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Tactics

Sea Control at the Tactical Level of War

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Sea Control Topic Week

By LT Adam Humayun, USN

From the dawn of naval war through the mid-twentieth century, sea control served political ends only indirectly. A force that exercised sufficient control of waterways could bombard, assault, withdraw, and feint from the sea, but could not (unless fighting an island enemy) produce war-ending consequences, absent victory on land.1 Witness Britain’s numerous post-Trafalgar conventional and guerilla campaigns against Napoleon. Even in the vast oceanic reaches of the Second World War’s Pacific theater, the Allies chose to seize key nodes in Japan’s island defensive network rather than simply suppress them. In the industrial era of warfare, comparatively few such nodes could be destroyed by fire, and new aircraft and ships could be made quickly available if destroyed. Sea control was an indispensable prerequisite to victory, but by itself did not win wars.2

In modern maritime war between great powers, sea control equates to leverage for war termination and the shape of post-war international relations. The late twentieth century saw two paired technical-tactical developments the – prevalence of missiles as the primary weapon at sea and the dawn of the post-industrial production era. As such, offensive power is no longer proportionate to the price or size of a combatant, and mass production can no longer be expected to replenish combat losses in time.3

Sea control is about sinking these ships and aircraft, platforms that are growing in vulnerability and are harder to replace than their predecessors. A force that performs well in attrition will weaken, and in many dimensions of military power, perhaps even disarm an adversary. Destroying military assets that cannot be effectively replaced for years, and only after the political issues at hand have been resolved, grants sea control today a value well beyond its immediate military effects. The battlespace, concrete and conceptual, in which contenders will struggle for sea control thus needs to be carefully defined.

This article explores sea control at the tactical level of war in an age defined by precision-guided munitions and post-industrial production. It opens by defining sea control in terms of objective, means, and effect, and proceeds to identify the capabilities key to achieving it. After discussing how to exploit and maintain sea control once won, it concludes by reflecting on the best path to effective training. Ultimately, sea control depends on attriting enemy sensors and shooters through superior scouting and decision-making – both processes complicated by the fog of war and by enemy interference. The review here is cursory, and further exploration of this general topic and the subtopics broached will be constructive.

Sea Control in the Missile Age: The Scouting and Network Battles

Modern combat at sea remains sudden, violent, and shrouded in uncertainty. The increasing speed, range, and autonomy of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and their associated sensors lends an advantage to the attacker.4 The fog of war persists: even when targeting information is available, uncertainty and human psychology often prevent its efficient exploitation. Electronic Warfare (EW), Cyber, deception, and anti-scouting capabilities will all play a role in expanding the fog of war, contra all predictions of “dominant battlespace knowledge.”5 Even superficial observation of trends in EW shows modern militaries are prepared to target sensors extensively.6

Sea control can be partial and is geographically defined. Objectively, it lasts only as long as the force and any defended assets remain outside the effective range of enemy PGM shooters; subjectively, only as long as the force believes this to be the case.

The net-centric force structures of modern great power militaries nest different types and levels of capability in different launch and scouting platforms. These networks may degrade gracefully under fire, but not in linear fashion.7 First, partial sea control can be said to exist when some platforms have been attrited (or when their force inventory is exhausted). Second, partial sea control can be said to exist when critical scouting capabilities have been denied, whether through attrition or (perhaps less likely, depending on the scenario) through non-kinetic fires. Either condition eases the problem of defending amphibious ships, merchants, and fixed sites on land by reducing options available to the attacker, conversely allowing air defense units to assume optimal dispositions against one or a few threats.

Sea control is about attrition. The long-range offensive power of nearly every platform in the missile age dictates this. The reconnaissance-strike complex composed of sensors –whether organic to the shooter or offboard – and missile systems of all kinds is increasingly able to reach out to hundreds of nautical miles of effective range.8 A place- (vice time- or method-based) maneuver warfare approach is not going to stop modern PGMs – only blinding the sensor or killing the shooter will do so.9

Sea control entails attrition; attrition in turn entails rapid and effective threat detection, combat ID (CID), targeting (inclusive of ROE), engagement, and battle damage assessment (BDA). In U.S. military parlance, this process is termed F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess). Whatever their name, all these processes will be opposed by an adversary seeking to slow one’s own Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop.10 Given these underlying conflicts within the broader struggle at the tactical level, we can best understand them cut into two parts – a scouting battle for acquisition of targeting information, and a network battle for its exploitation.

