  But it’s hard to say that about this statement:

“This is why the United States operates consistent with – even though the U.S. Senate has yet to provide its advice and consent – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”

UNCLOS was originally opposed due to the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which does such un-American things like taxing sea bed mining for distribution to other countries and mandating technology transfer.  The military normally focuses on the navigation portion of UNCLOS, which it has abided by since the Regan era.  The problem comes when the US is encouraging nations to use UNCLOS while not actually having ratified the treaty.  There isn’t an easy solution, short of removing the ISA from UNCLOS, but expect to see UNCLOS ratification cries in the near future.

2. It calls out everyone on the South China Sea.

 It’s not just China.  Every claimant in the South China Seas has issues.  This document clearly spells that out, taking away a talking point from the PRC that the US is overlooking the other countries to focus on China.  But it pulls no punches on China, going after the “so-called Nine-Dash Line” as an excessive claim.

3. It spells out why the Senkakus became a problem.

Most people view the Senkakus as a bunch of rocks that China and Japan hold in dispute.  Very few know that the Japanese government bought them in order to prevent the Governor of Tokyo from buying them.  This was actually an attempt to prevent a clash with China, since the Governor was rightwing and would likely have stoked the issue.  This narrative has been lost to China’s narrative about how Japan “changed the status quo,” so it’s good to see it spelled out here.

4. It puts India as a model for dispute resolution. 

Comparing the India/Bangladesh maritime dispute resolution to what is occurring in the South China Sea is no accident.  This document clearly spells out US support to India, likely in an attempt to spur continued Indian investment in their “Look East” strategy.

5. It denies territorial sea around reclaimed islands.

This is big. 

“At least some of these features were not naturally formed areas of land that were above water at  high  tide and, thus, under international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea  Convention, cannot generate any maritime zones (e.g., territorial seas or exclusive economic zones).  Artificial islands built on such features could, at most, generate 500-meter safety zones, which must be established in  conformity with requirements specified in the Law of the Sea Convention.”

This is a clear US denial of any Chinese territorial claim of these features.  This has been implied before, but not ever strongly stated. On that same note…

6. Freedom of Navigation (FON) is coming to you.

One paragraph in particular tells us to expect more FON operations:

“Over the past two years, the Department has undertaken an effort to reinvigorate our Freedom of Navigation program, in concert with the Department of State, to ensure that we regularly and consistently challenge excessive maritime claims.”

Coming on the heels of stating that PRC reclaimed land is an excessive claim, this is a really good sign, although realize that future FON operations will likely include challenges to all claimants (and make diplomatic efforts interesting).

7. It accuses China of changing the status quo.

If you sit on a beach, you’ll watch the waves crash against rocks.  The seawater slowly erodes the rocks until they split open at seams you couldn’t have seen before.  This is analogous to China’s strategy in the East and South China Seas.  They have slowly worn away at seams around every other claimant, always claiming to “maintain the status quo” when in reality they are waiting for the other claimant to make the first move, then instantly cry that they are the victim.  Scarborough Reef is a classic example, yet the media has essentially ignored the issue.  Luckily, this document calls it out, stating “China is unilaterally altering the physical status quo in the region.”

8. It calls out A2/AD and how we would stop any short war.

It gives vague language to DoD efforts to combat A2/AD, but it does say that it’s happening, with “robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and additive manufacturing.”  It also later mentions that we’ll be dispersing around the Pacific, into more Japanese bases and places like Australia.  This complicates PRC targeting.  Will the PRC risk war with the US if we have units spread out everywhere?  They don’t have enough missiles to hit everything, and striking into a country like Australia means that any sort of “short, sharp war” on their part quickly expands…something that will cause a lot of angst on their end. 

9. It calls out information sharing with allies.

“This is why DoD is working closely with partners in the Asia-Pacific region to encourage greater information sharing and the establishment of a regional maritime domain awareness network that could provide a common operating picture and real-time dissemination of data.”

