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Mine Warfare Topic Week

Meeting the Mine Warfare Challenge with Unmanned Systems

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Mine Warfare Topic Week

By Andrea Daolio

“We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.” –Rear Admiral Allen E. “Hoke” Smith

Mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare share many features, from the fact that both are very difficult and time-consuming tasks (often akin to finding a needle in a haystack). And despite how both submarines and mines achieved tremendous wartime success in the past, the peacetime effort and resources dedicated toward countering them are usually far less than what is required. By harnessing unmanned systems and machine learning, the U.S. Navy can bridge the gap between its own mine countermeasures capability and the growing mine warfare threat.

Historical Successes of Mine Warfare

During World War II, Operation Starvation which mined Japanese home waters severely disrupted Japanese maritime traffic and sunk more than 1.2 million tons of shipping for the loss of only 15 airplanes, while demanding only 5.7 percent of the XXI Bomber Command’s total sorties. Yet a few years later the U.S. Navy was unprepared when it had to face enemy mines itself in the Korean War, resulting in the delay of the amphibious landing at Wonsan. At the end of the war, the mine countermeasures forces, which accounted for less than two percent of all UN naval forces, had suffered 20 percent of naval casualties.

The 1987-1988 and 1991-1992 Gulf crises once again showed how deadly mines can be even for a totally superior force, damaging the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), the flagship for Airborne Mine Countermeasures operations USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and the USS Princeton (CG-59). Since World War II, mines have damaged or sunk four more times more US Navy ships than all other weapons.

U.S. Navy mine casualties chart. (From “21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare” Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare – Expeditionary Warfare Directorate – US Navy 2009)[Click to expand]
These events have been studied in detail by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and other potential adversaries of the U.S. like Iran and North Korea, and all those nations have significant mine arsenals. China has a fleet of 33 mine warfare vessels and over 50,000 mines (some put the estimate as high as 80,000 or even 100,000), consisting of over 30 varieties of contact, magnetic, acoustic, water pressure and mixed reaction sea mines, remote control sea mines, rocket-rising and mobile mines.1

Russia has a fleet of 47 Mine Warfare vessels and inherited an arsenal of “upwards of 250,000” mines from the Soviet Union, while Iran is estimated to have between 3,000 and 20,000 mines and North Korea is said to have 50,000 mines.2 As if these numbers were not threatening enough, Iraq was able to damage two U.S. Navy ships by deploying only around 1,000 mines, many of them old types dating back to before World War I that can be replicated cheaply (contact mines cost as little as $1500) even by third world nations. More than 30 countries produce and more than 20 countries export mines, and even highly sophisticated versions of the weapon are available in the international arms trade.

Chinese mine depot with warshot and training mines. The bands on the ninety-eight mines on the left side of the image indicate that they are exercise shapes, and could support a robust exercise program. The solid colors on the similar number of mines to the right suggest that they are warshots. (From Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, 2009)

NATO on the other hand has the largest MCM fleet in the world with 149 ships (as of 2016), but those ships are becoming old and obsolete (many are second-hand vessels retired by their original owner and then sold to smaller NATO countries). And only 7 percent of these vessels are part of the U.S. Navy. The need to renovate and enlarge this force is immediately apparent.

Countering the Threat

Mines can be put in place by aircraft, surface ships, pleasure boats, submarines, and combat divers and even from pickup trucks crossing bridges. They can be found from the surf zone to deep water (greater than 200 feet) and can be of many different and increasingly capable types. These range from simple contact mines to more complex magnetic, acoustic or pressure mines; from advanced mines that are a combination of the preceding types to computerized mines that can be even set to be detonated only by some specific ship type.

Mines are increasingly difficult to detect. The underwater environment is already a difficult medium to search through, as the currents, differences in salinity and temperature, and seafloor clutter (which is often littered with a vast array of debris) impede search. Meanwhile, mines are becoming even more elusive as stealthy mines made of fiberglass can be extremely difficult to detect. Furthermore, modern sonars are hardly capable enough to find advanced types of mines buried under the seafloor.

Types of naval mines: A-underwater, B-bottom, SS-submarine. 1-drifting mine, 2-drifting mine, 3-moored mine, 4-moored mine (short wire), 5-bottom mines, 6-torpedo mine/CAPTOR mine, 7-rising mine. (Wikimedia Commons)

But even if mines have always had an advantage over mine countermeasures, new technologies are emerging that will be able to greatly reduce or even eliminate this advantage.

Once in the water, mines are difficult to detect, but even if mines can sometimes remain deadly for an extended period of time (such as how fishermen still get injured or killed in the Baltic Sea by leftover mines from the world wars), the damaging effects of the marine environment (from corrosion to marine growth) mean that mines can’t be reliably set in the sea for long periods of time.