The scouting battle entails the competition between reconnaissance-strike complexes –be they SAGs, carrier strike groups, aircraft, or any combination of these – to acquire targeting information. Electronic warfare, deception, and conventional weapons could all contribute to anti-scouting campaigns. Effectiveness in scouting relies on coordinating multiple platforms and techniques to maximize probability of detection and communication while minimizing the vulnerability of one’s own assets.11 Effective anti-scouting entails dispositions that are difficult for scouts to detect or to classify, early warning, rapid combat ID, and sufficient firepower at the right time and place to attrit reconnaissance platforms.

The network battle consists of the competition between reconnaissance-strike complexes for the use of targeting information. It is a race to make and communicate decisions, one where sabotage is also possible. A force well-postured for the network battle will rely on mission command, including austere C2 and pre-planned responses, emphasizing rapid and seamless transition between the paradigms of “structured battle” and “melee” that were well-identified by CAPT (Ret.) Robert Rubel in a 2017 article.12 At the same time, the force will use all available means – including communications jamming, deception, and other information operations – to slow the adversary OODA loop, delaying and diluting the impact of its discovery and targeting.

These twin lines of effort pay dividends for sea control. The force that “wins” the scouting battle – all other things being equal – will be in a better position to contend for sea control, winning timely and accurate targeting information while denying the same to the enemy. Advantage in the network battle allows a force to quickly respond to changing conditions, maximizing firepower – and, perhaps, surprise – through quick reaction, as well as maximizing resiliency through reducing dependence on top-down, unitary, and vulnerable C2 nodes.

Winning and Maintaining Sea Control: Lethality versus Shaping

The discussion thus far has centered on attrition – what one might term the lethality approach to sea control. But why not seek to win or maintain sea control through less violent means? An alternative to the lethality approach to sea control is at least conceivable. This alternative can be termed shaping – a reliance on unit-level deterrence. Where a lethality approach continues the emphasis on attriting adversary scouts and shooters, a shaping approach targets the perceptions of threat platform COs, adjusting their perception of risk and reward to deter aggressive action. In the abstract, it seems the lethality approach would be applicable against challenges to sea control that fall under CAPT Rubel’s structured battle and melee combat paradigms. At least against a modern naval threat the shaping approach has good prospects only against challenges that rely on Rubel’s sniping paradigm.13

The tactical dynamics of the missile age undermine the shaping approach. Substantial advantage accrues to the side that “attacks effectively first;” where anti-missile defenses of all types and ship survivability are sufficient if effective attack blunts counterattack.14 Several countries have made substantial investments in advanced ship- and aircraft-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and consistently train for their employment.15 The highly centralized C2 seen in some navies also might reduce the scope of decision-making authority available to unit commanders.16 During a crisis with a peer competitor, it appears unlikely that either side could muster sufficient force to absorb a first strike should shaping fail.

Even against isolated PGM snipers, however, the shaping approach has significant drawbacks. Unlike the submarines of World War II, modern warships and submarines have effective firing ranges measured in hundreds of miles. Particularly the latter have likely improved their relative ability to avoid detection, if not to escape prosecution. Not all COs will be as easily intimidated as the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Admiral Kurita at the Battle Off Samar.  The forces needed to deter a professional and determined adversary would be better employed hunting that same adversary. Even once sea control is won, a lethality approach that emphasizes attrition remains primary.

Training for Sea Control: Nested Competition

A Tactical Action Officer (TAO) on watch at night onboard a destroyer acting as SAG commander (SAGC) confronts two empty large screen displays, their blue monotony broken only by the occasional merchant or commercial aircraft track. In searching for the enemy SAG, the TAO and the watchteam must be able to pick out the foe from environmentals and neutrals, satisfy rules of engagement (ROE), match weapon to target, win concurrence from the Commanding Officer and other appropriate legal authorities, and do all this quickly enough to “attack effectively first.”17 When this is done, the salvo away, the force must quickly conduct battle damage assessment (BDA) to determine if reengagement is needed. This is sea control in practice: a realm of ambiguity where human factors, especially level of knowledge, presence of mind, and sangfroid, are decisive in tactical effectiveness.

Training for sea control ought to reflect the reality of sea combat in the age of PGMs: that despite all technical developments, human factors continue to define war. The importance of winning the scouting and network battles, of blinding the enemy, of working inside his OODA loop, of deceiving him – all to the end of delivering the first effective attack – all of these pieces can be seen in “lessons learned” from SAG vs. SAG and similar free-play events in many U.S. and multilateral exercises. The extent they confront participants with the experience of the totality of combat – psychological and technical – will mean these events can prepare trainees well.

