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Capability Analysis

The Chinese Navy’s Marine Corps, Part 2: Chain-of-Command Reforms and Evolving Training

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This article originally featured on the Jamestown Foundation’s Chief Brief. Read it in its original form here. Read Part One here.

By Dennis J. Blasko and Roderick Lee

Editor’s Note: This is the second part of a two-part article discussing organizational reforms and evolving missions for the PLA Navy (PLAN) Marine Corps. The first part, in our previous issue, focused on the growing order of battle for the PLAN Marines. This second part focuses on the creation of a service branch headquarters for the PLAN Marines, and their expanding training for expeditionary warfare and other missions. Taken as a whole, this two-part article provides significant new information and analysis to update the December 3, 2010 China Brief article titled “China’s Marines: Less is More.”

New Marine Headquarters Established

Along with increasing the number of PLA Marine Corps (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Haijun Luzhan Dui, 中国人民解放军海军陆战队) combat units, a corps-level Marine Corps Headquarters also has been formed. Its first commander is Major General Kong Jun—who shared responsibility with Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi, until Yuan was reassigned in early 2019 (Pengpai News, May 27 2017; Pengpai News, January 15). Kong spent most of his career in the Army, rising through the ranks as an armor officer and commander in the former 12th Group Army. After being assigned to the Marines, he led the Marine formation that took part in the July 2017 parade at Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia. Yuan spent most of his career as a naval political officer with service in the South Sea Fleet—where the two existing Marine brigades have been located—but was transferred to the Air Force. His successor has not yet been identified. The two leaders are assisted by deputies and a staff; among the headquarters staff, Senior Colonel Chen Weidong, former commander of the 1st Marine Brigade since at least 2010, is now a deputy chief of staff (PLA Daily, July 29 2018). Due to his long experience in the Marines, he is likely to move up the ladder as leadership positions become available.

The location of the new Marine Corps Headquarters appears to be near Chaozhou, Guangdong, just north of Shantou and slightly to the east of Jieyang, where a new Marine brigade is stationed (Xiangqiao Regional Government, July 26 2018). By locating its headquarters outside of Beijing, the Marine Corps organization parallels the PLA Air Force Airborne Corps—which maintains its headquarters in Xiaogan, (Hubei Province), and which also commands subordinate brigades dispersed in multiple regions. By locating its headquarters a great distance from many of its subordinate units, this structure implies that the Marine Corps is not intended to deploy and fight as an organic whole, as may be the case for Army group armies. Instead, like the Airborne, Marine brigades likely are conceived and designed to be employed independently, but supported by other elements of its parent service. As such, Marine brigades do not appear to be directly subordinate to the Theater Command Navies in whose regions they are located; rather, they fall under the direct command of Marine Corps Headquarters (MCHQ).

A major responsibility of the MCHQ will be to manage the distribution of the increasing number of missions Marine units are now required to support. These real-world tasks include: providing forces to the Gulf of Aden escort mission, which rotates among the three fleets roughly every four months; deploying personnel to the Djibouti Support Base, which opened in August 2017; and manning garrisons and newly constructed facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The Headquarters will also manage training for the brigades, determining which units travel to what training areas and participate in which military competitions and exercises, both within and outside of China. It also will coordinate with the fleets to ensure that Marine units are available for service and joint exercises. Undoubtedly it will also inspect training and other brigade activities, such as political indoctrination, logistics, and maintenance.

Expanded Training Since 2014

For most of the past two to three decades, Marine brigades conducted the majority of their training in the South China Sea and near their bases on the Leizhou Peninsula. Most training was conducted independently, supported by Navy assets, and focused on island and reef operations. Only on a few occasions—such as the Peace Mission 2005 exercise with Russia on the Shandong peninsula—did Marine units engage in joint training outside of southern China. After Peace Mission 2005, Marine units began to exercise more often with foreign militaries, both in China and overseas. These opportunities increased as Navy task forces assigned to the Gulf of Aden escort mission traveled to and from their patrol duties, stopping along the way for port visits or bilateral exercises. Marine units have also hosted a variety of foreign visitors to their garrisons and opened a few of their exercises to outside observers.

Those training patterns changed in 2014 when the Marine Corps conducted its first winter training at the Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia. This was followed by trips to the Taonan Training Base in Jilin in 2015 and Korla, Xinjiang in 2016, which also included elements from the Navy SOF Regiment (PLA Daily, January 31 2015). In addition to the cold weather, units had to contend with desert, forest, and plateau terrain, very different from the sub-tropical climate and terrain in southern China. In a second out-of-area exercise in 2015, jungle training was conducted in Yunnan in August 2015 (PLA Daily, August 25 2015). In early 2018, Marine units, apparently including newly formed units, returned to Yunnan and also exercised simultaneously in Shandong (PLA Daily, March 16 2018). In July 2018, the PLA hosted the “Seaborne Assault” competition for Marine units as part of the International Military Games 2018 in Shishi, Quanzhou city (near Jinjiang and at one of the new Marine brigade’s garrisons) (PLA Daily, July 23 2018). These changes in Marine training indicate the determination of the PLA leadership for the Marine Corps to be ready to perform expeditionary missions in any terrain and climate.

PLAN Marine Corps Education

With the number of Marine Corps personnel roughly tripling in size and its missions expanding, one might assume that the PLAN Marine Corps Academy (海军陆战学院) in Guangzhou would also expand to provide education and training for aspiring PLANMC officers. However, the Marine Corps Academy is not currently listed among the PLA’s 37 professional education institutions. As a component of PLANMC restructuring, the Marine Corps Academy has been converted into a training base; it remains active in this capacity, but it does not appear to provide college education to young Marine Corps personnel.1 Accordingly, Marine officers and NCOs will be educated in other academies—some perhaps with Marine Corps Departments—and undergo specialized training at the training base or within their unit.