Therefore an adversary will likely have to deploy mines shortly before a confrontation, and that will give the U.S. a golden opportunity to stop mines before they are deployed via a more favorable preventative strategy.3

Satellites and High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) drones will be able to detect signs of the major logistical efforts necessary to take mines from ammunition depots to the ports and then load them onto platforms, offering military and diplomatic opportunities to halt the mining operation.

Even if an enemy wants to place only a few mines, persistent surveillance (such as through satellites or unmanned systems with a long endurance capabilities) can monitor the area for signs of strangely behaving ships (the capture of the Iranian-improvised minelayer Iran Ajr is a good example of American forces stopping a mining operation before the mines are deployed).

Using unmanned aircraft for the task will ensure that the area will be monitored for long periods of time at a fraction of the cost and without risking lives. Machine learning and AI systems are already used for guiding military and civilian UAVs4 and even for monitoring,5 therefore these systems can be implemented in the software of an UAV to automatically tell the signs of suspect behavior of enemy assets without humans having to painstakingly watch hours of video feed and thus reducing the workload of the crew. Likewise, a fleet of small Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUVs) can loiter in the suspected area and identify telltale signs of mining operations to stop it before it is too late. Similarly, underwater hydrophone arrays like those of the DADS and the Autonomous Off-Board Surveillance Sensor (AOSS) programs,6 even if intended to track quiet diesel-electric submarines, are capable of detecting airplanes, ships, and submarine mine-laying operations and monitor the water entry and the bottom impact of mines.

If these systems fail to stop the deployment of mines, once these are in the water, then the task gets more difficult and dangerous. Yet, unmanned systems and new technologies can greatly help the U.S. Navy in the task. Knifefish UUVs and Fleet-class USVs (Unmanned Surface Vessels) are already part of the MCM module of LCS ships and are a great step forward for mine countermeasures.7 The Knifefish has an endurance of up to 16 hours and uses onboard synthetic aperture sonar to detect floating or buried naval mines, identify them thanks to an onboard database and analytical computer, and mark them for the successive removal.

Various types of mines. (Image from “21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare”. Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare – Expeditionary Warfare Directorate – US Navy 2009)

Machine learning and algorithms can also improve the ability of a UUV to recognize mines and identify objects on the seafloor. The NATO Science and Technology Organisation,  Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (STO CMRE) of LaSpezia (Italy) has recently developed an advanced algorithm that will automate the time-consuming task of mine identification and disposal and further advances in this field will greatly improve MCM operations.8 Moreover, adding an advanced lightweight hydrophone array to UUVs will improve the capability to detect and localize underwater objects (and will give the UUV an improved secondary ASW capability).9

Likewise, unmanned systems can greatly help MCM operations in the air and on the surface. The experience gathered by DARPA with the ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) could be used to create an advanced and completely autonomous MCM ship. Using powerful sensors, advanced automation software and MCM gear, an MCM ACTUV will be able to take many of the tasks now given to the Avenger-class minesweepers. A fully autonomous large fleet of inexpensive unmanned UUVs and USVs could sweep large portions of the sea while avoiding all risk to sailors.

While ships, USVs, and UUVs are the best platforms to neutralize mines, airplanes and helicopters are the fastest platforms to sweep the sea. The laser-based ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System) and the unmanned COBRA (Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System) have recently entered service, but more systems can be deployed in the future.10 UAVs are the perfect choice for persistent reconnaissance and can be adapted for the MCM task and augmented to field the COBRA and ALMDS systems.

While the Navy arguably gives less attention to mine countermeasures than it deserves, it gives even lesser attention to its own offensive mining capability. If the U.S. Navy wants to maintain a solid deterrent against rivals then it should improve and expand its own mine arsenal. The new Hammerhead mine and the Clandestine Delivered Mine (CDM) are a good step in the right direction and more should follow.11 But the vast majority of U.S. mines are Quickstrike mines converted from general-purpose bombs. Dedicated bottom and buried advanced mines (similar to the advanced British Stonefish mine) should be developed and the number of platforms able to deploy mines should be expanded to include UAVs, USVs, and UUVs. Moreover, air-launched mines should get extended-range winged kits similar to those employed by the HAAWC High Altitude ASW Weapons Concept torpedo to give launching aircraft the ability to deploy the mine much further away from enemy positions.12

U.S. Air Force employees calibrate MK62QS MOD3 naval mines at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, July 10, 2018. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Ted Daigle/released)

Conclusion

“Hoke’s right: when you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, you haven’t got command of the sea. And command of the sea is the rock-bottom foundation of all our war plans. We’ve been plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we’re going to start getting mine-conscious—beginning last week.” –Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN Chief of Naval Operations October, 1950

Until recently the task of minesweeping has been extremely dangerous for sailors, but with new technologies such as unmanned systems and machine learning, it is time to invest heavily in these avenues of capability and convert a greater part of the U.S. Navy to fully autonomous and unmanned MCM operations.

