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An Artist at War – The Life of George Plante

By Christopher Nelson

I recently had the chance to correspond with Dr. Kathleen Williams about her new book, Painting War: George Plante’s Combat Art in World War II. I am personally fascinated with the intersection of art and war, and works that explore the lives of artists that were not behind a gun but who observed and captured war with their art are certainly worthwhile.

Nelson: Kathy, thanks for joining me to discuss your new book. To begin, who was George Plante? Give us a brief biographical sketch of this man, the center of your book.

Williams: George Plante, a Scot, was born in Edinburgh in 1914. He trained as an artist at the Edinburgh College of Art and the Contempora School of Applied Arts in Berlin. On the outbreak of WWII he was working for an advertising agency in London when he took radio officer’s training and spent the next several years in the British Merchant Navy traversing the North Atlantic on oil tankers. On his many stops in New York, he cultivated American advertising contacts and developed a profound affinity for the country and its people.

He also secured the support of the War Artist’s Advisory Committee and was assigned to spend much of his time at sea painting the Battle of the Atlantic. His paintings were widely exhibited in the U.S. and became a part of the British campaign to encourage American support for the war against the Nazis. On shore leave in London after his tanker was torpedoed under him in March 1943, Plante was recruited to work for the clandestine Political Warfare Executive. He was sent to Cairo and spent the rest of the war there and in Italy producing illustrations for propaganda leaflets that were dropped over Nazi-occupied southern and eastern Europe. This propaganda effort was a joint Allied endeavor and once again Plante worked closely with American colleagues.

Photo of George Plante as radio officer

After the end of the war Plante spent the rest of his working life carving out a very successful career in advertising, for many years with the London branch of an American agency and finally with a British company. He also continued to paint for his own pleasure and had numbers of well-received shows. In the 1950s he married an American and on his retirement they moved to the States were he lived until his death in 1995, not long after becoming a U.S. citizen

Nelson: As you mentioned, he spent a deployment on a merchant vessel, operating in waters off the Gulf Coast and the East Coast of the United States. As you write in your book, U-boats were a concern for all in those waters during the early war years. Yet he was drawing and making art while working as a radio operator. How did he do this? That is, the sea changes every minute, every hour, how does an artist capture that scene – and doing so during the war?

Williams: Plante had a lifelong habit of making quick sketches of whatever he saw. He also developed his own detailed vocabulary for rapidly recording color, tone and fleeting impressions, so that when he had a chance to paint he had prompts to remind him exactly how the action had looked. Of course, it also took a fierce concentration to be able to paint on a pitching, tossing deck with the constant threat of U-boat attacks. He was greatly helped in his artistic endeavors by being relieved of many of his radio watch duties because his work in support of the British war effort was seen as extremely important.

Gouache painting of a destroyer dropping depth charges (Courtesy Ms. Williams)

Nelson: In your acknowledgments, you thank George Plante’s son, Derek, for providing you with many of George’s letters and copies of his sketches. How important were these for you when writing the book?

Williams: Plante’s letters to his Scottish wife provide the backbone of the first part of the book. Without those letters the official account of his tours at sea, his correspondence with the War Artist’s Advisory Committee, and several newspaper articles based on interviews with him would have made for a much less interesting and informative account of his work as an artist in wartime. His letters from Cairo were equally important in providing insight into the activities of an artist engaged in an Anglo-American propaganda effort against the Axis. Plante was an evocative and entertaining writer and continued to write amusing articles and letters for the rest of his life. His sketches provide the visual evidence of his immediate connection to the war and vividly illustrate what he saw and experienced.

Nelson: Was there a particular letter you found touching or that moved you more than others?

Williams: Yes, many, especially the ones from spring/summer 1943 to his wife, Evelyn, when he knew she was pregnant and he wrote “My dearest Evelyn, and Oscar or Judy.” He also wrote a charming letter from Cairo in September 1943 when his son turned one year old. He bought Derek a pair of shoes in the Mousky (the open air market) writing that “they probably won’t fit and might make him have turned-up- toes if they did. But they amused me and I think they’ll make you laugh too.” He also referred to his son as “Little Chief One-Year-Old.”

Nelson: Did he sketch in his letters?

Williams: No, none of his letters have sketches – perhaps they would not have passed the censors?

Nelson: I recall in your introduction that George Plante didn’t enjoy his wartime painting style. Why didn’t he?

