Tag Archives: Poland

Defeating the Enemy’s Doctrine: Laughter Tactics

The people demand the downfall of the regime!
       The people demand the downfall of the regime!

As U.S. Navy strategy enters a new phase of revival it would be wise to prepare ourselves for future debates. However, writing about strategy is a daunting task, so I took as an exercise and example something that could be treated more lightly, especially during summer months. I asked myself, “What helped Eastern Europeans effectively resist communism?” and whether there was any strategy behind it. After a short conversation with friends, what emerged was that the important factor in defeating communism in Poland was a sense of humor. And yes, there was a sort of strategy behind it, which is even more interesting considering the lack of any structure or organization that would have supported it. Everything began as a simple self-defense against the overwhelming frustration from the inability to control one’s own life under the ruling Communist Party. The Party had almost total control over our material lives. Yet a sense of humor and laughter quickly evolved into a kind of massive resistance, and the last years of so-called “real” socialism in Poland was even a time of true renaissance of cabaret. Now let’s apply military language to this phenomenon: we essentially observed groups of insurgents (such as the audiences of cabaret performances, or even just friends making jokes about the Party) creating ad hoc and unpredictable patterns using humor as a weapon. The weapon was widely available and its nature very asymmetric. An official ban on humor only, and immediately, generated extra salvos of laughter. The Party was embarrassed — instead of being feared, it became the subject of the people’s laughter. This marked a shift in people’s attitude, with consequences far beyond just making Party people angry. This strategy, used by a large part of the population, was called “inner emigration”. As I mentioned, the government was able to control the material aspects of our lives, but the intellectual and spiritual lives were beyond their reach. So changing the focus from physical wellness to intellectual activity was like defeating the enemy’s doctrine in the best spirit of Sun Tzu’s teaching.

salami tacticsAnother technique popular in Eastern Europe is “salami tactics.” This occurs when an opponent divides an enemy slice by slice. Each slice is so thin that it doesn’t trigger a reaction until there is no more salami. The international application was demonstrated in the traditional “divide and conquer” approach of Hitler’s Germany, whereby the major powers thought they could appease the government by allowing it to absorb smaller neighbors a slice at a time. In Poland the communists took control of our material life, slice-by-slice, by introducing a series of small regulations that were individually unnoticed by the public. The final result was the same as making one big move. These tactics are potentially very effective against an opponent abiding by rules of proportional response. Breaking one of the initial, small rules would be considered escalating both violence and risk to an unacceptable level.

So how do we defend against salami tactics? One way is to convince an opponent that we do not have salami at all. This translates to strategic deception, which is very difficult in execution, especially in the long term. Another approach would be to take our salami out of an opponent’s reach, like the Poles did with inner emigration. They physically remained within Poland and subject to the rules of the Party, but their most robust undertakings retreated inwards to spiritual and intellectual pursuits, and where their loyalty was much harder to control or attain.

Both are examples of defensive strategies, meaning the object is to deny opponents their ability to achieve their positive goals. They were well adapted to the situation of the people in Eastern Europe, but inappropriate for the stronger side in a conflict. An example of a positive or offensive strategy would be to look for opportunities to apply salami tactics against an opponent. But the question is what does the other side consider salami? Answering this question is like linking something pleasant (salami) with useful (strategy) and hopefully appropriate for the summer holidays.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is the context, purpose, and structure of navies – and promoting discussion on these subjects in his country.

Update on Polish Navy Progress

Maritime Infrastructure Protection System: The sharks with lasers are mod 2.
Maritime Infrastructure Protection System: The sharks with lasers come in mod 2.

Last week was a good one for Polish Navy. A few things happened which look minor if considered separately, but put together show a glimpse of how the Polish Navy will look in the future. As publicly available information about military matters in Poland is still scarce, there is also room to put these events in broader perspective and explore their philosophical underpinnings.