The importance of mine warfare and of mine countermeasures for any modern Navy can never be stressed enough. Given how mining can achieve great results and inflict huge losses with relatively low risk and cost argues for greater investment in these weapons and the means to counter them.

Andrea Daolio, from Italy, has an engineering background and a longstanding passion for wargaming and for geopolitical, historical, and military topics. He has been a finalist in New York’s MTA Genius Transit Challenge. He is currently collaborating with video game developer Slitherine on the popular wargame Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations. His views are his own.

References

[1] Andrew Erickson, Chinese Mine Warfare, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/China-Maritime-Study-3_Chinese-Mine-Warfare_Erickson-Goldstein-Murray_200906.pdf

[2] Sydney J. Freedberg jr., Minefields At Sea: From The Tsars To Putin

[3] Sydney J. Freedberg jr., Sowing The Sea With Fire: The Threat Of Sea Mines

[4] Marcus Roth, AI in Military Drones and UAVs – Current Applications, https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/ai-drones-and-uavs-in-the-military-current-applications/

[5] Luis F. Gonzalez , Glen A. Montes , Eduard Puig , Sandra Johnson , Kerrie Mengersen  and Kevin J. Gaston , Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Artificial Intelligence Revolutionizing Wildlife Monitoring and Conservation, https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/16/1/97/htm

[6] Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10176/naval-mine-warfare-operational-and-technical-challenges-for-naval-forces

[7] Sydney J. Freedberg jr., From Sailors To Robots: A Revolution In Clearing Mines

[8] NATO CMRE, Autonomous Naval Mine Countermeasures, https://www.cmre.nato.int/about-cmre/fact-sheets/1292-autonomous-naval-mine-countermeasures-1/file

[9] Venugopalan Pallayil, Ceramic and Fibre Optic Hydrophone as Sensors for Lightweight Arrays – aComparative Study, https://arl.nus.edu.sg/twiki6/pub/ARL/BibEntries/venu_oceans_anchorage17.pdf

[10] Captain Danielle George, U.S. NAVY Mine Warfare Programs, https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/MineWarfare-George.pdf?ver=2019-01-17-133139-817

[11] Joseph Trevithick, US is betting big on Naval Mine Warfare with these Sub-launched and Air-dropped types, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25235/the-u-s-is-getting-back-into-naval-mine-warfare-with-new-sub-launched-and-air-dropped-types

[12] MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo and High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability (HAAWC), https://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2017/pdf/navy/2017mk54.pdf

Featured Image: September 22, 1987 – Contact mines partially covered by a tarpaulin on the deck of the captured Iranian mine-laying ship Iran Ajr (PH3 Cleveland, U.S. National Archives)

Mine Warfare Topic Week

Mine Warfare Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC will be featuring articles submitted in response to our Call for Articles issued in partnership with the U.S. Navy’s Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants.

As Dr. Sam Taylor, Mine Warfare Lead at PEO USC discussed in the Call for Articles, “…the legacy MCM inventory is becoming increasingly costly to maintain and is rapidly approaching the end of its useful service life. Today the Navy is approaching a strategic juncture in MCM where a host of emerging technologies provide new opportunities for widening the traditional approach to mine warfare and could, if successfully executed, bring about a 21st Century renaissance in MCM.”

Below are the articles featuring during the topic week. We thank these authors for their contributions. 

“Meeting the Mine Warfare Challenge with Unmanned Systems” by Andrea Daolio
“The U.S. Navy Needs AWNIS for Mine Warfare” by LT Colin Barnard, USN
“Embracing an Unmanned Solution for the U.S. Navy’s Mine Warfare Renaissance” by U.H. “Jack” Rowley and Craig Cates
“Swarming to Solve the Navy’s MCM Problems” by Dr. Joseph Walsh III
“A Pervasive and Persistent Approach to Mine Countermeasures” by Dr. Keith Aliberti and Mike Kobold

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: The Hirashima-class minesweeper JS Yakushima (MSC-602) detonates a mine (Japanese Ministry of Defense photo)

Capability Analysis

Aviation as the Key to Navy-Marine Integration

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By Carl Forsling

Marine Aviation Needs to Enhance Naval Integration

The Corps has drifted away from the Navy over the last two decades, and it didn’t need the Navy in Iraq or Afghanistan. Shortages of amphibious shipping combined with a need to justify force structure gave birth to shore-based SPMAGTFs. This trend has led to less-than-seamless integration between the Marine Corps and Navy. In the future fight, this gap leaves amphibious forces more vulnerable and less deadly than they should be. 

The new Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, said in his planning guidance, “…there is a need to reestablish a more integrated approach to operations in the maritime domain.” By virtue of their range and speed, aviation assets are inherently able to bridge gaps. Amphibious forces usually take this as meaning between the sea and the land, but it also bridges gaps between forces at sea.