Williams: In later years he disliked his wartime painting style, which he found heavy and dark and he often noted that he was glad so many of his paintings had disappeared into the Soviet Union when sent there with an exhibition after the war. Of course the dark realism of his wartime art reflected not only the style of the time but the dark subject matter.

Nelson: If not his war painting style, what style was his favorite?

Williams: He much preferred the soft colors and bright play of light in his later paintings. He particularly enjoyed painting scenery, often including old buildings, and any people were usually small and more or less incidental to the composition as a whole.

Nelson: Some of his sketches, particularly the one of a survivor on the New Zealand ship Takoa, are done with confidence – few strokes, clean lines, and the talent of a graphic illustrator. The sketch of the sailor on the Takoa reminds me of Ronald Searle’s work. Here I’m thinking about Searle’s work during his captivity in Singapore. To that point, did he work with other artists for his propaganda pieces? And did he ever comment about other contemporary artists that were working during the war that he admired?

Williams: Well, he was quite picky about the work of other artists and fairly critical. He did go to as many art shows as he could, especially in Edinburgh and London, and he did admire the work of Erik Ravilious, John Nash, and Edward Ardizzone. In Cairo he worked closely with American artist John Pike whose illustrations he found “certainly very good, sound stuff” although when he arrived in Egypt he pronounced that the work being done was generally of a “dreadfully low” standard. He also thought the work of most Americans was not nearly as efficient as that produced by the British.

Nelson: Tell us about some of the propaganda art operations he did during the war. Here I’m thinking about the one you describe focused on the Allied operations during the Italian campaign.

Williams: On his arrival in Cairo in the summer of 1943 Plante immediately began work on the propaganda campaign designed to break down Italian opposition to the Allies. Among other endeavors he illustrated a small booklet designed to emphasize the deep cultural differences between the Germans and the Italians. He was also deeply involved in illustrating pamphlets, leaflets, and news sheets aimed at the campaigns in Greece, Crete, and the Italian-controlled Dodecanese, in Yugoslavia and in Albania. Nearing the end of the war he also worked on propaganda leaflets aimed at Norway and finally, also at Allied occupied Germany.

Illustration of a German Solider attacked by two-headed eagles (Plante papers)

Nelson: He also drew maps. This is something I think many of us take for granted in the days of Google and other online mapping services and easy-to-find vector art of geographic features. What were some of the maps he drew and why did he draw them?

Williams: Late in the war Plante produced some rough sketch maps for leaflets demonstrating to occupied populations (and to German occupation troops) the steady Allied advances, both in the Battle of the Atlantic and on the European mainland.

Nelson: As an artist, what was his preferred medium? I see a large mix in the pictures in the book – ink, gouache, and oils. Was he comfortable across all mediums?

Williams: Yes, he was comfortable in all mediums. To the end of his life he seldom went anywhere without his sketchbook which he filled with drawings in pencil. He
produced more finished sketches in ink and also painted scenes in watercolor from his travels all over the world. After the war he seldom painted in gouache and most of his later work was either in watercolor or in oils. His more substantial work was almost always in oil although he produced many smaller very evocative pieces in watercolor.

Nelson: To close, what are some of your favorite drawings that he did? Why do you enjoy them?

Williams: From the wartime I love his painting of his tanker, Southern Princess, burning after being torpedoed. Otherwise I find his postwar art much more appealing, especially some of his paintings of old churches in Greece and on the French Riviera, and a wonderful series of watercolors he was commissioned to paint of Bahrain.

Nelson: Kathy, thanks so much for taking the time to discuss your new book. All the best to you.

Dr. Kathleen Broome Williams holds a BA from Wellesley College, an MA from Columbia University and a PhD in military history from the City University of New York. She has taught at Sophia University in Tokyo; at Florida State University in Panama; at Bronx Community College, City University of New York and also served as Deputy Executive Officer, of the CUNY Graduate Center’s Ph.D. Program in History; at Cogswell Polytechnical College in California; and since retirement she has taught part time at Holy Names University in Oakland. She spent the 2018-19 academic year at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland as the Class of 1957 Distinguished Chair in Naval Heritage. Her published work includes Secret Weapon: U.S. High-frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic (Naval Institute Press, 1996), Improbable Warriors: Women Scientists and the U.S. Navy in World War II, (Naval Institute Press, 2001) John Lyman award for best book in U.S. Naval History, NASOH, 2001; Grace Hopper: Admiral of the Cyber Sea (Naval Institute Press, 2004), John Lyman award for best biography/autobiography in U.S. Naval History, NASOH, 2004; and The Measure of a Man: My Father, the Marine Corps, and Saipan, (Naval Institute Press, 2013) as well as articles and book chapters on naval science and technology. Her new book, Painting War, also published by the Naval Institute Press, was released in May 2019. Formerly executive director of the New York Military Affairs Symposium, trustee of the Societyfor Military History, and regional coordinator for the SMH, she served on the Nominations Committee of NASOH and is now a member of the editorial advisory board of The Journal of Military History, the U.S. Naval Institute’s naval history advisory board, and Marine Corps History magazine’s editorial review board. Although born in the United States, Professor Williams was raised in Italy and England, and later spent many years in Germany, Puerto Rico, Japan, and Panama.