Conclusions

The 2018 Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress states that “large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations.” As such, amphibious operations require specialized equipment (both for landing and for naval/air support forces), extensive training, and intricate planning and timing in execution. Accordingly, considering the previously existing Marine and Army amphibious units and new Marine units under development, DOD concludes:

The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities.2

Campaigns against small or medium islands in China’s near seas likely would involve hundreds to the low thousands of troops delivered over the beach by a portion of the PLA Navy’s roughly 50 medium landing ships (LSM) and tank landing ships (LST) and scores of additional smaller landing craft, supported by ship-based helicopters and land-based aircraft. These assets are dispersed among all three fleets, but could be concentrated for an amphibious campaign. The Navy’s relatively new Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) large amphibious ships also could provide support to assaults on small or medium islands. Numerous civilian roll-on/roll-off ships and other transport ships may not be necessary for such limited operations, but would likely be employed in larger campaigns after a port is secured.

For missions beyond China’s three seas, the Navy’s fleet of six Type 071 LPDs, the first of which entered service in 2007, is the PLAN’s primary means of moving Marine units over long distances. These ships each can carry approximately a battalion of infantry, about 20 to 30 vehicles, and two to four helicopters for extended periods of time. Additional Type 071s are expected to enter service; and several new, larger amphibious ships, generally called the Type 075 amphibious assault ship (LHA), likely will also enter the force in coming years (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2018; National Interest, March 31 2017). Depending on the availability of ships, multiple battalions, amounting to a brigade or more, could be at sea for several weeks or months. In addition to combat, anti-terrorist, or deterrence missions, these forces could be used for disaster relief or emergency evacuation operations. But assembling a multi-ship, multiple battalion task force, with some degree of sea-based air support, is probably is at least a decade away as sealift is added and the PLA Marine Corps expands its resources and capabilities.

The expansion of Marine Corps is a major component of the goal to develop the PLA into a “world-class military” by the middle of the century (2049). When fully manned, equipped, and trained, the Marine Corps will provide Chinese leaders with options previously unavailable. As in Djibouti, PLA Marines will continue to be seen in places they’ve never been seen before. And, as they sing in their 2018 recruiting and propaganda videos, “We are different!” (PLA Daily, March 11 2018; PLA Daily, December 21 2018).

Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), was an army attaché in Beijing and in Hong Kong from 1992-1996 and is the author of The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition (Routledge, 2012).

Roderick Lee is an analyst with the United States Navy. His work focuses on Chinese maritime forces and strategy. He earned his Master of Arts degree from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

The views and opinions expressed herein by the authors do not represent the policies or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy, and are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Notes

[1] People’s Navy, December 18, 2017.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 95. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF#page=11&zoom=auto,-85,733.

Featured Image: Soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Marine Corps are seen in training at a military training base in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, January 11, 2016. Picture taken January 11, 2016. (Photo by Reuters/CNS Photo)

Capability Analysis

Don’t Forget Our Allies! Interoperable Maritime Operations in a Combined Environment

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By LT Jason Lancaster, USN

Introduction

“I’ve engaged with heads of navies from around the world, upwards of 72 different countries, in the concept that I call a 1,000-ship navy. It’s a thousand ships of like-minded nations working together to get at the emerging challenges of weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, drugs, weapons, pirates, human trafficking and immigration. These are challenges we all have, and we need to work together to ensure that the sea-lanes are secure.” -Admiral Mike Mullen1

In 2006, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mullen, put forward the idea of the navies of the world uniting to fight shared challenges to promote freedom of the seas. While today’s attention focuses more on great power competition and less on trans-national terrorism and piracy, the idea of like-minded nations fighting together for freedom of the seas remains.

The U.S. often fights wars as part of a coalition of like-minded states, and has frequently done so for over a century. The U.S. Navy has not fought a naval war alone since the Spanish-American-Cuban War of 1898. From the Boxer Rebellion to the War on Terror, the U.S. fights in conjunction with its allies and partners. The third theme of A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 is, “The Navy fighting with the Joint Force and with our allies and partners will control the high end of maritime conflict.” High capability allies increase the lethality of U.S. forces. Allied forces can complement a carrier strike group (CSG) by providing additional air defense units, contribute ships and Marines to amphibious operations, and support Theater ASW with submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and surface ships. Many allies also specialize in areas the US Navy is weak in, such as mine warfare.

Despite a lengthy pedigree of combined naval operations, the U.S. Navy must continue focusing on interoperability with allies. The U.S. Navy’s attention must remain firmly set on interoperability. It is a mindset that must be consistently reinforced by leaders and sailors operating in a combined environment. The operational staffs at CSGs and Destroyer Squadrons are vital to the successful execution of combined operations because they write the operational tasking messages (OPTASKs) and control the communications paths that enable our allies to fight with us. Without being able to communicate and operate together and understand the capabilities of allies, the U.S. Navy will not be able to take advantage of allied navy skills in a distributed environment.

Interoperability

There are four types of interoperability: Strategic, Operational, Tactical, and Technological. Strategic Interoperability is durable relationships with partner nations, organizations like NATO, or Mutual Defense Treaty relationships in Asia. These high level agreements indicate shared mutual interests and a long-term desire to cooperate and determine that an operation is required. Operational Interoperability can be achieved through a myriad of ways: a combined fleet or dividing tasks and territory between nations to accomplish individually. Tactical Interoperability is operating ships or aircraft from different countries together, and the technological level is the data links, radars, or weapons that they utilize to accomplish their missions.

