CDA Institute guest contributor Dave Beitelman, a PhD candidate at Dalhousie University, comments on why Canada should take a stronger position on China’s claims in the South China Sea. This is Part 1 of a two-part series.
It was just announced by Defence Minister Sajjan and Foreign Affairs Minister Dion that Canada will be contributing a battalion-sized force as a key element of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence in Eastern and Central Europe. With smaller commitments elsewhere, including in Iraq and Ukraine, this is a considerable commitment, and one which will limit the ability of the Canadian Army to deploy elsewhere. To put this new troop commitment in perspective, Canada deployed, on average, 2,500 troops to Afghanistan at any one time – the size and duration of which put an incredible strain on the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The new NATO deployment is expected to number approximately 1,000CAF personnel, though the exact number, and their particular responsibilities (infantry, support, etc.,) will not be known until a formal announcement is made at the NATO Summit in Warsaw.
In the official press release, Minister Sajjan is quoted as saying, “As a responsible partner in the world, Canada stands side by side with its NATO Allies working to deter aggression and assure peace and stability in Europe.” As a member of the NATO alliance, it makes sense that Canada would contribute to the mission, and can even be seen as an expansion of the work the CAF have been doing in Ukraine. Beyond the alliance politics, however, the more fundamental point is that Canada’s strategic and economic interests are served by a stable and peaceful Europe. Contributing to that stability is part of being a responsible ally and member of the global community.
Far from the borders of Eastern Europe, however, another challenge to the peace and stability of the global order is unfolding in the Asia-Pacific region, and most pressingly in the South China Sea. On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague is set to announce its verdict on the maritime jurisdiction dispute between the Philippines and China. China lays claim to nearly the entire South China Sea, while many other states in the region, including Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have claims of their own. China has said it will not recognize the Court’s ruling, a message the Chinese government has repeated since 2013.
While the circumstances and historical context of Russia’s challenges in Eastern Europe and China’s challenges in the Asia-Pacific are different, the essence is the same. In both cases, Russia and China have used proxy forces to do the pushing, with Russia using ‘volunteers’ and other non-official forces to help push its claims in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and China using a mix of coast guard and militia forces to bully its neighbors, while People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) vessels lurk nearby. By refusing to acknowledge the right of the PCA to hear the case, or even of the Philippines to file it, China has made its preferences well known: the South China Sea belongs to China and any disputes should be discussed and negotiated bilaterally, rather than through third-party mechanisms – particularly non-Asian ones. Notably, China can throw its weight around in bilateral negotiations and coerce its smaller neighbors more easily. This has the other states in the region worried, and rightfully so.
In addition to seeking closer ties to the United States, many states in the region have increased their defence budgets and made public statements denouncing China’s behavior. How China, the U.S., or any other country in the region will react to the PCA’s ruling is anyone’s guess. Some speculate China will unilaterally announce the imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, supported by the network of radar stations, missile batteries, and airstrips on the islands China has dredged into existence over the years. When China announced an ADIZ over parts of the East China Sea in 2013, the U.S. responded by flying two B-52 bombers through the zone. The stakes in the South China Sea, where the Chinese government has invested significant amounts of both financial and political capital, are much higher. Accordingly, tensions in the region leading up to the July 12th announcement are running high.
Over $5 trillion in trade passes through the South China Sea per year. The Canadian government has made the region a key economic priority, due to its many emerging economies, of which China is clearly the most important. To support its economic ambitions, Canada has also tried to gain membership to the institutions through which the region’s economic and security architecture are created, namely the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). All that is to say, it is a region of the world where stability is being threatened and where Canada has substantial economic and strategic interests. And yet, while Canada has been vocal in opposing Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, it has been largely silent on Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Save for two superficial ‘statements of concern’ by former Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird, Canada has said almost nothing. And that is a mistake which sorely needs correcting.
The reasons for Canada’s silence vary. It has been said that Canada has no ‘real’ strategic interests at stake in the South China Sea or vis-a-vis China, nor any real capacity to influence Chinese behavior, and so Canada has little to gain by ‘rocking the boat.’ What’s more, China is an important economic partner with whom Canada has sought closer engagement. By involving itself in regional politics, Canada risks alienating its second largest trading partner. As I’ve argued elsewhere, these arguments don’t hold water.
Outside of its membership in NATO, what direct interests does Canada have in Eastern Europe or the Baltic states? Members of NATO determine their level of engagement based on the relevance to their national interests (along with other considerations), and so it would not be unusual for Canada to be less active in the region than it has been. And, given its recent long-term engagement in Afghanistan, and its on-going missions in the Middle East to combat ISIS, the argument that Canada isn’t pulling its weight would not be particularly persuasive.