Christopher Nelson is an intelligence officer stationed at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland, Maryland. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in Newport, Rhode Island. He is a regular contributor to the Center for International Maritime Security. The views here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Navy or the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: Photo of George Plante from cover of Beaufort and South Carolina Low Country Magazine (George Plante papers).

Mine Warfare Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC featured articles submitted in response to our Call for Articles issued in partnership with the U.S. Navy’s Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants. From unmanned minehunting systems to swarming warfighting concepts, authors offered a glimpse into the future of how mine warfare could evolve. 

Below are the articles that featured during the topic week. We thank the authors for their excellent contributions. 

Meeting the Mine Warfare Challenge with Unmanned Systems” by Andrea Daolio

“By harnessing unmanned systems and machine learning, the U.S. Navy can bridge the gap between its own mine countermeasures capability and the growing mine warfare threat.”

The U.S. Navy Needs AWNIS for Mine Warfare” by LT Colin Barnard, USN

“One such doctrine is the Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System, or AWNIS, which is crucial for conducting military operations at sea, especially mine warfare, while minimizing disruption to merchant shipping. This crucial doctrine can help modify and reroute sea lines of communications as they become threatened and endure combat operations. But unfortunately, the U.S. Navy knows very little about this system, its processes, or its merits.”

Embracing an Unmanned Solution for the U.S. Navy’s Mine Warfare Renaissance” by U.H. “Jack” Rowley and Craig Cates

“In our collective Navy experience—spanning half a century—this is not a new issue for the U.S. Navy, but one it has struggled with for decades. We contend it is not for lack of want, or even a lack of funding (although MCM resourcing has lagged other procurement priorities), but rather, not having adequately mature technology to address the challenge.”

Swarming to Solve the Navy’s MCM Problems” by Dr. Joseph Walsh III

“In nature, everywhere we look, we see large groups of creatures that cooperate with each other to complete sophisticated tasks. For some problems, such as search and detection, their methods are far superior to our own. We suggest mimicking nature to develop a swarm-based approach with the ultimate goal being the development of advanced MCM capabilities.”

A Pervasive and Persistent Approach to Mine Countermeasures” by Dr. Keith Aliberti and Mike Kobold

“The U.S. Navy has developed a vast array of novel technologies to counter the ever evolving mine threat and has made great advancements in its MCM capabilities. We contend, however, that in order to make revolutionary advancements in our ability to counter mines, a shift from direct, operational/tactical-level thinking to indirect, strategic-level thinking needs to occur.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org

Featured Image: Featured Image:  SOUTH CHINA SEA (July 3, 2019) Mineman 2nd Class Collin Harvey uses vehicle handling system (VHS) to recover a mine neutralization vehicle (MNV) aboard the Avenger-class mine countermeasure ship USS Pioneer (MCM 9). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Corbin Shea)

A Pervasive and Persistent Approach to Mine Countermeasures

Mine Warfare Topic Week

By Dr. Keith Aliberti and Mike Kobold, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division

Sea mines have long been used as an effective form of asymmetric warfare as they are “easy to lay and difficult to sweep; their concealment potential is strong; their destructive power is high; and the threat value is long-lasting.”1 Key objectives of utilizing sea mines for “blockading enemy bases, harbors, and sea lanes; destroying enemy sea transport capabilities; attacking or restricting warship mobility; and crippling and exhausting enemy combat strength”2 clearly demonstrate that sea mines pose a significant threat to the U.S. Navy and its allied navies. The U.S. Navy has developed a vast array of novel technologies to counter the ever evolving mine threat and has made great advancements in its MCM capabilities. We contend, however, that in order to make revolutionary advancements in our ability to counter mines, a shift from direct, operational/tactical-level thinking to indirect, strategic-level thinking needs to occur.

