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Latin America

The Caribbean Sea: A Strategic Area with Many US Allies and Partners

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By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

In late March, the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) and the Guyanese patrol vessel Shahoud carried out joint exercises in Guyana’s exclusive economic zone and international waters. Washington has many allies and partners across the Greater Caribbean, particularly among the region’s English-speaking nations. Despite having limited budgets and assets, the defense forces of the English-speaking Caribbean are training and increasing their capabilities to carry out missions, which aligns with US diplomatic and military objectives.

Ongoing Dialogue

The good news is that high-level interactions between the U.S. military and Caribbean militaries continue. U.S. Navy Admiral Alvin Holsey, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), traveled to Trinidad and Tobago last December to participate in the Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC) 2024.

In early January, U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Nathan Moore, Commander of the Atlantic Area, visited Barbados and met with Barbados Defence Force Chief of Staff Brigadier Carlos Lovell. The two senior officers discussed further cooperation on common threats, including transnational organized crime and illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. Subject Matter Experts from the U.S. military traveled to Jamaica in March and visited the Jamaica Defence Force’s Joint Information and Operations Centre.

The Jamaican Defense Force hosted three key Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) at the Joint Information and Operations Centre in March 2025. (JDF photo)

More recently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname in late March. The tour was a chance to address Caribbean defense and security issues: during his stop in the Jamaican capital, Rubio also met with Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Stuart Young and discussed the bilateral security partnership and regional security issues.

Recent Acquisitions by Caribbean Forces

Improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) remains a priority for Caribbean governments and their defense forces. Hence, regional naval forces acquire new surface and aerial assets for these missions. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) has led the way over the past decade via the Sandy Bottom Project, which enabled the acquisition of a fleet of different Damen-made surface vessels, including patrol vessels. The RBDF has also acquired a fleet of drones. Similarly, the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) has acquired four offshore patrol vessels, also manufactured by Damen, for the JDF Coast Guard; the HMJS Norman Manley arrived in late 2023.

More recently, the Antigua & Barbuda Defence Force (ABDF) Coast Guard announced in late February the commissioning of a new speedboat for the fleet, hull number CG11-1 Swordfish. This acquisition demonstrates Saint John’s commitment to strengthening the ABDF and improving MDA. Suriname’s Navy is now operating the patrol vessel RSS Barracuda (P501), acquired through a lease-to-buy agreement with Damen Shipyard Group. The ship will have “a crucial role in the protection of the maritime area of ​​the country,” explained the Ministry of Defense. (Suriname’s official language is Dutch, not English, but I will mention it nonetheless).

Guyana deserves special attention. In late 2024, Guyana finally received the 115-foot Defiant patrol vessel GDFS Berbice, produced by the U.S. shipyard Metal Shark. Berbice is the new flagship of the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) Coast Guard and will support maritime operations. Given that Guyana has a border dispute with neighboring Venezuela over Guyana’s Essequibo region and oil-rich waters, acquiring new platforms for the GDF is a priority. In fact, in early March, the Venezuelan patrol vessel ABV Guaiqueiri PO-11 entered Guyana’s exclusive economic zone and harassed oil assets operating there. In a statement, the Guyanese government explained that, “The Venezuelan naval vessel communicated threateningly via radio communication that FPSO PROSPERITY was operating in Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone before continuing in a Southwestern direction towards other FPSOs, to which it delivered the same message.” The Venezuelan Ministry of Defense justified the operation, arguing it took place in contested waters.

GDFS Berbice being launched by Metal Shark in Louisiana. (Metal Shark photo)

The U.S. military and coast guard presence in the Caribbean

The U.S. military, particularly SOUTHCOM, its maritime component U.S. Fourth Fleet, and even U.S. Northern Command (with The Bahamas within its area of responsibility) continue to engage Washington’s English-speaking allies throughout the Caribbean. Engagement is not limited to meetings but also bilateral and multinational military training. For example, SOUTHCOM sponsors the annual exercise Tradewinds, specifically designed for the Caribbean – Trinidad and Tobago hosted Tradewinds 2024. Bilateral training occurs when U.S. warships visit the Caribbean. Passing exercises (PASSEX) are fairly common, case in point, at the time of this writing, in late March, the Normandy and the Shahoud carried out joint exercises, including PASSEX, “in international waters and the Guyana Exclusive Economic Zone to exercise communications and interoperability, and practice joint maneuvers,” according to the U.S. embassy in Guyana.

