Tag Archives: frigate

Capability Analysis

The Case for Pickets

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(Editor’s Note: Hey! Corvette week is going so well, we decided to extend it!)

“They Were Expendable” makes for a good movie title, but U.S. naval personnel in the 21st century are not such a disposable commodity.  They Were Expendable

This line in Steven Wills’ article points at a very pivotal question of naval force design, and he’s probably on the wrong side of history.

Small ships and boats – corvettes, avisos, frigates – were historically used for many support functions by battle fleets. These functions did not focus on the destruction or deterrence of enemies until the advent of practical torpedoes in the late 19th century, when the torpedo-boat destroyer was introduced in order to counter torpedo boats. The nature of the torpedo and the difficulties caused by the speed and small size of torpedo boats forced navies to adopt a pattern known from warfare on land: The detachment of small and preferably quick forces to positions between the main forces of both belligerents. Later anti-submarine screens by destroyers, destroyer escorts, sloops and corvettes were even more obvious analogies to their land warfare equivalent. The radar picket destroyers of 1945 were another extreme example.

These security efforts were indispensable for saving marching army corps the disruptions of raids, for countering hostile reconnaissance efforts, for providing reconnaissance and for delaying attacks until the own main force is ready to offer battle or has slipped away.

The core concept behind this is to expose a few assets to great risks in order to spare the bulk of the forces much risk. Small detachments were “expendable,” while an entire army corps caught in an unfavorable situation would be a disaster.

Mr. Wills is correct that this approach has lost much appeal to 21st century people in the Western World. In fact, this approach lost ground by the 1970’s already when the escorts – destroyers and frigates – grew to what’s now widely perceived ”capital ship” status because of the demands by powerful missile armaments.

Years of patrolling the very confined Persian Gulf did not help the idea that depth of defence may be gained by having picket ships such as the radar picket destroyers used to warn about incoming kamikaze aircraft in 1945. AEW and MPA aircraft had largely assumed the picket role.

Yet the HMS Sheffield’s fate on picket duty (substituting for an AEW asset) demonstrated both the need for a picket and the relative unsuitability of large ships in such a role: A picket itself must not be a worthy prize. Its survivability should rest on its unworthiness as a target. It should cause enough trouble to the enemy to help its own fleet, but not enough to become an intentional target itself.

Mr. Wills thinks a corvette crew of 35 would be too large for such an exposure, and he’s probably correct. The problem of existing corvette designs may be that they’re neither large enough to be a powerful and thus useful asset nor small enough to be a suitable picket, exposing themselves to protect the capital ships. The very smallest coastal corvettes known from Sweden may be close to a suitable picket hull, though.

A few more words about the possibilities of pickets:

Radar and infrared sensor suites of capital ships still have for plain physical reasons great difficulties with a timely detection of sea-skimming missiles. Less elaborate sensor suites deployed forward could detect incoming missiles much earlier than gold-plated ones on capital ships. The same applies to torpedoes.

Furthermore, advanced multi-static sonar concepts demand the use of multiple vessels with miles of spacing in between. The full potential of low frequency active sonars is likely not going to be exploited without such forward-deployed  vessels, and the smallest hulls to be called “corvettes” may just be the right hull size for this purpose unless we use modified civilian vessels for the purpose.

Detached boats could also serve as decoys, but the fashionable unmanned vessels are the natural choice for this mission.

Sven Ortmann is a German blogger. Since 2007, his blog, “Defence and Freedom,” has covered a range of military, defence policy and economic topics, with more than a million page views. His personal military background is his service in the Luftwaffe. He has guest-blogged at the Small Wars Journal Blog and other blogs on military topics.  http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/

Capability Analysis

Philippine Navy Frigate Program: An OPV by Any Other Name?

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By Armando J. Heredia

The Philippine Navy has unveiled bidding specifications to purchase it’s first new major surface combatant in several decades. Titled “Frigate Acquisition Program,” this key milestone of the Capability Upgrade Program will reorient the nation’s military from decades of COIN operations and enable a credible defense against conventionally-armed opponents.

090906-N-0120R-068A closer look at the program’s bid specifications along with missions that are likely to be met by the platform, reflects the balancing act between cost and capability that all naval forces must perform when seeking mid-to-low assets. Is it really a frigate that they’re looking for? Or is it more of a corvette? Or even an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV)?

It’s worth noting that at a functional view, the distinctions today between frigates, corvettes and OPVs are subtle; and in most cases, the label used is more about political expediency than clear-cut delineations about capabilities. For purposes of this article, an OPV leans towards enforcement or constabulary duties as opposed to being a dedicated combatant vessel, with a minimal weapons fit necessary to fulfill it’s function.