Borrowing from great advancements that the U.S. has made in its ability to counter improvised explosive devices (C-IED) over the past 17 years of war, we contend that an overarching strategic approach is necessary – a pervasive, persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) approach to MCM that requires a paradigm shift in how we approach the problem. Over the course of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military shifted from the operational/tactical strategy of “finding, fixing, and finishing IEDs” to a strategic approach of pervasively and persistently surveiling vast spaces to “know” where IEDs are. This approach required a paradigm shift in how to counter IEDs that was met with great success. We argue that MCM requires a shift in mindset from looking at MCM as an operational/tactical problem of “finding mines” to a strategic problem of “knowing where a mine is, a priori.”

It is no small feat to monitor a region, day and night, 24/7, to provide overarching ISR that can be utilized to say, with utmost confidence, that there is something of interest at a particular location. For land-based ISR, the U.S. military has at its disposal significant overhead imaging capabilities (whether from blimps, manned/unmanned aircraft, and/or satellites) to enable the realization of this approach. The challenges we face in countering mines, however, are compounded by, what these authors refer to as, the 3 by 3 problem: Mines are typically deployed via air, surface, and undersea platforms; are often found on the seafloor (proud or buried), moored, or drifting; and are typically of the contact, influence, or remotely detonated type. In essence, we have to deal with myriad mine threat types and operational environments.

Strategically, operationally, and tactically, our ability to yield an overarchingly pervasive and persistent MCM ISR capability cannot be achieved without significant advancements in our technical capabilities. Rapid establishment of long sea lines of communication, offshore operating areas, amphibious operating areas, and littoral penetration areas are required to establish large, safe operating areas and transit routes – and all of these drive MCM mission requirements. Time is paramount for MCM operations and while our desire for an “all-knowing” capability is not yet within reach, intersection of the core ISR components of multimodal and multidimensional continuous collection across the littoral battlespace (sensing), near-real-time and knowledge distribution (delivery), and horizontal integration of data coupled with advanced, distributed analytics (sensemaking and understanding), will enable “perfect knowledge.”3

One example of a niche capability developed over the past few years that will contribute to pervasive, persistent ISR is the U.S. Navy’s commitment to address near real-time knowledge distribution. Critical to our ability to sense and deliver within MCM operations and to “know” where mines are, will be large, distributed underwater wireless sensor networks (DUWSNs) that utilize novel acoustic underwater communication protocols. DUWSNs, as envisioned, are self-organizing networks of mobile sensors that enhance sensing, monitoring, and surveillance capabilities. They form a mobile, dynamic observation system to enhance the ability to detect, classify, localize, and track events of interest to provide underwater sensing and surveillance capabilities that will lead to more precise knowledge about surface, subsurface, and underwater activities, particularly for the detection, classification, and location of mines and minefields. DUWSNs are both mobile and dynamic (can adapt to changing conditions) in nature. In addition, they can monitor and detect time-varying events occurring within both their local and extended underwater environments. DUWSNs, when fully realized, will provide “perfect knowledge” about surface and subsurface activities and, hence, to the “all-knowing” capability that is necessary to provide revolutionary capabilities for MCM.

Inherent to the success of DUWSNs is effective communication, using acoustics, amongst all of the dynamic nodes of the network. Underwater acoustic channels, however, feature large-latency and low-bandwidth. In addition, the sensor nodes of a DUWSN are mobile and will shift position relative to one another due to dispersion and shear thereby resulting in coordinated networking amongst large numbers (potentially hundreds to thousands) of densely-deployed sensors a challenge. The “rules” by which the sensor nodes communicate, otherwise known as communication protocols, are key to advancing near-real-time delivery of information. The U.S. Navy has conducted research and development on novel network architectures to meet the needs of short-term, time-critical and long-term, non-time-critical MCM operational requirements. Using a systems engineering approach to acoustic communications, we have developed statistical models of undersea acoustic transmissions that allow a priori decisions on what communication protocols are to be used to communicate effectively and efficiently based on the location of the DUWSNs. Specifically, there are anisotropies and inhomogeneities in the water column that cause deviations in acoustic direct-path trajectories. We have used sound speed profiles (SSPs) that simulate tidal and storm variations (deterministic) and various random SSPs, both based on measurements, and this has led to our ability to develop specific, effective, and efficient communication protocols. We have developed Acoustic Modem Protocol Statistics (AMPS) that enable the calculation of throughput in terms of the percent of communication packets properly received using modem specifications. This research greatly enhances our ability to develop the right acoustic communication protocols to meet the demands of advanced underwater networks.