SOUTHCOM remains focused on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions across the Caribbean – and the rest of Latin America. The U.S. hospital ship Comfort is often deployed. However, in recent years, the Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport vessel USNS Burlington (T-EPF 10) has also traveled throughout the Caribbean to assist populations in need. HA/DR operations are already taking place this year.

The Lesser Antilles Medical Assistance Team (LAMAT) 2025, commenced on 24 February, during which U.S. military medical personnel will visit several Caribbean nations. While LAMAT 2025 does not involve vessels, the humanitarian exercise will provide invaluable medical services to the inhabitants of Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana. “All involved agree LAMAT’25 is a win-win scenario, benefiting both U.S. military personnel and partner nations. The mission enhances medical readiness and strengthens partnerships while improving healthcare infrastructure in underserved areas,” explained Air Forces Southern, the aerial component of SOUTHCOM.

The U.S. Navy deployed several assets over the past years throughout the Caribbean as regional countries were hit by deadly and destructive natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. (In previous commentaries for CIMSEC, this author suggested that SOUTHCOM deserves a permanently assigned hospital ship.)

As for security operations, U.S. Navy warships, particularly destroyers and littoral combat ships (LCSs), and U.S. Coast Guard cutters regularly patrol the Caribbean Sea to interdict illicit maritime activities, particularly drug trafficking via vessels and the infamous narco-submarines. Recent platforms deployed to the Command’s area of responsibility include the LCS St. Louis and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Thomas Hudner (DDG 116). The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Valiant unloaded approximately 12,470 pounds (5,656 kilograms) of cocaine in early March at Coast Guard Base Miami Beach, worth an estimated $141.4 million. The contraband was seized thanks to six interdictions in the Caribbean Sea.

Finally, the Caribbean Sea is ideal for testing emerging technologies. At the time of writing, Operation Southern Spear is underway as the U.S. Navy is testing Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs). The objective is to test new systems to develop the future U.S. Navy’s hybrid fleet as part of the service’s Project 33. 

Discussion and Analysis

Some Greater Caribbean countries have governments that clash with U.S. diplomatic aims, namely Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. However, the region has many historical and trustworthy U.S. allies and partners. In a recent interview, Belize Defence Force commander Brigadier General Azariel Loria discussed training exercises with SOUTHCOM, including Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) and the Louisiana National Guard via the State Partnership Program. “We are eager to continue joint training exercises focused on countering transnational threats, with the goal of incorporating tactical operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and specialized training on counterterrorism and disaster response,” he said. BG Loria added that the BDF “looks forward to more innovated ways to take our partnership to another level to improve coordination between our land, air, and maritime units.” In other words, the commanding officers of the English-speaking Caribbean defense forces see the U.S. armed forces (including the Coast Guard) as important allies and partners for training and operating together to combat crimes in air, land, and sea. This relationship must not be lost.

The issue of equipment availability and serviceability is an obvious problem within the region. The Caribbean Sea is a large body of water, and Caribbean countries are not one single unified island nation. Depending on the country, each nation can include countless islands, islets, cays and atolls, and a vast maritime territory. Hence, regional naval forces require a fleet of surface vessels and maritime patrol aircraft to properly monitor and command their maritime territory. Certainly, more vessels demand additional expenses like port infrastructure, fuel, ammo, and crew, among other financial considerations, meanwhile defense budgets across the Caribbean remain limited, hamstringing fleets across the Caribbean. However, the examples mentioned in this analysis- the Bahamas and Jamaica acquiring several ships and the more modest acquisitions of Guyana and Antigua & Barbuda- demonstrate civilian authorities’ commitment to assign more budgets for maritime procurement programs.