Understanding the capabilities and limitations of allied platforms is vital for effective use of those assets.2 Without an understanding of what partner units can do, both sides will be incredibly frustrated during the operation. The Allied Interoperability and Coordination Guide published by the NATO Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of Excellence gives specific examples of areas that have given combined forces problems during U.S. naval exercises. Unsurprisingly, many of those examples are communications related.

Four levels of interoperability (Interoperability A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations/RAND)

High-Capability Allies and Technological Interoperability

“Link-11 is for NATO because they’re cheap.”
-SWO Lore

Today’s Allies have modern, capable warships. If one was reading Janes and saw “AEGIS Weapons System, SPY-1 Radar, SM-2 Missile, and Mk-41 Vertical Launching System (VLS),” one might assume that it was a U.S. Navy ship. But today, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Spain, Denmark, and Norway have warships with the AEGIS Weapons System,  SPY-1 radars, and vertical launch cells. Italy, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany all have ships that have similar combat system capabilities. These ships have Link-11, Link-16, and satellite communications. Over 18 nations operate the P-3 Orion, Australia and India operate P-8 Poseidons, and the U.K. is expected to deploy them by 2020. Nine nations’ navies and air forces are buying variants of the F-35 Lightning II aircraft. Between the new ships and the new planes, the U.S. and its allies are technologically interoperable. The main interoperability friction points are communications and doctrine.

Mexican, German, and US warships conduct Underway Replenishment during UNITAS 2009 (Author photo)

Because of defense budgets and population size, many U.S. allies expect to fight in a combined task force. For example, Denmark has deployed Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates in support of U.S. and French CSGs, and plans to do the same with the British. These ships have regularly made cooperative deployments with the United States Navy. These frigates have AEGIS and SPY and are capable air defense platforms. In 2013, another capable air defense platform, the FGS Hamburg made a cooperative deployment with the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CSG in 2013, the first cooperative deployment for the Bundesmarine.3 The Spanish frigate Mendez Nunez is scheduled to deploy with the Abraham Lincoln CSG.4 Cooperative deployers go through their own domestic training cycle, followed with certification by the British Royal Navy’s Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST), before sailing to the United States to participate in a Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX) and follow-on deployment.

Large scale exercises such as BALTOPS in Europe, KEEN SWORD and COBRA GOLD in the Pacific, and UNITAS in the Americas are a chance to flex all four levels of interoperability. The strategic aspect includes messaging that partner nations are resolved to work together and are ready and willing to fight tonight together. At the operational and tactical level, these exercises give navies a chance to train together, build relationships, and work through interoperability challenges. These relationships, established through frequent exercises, enable confidence in both forces’ ability to fight together. This trust is vital to teamwork and success in a future conflict.

Problems in Tactical Interoperability
Communications

Tactical interoperability is the ability to communicate and operate together. The ability to communicate effectively is a complex, never-ending battle. HF, UHF, EHF, SHF, and VHF paths are favored by different nations for different missions and different nets. The U.S. military’s large satellite constellation enables the U.S. Navy to operate at sea with a focus on UHF, SHF, and EHF communications. This enables internet bandwidth which further enables the dominance of SIPR chat as a means of C2. The destroyer’s Tactical Action Officer (TAO) is inundated with chats in multiple chat rooms from higher headquarters expecting reports on everything from enemy actions to hourly potable water percentages or other minutiae. SIPR is a U.S.-only domain which precludes allies from participating. U.S. comfort in SIPR utilization means that oftentimes allies are left outside of the communications chain.

The U.S. also operates BICES and CENTRIX computer networks for use with allies, however there are fewer computers available aboard ship for use, which restricts the ability to operate those systems. This issue can be mitigated by focusing on voice communications. Some commanders utilize chat and then use voice when they remember to include their allies in the operation. This wastes time and sidelines allies, leading to frustration. It is better to utilize the radio nets instead of chat for C2.
U.S. ships are used to operating a myriad of circuits simultaneously, but not all partner nation ships have the same capability to use a broad spectrum of circuits. Understanding the limitations of partner nation radio shacks to limit the number of circuits U.S. vessels use is important for designing stable and effective comms architecture.

Cryptographic keying material (crypto) is another major issue for successful communications. One cannot communicate effectively if the crypto is wrong. Different types of crypto rotate at different times and sailors have to understand the nuances of those rotations. As an example, during an operation, two U.S. ships and one allied ship were conducting an exercise. The two U.S. ships did not shift crypto when they were supposed to, but the allied ship did. That allied ship mysteriously fell out of the net and no one knew why. The two U.S. ships did not switch, and said it was the allied ship’s fault they dropped out because the two U.S. ships could still communicate. Eventually, it was realized that the two U.S. ships had not shifted crypto within periodicity, and once crypto had been shifted, comms were restored. This problem is more pronounced when operating with aircraft that cannot reload crypto until they return home which eliminates an asset from the operation.

The N6 community should focus on ensuring that OPTASK Comms are written with interoperability in mind. Ship’s radio shacks must be trained to seamlessly utilize allied crypto. When a ship drops communications, all ships in the squadron should verify that their settings are correct and not assume the other person is wrong. Most importantly, the staff should prioritize voice communications over chat. Emphasis on these things will enable the commander to turn an allied warship from a liability into a useful asset.