From a U.S. Navy standpoint, progress is evident. Scripted firing events are gradually being supplanted in favor of Live Fire With A Purpose (LFWAP) events mimicking real-world weapons employment conditions. A comprehensive and usable standard ruleset for SAG vs. SAG and freeplay events, and the explicit, fleetwide understanding that these mock combat events – vice scripted certification evolutions or PHOTOEXs – are the “main course” in major exercises would facilitate planning and maximize training value.

Conclusion

The tactical dynamics and political-military impact of combat at sea are mediated by technological trends, but human factors remain central to its actual conduct. Topics deserving further exploration include, among many others: to what extent does the OODA loop model so ingrained in U.S. and Western forces remain valid at sea in an age of semi-autonomous weapons? What capabilities and which tactics, techniques, and procedures provide the greatest leverage for the scouting and network battles? Which C2 constructs do so? Are there elements of the “dominant battlespace knowledge” concept that are not fatally flawed on their assumptions? The force that is prepared to ask these questions, answer them, and then incorporate lessons learned into training and practice will have the advantage in a near- to-medium-term struggle for sea control.

Lieutenant Humayun, a native of Madison, New Jersey, graduated summa cum laude from The George Washington University with a B.A. in International Affairs (Conflict and Security Studies) in 2012. He commissioned in December 2013 from the U.S. Navy Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island. Onboard USS SHILOH (CG 67) he has served as CF Division Officer and Turbines Officer, and onboard USS MUSTIN (DDG 89) as Fire Control Officer.

He participated in multiple Strike Group patrols, Combined, and Joint Operations in the SEVENTH Fleet AOR, coordinated successful live SM-2 firing exercises in 2017 and 2018 and led planning for MUSTIN’s role as SAG commander in MULTISAIL 2018. Lieutenant Humayun is a qualified Tactical Action Officer who has stood the watch both at Condition III and for Special Evolutions in a high-threat OPAREA.  

Lieutenant Humayun’s decorations include the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various unit and service awards. 

All opinions expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or any of their subcomponents.

References

1. See generally Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Operations (1911 ed.). Accessed 9/2/18 <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm>

2. For the Pacific Campaign, see Toll, Ian W. The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944. New York: W.W. Norton, 2016.

3. See Hughes, Wayne P. “Missile Chess: A Parable,” in Hughes, Wayne P. ed. The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015 (181-190).

4. An excellent general introduction is Watts, Barry. The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs. Report. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C., 2011. Accessed 9/2/2018 <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2011.06.02-Maturing-Revolution-In-Military-Affairs1.pdf>

5. For examples of confident predictions of dominant battlespace knowledge, see Stewart E. Johnson, “DBK: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Libicki, Martin and Stewart  E.Johnson, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995. For anti-scouting, see Hughes, Fleet Tactics, pg. 193.

6. Gordon, Michael R., and Jeremy Page. “China Installed Military Jamming Equipment on Spratly Islands, U.S. Says.” The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2018. Accessed September 2, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-installed-military-jamming-equipment-on-spratly-islands-u-s-says-1523266320.

7. Hughes, Wayne P. Fleet Tactics, Table 11-1 (First Strike Survivors).

8. Watts, “Maturing Revolution,”pg. 21-25.

9. Surprise and deception are not unique to maneuver warfare approaches, but are inherent in the maneuver paradigm. For comparison of various (mostly pre-missile age) approaches to deception, see Whaley, Barton. Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. Artech House, 2002.

10. Implicit in John R. Boyd’s presentation, “Patterns of Conflict,” accessed 9/2/18 <https://www.dnipogo.org/boyd/patterns_ppt.pdf>. See especially slides 101-117

11. An excellent discussion is Kline, Jeffrey E., “A Tactical Doctrine for Distributed Lethality,” Center for International Maritime Security, February 22, 2016. Access 9/2/18 <https://cimsec.org/tactical-doctrine-distributed-lethality/22286#_edn7>

12. Rubel, Robert C. “Mission Command in a Future Naval Combat Environment.” Naval War College Review Vol. 71 No. 2 (Spring 2018), 110-113. Accessed 8/23/18 <http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/8>

13. Rubel, “Mission Command,” 110-113.

14. Hughes, Fleet Tactics.

15. Gormley, Dennis M. et al. “A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments.” Joint Force Quarterly No. 75 (September 2014). Accessed 9/2/18 <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577568/jfq-75-a-potent-vector-assessing-chinese-cruise-missile-developments/>.