A Philippine Navy Desired Force Mix paper published in 2012 identified gaps in several operational specialties including Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW); roles traditionally filled by frigates and corvettes. The bid specifications at a high level paint a picture of a multi-role combatant with embarked helicopter that meets both those capabilities, plus a moderate surface warfare punch.

However, a closer look at the requirements calls into question if the program is really seeking a frigate:

  • Perform Economic Zone Protection Roles
  • Operate up to Sea State 6
  • Operational Range of 4,500 nautical miles @ 15 knots
  • 30 Days Endurance
  • Minimum upper speed of 25 knots

Starting at the top, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) specification combined with high endurance and rough sea-state handling gives signals that we’re looking more at a patrol vessel for primary use. The contemporary history of spats with China over the resource-rich Shoals and the Spratlys is a stark reminder that asserting claims in the maritime space is one of the Philippine’s political drivers for modernization. Currently, the Navy has only two vessels capable of sustained operations to the edges of the EEZ; namely the newly acquired High-Endurance Cutters (WHEC) from the U.S. Coast Guard. It’s logical that follow-on ships would enhance those same patrol and presence operations.

The lower speed range (most combatants top out at 30+ knots), large operating radius, modest cruise rate and long endurance time reinforce the idea of patrol rather than dedicated offensive operations. While a specific propulsion type is not mentioned, one of the reasons the Philippines did not leverage wide availability of gas-turbine ships in the used defense market is a concern for their high fuel consumption rates. That may be explained in some part by the doubling of the Navy’s Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants (POL) expenditure; seeming to coincide with the initial operating year of the gas-powered Hamilton WHECs. While the cutters by themselves cannot be the sole cause, it’s a reminder that with new acquisitions comes a increased overhead – there are no free lunches. Gas-turbine plants are also a novelty, having been introduced to the Fleet only on the WHECs – and an older model to boot. Given all that, it’s likely that the winning bid will be diesel-based. This is also a characteristic of patrol vessels, prioritizing fuel efficiency and a greater operating range while trading off reduced speeds for sprints, evasive maneuvers and transits.

Other aspects to consider:

  • Embarked helicopter and rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) facilities, including full hangar space for the aviation asset
  • Accommodations for special warfare or other occupants
  • Selection of a 2D air search radar and Electro-Optical (EO) sensors
  • A quadruple Surface-to-Air (SAM) launcher with infrared or semi-active homing missiles (5km minimum range)
  • Two dual-box Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) Launchers (total of four missiles, 50 km minimum range)
  • 76mm main gun
  • One (1) secondary stabilized gun

Again, some subtle differences delineate this vessel’s requirements from a pure combat craft. Helos and RHIBs are common to both ship types – force multipliers that enable presence, intelligence-gathering and and if needed, kinetic reach well beyond the ship’s limits. Conversely, they can also be used for search-and-rescue (SAR) and law enforcement. A possible supporting indicator is whether the winning bid uses ramps versus davits. The latter method is more versatile and enables SAR operations in rougher seas that would swamp a ramp-equipped ship. The additional accommodations, while noted for special warfare detachments, can also double as holding areas for refugees, survivors or detainees.

When selecting a sensor suite for a frigate, there are no advantages to having a 2D radar versus a more capable 3D radar that facilitates, among other things, effective anti-air warfare. Coupled with the minimal SAM armament that is purely defensive in capability, this cannot be one of the ships meeting the AAW role. The under specification of the SSMs (eight missiles are nominally found on most warships) is another indicator of the balance between versatility and weapons fit, potentially indicating that deckspace is either at a premium or needs to be freed for other purposes. The 76mm main gun leverages operational and maintenance commonality, as the Oto-Melara is present on other ships in the fleet. It is also just about the largest caliber that can be found on patrol vessels. No explicit Close-In Weapons System, a staple in modern warfare against missile-equipped opponents, is another tell. Very rarely are OPVs armed with last-ditch defense systems, and their secondary gun is usually a slower-firing weapon in the 20-35mm range rather than high-speed multi-barrelled Phalanxes or GoalKeepers.

Of the eleven prospective bidders, what are some of the offerings that might fit? The tight budget requirement really drives baselines to be a small hull, likely accompanied by a custom sensor/weapons fit that may not tick all the boxes.