We want to stress that acoustic communication protocols and advances in DUWSNs are one component of the aforementioned overarching strategic shift in our thinking of how to address the challenges posed by sea mines. What DUWSNs provide is not so much in their technical capability, but a shift in how to apply new, innovative technologies to look at the MCM problem. In essence, the intent is for DUWSNs to be part of a much larger system-of-systems that includes unmanned underwater vehicles, components of subsea and undersea warfare, and littoral operations to enable pervasive and persistent ISR capabilities that will provide a major strategic, operational, and tactical advantage for MCM operations.

Dr. Keith Aliberti received his doctorate and master’s degrees in Physics from the University Center at Albany, State University of New York, in 1998 and his bachelor’s degree in Physics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1992. He is the head of the Science and Technology Department at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division, where he oversees research and development of mine countermeasures technologies, advanced mining, unmanned system technologies, and maritime special programs.

Mr. Michael Kobold received his master’s degree in Physics from the University of Michigan and his master’s degree in Electrical Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He is an optics, seismic, acoustic, and image processing scientist in the Intelligent Sensing and Irregular Warfare Branch of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division, and holds a Professional Engineering License in Mechanical Engineering.  He has extensive experience in nonlinear structural engineering, remote sensing, infrasound-related security and stability operations surveillance techniques, and electro-optics. Recently, his efforts have been focused on acoustical communications in underwater networks.

References

[1] Erickson, Andrew S., Goldstein, Lyle J., and Murray, William S. “Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability”, Naval War College China Maritime Studies #3, June 2009.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Stojanovic, Milica and Beaujean, Pierre-Philippe J. “Acoustic Communication.” In Springer Handbook of Ocean Engineering, pp. 359-386. Springer, Cham, 2016.

[4] Hogan, Todd C., “The Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Dilemma: Can the Department of Defense Achieve Information Superiority?”, Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007.

Featured Image: Lt. Andrew Kuo, from Durham, North Carolina, assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 5 Platoon 501, attaches a dummy explosive charge to floating mine during Mine Warfare Exercise (MIWEX) 2JA. MIWEX 2JA is part of an annual series of bilateral exercises held between the U.S. and Japan to increase proficiency in mine countermeasure operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Mario Coto)

Swarming to Solve the Navy’s MCM Problems

Mine Warfare Topic Week

By Dr. Joseph Walsh III, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division

The Navy is in a position to create a concrete definition of what swarms of unmanned vehicles (UxVs) can do for the future of mine countermeasures (MCM). Some advantages are ready to be applied while others are still on the horizon. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division has invested in the development of swarming-based technologies for MCM. Swarms require specific ‘swarm algorithms’ that will allow otherwise standalone systems to collaborate by dividing up tasks, such as surveying potential minefields, and these algorithms will need to be specifically designed to optimize division of labor. Those optimizations are only the tip of the iceberg for what can be done to improve future naval MCM capabilities. The Navy of the future might have:

  • Swarms that neutralize mines, rather than attempt to detect them
  • Swarms that could lead a ship safely through a minefield in a fraction of the time it would take to clear the area
  • Swarms that spread out over a minefield, “sniffing” for specific sonar or chemical signatures in the water, in the same way that animals or insects cooperatively search for prey
  • Swarms made up of existing MCM systems, using minimal resources to neutralize a minefield with a “divide and conquer” approach
  • Swarms that identify and defeat swarm-based mines

By exploiting swarm-based technologies, there is potential for the Navy to shape MCM for a generation. However, in order to take full advantage of swarming capabilities, three significant shifts in how we think about MCM are required.

Economy of Scale: More Units for Less Money

Economy of scale is perhaps the most immediate opportunity for naval MCM development. Existing MCM systems are typically single, large systems that tend to be costly to develop and deploy. Moving to swarming-based technologies may allow a shift from single, large MCM systems to multiple, lower cost, swarming-based, modular systems. Current naval MCM systems yield significant capabilities and are superior not only in their design, but in their ability to detect mines. A single MCM system, however, is often limited to be in one place at one time. Furthermore, limited resources reduce the overall availability of MCM systems thereby limiting our ability to conduct missions.