Operations

Once allies can communicate, it is time to operate together. Interoperability is a mindset. Commander’s intent can drive a CSG or DESRON to be interoperable. During exercises, the CSG and DESRON can demand that the training and doctrine commands, like Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center (SMWDC), ensure that their support during exercises is releasable to allies. The CSG and Destroyer Squadron must understand the capabilities and limitations of partner nation ships and aircraft and task them appropriately. Many naval vessels are multi-mission, however like most things, some ships are more appropriate for certain missions. A NATO air defense frigate with AEGIS that lacks a towed array sonar might be better suited as plane guard than part of an ASW search and attack unit.

U.S. forces are trained on U.S. publications such as Naval Tactical Techniques and Procedures (NTTP) and Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs). They typically receive less training on Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs). Yet NATO nations expect to fight as a unit and train from the ATPs. U.S. forces operate globally and tend to focus on their own doctrine which is similar to, but often slightly different from NATO doctrine. Part of this is a releasability issue. Since the U.S. partners with nations like Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea that are non-NATO countries, the U.S. needs doctrine it can release to them, but also doctrine that is the same in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. If OPTASKs are written using only U.S. doctrine it makes it more difficult to share with allied cooperative deployers. If a CSG has a cooperative deployer, it makes sense to utilize ATPs instead of NTTPs and ensure the OPTASKs are releasable to NATO, reducing the time required by short-staffed Foreign Disclosure Officers. The process of releasing critical information to cooperative deployers must be improved so that CSG staffs on deployment can rapidly transfer information required for day-to-day operations to allies.

OPTASKs can be written from ATPs or U.S. publications. The CSG’s OPTASKs should be written early enough for U.S. and allied ships to train to them. ATP-based OPTASKs will require adjustment for the U.S. ships, but will seamlessly incorporate any allied ships for operations on deployment. U.S. ships are supposed to utilize allied publications and procedures when operating with NATO allies; the commander should ensure that his OPTASKs are written to follow that.

U.S. Arleigh Burke Flight IIA warships lack Harpoon missiles and a significant surface strike capability. Most NATO frigates that are equipped with Harpoon or Exocet can provide additional missiles for the surface fight. The Danish Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate carries 16 Harpoon missiles, the equivalent of two U.S. cruisers or FLT I DDGs combined. This large quantity of Harpoons greatly eases the salvo sizes required for successful engagements. The U.S. Navy needs to ensure that once new Distributed Maritime Operations concepts, C4I processes, and techniques are developed, they are released to regular NATO cooperative deployers like Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom so that coalition assets strengths can be utilized.

The Korean Theater of Operations provides an interesting confluence of interoperability. The U.S. Navy regularly works with the ROK Navy and is interoperable with them, but in the event of a war, United Nations Command expects 11 United Nations Sending States – nations including European nations, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines – to contribute forces to the campaign. Currently there are few opportunities for European and ROK navies to train together. There are occasional passing exercises (PASSEXes) in CTF 151 and the occasional Tri-lateral Exercise when a European ship passes through the KTO or a Korean ship visits Europe, but those opportunities rarely stress complex interoperability issues like communications and tactical data links.

SEOUL, Republic of Korea (Oct. 11, 2016) More than 80 mine-warfare specialists from 12 nations including the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) pose during a break at the annual Mine Countermeasure Warfare Symposium in Seoul. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jermaine M. Ralliford)

There has not been much discussion over what doctrine will be used, including NATO Allied Tactical Publications or U.S. doctrine, and how to incorporate nations like the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. One area where the United Nations Command has been successful in incorporating U.N. Sending States is mine warfare. Since 2014, the U.S. and ROK Navies, and United Nations Sending States have come together to conduct mine countermeasure exercises familiarizing themselves with the local conditions and operating as a coalition. As United Nations Command ramps up that exercise, the doctrine and releasability aspects will hopefully solve themselves, however one must identify issues to solve it.

Conclusion

As fleet sizes around the world decline, Admiral Mullen’s thousand ship-navy vision becomes more important and CSGs composed of coalition partners will become more common. Since many U.S. allies operate the same or similar aircraft and ships, these coalitions are technologically interoperable, but tactical and operational interoperability starts with the commander and his intent. As the U.S. Navy creates new C4I systems and tactics, they need to be rapidly released to close partners to ensure the continued interoperability of naval forces. With good communications and releasable tactics, these nations can make excellent contributions to the fight. Without emphasis on partner nations’ interoperability, the U.S. Navy will waste valuable assets, and eventually receive fewer coalition assets on deployment.

LT Jason Lancaster is an alumnus of Mary Washington College and has an M.A. from the University of Tulsa. He is currently serving as the N8 Tactical Development Officer at Commander, Destroyer Squadron 26. The above views are his own and do not reflect the position of the Navy or Department of Defense.

Bibliography

1. U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of the Naval Operations, “Speeches” http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen060519-kqv.txt (accessed 31JAN19)

2. Hura, Myron, Gary W. McLeod, Eric V. Larson, James Schneider, Dan Gonzales, Daniel M. Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin M. O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, and Lewis Jamison, Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html (Accessed 31JAN19).

3. Gorman, Tim, Hamburg First German Ship to Deploy in U.S. CSG, 3Apr2013. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=73121 (Acessed 31JAN19).

4. NATO, Allied Interoperability & Coordination Guide Version 1.0, November 2018.

5. Richardson,John M, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Version 2.0, December 2018.

6. Gause, Kennth, U.S. Navy Interoperability with Its High End Allies, Alexandria VA, Center for Naval Analyses, October 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a468332.pdf (Accessed 31JAN19).

7. Jean-Gilles, Jacques,Carrier Strike Group Twelve Welcomes Spanish Frigate Mendez Nunez to Naval Station Norfolk, 14Jan2019, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/307019/carrier-strike-group-12-welcomes-spanish-frigate-mendez-nunez-naval-station-norfolk, (accessed 16FEB19).