Unfortunately, the threats of illicit activities and challenges across the Caribbean will remain ever-present. The sea is the preferred corridor for drug trafficking, while IUU fishing and human and weapons smuggling are also constant challenges and threats. An ongoing concern is the crisis in Haiti, which is forcing Haitians to migrate, often via vessels. Moreover, piracy is making a comeback. Last year, there were reports that two Haitian criminal entities, 5 Seconds and Taliban gangs (no relation to the Afghan Taliban), captured the freighter Magalie at Port-au-Prince’s Varreux terminal district, stealing one-sixth of the cargo of rice and took the crewmembers hostage. The situation was resolved when the police stormed the ship. Even though the incident occurred while the ship was docked, the situation in Haiti has become so dire that it now affects maritime shipping.

For the Caribbean, cooperation is the correct answer. Given the threat environment in the Caribbean Sea and limited surface and aerial assets to patrol this vast body of water, strengthening military-to-military relations advances U.S. and Caribbean interests. A lack of sufficient patrol vessels operated by Caribbean coast guards does not mean a lack of willingness to combat maritime crimes. The U.S. government should provide more tools, including a bigger budget for SOUTHCOM. Armed with a bigger budget, SOUTHCOM can expand its low-cost/ high-impact engagements, benefiting all partners across the Caribbean region.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: CARIBBEAN SEA (Mar. 27, 2025) – The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) conducts a passing exercise with Guyana Defence Force Defiant-class patrol ship GDSF Shahoud in the Caribbean Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dylan M. Kinee/Released)

NATO Week

NATO Naval Power Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC featured articles submitted in response to our Call for Articles on NATO Naval Power.

Authors explored a wide variety of themes and scenarios for the NATO alliance. How does NATO naval strategy evolve if the U.S. scales back its commitment and the Ukraine war rages on? How does the accession of Finland and Sweden change the maritime geography of NATO’s naval threat environment? How are allied nations deploying naval formations to the Indo-Pacific and contributing toward deterrence against China? NATO is at a historic inflection point and its future could take many directions.

Below are the articles and authors that featured during the topic week. We thank them for their excellent contributions.

“Parting Ways: A NATO Naval Strategy Without America,” by Paul Viscovich

“In this era of increasing danger, great power competition, and uncertain loyalties, the time has come for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to declare its independence. As at the time of its founding, NATO’s strategic adversary is Russia. But unlike during the Cold War, the Alliance can no longer count on the military and industrial might of the United States in confronting the threat.”

“Maritime Security on NATO’s Southern Flank: The Case for a Spanish Coast Guard,” by Gonzalo Vázquez

“Following the example of many of its European and American allies in NATO, it is worth exploring the potential establishment of a Spanish Coast Guard that merges all these existing services under a single, professional service with a unified and clearly defined command structure.”

“The Case for a Baltic SNMG-3: Developing Regional NATO Forces at Sea,” by Steinar Torset and Ian Bowers

“NATO should create a third Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) dedicated to operations in the Baltic. This would fully exploit the operational benefits of Finland and Sweden joining NATO and take advantage of ongoing force developments in other Baltic NATO navies, including Poland and Germany.”

“Keeping America Engaged: Three Possibilities for European Navies,” by Michael D. Purzycki

“To keep the U.S. engaged in the waters around Europe, European NATO members must find areas of common interest with the U.S. The threat of China to both European and American security interests creates many such opportunities. By monitoring China’s activities in the Arctic, becoming more active in the Indo-Pacific, and buying American, Europeans can maintain a strong military and industrial link to the U.S. even if U.S. military presence in and around Europe shrinks in the near future.”

“French Maritime Strategy – Carrier-Led and Indo-Pacific Focused,” by David Scott

“French maritime strategy has been on full public display with the deployment of the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) from November 2024 to April 2025, carrying out an extended deployment across the Indo-Pacific in the furthest ever Operation Clemenceau.”

“Strengthening Unity of Effort in the Atlantic: Lessons from Wargaming,” by Walter Berbrick and Terence Nicholas

“By stress-testing command structures, exploring new approaches to force employment, and fostering greater integration between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, wargames have directly informed adjustments that enhance unity of effort across the Atlantic. These insights have helped refine coordination among key commands, sharpen deterrence, and improve readiness to respond to emerging threats in an increasingly complex security environment.”

