Forgotten Naval Strategists – Sept 30-Oct5
Editor: Tiago Mauricio & Matt Hipple – NEXTWAR(at)cimsec.org
BJ Armstrong widened the view of Mahan with his book 21st Century Mahan, but let’s do one better by expanding our register of maritime strategists – the forgotten & abused navalists. Inspired by Tiago Mauricio‘s article on Fernando de Oliveira.
Maritime/Defense Innovation – Oct 21-31
Editor: David Lyle – jamminnav(at)yahoo.com
Coalition Effort with “The Bridge”
With the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum sandwiched like delicious deli turkey in the middle, we’ll be discussing innovation & innovators past, present, and future in the realm of defense technology and methodology – with a particular eye towards the maritime realm.
Ship Design – Nov 18 – Nov 22
Editor: Alex Clarke – alexanderdouglasclarke (at) gmail.com
What is the state of modern ship-building and are we building the right kinds of ships, but militarily and commercially, that take best advantage of our concepts, our geography, and our technology?
Amphibious – Dec 9 – 13
Editor: TBD
Talkin’ bout taking beaches, kickin’ in coast-shaped doors, and expeditionary goodness.
Sea Control Podcast Schedule:
Sept 15: EUCAP NESTOR
Sept 22: Sea Control, Asia-Pacific
Sept 29: The Future Defense Industry
Oct 6: East Atlantic: Falklands 2 – Col. Pike and Maj Neame
Oct 13: African Border Control
As part of the Fourth Global International Studies Conference held in Frankfurt (Germany) 6-9 August 2014, a series of panels was organized on Maritime Securityscapes. One of the events was a roundtable on the future of the emerging, informal subdiscipline “Maritime Security Studies”, a rapidly growing field of analysis and research. The participants were asked to provide their comments along four broad questions. The following is one participant’s input to provide food for thought and a better understanding of maritime security as an academic field of interest and study.
Frankfurt, site of the 4th WISC Global International Studies Conference (source: wikipedia).
What are the most pressing and important questions that Maritime Security Studies (MSS) need to answer?
There are four immediate aspects to this, two of which are more inward-looking and two of which are more outward-directed. First, students of maritime security must better utilize the momentum of conditions that are in favor of the thrust of the field (e.g., the littoralization of security, the maritime [and indeed naval] dimensions of climate change, the hypothesis of the increasing utility of naval forces in future conflict scenarios, the recent publication of a cross-sectoral European Maritime Security Strategy, etc.). Second, maritime security scholars must consider, and learn to mitigate, condisations that are seemingly at odds with the thrust of the field (e.g., current land-centric conflicts, continental geopolitical and strategic thinking in policy-making circles, etc.).
Third, there must be a consistent evaluation of the contemporary relevance of maritime security, especially in light of what will come after “anti-piracy”. The naval operations off the Horn of Africa have locked the theme of security at and from the sea in the minds of many policy-makers and analysts to the degree that maritime security is often seen as exclusively about counter-piracy. Naturally, this self-imposed limitation is neither desirable nor practical. Here, it is especially the strategic-minded researchers that have an obligation to make decision-makers aware of the broad security dimensions of the maritime sphere. While they cannot prevent the career of certain terms, they should at least attempt to manage it properly. Fourth, maritime security students must consider how policy-makers can be convinced that investments in maritime security capabilities and capacities at home and aboard is beneficial. This relates to the challenge of doing critical and pragmatic studies: traditional security studies are increasingly dominated and even overpowered by constructivist approaches.
Piracy areas worldwide.
What issues should be prioritized? What are the top priorities?
As with many fields of study, the top three priorities are funding, funding, and funding. Beyond stating this obvious desire, there appears to be the need to sharpen arguments and understanding of the subject matter “Maritime Security”. For example, in Germany, “maritime security” (“maritime Sicherheit”) has become an all-encompassing term, meaing all kinds of things to all kinds of people. From a naval perspective, “maritime security” usually means just one set of missions among many others (for the U.S. Navy as laid out in the most recent U.S. Navy strategy “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” from 2007; for the German Navy by default, i.e. the operational experience in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations since 2002/2008).