Canada has as much interest in the stability of the Asia-Pacific as it does Eastern Europe, if not more. Not only does Canada have extensive economic interests in the region, the many partners Canada has been attempting to build relationships with do too. Canada’s Five Eyes allies Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. are directly impacted by the rise of China. Japan, another important economic and defence partner, is at risk. Canada has very clear strategic and economic interests which are currently at risk. More to the point, however, the argument that Canada has few, if any, security interests at stake in the Asia-Pacific region contradict existing Canadian policies and actions– something I will explore in more depth in Part 2.
David A. Beitelman is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Dalhousie University and a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, where he served as Deputy Director from 2013–14.
Featured Image: (July 12, 2012) – Soldiers from multiple countries (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Tonga and United States) get in position on the flight deck to man the rails on amphibious assault ship USS Essex in Honolulu, Hawaii, on July 11 2012. (Canadian Forces photo by : MCpl Marc-Andre Gaudreault, Canadian Forces Combat Camera.)
From author Ian Birdwell comes The Changing Arctic, a new column that will focus on the unique security challenges presented by the increasingly permissive environment in the High North. The Changing Arctic will examine legal precedents, rival claimants, and possible resolutions for disputes among the Arctic nations, as well as the economic implications of accessing the region’s plentiful resources.
By Ian Birdwell
The Northwest Passage was once a mythic trade route that claimed dozens of Europe’s foremost explorers. Today, travelers can traverse the passage once sought by the likes of Cabot, Drake, and Franklin on the world’s first cruise line1from New York to Anchorage; the trip lasts only about a month. This shift in accessibility to the Arctic is a direct result of the planet’s warming climate. While increased access to the Arctic offers advantages in terms of commerce and tourism, it has also ushered in a new era of maritime security issues for Arctic nations. Specifically, as the Arctic Ocean warms and northern ice sheets recede, the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark will confront new aspects of maritime security, potentially causing rifts in long-established relationships. As such, it will prove increasingly important to examine the history of these states’ interactions with an eye to the Arctic Ocean’s commercial future.
The Arctic has always been a place of contention for the nations surrounding it. As receding sea ice opens new sea routes, however, a comprehensive understanding of historical territorial disputes in the Arctic and the influence of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) will be necessary. Canada was the first nation to claim vast swaths of territory in the Arctic Ocean in 1925. Not long after the Soviet Union followed suit, laying down their own claim in 1937.2Though not yet passable by sea, control of Arctic territories was viewed as beneficial as it provided access to and providence over air routes. While moderately contested, Arctic territorial disputes would only become a marquee issue during the Cold War, when the region gained strategic significance as an area to base submarine-launched nuclear weapons.
A map of overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic. (Encyclopedia Britannica Inc)
Arctic nations’ ratification of UNCLOS and the end of the Cold War were catalysts for tension. Notably, the provisions of UNCLOS did not affect Arctic relations until climate change began in earnest because the majority of exclusive economic zones provided within it were practically inaccessible. However, as the ice has melted, the tenants of the Convention have failed to alleviate emerging territorial concerns. Four of the five Arctic Nations have only recently ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas3; the United States has still yet to do so.
As the waters warm, the Convention has been used as a toolto entrench territorial claims4 through UN appeals and report submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf UN Subcommittee (CLCS).In short, the interested parties are attempting to exploit the convention as a way to extend legitimate Arctic claims beyond the 200 nautical mile mark, as in Norway’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). While Norway’s submission is noted by the UN is based on independent negotiations with other Arctic states to extend5beyond the 200 nautical mile mark6, the most recent Canadian7, Russian, and Danish8submissions to the CLCS have been partial submissions, allowing states to make arguments for territorial extensions in the Arctic beyond the CLCS time limit of ten years following ratification of UNCLOS, as outlined inarticle four9of Annex II of the Commission of the Limits of the Continental Shelf section of UNCLOS. This, coupled with the geography of the Arctic Ocean, makes Arctic relations more difficult as it pushes territorial disputes into the realm of global bureaucracy under a convention poorly designed for use at the top of the world.
Every square kilometer of ice that disappears raises the stakes in the Arctic region due to its large untapped commercial potential and as the world’s next trade route. Ice previously made oil exploration infeasible. Now, a shrinking ice sheet makes it easier to maintain oil rigs while offering opportunities for expansion. Russia has been pushing the most for this kind of expansion10due to their expansive arctic coastline. The Russian Federation stands to gain the most commercially.However, the opportunity to control vast amounts of petroleum resources has the United States, Canada, and Denmark excited for drilling opportunities as well. While the recent drop in oil prices11 has tempered this excitement somewhat, time will tell if market shifts and changes in government regulation spark an oil rush in the Arctic. This throws not just national oil giants like Gazprom into the Arctic, but potentially any private oil company capable of negotiating the use of ocean territory into the mix, further complicating territorial disputes and international agreements. Thus, it becomes vital for nations on the Arctic Ocean to solidify their territorial claims either in international courts, diplomatic agreements, or through deterring their rivals from contesting their claims with force.