Featured Image: SATTAHIP, Thailand (Feb. 10, 2019) – Marines assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) discuss vehicle capabilities with Royal Thai Navy Rear Adm. Chatchai Thongsaard, Commander Amphibious and Combat Support Service Squadron, during a ship tour. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Anaid Banuelos Rodriguez) 190210-N-DX072-1037

Europe

From the Azov Sea to the Black Sea: Russia’s Maritime Campaign

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By Jonathan Hall

Almost five years following the Minsk Agreements, the war in Ukraine has claimed the lives of over 13,000 individuals. While much of the attention has been on the annexation of Crimea and continuous fighting throughout the Donbas region, Russia has more recently added a maritime component to its campaign with aggressions in the Sea of Azov. The Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, sees the possibility of the region being used as a “springboard for further expansion,” a land invasion of Mariupol being his greatest concern. While many may fear expansion into the land environment, the far more likely scenario is westward progress by Russian naval forces, furthering their disruptive campaign off Ukraine’s coastline.

Linking the Seas

Western defense planners and analysts often refer to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov as independent entities. Distinct in their own rights, the latter largely unknown until recent events, what is important to note is the Russian government views them as inextricably linked. In 2003, President Putin reiterated this in stating, “the Azov-Black Sea basin as a whole…the zone of our strategic interests.”

Within this context, a useful analytical framework of inspection would be Russia’s “Boa Constrictor Strategy” (Тактика Удава). Attempting to economically strangle the Ukrainian government, the blockade of the Kerch Strait serves as the first example to do so in the maritime environment. Hamstringing shipment to and from the port cities of Mariupol and Berdyansk, located in the Sea of Azov, Russia is likely to continue these economically disruptive and militarily aggressive activities in the greater Black Sea region. The object of such operations would invariably be the littoral waters near Ukraine’s western port city – Odessa. While maintaining the status quo – relative restraint in deploying land forces – the Kremlin could similarly hamper maritime commerce, endanger sea lines of communication (SLOC), and therefore dissuade future investment in the region. Loss of industry and access to the sea via de facto Russian control of the remaining Ukrainian coastline could both financially cripple Kyiv’s economy and, in effect, landlock the country.

Fighting in the Gray Zone: From Land to Sea

Discussions of Russia’s operations often refer to its “gray zone” approach to warfare. Defined as, “Those covert or illegal activities of non-traditional statecraft that are below the threshold of armed organized violence; including disruption of order, political subversion of government or non-governmental organizations, psychological operations, abuse of legal processes, and financial corruption as part of an integrated design to achieve strategic advantage.”

In the Sea of Azov, there are already observed Russian gray zone methods in the maritime domain. Therefore, while the threat of a Russian land invasion should be considered, the threats facing Odessa – and the Ukrainian coastline writ large – likely will remain in the Sea. For several reasons, these incrementally disruptive hostilities, akin to ongoing naval tactics being employed by the Chinese in the South and East China Seas, should be Kyiv’s greatest worry.

First, an overt incursion on Odessa would necessarily involve Russia telegraphing the movement of its Black Sea Fleet – serving as host to a sizeable contingent of sea and land forces. Due to the augmented defensive capabilities installed by the Ukrainian military – its newly developed anti-ship “Neptune” cruise missile and modernized S-125 Neva/Pechora surface-to-air missile system – Kremlin strategists would likely advise against such a move. Although Ukraine’s personnel and equipment in the region would not ensure victory over a would-be invading Russian force, they provide the conventional deterrence required to allay concerns that Moscow believes it can quietly seize the region.

Route of Ukranian vessels seized by Russian vessels in late 2018 near the Sea of Azov (BBC)

Second, despite doubts regarding open invasion, concerns abound that Russia may attempt similarly subversive activities in Odessa to what occurred in Crimea and throughout Donbas. The tactics used in the early years of the conflict – in annexing the Crimean Peninsula and creating the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics – were both geographically and demographically dependent and unlikely to be as successful if applied in western Ukraine.

In Crimea, the Kremlin’s “little green men” were able to assume control without widespread violence due to favorable conditions which do not exist in Odessa. The political environment on the peninsula, conducive for a Russian takeover, hosted a citizenry which was, for the most part, either emboldened by Russia’s sudden presence, indifferent, or silenced by fear.

Throughout Donbas, the disinformation campaign and political saboteurs were able to stoke the flames of discord required to launch the creation of the so-called autonomous republics. With Russian-backed separatists, private military contractors, and Russian regulars all taking part, control was effectively fractured from Ukraine’s federal government.

Geographically proximate to the Russian border, the Kremlin was able to either leverage the political environment preexisting in Crimea or, in the case of Donbas, fabricate one through its disinformation campaign, funding of separatist fighters, and covert transportation of Russian regulars across the border. According to a 2015 study by the International Republican Institute, roughly 25 percent of Odessa’s citizenry are ethnic Russians, with 78 percent citing Russian as the primary language spoken at home. The presence of ethnic Russians, often referred to as a fifth column – or minority group which can be leveraged – in Odessa has sparked concerns that a similar situation which unfolded in the east could be incited. However, the geographic conditions and element of surprise required are missing. Additionally important to note, the general political situation in the country was diametrically different to what it is today. When Crimea was annexed, and subsequent fighting in Donbas began, Ukraine’s federal government was dysfunctional and divided. Following the Euromaidan protests and deposition of then-president Yanukovych, several top officials abandoned their posts. Among them were the Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs, the commander of the Internal Troops of Ukraine, and the commander of the Ukrainian Navy in Crimea (who convinced over 5,000 Ukrainian sailors to defect with him).