The week started with information that REMUS 100 won a tender to provide 2 systems for harbor-defense use by the naval bases in Swinoujscie and Gdynia. Later, at the Maritime Systems and Technologies 2013 Europe (MAST) conference and the NATO Naval Armaments Group meeting, both taking place in Gdansk, participants had the opportunity to see a live demonstration of Maritime Infrastructure Protection Systems, a multi-sensor maritime-monitoring system designed by CTM Gdynia. The next day, the Polish MoD issued a Request For Information (RFI) for just such a system, and, the very same day issued an RFI for patrol ships and corvettes. Little is known about these ships but the patrol ship is supposed to be in the range of 1,700 tons and possess the “capability to search and destroy naval mines and other dangerous underwater charges”. The corvette, which is officially called the Coastal Defense Ship, is expected to carry among other things weapons for “precision strike of land targets”. In parallel, the MoD prepared a tender for highly publicized project of Air and Anti-missile Defense, which will consist of 6 medium-range (100 km) and 11 short-range (25 km) batteries. Although that was not a predominantly naval development, the Navy’s modernization plan foresees 2 short-range batteries to be included in force structure. Add to that announcement the following and the overall picture becomes clearer: the newly commissioned Nadbrzezny Dywizjon Rakietowy (Coastal Defense Battery), equipped with Kongsberg NSM missiles will be extended to have a 2nd unit, there are rumors that planned submarines should be armed with “deterrence weapons”, and an ambitious plan that 3 new mine-hunters should join the fleet starting from 2016.

The first impression that comes to mind is that the protection of infrastructure and naval bases is viewed as a critical priority. This is also the message from the recently concluded mine-counter measures (MCM) exercise, IMCMEX 2013 – “It is more than just MCM”. The logic is simple – Two naval bases, one Swinoujscie and one in Gdynia, requires two sets of defensive weapons and systems. Taking a step back, the MoD seems to be building A2/AD fleet or modern version of Jeune Ecole, which is not surprising for a continentally oriented armed forces. At this point I start to have some problems with terminology in defining what kind of navy the Polish Navy will be. If we measure distance between major ports or naval bases in the Baltic Sea in a straight line we get following results:

Szczecin to Kiel, Germany: 147nm
Szczecin to Korsoer, Denmark: 139nm
Gdynia to Karlskrona, Sweden: 144nm
Gdynia to Baltijsk (In Kaliningrad, Russia): 47.5nm

Too close for comfort, or sea control.
Too close for comfort, or sea control.

This situation is not unusual in narrow waters but raises the question as to what degree we can speak about “area denial” when this area is congested, contested, and probably beyond control for anybody. In such a case the term “sea control” should have a very Corbettian meaning: “here and now”. In the extreme case of Gdynia and Baltijsk we observe a sort of direct contact within the range of modern artillery. It becomes hard to speak about any area to deny.

On the other hand if we use term Jeune Ecole, which heavily relied on torpedo boats, then another question emerges: how effective was this asymmetrical weapon of époque against an enemy battle force? Sir Julian Corbett, as Prof. James Holmes recently reminded us, was very concerned by the fact that the first torpedo-armed flotillas made fleets structureless, the weapons greatly empowering small craft and upsetting defined roles. Can we say something more on that subject after 100 years of experience? My not very scientific and brief review of Conway’s Battleships reveals that out of roughly 194 battleships constructed and commissioned (including a few completed as aircraft carriers), only three have been sunk as a result of torpedo attacks of surface flotilla ships [Scott C-P did an unscientific review last year of all types of sinkings]. These were Szent Istvan, Fuso and Yamashiro. In addition four were torpedoed and sunk by submarines, which at least at the time of Corbett’s writing were considered flotilla vessels. They were Barham, Royal Oak, Courageous, and Shinano. This produces a total of 3.6% — not much, and an invitation to reconsider the viability of a coastal navy focused on asymmetric weapons only. We need some symmetry in force structure as well.

The conceptual roots of the Polish Navy maybe lies in von Clausewitz’s thesis that defense is a stronger form of war than offense, but seeks an opportunity to switch to offense as soon as possible. Using Sir Julian Corbett’s subtitle from his “Green Pamphlet”, this Navy will seek a decision on land engaging in “offensive operations used with a defensive intention”. It leads me to my final and perhaps banal conclusion that the closer to the coast the Navy acts, the more land-warfare theories apply.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

Polish Navy’s Small Steps Ahead

A competition is underway for the honor of landing on the Polish fleet's decks.
                    A competition is underway for the honor of landing on the Polish fleet’s decks.