I’ve long argued that sharing data with allies is too hard.  At the CJOS-COE we worked hard to make Carrier Strike Groups use networks that supported integrating ships from non-“Five Eyes” countries, like Germany and Norway.  We proved that successfully, and in the Pacific we’ve integrated South Korean and Japanese ships before.  But what about Malaysia? Indonesia?  Brunei?  We get some play at RIMPAC, but not enough.  The disaster that was ABDA in World War 2 wasn’t that long ago.  We need to get friendly nation integration right before any shooting starts.

10. It’s got great graphics.

From the scale model of Fiery Cross Reef reclamation to a very nice and detailed map of South China Sea features, this is one of the few documents that uses more than just pretty pictures of military equipment.  Well done to the authors who picked quality illustrations to help drive their points home…almost as good as my choice of memes 🙂

Ryan Haag is the Hawaii CIMSEC President and an Information Warfare Officer navigating the uncharted waters of the Information Dominance Corps. He can be reached through his blog at The Navy’s Grade 36 Bureaucrat.

August Member Round-Up

Welcome to the August 2015 Members’ Roundup! Last month CIMSEC members have examined a range of major maritime security issues, including the new U.S. DoD Asia-Pacific maritime strategy, Iranian capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and NATO’s northern threat from Russia in the Arctic.

Beginning in the Western Pacific, Bryan Clark gave a presentation at the Hudson Institute concerning the missile threat China poses to U.S. regional allies and U.S. forward deployed forces. The discussion centered on China’s missiles and their ability to deter U.S. regional influence, primarily through limiting the operational capabilities of U.S. surface fleets in conflict. Harry Kazianis, for The National Interest, provides further details regarding the Chinese missile threat by describing the challenge U.S. sea-based interceptors, such as the Aegis based SM-3 and SM-2 Block 4, will have in engaging ballistic and conventional missiles such as China’s DF-26 or DF-21D. For further reading, Zachary Keck, also for The National Interest, identifies additional Chinese missiles posing threats to U.S. forces in the Western Pacific.

CIMSEC’s founder, Scott Cheney-Peters, along with members BJ Armstrong and Bryan McGrath, contributed to CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) with commentary on the new DoD Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. The review offers an evaluation of the pace at which U.S. military capacity in the region is being strengthened relative to China. Also provided was an analysis of the strategic importance of distinguishing conflict and coercion in the region. BJ Armstrong further analyzed the new DoD strategy in his article for War on the Rocks, where he also provided a historical context for U.S. naval operations in the Asia-Pacific.

Scott also joined Harry and The Diplomat‘s Shannon Tiezzi for a panel discussion on the latest South China Sea developments hosted by the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. You can watch their chat here.

Continuing on China and Asia-Pacific regional security issues, James Goldrick for The Interpreter, discusses the challenges the Taiwanese Navy faces regarding China and a high-level threat environment. Mr. Goldrick identifies key features of Taiwan’s future acquisition program for the Navy – emphasizing submarine hulls and major systems, guided missile destroyers, fast attack missile-carrying catamarans and mine warfare technologies.

A refreshing perspective offered by Vijay Sakhuja in the Nikkei Asian Review considers joint Search and Rescue (SAR) operations as a platform for increased inter-governmental relations in the South China Sea. With regional pressures reaching critical levels, he contends joint SAR operations would reduce tensions by creating a safer maritime environment while also promoting regional dialogue and cooperation.

Leaving the Asia-Pacific, another Zachary Keck National Interest article considers the U.S. Navy’s strategy to combat Iran’s asymmetric naval doctrine. Mr. Keck highlights capability improvements being implemented to date to overcome the challenges faced at joint war game exercise Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02), including deployment of Longbow Hellfire Missiles aboard Littoral Combat Ships. Also from The National Interest, Robert Farley delivers an overview of Iranian weapons and tactics that provide Iran with aspects of strategic influence in the gulf region, including C-802 cruise missiles and irregular warfare strategies.