Amphibious ships can no longer serve merely as transportation for their embarked Marines. In the future anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment, they have to be part of the open-ocean kill chain. If the naval services are to enhance their survivability and lethality against the medium- and high-threat fights of the future, they have to combine their efforts and their assets. The keystone of that effort will be the aviation assets of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). They must be reconfigured to better exploit aviation platforms such as the V-22 and F-35B, and turn the Corps into a force for sea control.

The strength of the Navy and Marine Corps team is the use of seaborne mobility to achieve effects on land. New aviation platforms can reinvigorate this for the 21st century, making both the Navy and Marine Corps more survivable, deadly, and integrated.

Ospreys Enable Naval Distributed Operations

In Marine parlance, “distributed operations” mean small units scattered throughout a given ground commander’s area of responsibility. In Navy parlance, distributed maritime operations are those within a naval commander’s area of responsibility. Rarely are the two domains intertwined, but now they need to be.

Marines routinely practice distributed operations within the ships of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) – performing “split-ARG” ops at widely separated locations. But this is much less common among the ships of the larger Expeditionary Strike Group, which adds attached surface combatants and often a submarine. 

It is virtually unheard of to detach Marines to other ships, such as those in a carrier strike group. The ARG typically does not integrate much with the rest of the Navy, but in the future, it will need to in order to survive. To that end, why are Ospreys tethered to ships at all, much less particular ships? Ospreys are easier to maintain on land. With the two KC-130Js normally assigned to the MEU, they can reach anywhere in most theaters within hours. 

SPMAGTF-CR-AF’s Ospreys can reach much of the 6th Fleet area of operations on one tank of gas from Moron, Spain. They could reach even further from a centrally located base like Sigonella. SPMAGTF-CR-CC can reach most of the CENTCOM AOR from its base in Kuwait. The Pacific isn’t quite as easy to traverse, but the Osprey has proven itself unique among rotorcraft in covering those distances, having already transited from Hawaii to Australia for the Marine Rotational Forces in Darwin.  

The tiltrotor squadron assigned to SPMAGTF-CR-CENTCOM and the half-squadron with SPMAGTF-CR-AFRICOM are burning out aircraft and people for little operational benefit. By making the MEU MV-22s and the tiltrotor company land-based, the SPMAGTFs are made redundant. Eliminating those would save six deployed MV-22s in the Mediterranean and 12 in CENTCOM. That would strengthen the VMM community and allow it to better support the MEUs. 

Instead of having a SPMAGTF in a given theater in addition to MEU assets, the MEU VMM, tiltrotor company, and KC-130Js would shadow the MEU from shore instead. In Europe, for example, they might primarily work out of Sigonella, but could move to Djibouti to support operations in the Horn of Africa or Romania to counter Russian moves in the Balkans. 

If the rest of the MEU is needed, the tiltrotor-borne unit could be a rapidly deployable advance element, or conversely, remain in strategic or operational reserve. The base tiltrotor squadron, KC-130J detachment, and tiltrotor infantry company would essentially be an airmobile split ARG, capable of independent action, but rejoining the MEU main body when necessary. They could immediately take spots on the air plan ferrying Marines ashore, recovering aboard ship, or to an airfield as the situation dictates. 

For many missions, there is no need to commit the entire Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) or ESG when V-22s can take Marines almost anywhere in theater. It saves these warship formations from having to steam for days. It also affords another way to split the MEU besides just between the ships in the ARG, increasing flexibility and the MEU’s ability to respond to multiple contingencies. In certain threat environments, staging Marines from ships other than amphibious platforms may be the most survivable option, offering greater distribution and putting a greater number of the enemy’s shore bases at risk of amphibious assault. The enemy will never be entirely sure which vessels present that threat, complicating their threat analysis.

Once the MEU doesn’t have to be in one place, or even two, options expand. Amphibious ships aren’t the only vessels Marines can stage from. Ospreys can land on many other naval vessels, even if they can’t support sustained flight operations. The Ospreys could embark, or they might just deliver a contingent of Marines, by alternate insertion means (FAST rope, hoist, etc.) if necessary. Then the ship’s organic air and surface assets would come into play.

With the right preparation, much of the Navy’s fleet could become staging areas for Marines. 

Aircraft carriers are certainly capable of supporting MV-22s. CVNs typically carry two squadrons of H-60s and will soon have their own CMV-22s Ospreys, so have a robust organic insertion capability. They also have sufficient billeting for any GCE Marines. If MV-22s deliver Marines to destroyers or cruisers, those also often have their own helicopters. While they typically carry the MH-60R, not optimized for troop transport, Marines could still use those ships as lilypads for certain missions. Those ships could also deploy small craft with Marines aboard. That would typically be for naval missions like interdiction and counterpiracy, but could also include going ashore for embassy reinforcement or humanitarian assistance. In permissive environments, even USNS vessels could provide staging areas for a small GCE. 