Passage through the Arctic region12 is likely to become incredibly important as ice levels stabilize and charts improve, yet there are several rising complications for passage that are not environmental. While most routes pass through either Canadian or Russian territorial waters, the entrances to those routes can be militarily contested by Denmark, the United States, and Norway, regardless of which nation’s territorial claims include those waters. This in and of itself poses a problem, because some form of stability and control is needed to ensure shipping routes can be used. While it is unlikely for routes to be blockaded or military conflict to arise, the fact passage control could be contested by any of these nations forces them to develop Arctic-capable assets.13
As climate change alters the Arctic Ocean, the transformation of the world’s highest seas will push the nations surrounding it into an area of unresolved territorial disputes and increasingly higher financial stakes. To provide for more detailed analysis on these nations, the consecutive articles in this series will take an in-depth look at each nation’s goals, limitations, and security concerns as the ice sheets recede.
Ian Birdwell holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Government and International Politics from George Mason University.
2.McKItterick, T.E.M. “The Validity of Territorial and Other Claims in polar Regions” Journal of Comparative legislation and International Law, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1939)
5. Russian Federation “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines” United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Updates June 30, 2009 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm>
6. Kingdom of Norway “Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf Outer Limits of the contiental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines” United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Updated August 20, 2009 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm>
7. Canada “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines” United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Updated December 29, 2014 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can_70_2013.htm>
8. Kingdom of Denmark “ Commission on the limits of the continental shelf outer limits of the conteitnal shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines” United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Updated May 21, 2014 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_dnk_68_2013.htm>
Written by Terence Bennett, Naval Applications of Tech discusses how emerging and disruptive technologies can be used to make the U.S. Navy more effective. It examines potential and evolving developments in the tech industry, communication platforms, computer software and hardware, mechanical systems, power generation, and other areas.
“The most damaging phrase in the language is ‘We’ve always done it this way!’”— Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper in an interview in Information Week, March 9, 1987, p. 52
By Terence Bennett
The famous phase, ‘One if by land, and Two if by sea’ recalls Paul Revere’s ride to warn of the impending British approach, but it is also an example of an early light communication system. From lighting large signal fires during the time of Homers’ Iliad to lighting smaller fires on Greek picket vessels to warn of a Persian attack, light communication has been used in military application for centuries. Additionally, the use of signal lamps – whale oil, then kerosene, and ultimately electric lamps – has been a staple of modern maritime communication. The Aldis Lamp, invented in the early 1900s, which uses Venetian blinds to easily cover and uncover a light bulb, is the most recent iteration of this technology. Its pairing with Morse code allowed for a sophisticated form of visual communication that has yet to be replaced. This technology was critical during the Battle of the Atlantic, when radio silence and highly coordinated tight formations were imperative for the safe transit of Allied convoys.1Although ship to ship communication has shifted almost entirely to radio communication, Aldis lamps are still ubiquitous on the bridge wings of U.S. Navy ships due to their simplicity and effectiveness. Light communication has again shown the potential to assist ships in secure and reliability communication. Light Fidelity communication is a new technology with widespread application in both ship-to-ship and internal ship communication.
External Communication
In today’s increasingly complex world of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) systems and cyber attacks, there is a returning place for this ancient form of at-sea communication. A new form of light communication system called LiFi, or Light Fidelity, uses generic Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) to transmit high-speed data through the visual light spectrum, and could be used for ship-to-ship communication.