Finally, one possible reason for escalations in the Sea of Azov – Russia’s first major foray into the maritime environment against Ukraine – would be the Kremlin’s decision that further subversion on land would be either impossible due to increased Ukrainian resilience, or inadvisable due to international backlash. Regardless, the fact Moscow has chosen to add this maritime component to continue its incrementally aggressive gray zone approach supports the argument that any activities to Ukraine’s west – a “harder target” in military parlance – would similarly remain offshore.

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, after suffering two decades of decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has undergone more than a decade of serious reform, doubling its offensive capabilities since 2014. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Russia had a basing agreement with the Ukrainian government. However, this agreement stipulated categorical limitations on personnel and equipment. Along with access to the port of Sevastopol, Moscow was allowed to garrison 25,000 troops, in addition to 132 armored combat vehicles, 22 military aircraft, and 24 pieces of artillery. In 2013, Russia was stationing 12,000 troops, zero tanks, 24 pieces of artillery, and 22 military aircraft. By 2018, those numbers rose to 32,000 troops, 40 tanks, 174 pieces of artillery, and 113 military aircraft – in addition to S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, Bastion and Bal coastal defense missile systems, and Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems.

The Fleet, also host to several new advanced surface combatants and submarines – along with many warships transferred from the Caspian Sea Flotilla – is fulfilling the guiding principles highlighted in Russia’s 2015 maritime doctrine: “In the Black and Azov Sea, the foundation of the National Maritime Policy is the accelerated modernization and comprehensive reinforcement of the strategic position of the Russian Federation.”

These tenets were further discussed in the 2017 Naval Fundamentals document, emphasizing improvement of combat capabilities and joint operability with other branches of the military in Crimea. Moscow’s recent development of its Special Operations Forces (SSO) command is the most likely suspect to be used in a combined arms operation in the Black Sea. An example can be seen with the oil derricks near Odessa, which were illegally seized by special operations forces and are subsequently being guarded by several small warships – preventing any attempt by the Ukrainian military to retake them. While a less severe example, this low-risk operation represents one of many lessons for the Kremlin that this sort of incremental approach pays dividends. These “stealth seizures,” i.e. annexation of Crimea, naval blockade of the Sea of Azov, and the capture of the oil derricks are the hallmark of Russia’s approach in the region but by their nature are limited in scope.

Area of Operations: The Black Sea

Unlike the proximate waters of the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea is busy with international activity and with all parties involved interested in keeping the sea lines open for trade and joint military cooperation. In addition to the western littoral states (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey), the navies of the United Kingdom and United States have operated in the Black Sea in recent months. The Royal Navy’s HMS Echo entered the Black Sea and arrived at Odessa on 19 December, 2017. The UK’s Defense Minister, Gavin Williamson, later announced joint exercises would take place with the Ukrainian Navy in early 2019. In early January, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) made a regularly scheduled sail through the Black Sea. The Fort McHenry, an amphibious ship, equipped with defensively oriented weapons, was followed more recently by a visit to Georgia by the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75), an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer – sending a much more clear message to the Kremlin. Backing up this show of resolve, the U.S. announced it would send additional lethal aid to the Ukrainian military.

While international presence in the region is a possible deterrent, many factors complicate the helpfulness of foreign vessels in the region. First and foremost, there is a perennial question mark in regard to what form(s) of Russian aggression will incite a Western response. And even then, showing diplomatic support of the situation is of little good to an embattled Ukrainian military. Second, the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, an agreement signed in 1936, presents a logistical impossibility to an ever-present U.S. Navy in the Black Sea. The agreement stipulates that an aggregate tonnage of all non-Black Sea warships in the Black Sea cannot exceed 30,000 tons (or 45,000 tons under special conditions), and they are permitted to stay in the Black Sea for no longer than twenty-one days. Russia, undoubtedly monitoring the U.S. Navy’s days at sea, could conceivably coordinate an operation during a lull of U.S. activity.

Defending Ukraine

The onus of defense, therefore, falls on the Ukrainian military. Prior to the aggressions in the Sea of Azov, for all intents and purposes the Ukrainian Navy lacked a coherent maritime doctrine within the overall military strategy. Suggested to have a “continental mindset,” the greatest cause for concern is always from the next impending land invasion. The most recent example was the build-up of Russian forces in its Western Military District, from which came no invading force. Rather than an abnormal development, prior to the annexation of Crimea, roughly 40,000 troops were amassed on Ukraine’s eastern border – used for purposes of intimidation and to mask subsequent asymmetric operations, rather than to be conventionally deployed.

Despite these issues of threat assessment, the Ukrainian Navy has maintained steady success in developing itself into a competent fighting force, notwithstanding losing the majority of its assets during the annexation of Crimea. The guiding principle toward renewed maritime capacity building in the Ukrainian Navy can be seen in the “mosquito fleet” concept first proposed by Captain Andriy Ryzhenko, the Navy’s deputy chief of staff for Euro-Atlantic integration. His idea is that despite budgetary pressures the navy should plan for “near-term procurement of small, fast, low-signature, well-armed boats and craft for various purposes.” The highly mobile proposed flotilla would serve well in the face of uncertainty presented by Russia’s subversive maritime activities.

Toward this goal, the Ukrainian Navy plans to commission two Gyurza-class armored boats and two Centaur-class fast assault craft sometime in 2019, and to assume command of two U.S.-built Island-class patrol cutters this summer. These efforts toward naval capacity building are the key component of the “New Strategy of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to 2035,” introduced by the Commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, Admiral Ihor Voronchenko in November 2018.