Strike – A Primary Mission

Moving the Ospreys and the tiltrotor company off the ship or distributing these assets across more ships frees up plenty of space above and below deck. This allows for other assets that are more dependent on shipboard space compared to more flexible aviation assets. Those can bring new capabilities such as increased lethality.

Given the number of active theaters today, the 11 big-deck carriers are not enough. However, with the F-35B amphibious strike capability is no longer just providing bomb trucks for low-threat sideshows new amphibious assault formations can strike targets in high-threat environments.

The F-35B is not just a replacement for the AV-8B. It is a 5th generation multirole fighter, capable of penetrating integrated air defenses. But six F-35s per MEU is not sufficient. Due to the situational awareness the F-35 provides pilots, its preferred maneuver element is a division of three or four aircraft, vice the sections of two that AV-8Bs typically employ. Given 75 percent availability, eight aircraft are required to make two light divisions, and thus support sustained combat flight operations. With eight F-35Bs, both the strike and counter-air capabilities of the MEU are dramatically improved. Having a baseline detachment of eight F-35s per MEU will enable a full spectrum of missions, especially a fairly robust offensive and defensive counter-air capability, which the AV-8B was only able to perform in relatively permissive environments. 

Having more F-35s doesn’t just mean more bombs on target. F-35s make every other combatant around them more effective. For example, F-35Bs are capable of directing SM-6 intercepts, HIMARS strikes, and providing in-flight retargeting support to other networked munitions. The SM-6 is not only a capable SAM, but can also be used to engage surface targets. The HIMARS is not limited to working ashore, but can also be fired from a ship’s deck, filling the long-neglected gap in naval gunfire support. Ship-launched HIMARS could also provide amphibious platforms with a powerful new anti-ship capability without requiring launch cells, further expanding the high-end mission set to include sea control.

The F-35 links the ships of the ESG together into something far more deadly and survivable than before. Big-deck amphibs can become formidable strike platforms, reaching out not just with the F-35Bs themselves, but also with their networking support for other shooters distributed across the battlespace.

HSC to VSC?

If LHAs and LHDs are to be legitimate strike and counter-air platforms, they are going to need greater logistics and search-and-rescue (SAR) capability. The current Navy SAR detachment aboard the LHD/LHA is only capable of relatively short-range recovery in secure areas, generally overwater “planeguard” duty. But soon the Navy will be fielding its own enhanced variant of the MV-22, the CMV-22.

A CMV-22 detachment would enhance the capability of both the Navy and the Marine Corps team. With CMV-22s aboard, the Navy could reclaim the long-range SAR mission. This is key if amphibs are going to routinely serve as strike platforms and perform a greater role in sea control. With the right equipment and personnel, this could provide a capability well up the SAR decision matrix, making a VSC detachment valuable as a joint theater personnel recovery asset.

Using more F-35Bs means using more engines, including those the CMV-22 is uniquely suited to carry, not to mention the additional bombs and missiles a “lighting carrier” would need. This is in addition to the benefits of being able to conduct longer-range resupply in general, especially at the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific. The CMV has an 1150nm range, roughly 300nm greater than an MV.

That is not a small investment on the part of the Navy. Replacing the expeditionary MH-60S with CMV-22s would require 22 aircraft, assuming that the squadron and the ship keep similar deploy-to-dwell ratios. With additional Fleet Replacement Squadron, pipeline, and attrition aircraft, the ultimate requirement would be 25 to 30 CMV-22s to sustainably outfit all the big-deck amphibs. That said, the MH-60S is starting to come up on the point when recapitalization is necessary. With the CMV-22 already being purchased for COD, expanding that community to include the gator Navy offers a huge increase in capability for a marginal increase in cost.

In exchange for that investment, the Navy and Marine Corps can make a leap from a marriage of convenience in their rotorcraft fleets to a truly synergistic and integrated partnership.

Room to Grow

Even with the addition of F-35Bs and trading MH-60Ss for CMV-22s, there is still significant room for adding capability.

One of the recurring complaints about the MV-22 is that it is too large for certain missions, such as VBSS (Visit Board Search and Seizure). While the UH-1N was not able to do significant troop lift, the UH-1Y can. That means the aviation combat element (ACE) needs at least four, not the typical three aircraft. At a readiness rate of 75 percent, that would allow a section of UH-1Ys to be devoted to assault support, especially in support of special missions and hard hits. The third would be able to perform any other tasks in the utility mission set. The Marine Corps has already purchased attrition aircraft over its T/O requirement that could be used to fill this need immediately. If this employment proves useful, additional UH-1Ys could be purchased to preserve this capability into the future.

There are normally four AH-1Zs assigned to the ACE. With a typical four aircraft to make three, the addition of that extra UH-1Y would allow an extra mixed section of skids to provide CAS and FAC(A) when shooting becomes the priority. The Yankee brings significant CAS capability, including Precision Guided Munitions – for now just APKWS rockets, but in the future, likely Hellfire missiles as well. 