Developing large numbers of inexpensive MCM units, designed to work collaboratively in swarms, is one way to advance MCM capabilities. Simply by virtue of their numbers, swarming units provide increased flexibility when dealing with logistical and operational challenges. Swarms can be combined, or subdivided, depending on the strength required. When deciding how much MCM capability to assign to a region, commanders would be able to choose from multiple options. Cost reduction may open up new strategic options. Inexpensive swarm units are expendable and this allows the Navy to build swarming MCM systems designed not to only detect mines but to also trigger them in efforts to speed the process of mine clearance while being able to accept more risk. With a swarm specifically designed to detect and trigger mines, some of the existing problems we face in mine detection become irrelevant. Certainly, some members of the swarm might be lost to an explosion, but fewer than one might think. Most of the individual swarming units would be scattered but intact, so the remaining swarm agents could simply regroup and continue their work.

Once we consider the paradigm shift of more units for less money, we need to consider how that shift will affect our design of future MCM capabilities.

Modularity: Design Teams Not Systems

Swarm-based MCM designs need to focus on modularity: separating the work into individual components, according to their design and how they will be used. Modular systems are easy to test and upgrade, and when they do break, they are much easier to diagnose and repair. In a modular swarm, individual UxVs are specialized. They perform the fewest tasks necessary, because they can count on their nearby teammates to complete the mission.

A modular approach allows for the creation of highly specialized MCM units. For example, consider the problem of detection. Different types of mines require different, specialized detection approaches, so if commanders know what type of mines might be present, they can deploy swarming sensing units optimized for those detections. If the mines are buried, even more specialized approaches are typically required. Similar trees of specialization and sub-specialization can be constructed for problems of identification and neutralization.

With a single system, all of the parts are designed to work together. Components are judged and chosen based on how they impact the system as a whole. To be effective, swarms need similar consideration. This brings us to the next point.

Compatibility: Metrics to Encourage Collaborative UxVs

Acquisitions that take a single-system approach have a tendency to stovepipe development and while this has been successful, we are suggesting a different approach. Current systems are often tested and evaluated in isolation, without consideration for how the might interact with other systems. A swarm is, by definition, a large group collaborating toward some goal. A swarm-based approach to acquisition will measure the success of a program by its effectiveness in groups, particularly groups composed of a variety of different UxVs.

Specifically, the Navy could test and evaluate how a new product works when applied to swarm-based scenarios. It should offer incentives for the use of multiple kinds of agents, particularly those designed by outside groups. (Increased collaboration between diverse research teams is one side-effect of this approach.) The Navy might also consider developing standard scenarios for swarm-based MCM, both to direct innovation and to offer a concrete basis for measuring success.

Above and beyond standardizing scenarios, the Navy is poised to take the lead in defining what swarm-based MCM means. This would require investments in several important swarm-enabling technologies, such as:

  • Improved communications. In contested environments and underwater, messaging is slow and bandwidth is at a premium. Anything that improves these conditions makes swarm-based MCM easier and more effective.
  • More robust communication systems.
  • A rapid-development approach to swarm member creation. Specifically, this does not mean developing a “minimal cost viable prototype,” but establishing a process whereby finished products can quickly transition from laboratory to factory, and once there, can be produced inexpensively in large quantities. The focus here should be on single-function swarm members that add specific desirable capabilities, even if that makes them dependent on the results of other projects.
  • Improved swarm logistics. If development is not done carefully, rapid deployment of swarms could become an insurmountable obstacle. Ideally, swarm deployment could be as simple as emptying a box of them over the side of a ship, and retrieval as easy as scooping them up in a large net. With a proper recharging station, readying the swarm could be practically painless.

To achieve successful swarm-based MCM, the Navy will need to develop a mindset around large groups of swarming technologies that are low cost and, perhaps, expendable. The human mind is hard-wired to think in terms of action by individuals, or possibly small groups. Yet this is not the only option. In nature, everywhere we look, we see large groups of creatures that cooperate with each other to complete sophisticated tasks. For some problems, such as search and detection, their methods are far superior to our own. We are suggesting to mimick nature to develop a swarm-based approach with the ultimate goal being the development of advanced MCM capabilities.

Dr. Joseph Walsh received his doctorate degree in Mathematics from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 2017. His dissertation is in the area of optimal control and his research has been applied to heterogeneous teams of vehicles. He has published numerous papers in multi-agent coordination. He is currently the head of the Applied Sensing and Processing Branch at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division.

Featured Image:  Naval Oceanographic Office personnel prepare to launch 10 littoral battlespace sensing gliders from USNS Maury in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean in support of NAVOCEANO’s goal to deploy more than 50 gliders globally. (U.S. Navy photo)