Moving Forward

As this gray zone approach continues to permeate the maritime environment, these aggressive asymmetric operations must remain an integral component of Ukraine’s military calculus. They are incremental in their approach, and below the threshold of war in their character. For these reasons they will be difficult to predict, deter, and defend against. However, the Ukrainian military has been and will continue to undergo reform with these very tenets in mind. Analyzing the tactics used in the Sea of Azov by Russia, similar operations in the South and East China Seas by China, and how they may be adapted to fit the Black Sea is the most advantageous starting point toward an effective plan of defense. As the Ukrainian military remains resilient, and its allies supportive, the defense of Western ideals and international rule of law will come through the sober realization that these low-scale acts of force and subversive maneuvers are here to stay both within Ukraine’s borders and off its coast.

Jonathan Hall is a security and political risk analyst focused on Eurasian geopolitics, military affairs, and emerging technologies. He can be found on Twitter @_JonathanPHall.

Featured Image: Military base at Perevalne during the 2014 Crimean crisis. (Wikimedia Commons)

Current Operations

A First Time for Everything: The United Nations Maritime Task Force in Lebanon

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By David Van Dyk

There are instances of failure and success throughout the history of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The instances of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda in 1994 and the UN Protection Force at Srebrenica in 1995 are difficult chapters in a complicated past. In contrast, the success of the UN in stabilizing East Timor in 1999 and early 2000 was realized by defeating pro-Indonesian militias and gaining the trust of the surrounding community fighting for independence. Additionally, the ongoing efforts of the United Nations in the Kashmir region (UNMOGIP) have been vital in keeping a volatile area from potentially exploding into nuclear war.

Another example of successful UN peacekeeping includes the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), forged from the fires of the 1978 war between Israel and PLO fighters operating from southern Lebanon. This UN mission was substantially enhanced in 2006 following a repeat of the conflict. It also included a historical development in UN peacekeeping, the establishment of the Maritime Task Force (MTF) attached to UNIFIL, the first such naval operation of its kind under the auspices of the United Nations.

Beginnings

Created in 2006, the MTF was designed to “support the Lebanese Navy in monitoring its territorial waters, secure the Lebanese coastline and prevent the unauthorized entry of arms or related materials by sea into Lebanon.”1 Additionally, the withdrawal of the Israeli blockade of Lebanon in September 2006 was brought about due to the existence of the MTF, assuaging Israeli fears of a rearmed Hezbollah due to unregulated sea traffic along the coast.2 The MTF gains its authority from UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 ending hostilities between the Israeli military and Hezbollah elements; yet the MTF found its true birth in a request of then-Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to the UN Secretariat for a naval force to help Lebanon patrol its coastline and train the country’s underdeveloped navy.3 This allowed not only for the eventual withdrawal of the Israeli blockade but also for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to try something new – deploying blue helmets on the high seas.

Mission

Officially, as noted above, the task of the MTF is to help Lebanon secure its coastline and sea traffic while helping train the Lebanese Navy. Unofficially, the MTF has provided an opportunity to a handful of nations in helping train their navies as well. Indeed, a Belgium commander of an MTF flagship, BNS Leopold I, noted in an interview in 2009, “The crew underwent an intensive training package covering the full range of warfare drills applicable for the envisaged mission and with emphasis on boarding operations as well as underway and alongside force protection.” No doubt the MTF has provided countries with a chance to showcase their abilities in a combined task force; when Belgium took over command of the MTF in April 2009, RADM Thierry Pynoo commented, “It is evident that we are willing to fulfill our international responsibilities towards securing stability in this region. It also shows that Belgium is highly regarded by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, not in the least due to Belgium’s performances during former UN missions.”5

Yet the MTF is not all show and no action; far from it. Since operations began in 2006, the task force has hailed more than 90,000 ships and referred more than 12,000 to the Lebanese government for closer inspection.6 Additionally, the MTF as of 2018 conducted 713 training exercises with elements of the Lebanese Navy. These simulations cover a gamut of situations from boarding suspicious vessels to live-fire exercises. Furthermore, “these efforts are complemented with initiatives by other countries that provide capacity building and technical assistance, as well as radar and other naval materials on a bilateral basis.”7

A naval helicopter prepares to take off from the Brazilian frigate Uniao, flag ship of UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force, Sept. 25, 2013. (Photo by Pasqual Gorriz/UNIFIL)

Currently, a total of 15 countries have contributed resources to the MTF since 2006: Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. The naval force is typically made up of 6-7 ships, with the flagship being Brazilian since 2011 when Brazil accepted command of the MTF from a rotating system of European countries. Brazil has been at the helm since, and has gained international attention for the country’s significant contributions and professional conduct in this operation.8

Brazilian Leadership

Since the decision to accept command of the MTF in 2011, Brazil has been recognized both by UNIFIL command and the international community. Major-General Michael Beary, having served from 2016 to 2018 as UNIFIL’s Head of Mission, commended the nation’s role in UNIFIL’s overall mission: “The sailors who patrol Lebanese waters under the flag of the UN are pathfinders [who have] developed a UN Doctrine on Maritime operations and proven to both the Security Council and the international community the benefits that the maritime domain can bring to peacekeeping operations. … I do not take this ongoing support for granted and I would like to thank both the Brazilian government and Navy for their continued commitment to UNIFIL.”9 Brazil has sought to position itself as a global player in international relations, emphasizing the rule of law and seeking diplomatic answers to international conflict. The foreign policy establishment in Brazil has pointed to the enduring interstate peace enjoyed in Latin America as proof of Brazil’s leadership in the region. Even with the escalating crisis in Venezuela, regional leaders have managed to hold at bay military interventions or saber-rattling, seeking humanitarian, diplomatic, or economic solutions.