To conclude the August roundup, ADM. James Stavridis, for Foreign Policy, provides insight on current NATO defense capabilities while emphasizing the increase in Russian military operations in the Arctic. ADM. Stavridis describes Russia’s aggressive territorial claims near the Lomonosov Ridge, increased air patrols and the establishing of Arctic Brigades, as well as NATO’s capability to respond to an increasing Northern threat.  ­­

Members of CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during August:

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

July Member Round-Up

Welcome to the July 2015 Member Round-Up. Our members have had a very productive month discussing three major security topics; the rise of China, the Iranian Nuclear Deal, and the fight against ISIS. A few of the articles are shared here for some light reading over your Labor Day Weekend. If you are a CIMSEC Member and want your own maritime security-related work included in this or upcoming round-ups be sure to contact our Director of Member Publicity at dmp@cimsec.org.

Henry Holst begins our round up discussing the PLA/N’s options for submarine activity in the Taiwan Strait. His article in USNI News states that the Taiwan situation remains the driving force behind the Chinese military buildup. Holst goes into depth discussing the capabilities of the Yuan Type-39A class SSK in a standoff between China and Taiwan/US forces. This article is a must read for all who are interested in the recent developments of the Chinese submarine service.

CIMSEC’s founder, Scott Cheney-Peters, meanwhile discussed the nuances of potential joint aerial patrols in the South China Sea with CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) and joined fellow CIMSECian Ankit Panda from The Diplomat for a podcast discussion of India’s evolving approach to maritime security in East Asia.   Also at AMTI, Ben Purser co-authored a piece on China’s airfield construction of Fiery Cross Reef. AMTI’s director, Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper joined others testifying before a Congressional committee on America’s security role in the South China Sea.

Zachary Keck, of The National Interest, provides the next piece. July was an especially intense month for Mr. Keck, as he wrote 25 articles in July alone. Staying in East and Southeast Asia, Mr. Keck writes that just as China has done in the South China Sea, the PRC could build artificial islands nearer to India as well. His concern is due to a constitutional amendment in Maldives that was passed in late July. This amendment allows for foreign ownership of Maldives territory.  China has rebuffed these concerns and says that they are committed to supporting “the Maldives’ efforts to maintain its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.” This piece will be of interest for those that are keeping tabs on Chinese expansionist tendencies.

Moving on from the Chinese situation and the South China Sea, Shawn VanDiver takes us to the Iranian Plateau and the Persian Gulf to discuss the Iranian nuclear deal now before Congress. He penned two articles last month describing the advantages of the deal. His first article, in Task & Purpose, describes his support for the P5+1 Talks With Iran in Geneva, Switzerlanddeal as a 12 year veteran of the United States Navy. He describes his apprehension and the sense of foreboding transiting the Strait of Hormuz at the sights of a .50 caliber machine gun. The next day his second article on the Iran deal came out in the Huffington Post. This article was slightly different as he focuses more on the stated positions of the then current crop of GOP presidential contenders and Senators. He states that the deal is a new beginning. Well worth the read if you are at all hesitating on the importance of this crucial deal.

For the last mention in our member round up, Admiral James Stavridis spent time last month discussing the role of Turkey in the current fight against ISIS. As former Supreme Commander of NATO forces, Admiral Stavridis is uniquely qualified to render judgement on the role of a critical NATO member in the region, the only one directly affected by ISIS fighters. He was interviewed on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos.  In the same vein, he penned an article in Foreign Policy discussing the importance of NATO use of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey on the Mediterranean Coast.  This base is seen as critical to the effort against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

CIMSECians were busy elsewhere too:

That is all for July. Stay tuned to CIMSEC for all your maritime security needs.

“A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.”

President Theodore Roosevelt, 2 December 1902

The views expressed above are those of the author’s.

Let’s Change the Name of the South China Sea

Submitted for your consideration (pretend this is a Rod Serling sounding voice).  Imagine that the United States diplomatic corps starting doing the sort of thing all of these less-than-cooperative states like China, Russia, Iran, and Daesh  (the Islamic State) have been doing.  Imagine calling things by a name that suits our purposes, even if it is different than what is on a map.   I propose we quit calling the body of water that is surrounded on most of its many sides by Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Borneo, and Malaysia by another name other the South China Sea.   This was the name was given to it by Europeans, the Chinese simply calling it the “south sea” for most of their own history.   I propose instead we call it the Indochina Sea.  Period.