“A Post-Mortem of the Red Sea Crisis: NATO versus the European Union,” by Anna Matilde Bassoli

“The disjointed approach of the U.S. and the European Union to the Red Sea Crisis deserves thorough analysis as a critical yet overlooked cause of transatlantic distress. Indeed, the issue between the transatlantic allies is not who has to bail out whom. Instead, the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the maritime domain has weakened the U.S. grip on NATO’s naval strategy.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: July 7, 2022 – U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Michael Sciretta assumes command of Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) at a change of command ceremony on board the Italian frigate Carlo Margottini in Taranto Naval Station in Puglia, Italy. (NATO photo)

NATO Week

A Post-Mortem of the Red Sea Crisis: NATO versus the European Union

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Anna Matilde Bassoli

After more than a year of disrupted global trade, the Red Sea Crisis appears to have no end in sight. Rather, in a series of leaked messages, senior U.S. officials have cast doubts over U.S. involvement and “having to bail Europe out again.” However, while frustration on each side of the pond is understandable, emotions fail to address the root causes of growing transatlantic distrust. The disjointed approach of the U.S. and the European Union to the Red Sea Crisis deserves thorough analysis as a critical yet overlooked cause of transatlantic distress. Indeed, the issue between the transatlantic allies is not who has to bail out whom. Instead, the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the maritime domain has weakened the U.S. grip on NATO’s naval strategy. A coherent NATO naval strategy requires the United States and its European allies to align their postures, without the EU as the third wheel.

On December 18, 2023, the United States called upon allies to respond to the Houthi attacks on global shipping with the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. This multinational coalition was intended to include the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and others. However, only the UK, Canada, and Norway upheld their commitment. A few days after this announcement, most European navies withdrew to join the EU-led Operation Aspides, an overlapping defensive mission. Specifically, European navies explicitly rejected US leadership and command in an unprecedented transatlantic schism. The establishment of the EU-led Operation Aspides has resulted in a divided naval commitment and undermined efforts in the Red Sea Crisis in three crucial ways.

First, this divided effort has effectively deprived Prosperity Guardian of European naval assets over the past year. The Italian Navy has committed two destroyers and two frigates to Aspides, contrary to the single frigate initially announced in support of Prosperity Guardian. The French Navy has provided three frigates to Aspides, while it remains unclear what role they would have played in Prosperity Guardian. Similarly, the German and Belgian navies each contributed a frigate. Other European navies have divided their limited commitments between both missions, although it is unclear under which command. For example, the Hellenic Navy provided two frigates to Aspides, while the Royal Netherlands Navy contributed one frigate, a joint support ship, and aviation assets. Even the newest members of NATO, Sweden and Finland, have shown inconsistent commitment, with both countries providing only limited personnel. Despite its initial commitment to the US-led effort, Spain made no contributions. Interestingly, however, Spain’s ports benefited from the crisis, placing the country in an ambiguous position.

These commitments – or lack thereof – contrast sharply with the United Kingdom’s contribution to Prosperity Guardian during the same timeframe. In addition to the destroyers HMS Diamond and HMS Duncan, the Royal Navy provided two frigates and critical air support. While this still pales compared to the US show of force, it demonstrates the UK’s consistency in its transatlantic commitment. The other European powers cannot claim to have done similarly. The Danish Navy, for instance, sent the HDMS Iver Huitfeldt, but ship malfunctions plagued its performance, resulting in the dismissal of the Danish chief of defense. Furthermore, the French Navy has prioritized French-linked vessels, indicating that national interests rather than transatlantic ones drive their participation.

Second, the European decision to withdraw from participation in Prosperity Guardian shows how Europe was already veering towards strategic autonomy before the Trump administration came to the White House. Upon announcement, the Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense specified that Italy, France, and Germany were pushing for an EU-only operation of a purely defensive nature, without land strikes. This European insistence on going solo deserves a deep dive. For starters, Europeans have criticized the Trump administration’s stance on transatlantic relations in recent weeks, calling for renewed unity. However, the lack of European support for the US-led effort demonstrates that European conduct has been inconsistent with their leaders’ rhetoric and parallel maritime commitments. For instance, Europeans have been eager to participate in Indo-Pacific exercises and showcase these efforts as a sign of strong friendship. In the same breath, Spain has actively participated in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean. However, a key question arises: how can the United States truly trust its European allies if they only show up to train and not to engage?