Researcher Harald Hass has developed a way to modulate the intensity of a LED bulb like a radio wave, and receive its signal through a photodiode to decode it. The technology was first demonstrated at a TED talk given by Haas in 2011. LiFi works by modulating the normally steady stream of light from an LED bulb at over a million cycles per second (or 1MHz). A photodiode receiving unit can detect these modulations in the form of undetectable flashes and decode them into a signal. Once a photodiode receives the signal, it is decoded like any other signal and the computer determines what to do with the data. The network works on the same principles as WiFi, but at much greater speeds (up to 224 GB/sec). In its commercial application, LiFi will challenge WiFi’s dominance of the networkable wireless field.2 Most advances in the technology have been to develop LiFi use for a standard room-sized area as a replacement for WiFi, but some research has proven LiFi’s ability to transmit at distance. A project in the Czech Republic, called the Reasonable Optical Near Joint Access (RONJO) project, has created an open source light communication system that transmits a 10 Megabit per second link, comparable to a high-speed Internet connection, over a one-mile distance. The project design was released under a General Public Use Free license and the parts only cost about $100. Some amateur users have been running the system for more than ten years and report high reliability communication during day or night, and even in light rain, fog or snow.3
German physicist Harald Haas with LiFi device. (Harald Haas/University of Edinburgh)
With additional research and customization, the range of this technology could be extended to the twelve nautical mile horizon and still be extremely secure, requiring an adversary vessel to either get between the two vessels communicating or into a position behind one of them to intercept half of the transmission. Mr. Haas’ early version of LiFi reached broadcast levels of 10 MB/sec, similar to the RONJO project. Mr. Haas’ later research uses diode lasers with different light frequencies that are interpreted as different channels, thus allowing for data transfer rates up to 224 GB/sec.4
This technology is especially exciting for its use in special applications. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is currently working with the firms Exelis and Nova-Sol to develop the Tactical Line-of-Sight Optical Network (TALON) for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication. The TALON is still in a testing phase, but is estimated to be deployable within the next five years.5 It works in the invisible spectrum, requires proprietary technology, and although ‘low cost’ by Navy standards, it certainly costs orders of magnitude more than the $100 off-the-shelf RONJO design. Although the TALON system will fill important gaps in our communication architecture, specifically the transfer of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data, it will be expensive and ultimately designed for a niche purpose as with all proprietary systems.
The TALON optical antenna Phase 2 design. (CHIPS Magazine)
Because of these limitations, a simpler Sailor-built LiFi system modeled after the RONJO design has a place in the Navy today. In a future battlespace of radar spoofing and communication jamming, the Navy needs secondary and tertiary technologies to support these mission critical functions. Ship-to-ship LiFi could provide a cheap, secure, and, reliable technology for ships in formation. Commanders can build this redundant capability using a ship’s 2M shop (onboard Electronics Technicians), who can build and repair these systems with off-the-shelf components and software. Unlike many Navy systems that require contract support, the RONJO LiFi system would make ships wholly independent of technical support from the shore.
Through experimentation the Navy can take immediate advantage of the advances in LiFi discussed above. By looking at LiFi as a high-tech upgrade of the ALDIS lamp, the Navy can provide a necessary, dependable, and affordable capability to the Fleet. LiFi also has applications for the Navy outside of ship-to-ship communication in internal communication systems.
Internal Communication
In April of last year, the Navy started experimenting with issuing Sailors tablets at Basic Training. The long term goal of this eSailor program is to integrate many daily functions through these wireless devices while also giving Sailors a tool to connect with family and friends. By doing this, the Navy will build a scalable and flexible platform for implementing training, maintenance requirements, and general daily functions. The long-term viability of this program relies upon the Navy developing a system to securely and efficiently connect devices to internal Navy networks and the Internet. Traditional technologies have proven difficult to implement and hardwire connections like Ethernet defeat the purpose of going wireless. The most common WiFi frequency, 2.4Ghz, has become mainstream because of its ability to penetrate wood, sheet rock, and even small amounts of concrete and metal. The nature of ship construction though, ¼ inch steel bulkheads in particular, obstructs the propagation of these frequencies.
The Navy needs an internal wireless broadcast network for use with personal tablet devices. The adoption and implementation of the eSailor tablet program rests on the ability for tablets to be used on ships for everyday functions. Sailors will need to connect to central maintenance servers onboard the ship and other internal Navy networks. The security of these internal servers is very important, which has led the Navy to move slowly toward connecting internal servers to anything besides traditional Ethernet connections.
The Navy has many options for securing a traditional wireless network on land, but ships provide many more challenges. One option is to place the router in a low space, like a basement, to shape the signal only upwards and not outwards. Another method would be to set up multiple routers at low broadcast power levels to ensure the signal did not leave the intended area. These methods would be difficult and expensive to set up on a steel ship because of the high degradation of the 2.4 GHz frequency through steel. Instead, LiFi broadcast technology could provide a highly secure method to transmit data inside ships while not adding to a ship’s electronic signature or making the network vulnerable to attack from outside the ship. Due to the recent nature of advances in LiFi technology, commercial products are limited, but many companies are demonstrating exciting potential for the technology. Ultimately, competition in the network industry will make LiFi a long-term affordable solution.6
The Navy’s recent demonstrations with 4G LTE aboard the USS Kearsarge and USS San Antonio proved this highly adaptive traditional cell phone technology works for broadcasting high speed signals in a local area. The system brought voice, text, and video communications to the crew of these amphibious ships. But it also demonstrated the very real difficulty of closed steel doors cutting off radio signals.7 The commercial availability and easy integration of 4G makes it a great candidate for fleet-wide and ship-to-ship communication. Furthermore, it could allow Sailors to make phone calls home without using a ship’s limited secure bandwidth. There is a downside to an over reliance on 4G technology though, its open broadcast architecture. As with other radio frequency emissions, it can be collected passively, giving away a ship’s position and reducing Operational Security (OPSEC). At times, operational commanders will want to turn off these broadcasts to allow a ship to hide.