16. Erickson, Andrew S. and Michael S. Chase, “Informationization and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy,” in Saunders, Philip et al., eds The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities,Evolving Roles. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011, pgs. 265-268.

17. Hughes, Wayne P., Jr. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 24, 2018) An E-2C Hawkeye, with Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 117, sits chocked and chained on the flight deck aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). John C. Stennis is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class William Rosencrans)

Capability Analysis

New Forms of Naval Operational Planning for Earning Command of the Seas

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Sea Control Topic Week

By Bill Shafley 

Introduction

Sea Control operations require a delicate balance of protecting the hunters and releasing the hounds. Strike Group and subordinate staff’s tactical planning, general thinking, and day-to-day operations are biased toward the defense of a High Value Unit. This is a direct result of nearly thirty years of fighting from-the-sea not for-the-sea – or to use operational terms – existing as a power-projection force without the burden of first establishing maritime superiority through sea control operations. Future operations against peer competitors will require a different mode of thinking to understand the nuances of employing a strike group’s combat power where near-constant tradeoffs are required between offense and defense. Staffs must refine their thinking and improve their methods in three ways to make planning for Sea Control operations more effective.

Warfighting staffs must develop an increased understanding of sea control from the strategic to tactical levels. This would improve risk assessment by ensuring decision-makers can link a resource informed theory, of establishing and maintaining it, to the value that maritime superiority brings to the larger operation. A review of Sir Julian Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy provides this basis.

Planners must organize their tactical thinking around the joint battlefield and all domains of warfare to plan for sea control operations. Planning in terms of these functions (movement/maneuver, fires, protection, intelligence, and sustainment, and command and control (C2) will force staff members out of thinking about the tactical problem through the stovepiped Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) structure. Planners should appropriately balance limited strike group resources in a manner that sets task and purpose for each warfare commander to execute.

Staff and planners require a framework to examine and visualize the tactical problems associated with establishing and maintaining maritime superiority operations. Wayne Hughes’ well-known work Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat provides this inclusive framework. His methodology helps warfighters understand the resourcing tradeoffs necessary to establish and maintain the level of maritime superiority needed for mission accomplishment and effectiveness. And, more importantly, Hughes work can help staffs identify and capture risk in a manner that informs and communicates a commander’s risk appetite.

Theories and Degrees of Command of the Sea

It is important to understand sea control from its historic origins. Planners must apply critical thinking to the operational and tactical considerations of achieving the proper level of maritime superiority through sea control operations. While doing that, Sir Julian Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and the Green Pamphlet provide a good place to start. “Command at-sea exists only in a state of war.”1 This is an important distinction, where the use of the expression presupposes a fleet structure adequate to confront a maritime adversary and prevail.2

The relationship between war and command of the sea is an important one. In an active state of conflict with another maritime power, naval forces compete for command of the sea, or as modern doctrinal language would call it, maritime superiority or supremacy. The navy that leaves the competitor unable to seriously interfere with their ability or achievement of their own objectives is said to have it.3 Corbett structures command of the sea in terms of degree. It can be general or local, temporary or permanent.

This discussion of scope in terms of area and duration is important for planners to comprehend. The Fleet’s requirement to establish command of the seas are born of the necessity its operations support. Command of the sea comes with a price tag in terms of opportunity costs and scarce resources. Generally permanent command of the sea must be achieved throughout the theater of operations and it must be maintained indefinitely. This condition may be achieved only by the annihilation of the enemy’s capabilities and an associated set of resources and level of effort. Local temporary command more narrowly scopes the requirement in terms of a location and duration, tied to the necessary theater military objective of a fleet’s operations support.4 It is this more temporal control of the sea that is the providence of carrier strike groups and subordinate staffs, and may be met with a different set of resources and effort.

This logic forms the basis of a basic strategy question, which is answered at higher level echelons. Operational level fleet staffs do their best to translate Corbett’s thinking into action. Command of the sea as Corbett worked to define it, has been replaced with discussions of maritime superiority as achieved through sea control operations. Sea Control operations (the destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital seal lanes, protection of shipping, and establishment of local maritime superiority in areas of naval operation) are introduced as terms of art to aid planners in further developing tactical tasks to subordinate units to achieve it.           