Unmanned Systems 

The Marine Corps and the Navy are working past each other when it comes to UAS. The Marines field small tactical platforms and the Navy seeks to enhance sea control with larger systems. Neither of those efforts reaches the other, nor provides top cover for the critical period when Marines transition ashore.

The Marine Corps has begun the MAGTF Unmanned Expeditionary program (MUX), looking to acquire a large UAS capable of vertical takeoff. For CAS and persistent ISR, it requires a Group 5 UAS, a huge asset in normal MEU operations. Just as importantly, a VSTOL UAS with a reconfigurable payload and long endurance would make every platform around it, both Navy and Marine, more capable.

Currently the ESG does not have an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability. Its organic sensors are limited by line-of-sight from just above the waterline, or at best from the radars of MH-60Rs from surface combatants, which can provide coverage for only a few hours at a time, even if they are near enough. Sea-skimming threats traveling below the radar horizon would pose a considerable threat, making an organic AEW capability fundamental for awareness and survivability in a high-end threat environment.

Currently an LHD or LHA flight deck is able to support only eight to twelve hours of flight operations a day. A long-endurance UAS would extend this coverage greatly, staying in the air even when ships aren’t at flight quarters. With two, ideally three, AEW-equipped units, MUX would enable almost continuous coverage.

AEW would allow the F-35Bs to stay on the deck in an alert status appropriate for the threat, vice burning hours overhead performing the same AEW function. MUX could also detect and cue air or surface targets for other shooters. Long-range weapons like Tomahawk and the Long Range Anti-ship Missile (LRASM) work best when standoff observation and in-flight retargeting support is readily available, and where unmanned aviation platforms can be more readily risked to provide time-critical networking support.  

Marines are still Naval Infantry

In the future, we can’t assume that we will possess uncontested sea control, whether in the objective area or in transit. The ESG may have to fight its way there. Every asset aboard every ship, including manned and unmanned aircraft, whether they have “Marines” or “Navy” painted on the side, must work in concert. We need to move beyond the construct where the Navy exists only to move Marines to an objective, into one where elements of both are a cohesive fighting team from embarkation to debarkation.

With V-22s, every ship can have access to a Marine detachment when needed. We do not always need CVNs for strikes if we have F-35B-capable amphibious ships. With additional UH-1Ys, the ACE can execute more direct action missions and CAS, relieving other high-demand assets. And with the right UAS providing overwatch, the ESG should never be surprised.

Once we stop thinking of the Navy and Marine Corps as operating in distinct domains, the survivability and lethality of the ESG and the MEU, and even carrier strike groups and surface action groups will be increased. Employed correctly, emerging Marine and Navy aviation platforms, such as the F-35B, CMV-22, and MUX, combined with the assets of the MEU, ARG, and ESG, will make the integrated Navy-Marine team more capable and deadly. 

Carl Forsling is a retired Marine officer and pilot with multiple deployments flying the CH-46E and MV-22B as well as advising Afghan security forces. He currently works in the aerospace industry and is a senior columnist at Task&Purpose. He is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and Boston University. He is married with two children and lives in Arlington, Texas.

Featured Image: BAB EL-MANDEB STRAIT (Aug. 18, 2019) The amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) transits in formation through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dalton S. Swanbeck/Released)

History, Interviews

Sailing True North: James Stavridis on Admiralty and the Voyage of Character

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By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss with Admiral James Stavridis (ret.) his latest book, Sailing True North: Ten Admirals and the Voyage of Character. In this book Adm. Stavridis profiles ten historical admirals, revealing their character traits, leadership skills, and what their life accomplishments can teach modern Sailors and society. 

Q: From Fisher to Zumwalt, Rickover, and Hopper, you profile trailblazing admirals who built their legacies on innovation and reform. What can these leaders teach us about driving change into large organizations, and how to manage the risk that comes with innovating?

JS: Most of the admirals profiled in Sailing True North were innovators to one degree or another, but especially Fisher, Rickover, Zumwalt, and Hopper. As Steven Jobs of Apple said, “The difference between leaders and followers is innovation.” And it is worth observing that the innovations developed by these trailblazers were at times successful, and at other times ended in failure. But each of their stories as innovators had several common attributes. Indeed, the three key lessons for anyone seeking to move truly big organizations through successful innovation come from “the inside out.” First, building consensus from within; then obtaining committed support from outside the organization; and stubborn persistence. Achieving all of these requires an inner strength of character and deep self confidence.