The Navy has a real requirement to find an internal wireless broadcast medium that is affordable, reliably secure, and can be used when standard radio systems are secured for operational reasons. WiFi fails all three needs because it will be inherently difficult and expensive to set up on a ship – both due to ships’ steel construction and its expense and largely dectable radio footprint. Despite recent successes with 4G at sea, it fails the same tests as WiFi because of its inability to broadcast within a ship and be used during periods of radio silence.
Assuming every lamp on a ship was installed with LiFi bulbs, multiple LiFi enabled tablets would be able to connect to a local ship’s network the same way they would connect to a WiFi network. An obvious requirement for LiFi is having the lights on, which is not a problem on ships, but researchers have even proven that LiFi can work from a barely-detectable dimmed lightbulb as well.
As for security, transmitting LiFi could prove problematic if an adversary was close enough to see it and be able to decode it, but design requirements for U.S. Navy ships provide a natural barrier against accidental LiFi emission. Positive-pressure ventilation systems and the preexisting shipboard requirement to control externally emitted light at sea make ships a great platform for LiFi. Starting with the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, the Navy has implemented positive-pressure air filtration systems called the Collective Protection System (CPS) aboard ships. This design concept means that modern warships have significantly fewer windows and openings. This fact, combined with the importance to all ships of controlling their light emission at sea for purposes of Rules of the Road, means that the only light emitting from a ship is intentional.
PACIFIC OCEAN (Nov. 13, 2014) An F-35C Lightning II carrier variant Joint Strike Fighter conducts its first carrier-based night flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68).(U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Lockheed Martin by Andy Wolfe/Released)
A majorhurdle that technologists have yet to fully overcome is the unbalanced nature of LiFi transmission. The technology is ideal for providing download capability from an overhead lamp, but the upload side of transmission back to a router is more difficult. The use of traditional WiFi frequencies have been proposed for home use since downloading is the typical bottleneck in internet traffic. Docking stations or limited upload-only Wifi stations could be used around a ship to alleviate this problem.
There will be many engineering challenges to the ultimate adoption of LiFi, but the technology industry is making large investments in LiFi and these advances will make later adoption more affordable. PureLiFi and light bulb manufacturer Lucibel have already created the first industrial scale LiFi system and outfitted a recent conference venue with the bulbs as a demonstration. Velmenni, an Indian startup company, developed a smartphone adapter case with a LiFi adapter.8, 9 Recently, Apple patented multiple LiFi-enabled features including the ability to capture data though the photodiode in the iPhone camera. Apple also appears to be developing a LiFi enabled lighting fixture.10
With the Navy already planning to install LED bulbs throughout ships, LiFi is an elegant solution for a sticky problem. In April of last year, the Secretary of the Navy released a memo directing all new construction ships to be outfitted with LED lamps instead of florescent lamps. The press release states that 170 ships already have LEDs installed on them.11 With a little foresight, the Navy could install the required modulation hardware with the new LED lamps to allow for later implementation of an approved LiFi system.
Conclusion
Together, the RONJO solution to Ship-to-Ship communication and PureLiFi solution to WiFi limitations provide a lucrative opportunity for the Navy. In the case of RONJO, the Navy need only leverage a Ship’s onboard manpower to build and maintain a LiFi system to RONJO specifications. With minor adjusting, this system would work today in calm seas. With some additional re-engineering the potential is far more versatile. In the case of networkable LiFi like PureLiFi, the Navy need only look ahead in shipbuilding. The Navy would need to fund the addition of a modulation capability during scheduled installation of LED overhead lamps in new and existing Navy ships. This technology is being worked on by some of the biggest names in Tech. The Navy just needs a small amount of investment now to benefit greatly from it in the future.
Terence Bennett is a Navy Lieutenant who enjoys researching and learning about new technology. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.
References
1. Haas, Harald, “Wireless Data from Every Light Bulb,” Youtube, August 2, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaoSp4NpkGg.