Navatia’s Avante 1800 is an excellent candidate, ticking and in most cases, exceeding the requirement checkboxes. South Korea could be sitting pretty, as the pending sale of FA-50 fighters could put them at the top of the list to leverage same-source efficiencies. But it will take a lot of corner-cutting to get Hyundai’s Incheon-class frigate down-specified to fit the bill. While not in the prospective bidders list, other close alternatives are BAE’s Amazonas-class OPV, and ST Marine’s Fearless baseline platform. Other alternatives may be immediately disqualified on the basis that they must be “proven vessels,” – i.e., previous successful sales of the platform in the past ten years.

Given the short period that has passed since publication of the technical specifications, it’s not surprising that the bidding deadline moved to the end of November, granting interested parties more time to build competitive proposals. Of all the hurdles they face, the one that may be most daunting is the projected total budget of roughly USD400 Million for both units plus integrated logistics support. The situation is further complicated by the notorious 2-Stage Bid Process that has derailed previous acquisition programs.

A term that will likely puzzle and frustrate the bid analysis is “Fitted for but not with” – meaning, “yes, we’d like to have Feature X, but if your bid doesn’t have it, it might still be okay and we might actually have the money for it but we can’t tell you right now.” It’s a very big symptom of the program’s tone of uncertainty. If no changes are issued to the technical specifications, then only pre-bid Q&A will enable prospective companies to tailor their offerings.

The program could quickly run out of steam if winning bids don’t emerge. If that happens, the bid process resets with accompanying waiting periods. Several factors are lining up that would make such delays to a successful signed contract fatal. For starters, the monies allocated will need to eventually be reset if not spent, requiring passage again through an already lengthy and onerous legislative process. President Benigno Aquino III’s term will end in 2016, and there is no guarantee that the following administration will be as supportive of military modernization. Finally, there is growing call for a rejection of purchases that are not addressing immediate security needs such as the Sabah and Zamboanga crises. Assuming a bid makes it past, they will still have to reckon with Stage 2, where potentially something as small as a documentation omission or error could force a reset back to the beginning as well.

To succeed, the Frigate Acquisition Program needs to move away from a minimums-only approach on technical specifications. A Request-for-Proposal that states minimums exclusively will beget minimums – driving the bidders to a cost-sensitive solution. By emphasizing what this platform really should excel at (i.e., surface warfare or AAW), this gives maneuvering room for the suppliers to build in additional selling points under the bottom line. This gives the Philippine Navy a solution that should satisfy cost limitations and deliver the most value.

Armando J. Heredia is a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Future War

Flight III – A Piece in The Surface Combatant Puzzle

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A Lockheed Martin AMDR conceptual depiction.
A conceptual depiction of the Flight III and AMDR.

For a distant observer, commenting on alternatives to the DDG Flight III would be difficult without the well written documents by Congressional Research Service writer Ronald O’Rourke.  His Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress lists most of the program’s considered possible alternatives, reducing the scope of the issue to selecting evaluation criteria and identifying a specific solution.  Besides the considered options there is also a recommendation that could broaden the scope of the discussion:

Conduct a thorough [Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)] in accordance with DOD acquisition guidance for its future surface combatant program to include:
(c) implications of the ability of the preferred ship to accommodate new technologies on future capabilities to determine the most suitable ship to carry [The Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)] and meet near-term [Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)] requirements and provide a path to far-term capabilities;
(d) implications on future fleet composition;

With the gradual disappearance of frigates from the Navy’s service, the truncation of DDG-1000 to three units, and LCS under critics’ fire, Arleigh Burke is slowly becoming the sole “can-do-all” class of surface combatant. There is an interesting critique of a homogenous ship class force structure related to the history of the Canadian Navy, with the judgment rendered thus:

“Force structure planners should be aware that the history of the RCN shows that naval flexibility cannot be derived from a uniform fleet.”

The author, Kenneth Hansen further elaborates his thesis in another article, concluding that  “If the strategic context is complicated, changing, or uncertain, a diversified fleet structure is required.” Armed with such knowledge, let’s step back and reconsider Navy assumptions for its old Future Surface Combatant Program. This envisioned:
• – A DD(X) destroyer for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire missions;
• – A CG(X) cruiser for the air defense and ballistic missile defense missions; and
• – A smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter submarines, small surface attack craft (boat swarms), and mines in heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.

Many things have caused the cruiser as originally conceived to become unaffordable, the destroyer (DDG-1000) has grown to the cruiser’s price and size, and LCS is suffering badly from a lack of operable modules. But the concept itself is not dead. The original requirements, changed under the pressures of the economy and a drive for efficiency, asked for an AMDR with a relative capability described as “SPY+30.”  The new solution for DDG Flight III has a relative capability of “SPY +15”, called in a GAO report “marginally adequate“. At the same time Ronald O’Rourke reports states:

As part of the [Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces (MAMDJF)] AOA, the Navy identified that DDG 1000 can accommodate a SPY+25 radar. As part of a technical submission to the Navy, BIW, the lead designer for DDG 1000 also identified a possible design for a 21-foot radar on DDG 1000. The Navy did not include a variant with this size radar in the Radar/Hull Study.