Admiral Zumwalt was a “shock to the system” of the Navy and never slowed down to bring the organization along. While some of his initiatives survived his tenure (notably real progress on race relations), many of them failed – from very youthful commanding officers to beards for Sailors. I too learned the hard way that if you want to change an organization, it is necessary but not sufficient to have a big idea. When I took over at U.S. Southern Command, I wanted to change the focus of the military combatant command from a warfighting entity to an interagency structure optimized for the soft power missions of South America and the Caribbean. But I failed to build an internal consensus on the change, largely through overconfidence that my idea was so brilliant that everyone would simply fall in line. I was able to ram the changes through, but the next commander simply reversed course. So the first lesson in innovation is laying out a coherent case and building internal support.

The second key is getting outside support. When Grace Hopper wanted to bring the Navy into the computer age, she worked hard at connecting the chain of command with new technologies. She went on the road endlessly talking about computing and innovation as the keys for the Navy to move forward. Inspiring change requires not only support and buy-in within the organizational lines, but also convincing external stakeholders to move forward as well. Personally, I truly learned this while as the supreme allied commander at NATO, where we needed all 28 nations to move forward in consensus to make change – so I spent an inordinate amount of time on the road convincing European leaders to make necessary changes in our operations, from the Balkans to Afghanistan to counter-piracy.

Grace Murray Hopper, in her office in Washington DC, 1978. (Photo by Lynn Gilbert)

Third and finally, stubborn persistence is almost always necessary. The world hates change, and as a general rule, three out of four innovative ideas will fail. Taking no for an answer is not an option if you truly believe in the importance of the outcome. Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher was a deeply committed innovator, but frequently his ideas were rejected for lack of resources, professional jealousy, or fear of change. Yet he pounded away year after year and decade after decade and wrenched the Royal Navy into the 20th century – with fast capital ships, submarines, gunnery improvements, and many personnel changes. When I led the Navy’s innovation think tank, Deep Blue, in the days after 9/11, we failed on many ideas – but some vital ones emerged and changed the way the Navy fought in the Global War on Terror. 

Inspiring change – the heart of innovation – is in the end a challenge of character. To make others leap into the unknown with you requires not only a brilliant idea, but the inner self-confidence that others admire.

Q: When it comes to Admirals Nimitz, Nelson, and also Themistocles, these leaders are remembered for earning decisive success in conflict. What can we learn from these leaders on what it takes to be a successful wartime commander?

JS: The warfighting Admirals Themistocles, Nelson, and Nimitz all faced extreme existential levels of combat – they literally carried the future of their countries on the decisions they made.

First, each was a shrewd judge of subordinates, selecting the right commanders, then giving them plenty of leeway when it came to actual combat. And each was skilled at building operational and tactical teams that could work seamlessly on the vast battlespace of the world’s oceans. Of note, Nelson’s “band of brothers” never required elaborate battle plans of detailed instructions, nor did the subordinate admirals of WWII or the galley captains of the Battle of Salamis.

Second, each of the three set the values of their nation ahead of their own agendas. In terms of their inner character, each burned with zeal for their homeland, and were willing to make extreme personal sacrifices to succeed.

Third, all were masters of the technology of the day in terms of understanding what we would call the “kill chain” in today’s world. They mastered their craft coming up and were able to use all of the combat tools at their disposal.

And finally, each of the three were strategically minded, highly aware of the interconnection of the individual battles and campaigns they led to the “larger picture” of the global conflicts each faced – Themistocles with Persia, Nelson with Bonaparte’s France, and Nimitz with the Japanese Empire.

Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson (Lemuel Francis Abbot)

All of these come from qualities of inner character, of course. To know others, you must be aware of your own inner set of values. Patriotism and a willingness to be part of something far larger than yourself is crucial, as is the discipline and diligence to master the technology of the time. And the quality of strategic thinking is one that is honed through reading, study, and practice. Each of these admirals – none of them perfect, by the way – had all four of those qualities.

Q: For Zheng He and Sir Francis Drake, these leaders traveled far from home on uncertain voyages, and their superiors afforded them a great degree of discretion to act as they saw fit. What can be learned from how these leaders skillfully managed the independence of command?

JS: Even across the great distance of centuries, both Zheng He and Drake stand out in their ability to lead into the unknown. Yet they used a very different set of tools to do so, reflecting their highly different backgrounds and character. Zheng He, a eunuch and courtier as well as a warrior, was a skilled bureaucrat who could marshall significant resources to build overwhelming fleets. His inner character was one of sacrifice and seeking to gain glory for his master, the Han emperor. Drake, on the other hand, was an angry, brutal leader who used the lash, harsh punishment, executions alongside a reward system built around theft and plunder.

What they shared in common was a driving, energetic personality; strong physical stature; and above all personal courage. To lead into extreme danger and the unknown requires inner energy and self-confidence that can be instantly intuited by a crew. Both of these admiral had those qualities in abundance.

Q: This book was not written strictly for a military audience, because as you write in the introduction, “I am also motivated by a growing sense in this postmodern era that we are witnessing the slow death of character…” Of the many qualities and virtues of these admirals, which do you think both today’s U.S. Navy and society writ large need the most? 