2. Andrew Williams, The Battle of the Atlantic: The Allies’ Submarine Fight against Hitler’s Gray Wolves of the Sea, New York: Basic Books, 2004.
3. “Home.” Home, http://ronja.twibright.com/.
4. Nicole Arce, “Oxford Researchers Achieve 224 Gbps Connection Using Light: LiFi Will Let You Download 1.5GB Movie In A Blink,” Tech Times, February 18, 2015, http://www.techtimes.com/articles/33295/20150218/oxford-researchers-achieve-224-gbps-connection-using-light-lifi-will-let-you-download-1-5gb-movie-in-a-blink.htm.
5. Charles Casey, “Free Space Optical Communication in the Military Environment,” Dissertation, August 2014, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43886.
6. Allison Williams, “LEDs Could Replace Your Wi-Fi.” Popular Science, July 14, 2016, http://www.popsci.com/say-hi-to-lo-fi.
7. Spencer Ackerman, “Navy’s First 4G Network Will Head Out to Sea in March,” Wired.com, https://www.wired.com/2013/02/navy-wwan-deploys/.
8. Nikola Serafimovsk, “PureLiFi and Lucibel Introduce First Fully Industrialized LiFi Luminaire – PureLiFi™,” PureLiFi, November 25, 2015, http://purelifi.com/purelifi-and-lucibel-introduce-first-fully-industrialized-lifi-luminaire/.
9. Ibid.
10. Ray Molony, “Why Is Apple Starting to Patent Light Fittings?” Lux Magazine and Lux Review, January 12, 2016, http://luxreview.com/article/2016/01/why-is-apple-starting-to-patent-light-fittings-.
11. Secretary of the Navy Public Affairs, “SECNAV Directs Navy to Expand Use of LEDs, Navy.mil, April 13, 2015, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=86532.
Featured Image: U.S. Navy file photo. (MC2 Ryan J. Batchelder)
U.S. Air War College Professors Richard Bailey Jr., James Forsyth Jr., and Mark Yeisley recently published an eclectic book of essays on strategy. The book, Strategy: Context and Adaption from Archidamus to Airpower, contains eleven essays that span strategic topics–from cyber warfare to irregular warfare. This book, then, has a little bit of everything packed into 320 pages. The editors, interviewed over email, took the time to talk about their new book and the nature of strategic thinking. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower, edited by, Richard J. Bailey Jr., James W. Forsyth Jr., & Mark D. Yeisley. (U.S. Naval Institute Press)
Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for joining us to talk about your new book. I want to start off with a question for all of you. Of the eleven essays in the book–and all by different contributors–which one was your favorite? And why?
Bailey: I have to give an unsatisfying answer to this, unfortunately, and not because I am trying to spare anyone’s feelings.After two years of working on this book, I freely admit that I love each chapter in different ways and for different reasons.I do think that Professor Dolman’s opening chapter is foundational for the chapters that follow it.
Forsyth: That’s a good question. I am a theory guy so I am naturally drawn to theoretical pieces–Dolman’s stands out as particularly interesting. However, I thoroughly enjoyed Rich Muller’s piece, which orbits around the importance of history and the teaching of strategy. I feel a bit of pressure here as I generally enjoyed them all. The book has a certain uneven quality, as collections often do, but I think that gives it a certain charm–there is something here for everyone.
Yeisley: I would definitely say that the Bailey essay on thinking strategically on cyberspace and cyber power was my favorite, because of the framing he used to describe the tensions that exist within this realm.Balancing classical ideals of liberty versus order, the dichotomy that exists between cooperation and isolationism, and the question of choice between transparency and privacy are all social tensions that will remain so well into the near future.
Professor Bailey, as you are probably well aware, and as one of the contributors mentions early on in the book, there are literally thousands of books on strategy.Where does your book fit in this discussion?Or maybe a better question is, does your book cover areas of strategy that are under appreciated in other works?
Bailey: Most contemporary literature on strategy focuses on applications for business, and many suggest that a blueprint exists for strategic thinking and implementation.At worst, we may tend to seek out a cookie-cutter model and use that for all strategic problems.In our opinion, we have to fight the human tendency to find a one-size-fits-all panacea for strategic challenges.Thus, we insist that strategic thinking requires a widening of one’s own intellectual aperture to consider different perspectives and assumptions.This helps us to improve our understanding of the strategic environment, and to become more cognitively flexible in the face of uncertainty.In my opinion, this is our most important contribution to the existing literature on strategy.