Fancy a frigate?
                          Fancy a frigate?

Another conclusion from MAMDJF AOA study was that a smaller number of higher performance ships is preferable to networking less-capable but more numerous ships. On the other hand such a former approach deepens the deficit of cruiser/destroyers. Is there a way out of this trap? As controversial as it seems, it is theoretically possible to reintroduce a hi-lo mix into the surface fleet, consisting of cruisers and frigates. The aim would be to acquire one cruiser and two frigates for a price of two DDG Flight III. The result would be a Navy with a high-capability ship focused on IAMD undistracted by other tasks, such as ASW, with dedicated escorts in numbers allowing it to close the gap in surface combatants hulls. The fleet structure could therefore consist of:

1. Cruisers with the IAMD mission. If DDG-1000 fills this role it can retain its striking capability. Its towed sonar would be eventually cancelled and ASW mission limited to self-defense and shorter ranges. As an intermediate step toward future capabilities, an extant volume search radar could be retrofitted to the three hulls under construction, allowing more time for BMD software development and integration. This cruiser would represent a scaled-down version of CG(X).

2. Frigates would fill the escort mission focused on ASW and anti-air local area defense. For this purpose, a low-end Aegis could be used, possibly combined with a future, economy version of SPY-3 radar. Frigates should resemble the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen more than the Spanish Alvaro de Bazan-class with a the difference being a higher number of VLS cells. This class promises to be an affordable workhorse of the fleet, doubtful for the DDG Flight III, which looks more and more strategic.

3. DDG-51 and its follow-on class, which opens a discussion about the word “destroyer” in the U.S. Navy. In order to avoid a “can-do-it-all” syndrome, the follow-on class (a differently conceived Flight III perhaps) could specialize in strike and anti-air area defense capabilities without BMD, and limited ASW capabilities similar to the aforementioned cruisers. In other words, this class would represent a return to a more realistic representation of DD(X) idea. A flexible class would be a good companion both to carriers, supporting the strike mission, and to the corvettes below, providing air defense. It is also neutral towards follow-on decisions and permits the class to free up the extra room for needed growth margins.

4. Corvettes, with a mission to “clear littoral clutter” and focus on ASW, ASuW, MCM, and patrol tasks.

Such a mix would also open the path for new technologies like an all-electric drive, a Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE), or Advanced Gun System (AGS) to develop in the Fleet. New technologies need enough numbers to evolve into something practical, otherwise they become unwanted expensive “gold-plating”. This four-tier structure also offers flexibility for forming surface task forces tailored to changing situations.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

New Initiatives

MFP 5: Designing the Next Naval Vessels

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How would you design the next naval vessel for your fleet?

This is the fifth in our series of posts from our Maritime Futures Project.  For more information on the contributors, click here.  Note: The opinions and views expressed in these posts are those of the authors alone and are presented in their personal capacity.  They do not necessarily represent the views of their parent institution U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, any other agency, or any other foreign government.

Like LCS, but not LCS
Like LCS, but not LCS

Sebastian Bruns, Fellow, Institute for Security, University of Kiel, Germany:
It looks like a very basic choice will have to be made between multi-functional platforms and increasingly specialized platforms.  In other words, the decision will likely be between multi-purpose programs such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program of the U.S. Navy, and more narrowly designed warships.  At this time, most navies look to be favoring the flexible approach.  The early feedback from the LCS and other programs – most notably the overloading of platforms – should shed a light on the challenges and shortcomings of such an approach.  It should be noted that there are some very flexible, very capable platforms that work – i.e. the Danish Absalon-class.  In light of the inherent flexibility of seapower and almost all warships that buttress maritime power, a balance must be struck between flexibility without over-burdening (i.e. LCS programs), and specialization without discarding too many operational options.  If further burden-sharing, political and military integration, and pooling & sharing of resources are the ways of the future, they will lead to some hard decisions.  The results of such deliberations, however, must be fully embraced.  This is nothing short of a monumental task.

Felix Seidler, seidlers-sicherheitspolitik.net, Germany:
I would leave things as they are.  However, besides the Joint Support Ship/LHD I mentioned in answer to earlier questions, an advanced addition to our submarine force would be an interesting idea.  There are plans for air independent propulsion (AIP) Class 216 subs; as quiet as the 214s, but with far more operational range and, therefore, nearly reaching a SSN’s global mission capabilities.