It’s important for planners, regardless of the what echelon they work at, to ensure Corbett’s distinctions do not get lost. His nuances are important. Corbett’s degrees of command of the sea are directly tied to the operational and tactical discussions surrounding establishing and maintaining maritime superiority. The degree of maritime superiority required shapes a theory of control that is based upon its relation to the larger operation it supports. If the success of the entire operation requires unencumbered access to seaborne lines of communication, then planners need to develop a theory of control and dedicate the resources necessary to ensure that objective is met. If in a more limited conflict, the seaward approaches must be made available to enable timed seaborne fires and effects to set the conditions for land-based operations, then planners will need to develop a different theory of control and dedicate a commensurate set of resources to meet those objectives. In either case, the type and degree of command of the sea required is different. Thinking through command of the sea in this manner allows a commander to communicate risk appetite, establish task priorities, and help planners assign tactical tasks and intimately understand the extent of resourcing necessary to meet the condition.

Command of the Sea in Operational Context

Warfighters responsible for sea control require a tool to help them better visualize a war at sea and the level of maritime superiority it requires. Strike group commanders must be able to issue intent that captures risk appetite, task priorities, and the tactical problems associated with establishing sea control. Wayne Hughes’ in his well-known work Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat provides such a model. Hughes contends that war at sea is attrition based and therefore revolves around the timing of successful delivery of effective firepower. To successfully deliver effective firepower, some sort of command and control must exist to task units to find, fix, and engage enemy ships and aircraft before they do the same to the friendly force. War at sea is therefore a dance where commanders, through C2, maneuver, firepower and scouting assets achieve successful engagements within the battle space to.6

Firepower, the ability to destroy an enemy, is countered with counterforce, the capacity to reduce the effect of delivered firepower. Scouts, units tasked to deliver tactical information about the enemy’s position, vulnerabilities, and intent are countered with anti-scouts, units tasked to destroy or disrupt, or degrade a scouting force. Command and Control Systems, the processes and equipment used to define missions and transform them into actions are met with actions and processes taken to limit their effectiveness.7 The goal of a commander being to achieve “[t]he fundamental tactical position…the early detection of the enemy”8 and therefore concentrate firepower at long ranges.9

With a refined sense of the level of maritime superiority required for mission success, this rubric can be a powerful tool. It can help a staff visualize the solution to the tactical problem associated with establishing command of the sea, prioritize tasks, as well as further the scope and communicate risk appetite from the commander to subordinate units. Thinking through a sea control problem using this method allows the commander to assess available combat power and think through the maneuver considerations necessary to place it in position to achieve effect. Firepower and counterforce considerations allow a commander to think through how much firepower will be necessary to adequately attrite an enemy in the face of active and passive defenses. Scouting and anti-scouting considerations allow a commander to think through how much firepower must be taken away from the main body to find and fix first. By considering maneuver with these pairings in mind, the commander has an opportunity to look beyond stationing considerations and really dig into where the strike group and its assets need to be to attack effectively first with resources and task priorities aligned to risk.

Augmenting the Composite Warfare Commander Construct

A Sailor’s thinking regarding operations at sea is informed by the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) construct. The CWC organization is structured around warfare commanders and coordinators. Warfare commanders manage the defense of the carrier across various domains such as air, land, maritime, and space, as well as the information environment (cyberspace). Warfare coordinators manage common resources required by warfare commanders to enact those missions such as data in the case of tactical datalinks, aircraft, and ships as they are necessary to screen the main body. Operational Tasking (OPTASK) messages are drafted and generated to provide procedural controls put into action through command by negation. Each warfare commander has a modest staff that coordinates warfare responsibilities with the CSG staffs, as they are the primary point of entry for tasking from the Fleet Commander. This staff structure has proven effective for steady state operations for decades.

The application of Hughes’ tactical model does not align well with the CWC concept. As a result, it is important to understand possible implications and the effects on planning for sea control operations. The notion of a CSG planning staff generating planning products that inform the Warfare Commanders’ execution loses credibility as the sea control fight drives the warfighting staffs to resource problems to the balance of offense and defense required to attack effectively first. The CSG staff and warfare commanders will be challenged to create risk informed and prioritized phased courses of action (COA) that are nuanced enough to be successful.

Shifting the planning construct from a warfare commander-centric mode to one of joint battlefield functions (movement/maneuver, fires, protection, intelligence, sustainment and C2) may prove more beneficial. Achieving a degree of maritime superiority requires balancing offense and defense in the context of risk. It requires setting priorities. Hughes’ tool provides the framework to visualize the fight and communicate commander’s intent. Approaching COA development through joint battlefield functions will take advantage of the insights gained through Hughes’ model. Instead of each warfare commander and coordinator looking at a tactical problem through a narrow lenses of domain, battlefield functions afford a unifying approach to resourcing and prevailing in the fight.