The Polish Navy is expected to receive 6 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and 6 Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters starting in 2014-2015 as part of a much bigger yet-to-be-awarded deal, totaling 70 helicopters and more than $2.5 billion. The new fleet will replace 10 aging Mi-17 and 4 Kaman SH-2 helos used for ASW and SAR. Poland’s Ministry of Defense announced its intention to purchase the helicopters as a result of National Security Review, which calls for higher mobility in the armed forces. Another 10 of the 70 helos will go to the Air Force in SAR configuration, but most of the fleet, 48 in the troop transport version, will be troop transport versions for the Army. The Polish military speaks (in Polish) about “common-base airframe,” but it is not clear if that refers to all versions, as requirements between services differs significantly. It is also expected that the helicopters will at least in part be produced in Poland.

Potential contenders for the contract are Sikorsky, Eurocopter, Agusta Westland, and AW’s Polish subsidiary, PZL Swidnik, bidding separately. A brief look at the actual range of aircraft makes it interesting to see what the sales strategies of the companies will be. Sikorsky and AW already have production lines in Poland. Sikorsky and Eurocopter (specifically NH Industries) could offer common-base airframes. The closest replacement to the Mi-17 in terms of size is the Super Cougar from Eurocopter, but the short lead time makes it difficult to integrate ASW gear into a new airframe.

New ASW helicopters, in contrast with the Mi-17, are more likely to operate from the decks of Coastal Defense Ships (CDS), for which specifications are being drafted and should be ready this year. Their rather enigmatic name, according to Commander in Chief means ships that differ from classic corvettes in mission priorities and equipment. The ship should also be able to operate as part of allied task groups beyond the Baltic. Such a definition will certainly will hangers with the necessary facilities to support air operations .

The first new assets in the modernization of the Polish Navy will not be ships, but helicopters. Additionally, the ill-fated Gawron corvette program seems to have come to a reasonable end as the MoD approved the final configuration for the unfinished Meko A-100 corvette as a patrol ship. Under the name Slazak she will join the fleet in first quarter 2016.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

Poland’s Heightened Defense Priorities

           The NSM Coastal Defense System

As national defense gains more attention in Poland, the Navy should benefit after years of neglect.  Specifically, the renewed focus raises hopes that all of the projects laid out in Poland’s recently published modernization plan will receive political support.  During only the last 2 months Poland has declared its intent to participate in NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance project and announced it would join the European Space Agency, mindful that:

Poland’s presence in the ESA will simplify cooperation within international projects that have already started, e.g. the satellite defense agreement with Italy and participation in Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Observation (MUSIS).

The latest news (in Polish) says delivery of the first 12 Naval Strike Missiles (NSM), for the coastal defense battery called NDR (Nadbrzezny Dywizjon Rakietowy), is expected to take place at the end of the month.  Further deliveries will continue until 2015, based on the contract valued at 924M PLN ($280M). 

In the background is a series of political meetings.  On November 12th, the Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Defence from Poland and Sweden held talks about military cooperation and regional security.  As an official MoD newsletter says, it was an “historic first”.  The meeting also highlighted the dual role of navies in war and peacetime, as the Polish Navy plays a role in international cooperation focused on maritime security that is equally a matter of defence and foreign affairs.  In another series of bilateral meetings with the German Minister of Defence, the importance of the Navy was directly raised. 

During the meeting the Ministers talked about bilateral military cooperation and international affairs.  Modernization of the Armed Forces, including modernisation of the Navy, was among the topics as well. 

“Besides air defence and missile defence, modernising the Polish Navy is very important for us.  We carefully observe Germany and its solutions for modernisation of mine-hunters,” Minister Siemoniak said.

Another source (also in Polish) gives a handful of details about the fruits of these engagements, and mentions that specific directives have been issued for the Chiefs of Polish and German Navies, including joint patrolling in the Baltic.  Cooperation with Germany on the industrial level is also highly probable as the Polish Navy prefers austenitic steel for construction of its new mine-hunters and such technology is offered by Luerssen only.

However, intentions remains just intentions without correct financing.  The good news is that project of the 2013 military spending is 6.74% higher compared to 2012, and 12% higher in the case of equipment modernization.  After joining NATO, the Polish navy significantly increased its participation in multinational exercises.  Operational tempo grew, but this was not seen as important tool of diplomacy.  Only recent shift in government interest promise that old and worn out navy platforms will be replaced and properly recognized for the diplomatic role they play.

 

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country