JS: Above all, the intertwined qualities of humility, empathy, and listening are fading in many of our leaders across the political spectrum. The relentless pounding of tweets, blogs, Instagram posts, and the deluge of transmission shortens attention spans and reduces our ability to thoughtfully process what we hear. Too many have their transmit side set to max, and their receive side turned off. Character is about quiet self-confidence which allows us to listen to our friends and our critics as well. These are vital in both the military world and civilian life. Not all of the admirals in Sailing True North were humble and empathetic, and often when they stumbled it was for a lack of humility. There is a powerful lesson in that.

Honesty is also a character quality increasingly diminished in a world that seems to shrug off lies, half-truths, and exaggerations with a cynical comment and a knowing look. So often, we see people providing the “easy wrong” answer instead of the “hard right” one. Some of the admirals in the book played it loose with the truth from time to time, but all were at heart unafraid of the truth and wielded it with great effect at crucial moments of decision. We live in an utterly transparent world, and in the end the truth will come out. We need to pay more attention to veracity.

Lastly, I worry that in an age of accelerating technology, we are not innovating fast enough. Advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, materials, nano-technology, and above all synthetic biology are merging. Can we move fast enough – both inside the military and in the larger civilian world – to keep up? So innovation, a deeply seated quality of character, is vital.

Q: None of the admirals in the book are by any means perfect individuals. Which of their flaws and faults did you find to be the more fascinating?

JS: The anger of Admiral Rickover fascinates me. Having encountered it personally several times (not pleasantly), I feared him. Yet his driven, intense personality also created a kind of cult of admiration among many. I entitled the chapter of the section about him, “The Master of Anger,” and I don’t know if it was something he used consciously or it was merely who he was. In today’s world, we would see many aspects of the “toxic leader” in Rickover, yet the results he delivered and the deep affection he inspired in many contradict that assessment.

Certainly Sir Francis Drake – a killer (both of his own men and victims in his raids) is a bundle of contradictions. His harsh treatment of pretty much anyone he encountered achieved a level of brutality we can only glimpse across the centuries. But he helped defeat the Spanish Armada and achieved great results for queen and country. Another very contradictory personality, with both flaws and virtues.

And Jackie Fisher’s towering ego can be maddening to encounter. He had to be the center of everything, his ideas were always right, and he brooked no interference in his schemes, ever. He must have been a wildly annoying contemporary in the admiralty. But he delivered enormous reform to the Royal Navy and did it all with a certain charm – he was a famous ballroom dancer and was in a passionate marriage.

Admiral of the Fleet John Arbuthnot “Jacky” Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher of Kilverstone (George Grantham Bain Collection)

Q: Throughout the book you relate your personal experiences, whether being a seaborne commander or an officer on staff duty in the halls of the Pentagon. You candidly reflect on past mistakes and flaws, but how did you see yourself grow as a leader over the course of your career?

JS: I started out, like many junior officers, with a lot of arrogance about my own skills. It took me a long time to find balance between self-confidence and over-confidence. My peers, especially my naval academy classmates, helped me with that. Over time, I became a better and more humble person. A big part of that was simply growing older, having children, meeting failure along the voyage, and other natural events.

Also, speaking of balance, I have struggled to find the right balance between career and family. David Brooks, in his marvelous book, The Road to Character, speaks about the difference between our “resume values” (Annapolis grad, Phd, 4-star admiral, NATO commander) and our “eulogy values” (good father, loving brother, best husband). I could do better on those eulogy values in terms of the time I devote – I remain very driven on the professional side. But that is the beauty of the human condition, right?  

In the end, we get to choose how we want to approach the world, knowing that our small voyages are so often going to end up sailing against the wind. There is immense comfort in understanding that the value of the voyage will be in seeing that beautiful ocean, and knowing that when we look at it, we see not only vast expanses of salt water, but eternity itself. That voyage for me continues, and I try hard every day to keep sailing as close to true north as I can. 

Admiral James Stavridis is an operating executive at The Carlyle Group and Chair of the Board of Counselors at McLarty Associates. A retired 4-star, he led the NATO Alliance in global operations (2009 to 2013) as Supreme Allied Commander, focused on Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans, Syria, counter-piracy, and cyber security. Earlier, he was Commander U.S. Southern Command (2006-2009) responsible for Latin America. He has more than 50 medals, 28 from foreign nations.

In 2016, he was vetted for Vice President by Hillary Clinton and subsequently invited to Trump Tower to discuss a cabinet position in the Trump Administration.

Admiral Stavridis holds a PhD in international relations and has published nine books and hundreds of articles in leading journals. His 2012 TED talk on global security has over one million views. Admiral Stavridis is a monthly columnist for TIME Magazine and Chief International Security Analyst for NBC News, and has tens of thousands of connections on the social networks.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz at his desk in the Navy Department. (Naval History and Heritage Command Photo #80-G-K-9334)