If the sea control problem favors preserving combat power for prolonged action on station, a bias toward a Hughes’ counterforce approach may prevail. This makes less scouts available to find and fix the position of enemy targets in favor of protecting the main body. It could also portend that maneuver and counter-C2 approaches take precedence over offensive considerations until the timing is right. Protection tasks take precedence based upon the nature of the highest probability threat, intelligence demand is shifted from finding targets to looking for indications and warnings, fires (air and surface launched weapons) are prioritized appropriately, and the force is dispersed and maneuvered in a manner that mitigates detection risk. Starting the planning dialogue from here is a much different approach than to have warfare commanders take a supporting/supported commander approach to develop a COA.

Battlefield functions will provide a richer forum to discuss common questions such as:

  • Which warfare commander is in charge of protection in a threat environment that is coming from all domains (air, surface, subsurface, and information)?
  • Which warfare commander owns dual use fires and the associated targeting process?
  • How are priorities determined and risk appetite communicated?

It is not the point to propose a new operating construct. The CWC organization remains fit for purpose in most regards and would be impractical to change. Yet, introducing battlefield functions to staff planners across all echelons, to use in COA development, will complement their ability to plan for complex sea control operations.

Conclusion

Effective sea control operations require staffs to understand the nuances associated with establishing and maintaining maritime superiority. A deeper study of the background thinking surrounding command of the sea affords planners a solid foundation to build tactical plans to achieve maritime superiority. The degree of maritime superiority requires a theory of control that is balanced between resources and effort to meet joint force objectives. The CSG Commander and his or her warfighters should consider incorporating Hughes’ thinking about maneuver, firepower, counterforce, scouting, anti-scouting, and command and control to help better understand and communicate their priorities and risk appetite to ensure its limited assets make that necessary contribution to that theory of victory. Battlefield functions as an organizing heuristic in planning over one that is warfare commander centric improves the understanding of the associated tasks and will lead to better CONOPS development.

The Carrier Strike Group will be the primary maneuver element in the maritime based engagements of the future. Fleet Staffs will look to CSGs and their warfighters to provide the sustained combat power necessary to exploit sea control for maximum effect. Staffs must understand their contribution to this larger fight, communicate priority and risk both down and up echelon to win. These three small shifts in thinking could have much larger impacts on the lethality of every CSG’s ships, aircraft, and Sailors and their readiness to plan for battle in the future fight.

Captain Bill Shafley is a career Surface Warfare Officer and currently serves as the Deputy Commodore, Destroyer Squadron 26. He has served on both coasts and overseas in Asia and Europe. He is a graduate of the Naval War College’s Advanced Strategy Program and a designated Naval Strategist.  He thanks Lieutenant Commander Matt Noland for his continued dialogue on these important issues. These views are presented in a personal capacity.

References

1. Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. New York: AMS Press, 1972. Print. p. 337

2. Ibid, p. 337

3. Ibid, p. 338

4. Ibid, pp. 338-339

5. CAPT Chris Senenko, LtCol Rob Gardner, and CDR Scott Croskey have been experimenting with this model with their Maritime Adavnce Warfare School students at the Naval War College. I am grateful for them exposing me to this thinking.

6. Hughes, Wayne P, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Print. p.174

7. bid, p.175

8. Ibid, p.179

9. Ibid, p.179

Featured Image: GULF OF ADEN (Sept. 4 2018) – Lt. William Maloney, ship’s aircraft handler, uses the ship’s 3MC announcement system from flight deck control aboard Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) during a regularly scheduled deployment of Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Matthew Freeman)

Capability Analysis

Topic Week on Bringing Back Sea Control Kicks Off on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC will be featuring articles sent in response to our Call for Articles on bringing back sea control. Below is a list of articles and authors that will be featured during the topic week and could be updated as prospective authors finalize additional submissions. 