Professor Bailey, in your essay titled “Four Dimensions to the Digital Debate: How Should We Think Strategically About Cyberspace and Cyberpower?” you raise some important topics. There is one topic I’d like to focus on. You ask the question: “Are our existing military and governmental structures sufficient for both optimizing its possible strengths and defending against malicious attacks?” So, if you had the authority and the money to reorganize or create cyber organizations, what would they look like in the future? Do you envision a Cyber Combatant Command? Is it something else?
Bailey: That is a great question.I do consider cyberspace to be a ‘domain’ where the military is concerned, but recognize that there are many more stakeholders outside the military.As opposed to operations in the physical domains (land, sea, air and space), cyberspace operations require a different set of assumptions, particularly regarding our previous focus on elements such as time and distance.As our military forces become more dependent on access to cyberspace for efficiency and effectiveness, I think there will be a strong argument for making CYBERCOM a functional Combatant Command, much like we did with Special Operations Command.I also think discussions of a separate cyber service will continue, particularly as the desire for independently minded cyber professionals gets stronger.
Professor Forsyth, you wrote an essay titled “The Realist As Strategist: A Critique.” This is a broad question, but I believe it is an important one.What do you think makes a “good” strategist?While you offer a critique of realism in your piece, I am curious if you believe there is a way in which one sees the world that tends to make for skilled strategist. To be clear, when I use words like a “good” or a “skilled” strategist, let us say for the sake of discussion that these people are able to formulate a strategy that achieves a successful end state.
Forsyth: Another very important question and one with no easy answer. As is made plain in the book, the SAASS faculty have many ideas regarding the meaning of strategy. So many in fact that some time ago I decided to forgo a definition and focused instead on what strategists do. So, let me ask you: what do strategists do? In its simplest sense, strategists attempt to solve puzzles and place bets. The key word there is ‘attempt.’ As we know, some puzzles cannot be solved and, therefore, ought to be avoided. Deciphering which puzzles can be solved and gauging the costs of attempting to solve them are key elements of any good strategist. Now, how do we develop that sort of a mind? For one thing, one must read deeply and widely. Strategy is an interdisciplinary enterprise and one field alone does not hold the key. Second, one must develop the ability to build bridges across a wide body of what might look like unconnected knowledge. One must see the relationships that exist between history, theory, science, economics, etc, in order to ascertain what is to be done. In doing so one develops a bone deep sense of humility, something in short supply these days.
As to a way of thinking that serves strategy best–realism is a tradition worth defending. It has a rich history and its descriptions about the nature of international politics is a good place to start one’s education. However, it should not stop there, as I mentioned.
Professor Forsyth, a short follow up.Do you believe that modern wars, namely those from the 19th century to today, start with moral considerations in mind, yet because we are human and emotional beings, that the realist inevitably comes to the forefront as leader and strategist? Does realism often consume moralism in strategic development and planning?If so, why?
Forsyth: The tension between justice and necessity is as old as politics itself, and it will never go away. What I have become convinced of is this: even when the demands of justice and the demands of necessity conflict, as they so often do, one need not eschew all calls for justice. The relentless pursuit of interest can lead to a bad end, as I try to make clear in my short chapter in the book. What ‘consumes’ the Athenians is the growing realism of their policies, not the other way around. There is a lesson there: a strategy based solely on the pursuit of interest can be as dangerous as one based solely on moral concerns–the two hang together or should, as best they can.
Another question for the group.In your opinion, today, who is writing about strategy, whether on historical case studies or contemporary strategic thought, that is worth reading?
Bailey: In my opinion, some of the most useful works on strategy today are those that explore how and why we think the way we do.Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slowis a good example. We cannot think about crafting, implementing, or evaluating strategies unless we first gain a respect for our own cognitive habits.Some of those habits provide intellectual opportunities, while others present challenges and pitfalls to strategic thinking.Let me also say that there are some classics reflecting many of those same teachings.Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian Warcontains concepts that, even 2,500 years later, are useful for today’s strategists.
“Seeing Like A State,” by James C. Scott. (Google Books)
Forsyth: I just finished reading James Scott’s Seeing Like a State. I commend it to anyone interested in strategy and understanding the limits of what states can and cannot do. I also have Stephan Jay Gould’s magnum opus The Structure of Evolutionary Theory on my desk as summer reading–as my colleagues will tell you, it has been sitting there for a long time. I’ve always been intrigued by his ideas regarding change and the natural world and I am trying to ascertain the usefulness of his ideas and political change.
“Strategy,” by Lawrence Freedman. (Google Books)
Yeisley: I just finished Lawrence Freedman’s Strategy: A History, and found it an excellent piece for both the professional strategist and anyone casually interested in a comprehensive history of strategic thought.It begins with the earliest origins of strategy among primates, then moves through Biblical times, into ancient Greek and Chinese thoughts on the subject, and in theory and from practical experience.The book travels through time at breakneck speed and finishes off with a view of strategy from the business world, which is a fairly modern concept in terms of books on the subject.One of its primary questions is also one of the most basic: is it truly possible to manipulate one’s environment to maximum advantage, or do we all remain vulnerable to the vagaries of our adversaries and surroundings?