Disciples of the emerging field of study should also not forget to look at the field from a commercial and naval perspective. The defense industry, after all, is increasingly looking at littoral security and the emerging maritime safety and security missions, fishery surveillance, counter-piracy, drug interdiction, environmental protection, humanitarian aid, and SAR. Commercial shipping companies are increasingly looking at security in the littoral areas, the ports, and the choke point regions. This offers critical and pragmatic scholars an excellent starting point to link their academic work and insight with influence on actual events and developments.
Scholars should also consider to revive and revitalize the concepts of seapower/sea power in their institutional, function, and geographic dimensions (as British naval strategy dean Geoff Till reminded us once, sea power is something that certain states, or seapowers, have). In addition, it behooves to freshen up on the three uses of the sea for navies (developed by Ken Booth in 1977 and Eric Grove in 1990): diplomatic, constabulary, and military.
Boundaries are a necessary evil, but they help to frame our analytical approaches.
What are the convergences between academic and policy needs in maritime security? Are there shared gaps and how could these be addressed?
The effects of sea power and the policies that make and shape it must ultimately be felt ashore. The same goes for maritime security studies; there are inherent limits to bemoaning “sea blindness” again and again. Policy and maritime security studies both need a better understanding and appreciation of the value and virtue of naval power, and the opportunities of naval forces (presence, flexibility, versatiltiy, modularity, speed, crisis response, etc.). To that end, Maritime Security Studies disciples must learn to embrace navies (even if it means learning some dreaded military lingo and going to acronym hell and back). Navies, in turn, should learn to reach out to the academia and ask hard questions and demand sustainable answers and solutions. Whereas many navies are more about operations than about strategy, and policy-makers often confront a whole host of demands and pressures that keep them from thinking (and acting) strategically, the ultimate goal must be a closer linkage between naval officers, policy-makers, and maritime security students. Those in every field that reach out to the other two players must be identified, and the relationship could even be deepend by way of reserve duty in a navy for civilians and academic fellowships for naval officers).
The secret fantasy of the Maritime Security Studies analyst.
How can the new maritime security studies be strengthened? What institutions will we need to undertake research collaboratively?
From a German perspective, there isn’t a single definitive center of gravity for maritime security (especially strategic) intellecutal thought, although there are a number of institutions that could collaboratively engage in maritime security studies (such as the Future Ocean cluster in Kiel, the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg, and the University of the German Armed Forces). Maritime Security Studies can only be strengthened in a comprehensive manner. Geramns love the comprehensive approach but too often quickly turn a blind eye toward the indispensable military component of that approach. This requires a mapping of institutions and actors who are into the subject. The Institute for Security Policy in Kiel, with its demonstrated experience in third-party research projects and maritime security and naval strategy expertise (one PhD completed in 2009, one to be completed this year, three more due between 2015 and 2018) would be another natural player. Last, but certainly not least, the Center for International Maritime Security itself could play a role.
Analyze this!
What are plausible next steps for Maritime Security Studies?
There should be a drive for greater institutionalization of the field through dedicated conferences, journals, university chairs, summer schools (one such event was recently organized in Greece), M.A. and PhD courses, etc. There could be a biennial maritime security studies conference – not unlike the McMullen Naval History Symposium in Annapolis, MD – that brings together experts and students from different fields (e.g., naval strategy, recent naval history, etc.). The subject at hand is interesting and exciting enough to explore more dimensions and collaboratively engage in visits on ships, war games and simulations, etc.). In the end, the goal must be to move from maritime case studies such as the dominating anti-piracy operations to the larger trends.
Sebastian Bruns is a Research Fellow at the University of Kiel’s Institute for Political Science/Institute for Security Policy. He holds an M.A. in North American Studies (U of Bonn 2007). The views he presented in Frankfurt and here are his own.