New Forms of Naval Operational Planning for Earning Command of the Seas by Bill Shafley
Sea Control at the Tactical Level of War by Adam Humayun
Bringing Back Sea Power from the Deckplate on Up by Olivia Morrell
For Sea Control, First Control the Electromagnetic Spectrum by Damien Dodge
The Nature of Sea Control and Sea Denial by Dr. Ching Chang
Merchant Warships and Creating a Modern 21st Century East Indiaman by Steve Wills
Fighting For Sea Control in the Next War by Lars Wedin
Adjusting to New Conditions for Command of the Seas by Theodore Bazinis

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 24, 2018) The Royal Australian Navy guided-missile frigate HMAS Melbourne (FFG 05) is underway at sunset July 24, during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class David Weydert/Released)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Competition and Neutrality of Southeast Asian States in Indo-Pacific Strategy

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By Shang-su Wu

Due to their central location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, maritime Southeast Asian countries have increasingly important roles in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Initiative. Despite some constraints, such as the inability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to coordinate its membership’s defenses, these regional states and their relatively weak but growing navies, with a home field advantage, matter in terms of the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. Based on their non-alliance tradition and economic interests with China, Southeast Asian countries would not join FOIP, but engagement between them would be crucial for the strategy connecting the two oceans.

Geographically, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are the most relevant to control of the critical straits, whilst other coastal states, such as Brunei, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have a potential influence over adjacent sea lines of communication (SLOCs). These Southeast Asian countries are not militarily or economically equivalent with any member of the Quad (the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India), or China, and it is unlikely that these relatively weak countries could challenge the rights of passage under the United Nation Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, while their naval and air bases are strategically important for securing nearby SLOCs, the physical capture of such locations appears politically and militarily infeasible nowadays.

Politically, it would be very difficult for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to pass any resolution authorizing any power to conquer one or more Southeast Asian countries, as a veto would be expected from other permanent UNSC members. Although hybrid warfare, such as a Crimea-style invasion, could not be excluded, lack of similar historical and ethnic linkages could make such operations more uncertain, if not unlikely. In addition, unlike some “trouble-maker” countries that challenge existing international norms, Southeast Asian countries generally remain neutral, taking modest positions which keep them from becoming legitimate targets in the international community.

Militarily, force projection in Southeast Asia is already a certain challenge for most aggressors, and to secure control over local populations could be even more difficult. For example, territorial defense with grassroots organizations prepared by the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) would provide systematic resistance during and after conventional warfare in cases such as Sunda, Lombok, Makassar, and other Straits in the Indonesian Archipelago. Securing control of the Malacca Strait is further complicated since it falls under the control of three countries. Given that conquering the islands at chokepoints in key straits would be difficult, the roles of maritime Southeast Asian countries in the FOIP need to be discussed in various scenarios.

Scenarios, Positions and Policies

The potential maritime conflicts between sea powers in the Indo-Pacific region can be categorized into three scenarios: major conflict, tight confrontation, and peacetime. A major conflict between China and the U.S., and perhaps its allies, would only likely impact Southeast Asia if China is able to maintain sea control over the first island chain. If Beijing loses the first battles or cannot retain sea control over the specific disputed area, its dream of sea power could vanish and make Southeast Asia strategically less important. In contrast, if China is able to gain the upper hand over the U.S. or another Quad member in a first-round exchange, this could force the latter to choose between preparing for the next battle or blockading the key straits in Southeast Asia, aside from negotiating for peace. In a blockade, there is no doubt as to the importance of the maritime Southeast Asian states along the straits. Another scenario is a major Indo-Sino conflict shifting from land borders to the maritim domain, where Southeast Asia is an inevitable chokepoint for both navies. In a scenario of tight confrontation where aircraft and vessels of China and the Quad members follow each other with occasional provocations, the relatively narrow sea passes in Southeast Asia are convenient for such tailing operations. During peacetime, the straits in Southeast Asia still provide critical locations for surveillance and deterrence.

Southeast Asian countries would have three political positions in the face of such scenarios: strict neutrality, loose neutrality, and aligning with one side. Loose neutrality would be the common practice in the region, evidenced in all maritime Southeast Asian countries’ policies and participation in the non-alliance movement. Although the Philippines and Thailand retain their defense treaties with the U.S., their current policies are notably different. During the previous Aquino administration between 2010 and 2016, Manila was probably seen as pro-Washington due to countering Beijing’s territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea, but President Duterte has replaced these policies with Beijing-friendly ones. In contrast to the common practice, strict neutrality and alignment with one side would be less favorable options for Southeast Asian countries during peacetime or even in crises of tight confrontation due to different concerns. Strict neutrality does not fit the complicated inter-state competition overshadowing the era of globalization, but alignment would present risk for being on a loser’s side.