Why?  Simple—it seems the People’s Republic of China has decided to appeal to a sort of lowest common denominator approach in their neo-maritime imperialist venture.  They have claimed much of the Indochina Sea according to a policy known as the “nine-dash line”—basically using the rationale that it has “our” name on it so it is ours.  What is more fascinating is how effective the Chinese have been in selling their rationale to different audiences, many of them poorly informed about the history and geography of this vital region. In short,  the first purpose in such a re-naming is to try to educate a bit, but educate to suit the purposes of the United States government as it continues in its job of trying to maintain the current international maritime order, which has worked quite well since the UN was created almost 70 years ago—the Cold War notwithstanding.

There is plenty of precedent for the United States (and frankly its many allies) to do this.  In fact, we did it back in 1990.   That was the year that Saddam Hussein invaded and conquered the independent sovereign nation of Kuwait.  Some of you know it as Gulf War I, although historians like the humble author consider it Gulf War II, since the Iran-Iraq War  was really the first of the modern Gulf Wars.   It involved the United States in its closing phases when we conducted operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis in order to protect Gulf shipping.  But which Gulf?  You mean the Persian Gulf?  Well…that was a bit of a problem.  Our Arab allies in 1990 such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria (yes folks, Syria), found Americans’ use of the term “Persian Gulf” offensive because none of them liked Iran (a.k.a. Persia) and—presto chango—it became the Arabian Gulf in all formal diplomatic and military channels ever since.  Seriously, check it out on the internet if you dare.   Of course changing South China Sea to Indochina Sea would probably irritate the Chinese as much as it might make our Southeast Asian partners happy, but I am sure the Iranians were none too pleased either when we renamed “their” body of water.  The point is, there is precedence and two can play this game.

“Oh those Americans, they are so obnoxious,” one might think when hearing this proposal.  If however one wants an example of the forbearance and moderation of Americans one need only look in their own back yard, where sits the Gulf of Mexico.   They could have renamed it the Gulf the United States or Florida, but no, they (we) did not.  Maybe the fact that Mexico has not claimed all of the Gulf of Mexico to some five-dash line or something helps explain why it gets to keep its name for the geography books and in diplomatic and military language. 

Names mean things – China certainly sees it that way, so should we.  Why continue to give her a stick, albeit a rhetorical stick, that she can hit us, her neighbors, and the international community with?  We can and should start simple—at least inside our government and the Department of Defense (DoD).   The essence of information-politics (as opposed to information warfare) as well as strategic communications is to begin to fight back in the war of words in a meaningful, often incremental way.   As long as we are at it, we might label this initiative information diplomacy and, just for giggles, have it come out of the Department of State rather than big, bad DoD.  Sometimes doing something silly can show someone else just how silly they are acting.   A lesson for China perhaps?

John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Professor of Military History and has served on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College since July 2000, retiring from the naval service in 2004.  He earned a Ph.D. in History from Kansas State University in 2007.   He is the author of Agents of Innovation (2008) and co-authored Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008) with D.M. Giangreco, an a Military History of Japan (2014).  He was awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society for Military History in 2011 for “The U.S. Navy General Board and Naval Arms Limitation: 1922-1937.”  He is also an adjunct professor for the Naval War College Fleet Seminar Program and with the Military History Masters Program at Norwich University.  A former naval aviator (flying in both EP-3 and ES-3 aircraft), he has completed numerous cruises aboard four different aircraft carriers.  He flew reconnaissance and combat missions during the last decade of the Cold War, the First Gulf War (Desert Storm), Iraq and the Persian Gulf (Southern Watch), and the Balkans (Deliberate Force over Bosnia).   His most recent book, also published by Praeger, is entitled Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns.

CIMSEC content is and always will be free; consider a voluntary monthly donation to offset our operational costs. As always, it is your support and patronage that have allowed us to build this community – and we are incredibly grateful.
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