Drones are a rapidly expanding market in the international arms trade. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is crucial for operating in the modern battlespace and drones are the best way to get that information by maximizing loiter and removing risk to a pilot. Demand is high and supply is low; only a few countries produce the class of drones that are most in demand. This would seem a perfect market for the United States to sell its wares and dominate the exchange but it is currently hamstrung by policies which discourage their export. The hesitation to export the technology, while done for good reasons like maintaining United States’ technological advantage and protecting a powerful capability from exploitation by foreign agents, is misguided; without the powerful network of communications satellites and Global Information Grid (GIG), the drones themselves are little more than complex model airplanes with good cameras. The United States’ efforts are akin to closing Pandora’s Box because of imagined evils without recognizing the good that remains left trapped inside.
Exporting drones is a good thing for the United States. First, it promulgates a capability we want our allies and partners to possess. For years, British and Italian MQ-9 Reapers have patrolled the skies over Afghanistan, bringing the twin benefit of additional ISR to the battlefield and eliminating the need for American assets to cover those units. In addition, the British have armed MQ-9s that provide additional strike assets to coalition operations. The United States only stands to gain by exporting more of these assets.
Dominating the supply of drones brings the United States leverage it would not otherwise have. Just as with other aviation assets, drones need a steady stream of supplies to be viable. If the country that operates those assets uses them for purposes that are against the United States’ interests, the United States can then press forward with sanctions and cut off supply of crucial parts needed to keep the assets operational. In a world fraught with fault lines and shifting loyalties, leverage matters.
There are a couple arguments in favor of restricting drone exports. The first is wishful thinking. The argument holds that by restricting the sale of to foreign clients, we will deny them drone capabilities, particularly their ability to conduct strike missions. The problem is that Pandora’s Box is already open. Even though there are few suppliers of in the field right now, there are many others that are about to enter the market. A joint European consortium, led by France, is developing the nEUROn. Britain is developing the Taranis. China is aggressively marketing the ASN-209 at international airshows. Chris Rawley highlighted Singapore’s entry into the market in his recent article (https://cimsec.org/unmanned-systems-distributed-operations-one-many/). Even Turkey is developing the Anka. If there are lots of suppliers, the United States will no longer have its privileged negotiating position and will need to make more available to encourage use of its platforms. This means expanding the list of what is exportable and seriously considering exporting armed assets.
Britain is developing the Taranis, one of many competitors the United States will face in the international drone marketplace (image from BAE Systems)
The other argument against exporting drones is out of fantasy (as Dave Blair elucidates in his excellent article here: https://cimsec.org/remote-aviation-technology-actually-talking/). The argument goes that the United States should not export drones because they are a revolutionary capability that would unfairly strengthen possible adversaries. This, too, falls short. The aircraft themselves are only a small portion of the equation and what makes them great tools of war. The real strength of drones is their ability to conduct global operations which requires the United States’ network of satellite communications to operate in a distributed manner. Without that network, the drones are nothing more than a more capable model airplane that linger longer than a fighter or helicopter.
The story of Pandora’s Box ends with Pandora desperately shutting the lid in a vain attempt to keep bad things from entering the world. Unfortunately for Pandora, it was too late; the damage was done. The only effect that she reaped by keeping the box closed was to leave hope penned inside. While the United States did not unleash the desire for countries to acquire drones, it certainly is achieving the same effect as Pandora by ignoring the world in which it lives. The better course of action is to recognize what drones are truly capable of on their own and embrace an export mindset.
Matthew Merighi is a civilian employee with the United States Air Force’s Office of International Affairs (SAF/IA). His views do not reflect those of the United States Government, Department of Defense, or Air Force.
Military planners have historically used wargames to influence future operations. The extensive wargaming conducted at the U.S. Naval War College during the interwar years is widely credited with preparing the Fleet to fight one of the greatest seaborne wars in history against Japan during World War II.
As Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz put it: “War with Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms at the Naval War College by so many people and in so many different ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise…absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war; we had not visualized these.”
Wargaming at the U.S. Naval War College in Pringle Hall, circa 1947
The iconic images of War College students maneuvering model fleets across the wargaming floor of Pringle Hall as the players experimented with scenario after scenario are staples for any student of naval history. Since then, technology and computers have greatly improved the process, and the War College is arguably still the world’s premier wargaming organization, providing key insights to fuel operational planning and acquisition. Unfortunately, as extensive and sophisticated as its program is, it can only perform about 50 events each year. Facility space, equipment availability, and personnel to actually play the games will always constrain the robustness of on-site wargaming programs…at least for now.
What if all resource constraints were removed from our wargaming activities? What if an infinite amount of space was available – only limited by the surface of the Earth? What if the potential participants were only limited by a population willing and able to participate? What if they were equipped with the resources necessary to execute a war game? These questions might seem absurd at first, but a new and powerful concept known as crowdsourcing could be the answer to solve these resource issues.
No longer a notional concept, crowdsourcing is becoming more widespread. The basic idea is to leverage the collective intelligence and creativity of the “crowd” – a large, virtually limitless population. Advances in collaborative technologies have helped commercial entities leverage this concept and vastly increase productivity. One of the more well-known is the Amazon Mechanical Turk which, at last count, had more than 500,000 participants in more than 190 countries all simultaneously completing simple tasks. Another is CrowdFollower, which claims to be able to access more than 2 million participants across the globe. Even complex strategic analysis from a crowdsourcing consultancy like Wikistrat is being done today.
The basic idea is to leverage the collective intelligence and creativity of the “crowd”
How can this be applied to wargaming though? Given current processing power and infrastructure, it is not feasible for the crowd to submit traditional wargaming moves to a central hub (such as the War College) for adjudication. Instead, this broadening of the talent pool enables more ideas to effectively put the crowd to work. A starting point has been established by the U.S. Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), where they have conducted Massive Multiplayer Online War Game Leveraging the Internet (MMOWGLI) sessions that seek creative ideas to mission requirements across the active, reserve and civilian forces.
Crowdsourcing traditional wargames (such as those at NWC) in this way, would seek solutions to strategic, operational, and tactical problems while coupling realistic analysis with user-friendly interface necessary to enable an end-to-end scenario played by participants. The balance between the level of fidelity required to provide meaningful data, with the level of abstraction necessary to enable experimentation would be a key attribute. After processing of the information, these game results could reveal meaningful insights for tactical development.
As demonstrated in the interwar period, iteration after iteration of experimentation in wargaming can help predict possibilities in war and then provide at least a starting point to begin to prepare. Today, technology is advancing at rates never dreamed of prior to WWII, while geopolitical shifts are much more rapid and pronounced. The necessity for speed of iteration and experimentation has never been greater, and the crowd has the potential to help address this. Instead of roughly 50 war games each year, imagine hundreds – even thousands – played daily. The crowd can win and lose wargame scenarios over and over, rapidly resetting and fighting again. Combined with near-instant social media exchange of ideas, innovative solutions can emerge through pure trial and error from a group almost unimaginably large.
The world will always lean on experts. The crowd will most likely never replace the great wargaming work conducted at war colleges and throughout the military, but it has the potential to be a powerful source of rich data. The crowd is moving into formation, preparing to sail into war. Will we use the crowd or waste this virtually untapped resource? The time is coming to send the crowd to war.
LT Jason H. Chuma is a U.S. Navy submarine officer who has deployed to the U.S. 4th Fleet and U.S. 6th Fleet areas of responsibility. He is a graduate of the Citadel, holds a master’s degree from Old Dominion University, and has completed the Intermediate Command and Staff Course from the U.S. Naval War College. He can be followed on Twitter @Jason_Chuma.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.