Under these loosely neutral positions, each Southeast Asian country may have certain policies favoring a specific power. Arms procurements and intelligence sharing would represent relatively implicit policies showing their preferences or linkage. Joint exercises, foreign military presence, and deployments are clearer indicators.

The Regional Military Capacity

Thanks to decades of economic growth, maritime Southeast Asian countries have significantly modernized their navies and other related forces, which have strategic values for two main reasons. Firstly, as an overt invasion of Southeast Asian countries is unlikely, their military capacity is unlikely to be fully neutralized. As a result, their specific capabilities, particularly submarines and other sea denial means, can deter potential aggressors. Secondly, despite inferior quantity and perhaps quality, regional militaries have home field advantages, such as theater familiarity and shorter LOCs.

Several characteristics appear when examining Southeast Asian naval modernization. Firstly, the naval modernization among regional states is diverse on both national and asset level. On the national level, some countries, like Singapore, are comprehensively armed, and some others, such as Brunei, are at best partially equipped. On the asset level, vessels and aircraft in the same classes may have differing performances due to different designs and costs. For example, some regional frigates are armed with layered defense against anti-ship missiles, but some have only a single system of short-ranged surface-to-air missiles (SAM) without any additional margin.

Secondly, despite the diverse practices, regional countries take a balanced fleet approach and invest in both sea control and sea denial capabilities. The level of distribution between sea control, such as major surface combatants, and sea denial, such as submarines and fast attack craft (FAC), depends on each country’s strategic circumstances. The balanced fleet approach weakens the capacity of Southeast Asian navies in conventional warfare against a stronger adversary, as most ships remain vulnerable in the face of superior firepower and are unlikely to achieve their sea control mission during wartime. However, the regional navies have to deal with peacetime missions, such as counter piracy and maritime territorial control, where large surface platforms are essential. In other words, the balanced fleet approach reflects the compromise between the needs of peacetime and wartime.

Thirdly, regional submarines provide a vital deterrence by denial capability. Southeast Asian submarines within their home waters, despite their small numbers, relatively little experiences, and less sophisticated technologies, would still pose a credible threat to intruding sea powers. An external sea power may have the capacity to absorb some losses, but these losses would stretch limited expeditionary capabilities, damage its national pride, and possibly affect domestic political decision making. Striking the home bases of these submarines would be an effective measure to lower their operational sustainability, but it would significantly escalate the situation during a crisis and threaten whatever argument for legitimacy the invader was trying to use to justify their actions.

There are some drawbacks in regional naval modernization. Although more and more capable surface combatants are joining the service, a great portion of the fleets have weak air defense and anti-submarine capabilities which makes them vulnerable to modern anti-ship missiles and submarines. Maritime patrol aircraft would provide the main method of surveillance, but are vulnerable and unable to conduct patrols in a hostile air space. Without maritime patrol aircraft, these regional navies would have limited surveillance capacity. Southeast Asian states possess fighters with airborne sea strike capability, and they may be able to respond to challenges from a ski-jump aircraft carrier with limited capacity and support. However, as all these fighters belong to air forces which focus and train for more missions than maritime operations, their jointness with navies would be limited. Due to these drawbacks plus the issue of relatively inferior quantity, maritime Southeast Asian countries have little room for escalation.

Gaining Support

The traditional methods of formal alliance may not successfully work with maritime Southeast Asian countries under the present context. Trade, investment, and other economic ties with China would constrain the willingness and likelihood of direct participation by maritime Southeast Asian countries in the FOIP Initiative. Moreover, Beijing is also endeavoring to develop and deepen security ties in the region, evidenced in arms deals, personnel exchanges, joint exercises, and other forms of interactions. However, it is possible to gain the contribution of regional countries to the FOIP Initiative, under their loose neutrality position. As maritime Southeast Asian countries have relatively less experiences in various military capabilities, the militaries of Quad members with rich operational experiences could provide more interaction based on the existing foundation.

Intertwined interests would be another significant motive for supporting the FOIP. Given their maritime interests and territory, Southeast Asian countries are likely to further expand their maritime capacity and the Quad members can supply proper assets and technologies to fill their existing shortfalls, while arms deals with logistical and training packages provide another channel to strengthen military-to-military relations. Last but not least, the Quad members, with their combined market share dwarfing China’s, should build up economic ties with maritime Southeast Asian countries. It would not be easy for regional countries to formally participate in the FOIP, but their cooperation or other positive responses would be the core of a strategy across the two oceans.

Shang-su Wu is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Featured Image: Marina Bay Sands Resort in Singapore (Wikimedia Commons)