Dr. Robert Farley, Professor, University of Kentucky:
I think that the most pressing need is for a vessel capable of undertaking maritime maintenance missions; something akin to the current Oliver Hazard Perry (OHP) frigates.  Focus for design would consequently be on endurance, flexibility, and reliability, while potentially giving up some high-end capabilities.  I liked the idea for a new generation frigate that John Lehman floated during the U.S. Presidential campaign.

Fast Patrol Catamaran
Fast Patrol Catamaran

Bryan McGrath, Director, Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis:
The very next naval vessel I would build would be a 50-meter Fast Patrol Vessel, heavily armed and lightly armored.  It would be built in great numbers (approx. 150) and be available for foreign military sales.  It would serve as “maritime boots on the ground” as a forward presence force, there to remind others of our interests and to carry out a great deal of the day-to-day business of presence and international cooperation.  Again – I would build these only if Navy budgets were increased.  If cuts are made, then this investment would not be made.

CDR Chris Rawley, USNR:
See my response to question 2 (small, affordable multi-purpose ships).

LT Drew Hamblen, USN:
I’d ensure submarines were able to launch unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

CDR Chuck Hill, USCG (Ret.):
Better information will not totally eliminate the need to board and search vessels.  In fact it might raise more questions that can only be resolved on scene.  The U.S. Coast Guard will continue to need vessels to do boardings, as will the Navy in wartime.  A significant unmet requirement for the Coast Guard and possibly for some elements of the Navy is an ability to forcibly stop even the largest merchant ships.  With merchant ships now up to 100 times as large as their WWII counterparts, gunfire and even ASCMs may not be effective.  Torpedoes, even small ones, targeting ships propellers might satisfy this need.

To maximize their utility in war, I would like to see new cutters equipped for peacetime roles to keep down the cost of operation, but designed with the ability to be upgraded to wartime roles within a few months.

LT Scott Cheney-Peters, USNR:
First, I’d pay great attention to the concept of modularity, as demonastrated – though yet to be perfected – in the U.S. Navy’s LCS.  The basic philosophy of modularity opens up a lot of opportunities for cost-effective means for keeping a seaframe technologically relevant.  Second, I’d invest in a hybrid-electric drive.  A powerful electric bus aboard a ship will become increasingly important if the technological hurdles of directed-energy/electric weapon systems (DEEWS) are overcome.  Third, I’d figure out how to ensure the flight decks/well decks/boat decks were designed to easily launch and integrate (along with combat systems suites) with an evolving array of new drones.  As with modularity, because it’s not easy to predict with hi-fidelity the exact outlines of the fleet of fifty years from now – creating a craft that’s more adaptable to the changing times is an advantage that is vital to build in.  Fourth, I’d leave space to play with 3D printers.  If they don’t pan out it’s room for another ship’s gym!

YN2(SW) Michael George, USN:
I would not.  I honestly believe we have all the ships we need right now.  Maybe more than we need, especially since Naval warfare as we know it from World Wars I & II will not be reappearing.  Ships are entirely too slow and simply not as practical.  Why use all the money, bodies, and logistics to send a ship to another country to attack when a missile could “simply” be shot from the U.S. to any country in the world with precision?  Just my opinion.

Can I interest you in a sub-launched drone?
                Can I interest you in a sub-launched drone?

LCDR Mark Munson, USN:
This is difficult question and my instinct is to hedge and advocate ships that meet a strategy along the lines of Zumwalt’s “High-Low Mix.”  A worst-case scenario for the U.S. Navy would be a fight against China and its growing Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) capabilities, while the more likely mission is low-end maritime security options.  My perfect ship for supporting the Maritime Security mission would be designed around requirements for lots of deck space (for small boats and helicopters), and command spaces for embarked staffs equipped with the necessary Command and Control and Intelligence Collection/Analysis systems.

LT Jake Bebber, USN:
Again, vessel design should match the strategic imperative.  However, as a cryptologist, I’d hope for a large cryptologic space with lots of antennas!

Anonymous, USN:
I would focus on making sure that the ships that we have now are properly manned/trained/equipped before worrying about the next generation of naval vessel for the fleet.

LT Alan Tweedie, USN:
Modularize every aspect of the ship.  Everything from combat systems to navigation to hotel services would be a module.  If an upgrade or maintenance opportunity arises on literally any piece of equipment it could be swapped out and worked on off-ship.  LCS is a step in the right direction but my model would carry the LCS mission module concept to the entire ship.