In their leadership over the MTF, the Brazilian Navy has gained valuable training and insight from fellow countries, while sharing their own knowledge as well. This has contributed to a robust training program in Brazil, as crewmembers and ships rotate command on the MTF. As new crewmembers join the task force, the outgoing officers bring with them knowledge and abilities gained through their time on the MTF. These lessons are then implemented at Brazil’s dedicated program, the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Center (CCOPAB). Even amid the relatively high costs and distant theatre of operations associated with UNIFIL MTF, scholar Adriana Erthal Abdenur, in International Peacekeeping, posited three main motivations for their continuing involvement: “projecting Brazil in international security; deepening bilateral relations with Lebanon; and naval capacity-building with a view to expanding Brazil’s role in the South Atlantic.”10 An early test for President Bolsanaro’s commitment to UN missions will center on his decision whether to continue his country’s leadership over the MTF.

A UNIFIL Indonesian helicopter on patrol flying over a Maritme Task Force frigate off the coast of Beirut. Lebanon, October 26th 2011. (Photo by Pasqual Gorriz/ UN photo)

Future Applications

With the documented successes of the UNIFIL MTF, the United Nations has been able to gain valuable insight into what it takes to operate and maintain a naval task force. Additionally, countries have shown a proven willingness to contribute to its budget and its fleet. While helping to secure peace on the Lebanese coastline, countries have been able to put navies to good use, gain international standing, and share best practices with partner alliances. While UNIFIL MTF will likely continue to operate well into the next few years, other maritime hotspots may also need to be addressed. A UN-led MTF becomes an attractive option when a targeted region is too tense for local actors or alliances to effectively manage certain security concerns.

As Jeremy Thompson points out in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, the East China Sea has slowly but gradually deteriorated in stability; claims to the Senkaku Islands, currently administered by Japan, have been disputed by China and Taiwan.11 Maritime clashes involving fishing vessels and skirmishes between the three countries’ coast guards have been reported with increasing frequency.12 Diplomatic maneuvering over the islands has seen an uptick, especially with the outright purchase of the islands by the Japanese government in 2012. Oil exploration missions have often escalated to unhelpful saber-rattling, as seen in November 2004 when China sent a submarine near Japanese territory following a disagreement over an oil production platform operating in the East China Sea by Chinese oil companies. By January 2005, China had stationed two destroyers near the disputed area.13

China began its aggressive assertion over the islands when environmental reports conducted by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in the late 1960s suggested a significant amount of oil, natural gas and mineral resources could be discovered and exploited in the region. Additionally, the waters around the islands are fertile fishing grounds, capable of providing a serious boost to the vibrant and competitive fishing industries already operating in the region. However, due to the political and military insecurity in the area, a truly stable environment has not been maintained to make the most of the fishery.

While there is not yet cause for alarmism, the potential for the East China Sea to devolve into inter-state warfare is present. Unlike the undeveloped state of the Lebanese Navy, the fleets of China, Taiwan and Japan are among the most advanced in the world. As such, the region needs to be addressed in a constructive and neutral manner by the United Nations Security Council, with an eye toward instituting a framework for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. The UN Secretariat should consider drafting an outline for establishing a maritime task force to operate in the East China Sea, and one that may be constituted of extra-regional naval forces.

The serious legwork has already been completed, thanks to the efforts of the UNIFIL MTF; as then-UNIFIL Head of Mission Beary noted, the UN has already developed a naval doctrine; now, the international community must give the doctrine a chance to branch out and improve on the accomplishments found in Lebanon.

David Van Dyk is an associate editor with the Center for International Maritime Security and a doctoral student at the Helms School of Government studying Public Policy with a focus in foreign policy. He has received a Master of Arts in Public Policy with a focus in international affairs. He can be reached at dvandyk@liberty.edu.

References

1. https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-maritime-task-force

2. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/08/world/middleeast/09mideastcnd.html

3. Lebanese Republic, ‘Letter of Prime Minister Siniora to Secretary-General Kofi Annan’, Beirut, 6 Sept. 2006

4. “Interview with Cdr Jean-Marc Claus, Commanding Officer Bns ‘Leopold I’, Flagship of Com Unifil Mtf 448.” Naval Forces 30, no. 2 (April 2009): 108.

5. “Scoop for the Belgian Navy.” Naval Forces 30, no. 2 (April 2009): 106.

6. https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-maritime-task-force

7. “Rising Powers in Stormy Seas: Brazil and the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force.” International peacekeeping. 23, no. 3 (June 1, 2016): 389–415.

8. https://unifil.unmissions.org/major-general-beary-applauds-brazil’s-leadership-role-unifil’s-mtf

9. https://unifil.unmissions.org/new-brazilian-rear-admiral-helm-unifil-mtf

10. “Rising Powers in Stormy Seas: Brazil and the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force.” International peacekeeping. 23, no. 3 (June 1, 2016): 389–415.

11. Thompson, Jeremy. “Fly the U.N. Pennant Over East Asian Waters.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 9 (September 2015): 40–45.

12. https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/08/01/senkaku-islands-dispute/

13. https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/drillships-warships-increasing-tensions-east-china-sea/

Featured Image: UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Michael Beary, addresses the audience at the event for International Day of Peace held at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, south Lebanon, Sept. 21, 2016. Photo by Pasqual Gorriz/UNIFIL