You each get to have one historical strategist over for dinner.Who’s coming?And what would want to ask them?
Bailey: I would invite Andy Marshall.Marshall served as the head of the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon from 1973 to 2015, and is credited with much of the long-term strategic thinking that advantaged the U.S. during the Cold War.I’d pick his brain about his intellectual habits, and about how he mentored those around him to serve in strategic roles.
“Admiral Bull Halsey: A Naval Life,” by Thomas Hughes. (Google Books)
Forsyth: Well, that is an interesting question. Another book I’ve just finished reading is Thomas Hughes’ Biography of Admiral Bill Halsey, Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life. Another one I easily commend to all. Halsey was making Naval strategy at a time when the modern Navy was coming of age. His exploits in the Pacific theater seem particularly germane today and I’d like to ask him, ‘what do you think?’
Yeisley: I would resurrect a strategist whose life came to an end all too soon–I would invite Thomas Edward Lawrence (aka Lawrence of Arabia) for a candid discussion of the basic concepts of irregular warfare from the Arab point of view.Lawrence was a fan of the indirect approach, and led his Arab forces in skirmishing attacks on thinly distributed Turkish forces along a major rail line.His words would have great worth in a time when the U.S. has spent billions fighting the same types of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan today.
Professor Yeisley, in your essay, “Staying Regular? The Importance of Irregular Warfare to the Modern Strategist,” you state that some of the classical strategic thinkers and writers–like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, for example, have something useful to say about irregular warfare.How so?Is there one historical strategist you would recommend we read above all others when we are thinking about irregular warfare?
Yeisley: If I had to choose one among the many classics on this subject, I would choose the writings of Mao Tse Tungas the one to read above all others.Mao created and then led an effort against the Chinese nationalists prior to WWII, adapted his tactics to fight against Japanese oppression, then adapted once again to ultimately win against his adversary and secure his place in Chinese history.While his ideology was anathema to the Western mind, his ability to train both his troops and the supporting civilian population to secure victories against armies far greater than his provides valuable lessons for strategists today.
Professor Yeisley, last question goes to you.In your essay you warn the reader that we need to be prepared for the “reality of future irregular warfare.”What advice would you give to those who must prepare for such a future?
Yeisley: I would begin by acknowledging that the irregular warfare moniker may be somewhat of an anachronism these days.“Regular” warfare, whether it be interstate conflict or not, is becoming increasingly rare – whether that has to do with the rapid pace of global interconnectedness, or due to some other factors. The fact is that “irregular” warfare is becoming the norm.That said, there seems to be little argument that this type of warfare will likely be the most prevalent in the next several decades at least.Yet the U.S. continues to prepare for conflict with a near-peer competitor, and sees China as the most likely to fit that bill.
After over a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and spending billions on efforts in each of these states, we are still facing an uncertain future.More effort needs to be spent on identifying and addressing the causes of such conflict, and that will involve an effort that spans the gamut of U.S. instruments of power.Economic aid will be necessary to decrease poverty and improve the institutions necessary for future generations. Information campaigns will need to be improved to show the populations of these states our true intentions, and diplomacy must complement both these and military efforts to combat those diehards who insist on violence.But the stark reality is that such efforts will be costly and take a long time–and that will be the reality that is hardest to face for a nation whose public wants to win quick and go home.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time.
Richard J. Bailey Jr. is an associate professor of strategy and security studies, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He holds a PhD from the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Rick is an active-duty U.S. Air Force colonel, with over 3,500 flight hours in various Air Force aircraft. His research interests include military strategy, cyber power, and civil-military relations. Rick will retire this fall and has been announced as the next president of Northern New Mexico College.
James W. Forsyth Jr. is the dean of the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He received his PhD in international studies from the Joseph Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. While there he studied international and comparative politics, as well as security studies. His research interests are wide ranging, and he has written on great power conflict and war.
Mark O. Yeisley is a former USAF colonel and associate professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He holds a PhD in international relations from Duke University. While on active duty he served in various operational and staff assignments, and he currently teaches for the Air Command and Staff College.His research interests include contemporary irregular war, ethnic and religious violence, and political geography.
LCDR Christopher Nelson, USN, is a naval intelligence officer and regular contributor to CIMSEC. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS) in Newport, Rhode Island. The comments and questions above are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Department of Defense or the US Navy.