In this respect, the US offensive approach against the European defensive posture demonstrates that the transatlantic allies could not be more distant. By the time European navies were rotating their naval forces in the summer of 2024, some commentators had already started casting doubts on the effectiveness of Prosperity Guardian as a purely defensive mission. In response to this lack of results, the United States doubled down on eliminating the Houthi threat and deterring further attacks with strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen under Operation Poseidon Archer. Once again, however, European commitment has been limited, and preference has been given to the defensive posture of Operation Aspides. The problem plagues transatlantic relations is not the Trump administration’s aggressive stance towards Europe. Rather, the lack of entente between the US’s forward-leaning posture and the EU’s defense posture has eroded trust and partnership across the Atlantic.

Third, the US’s lack of acknowledgment of the EU as a security actor has undermined its efforts. Most recently, Michael C. DiCianna has argued that “Europe needs to fight the Houthis.” However, his analysis focuses only on Prosperity Guardian, as if it were the only ongoing operation in the Red Sea, incorrectly accounting for the European contribution. Similarly, Doug Livermore acknowledges European contributions but employs a US-only perspective to make the case for using force in the Red Sea Crisis. Neither of these authors seems to grasp the actual problem. It is not that Europe does not fight – from the European perspective, they are protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Rather, the European and US perspectives on transatlantic security and interests do not align.

This analytical bias highlights two major problems in the US debate. First, it shows that the United States only views Europe through NATO lenses, while Europeans increasingly look to the EU to bolster their security needs. Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides began while transatlantic relations were still good. So, why did the Europeans part ways with the United States? The most evident answer points to European strategic autonomy, meaning a European defensive approach for European interests within the EU.

As evident in the Red Sea, none of this concerns the United States. Rather, Aspides attempts to demonstrate that Europe could rely on the EU as a security actor. The strong push behind an EU-led, European-only defense, particularly regarding defense spending and the primary US request since the first Trump administration, is not the result of a sudden storm. Instead, renewed US aggressiveness has further nudged the Europeans towards strategic autonomy. Indeed, Europeans have been most vocal and proactive regarding their security, not within NATO, but in the EU. The EU will never fight for US interests or in the US way. This is not what the EU was created for. On the contrary, this was why NATO was established, making it an organization suited to defend US and European interests in the American way.

This also highlights the second major problem in the US debate. Because the United States ignores the EU as a security actor, it fails to recognize that the EU and NATO rely on two opposite perspectives. Misunderstanding the difference between the EU’s inward-focused posture and the US’s forward-leaning one undermines US attempts to reset transatlantic relations. While US commentators correctly ask Europeans to contribute more, they overlook their counterparts’ perspective. From the US point of view, fighting the Houthis means not only preventing attacks on the seas but also bombing their positions on land. For Europeans, this is excessive, rendering US complaints about their conduct dangerously pointless.

In no other domain has this mistaken approach had more consequences than in the naval domain. The US viewpoint is forward-leaning – hence, offensive – towards protecting SLOCs, involving heavy military force. On the other hand, the European perspective is reactive, building convoy-like defenses around commercial ships. In short, Americans prefer to charge ahead, whereas Europeans tend to build trenches. The Red Sea Crisis exemplifies this dynamic.

The Euro-American split has resulted in two overlapping operations acting from different perspectives without a common end goal. While the EU-led Operation Aspides focuses solely on protecting commerce, US-led efforts have multilayered strategic goals: protecting SLOCs, demonstrating maritime strength on the global seas, and eroding Iran’s influence in the Middle East by striking its proxies. From the US viewpoint, these goals are not isolated but interconnected ends on a dynamic maritime chessboard, where the ultimate objective is to checkmate China. From the European perspective, China is not even on the board.

Indeed, contrary to popular US belief, the Red Sea Crisis is not about European trade; rather, it is about US sea power. The United States is not fighting the Houthis to bail out freeloading Europeans. This view is contrary to US interests and damaging to US strategy. The United States is taking charge of a maritime crisis because it can still be the premier global maritime power. This demonstration of maritime strength sends two messages. First, the United States still dominates the seas. Second, the United States is not a dead sea power to China. Underestimating the value of these messages in the context of strategic competition with China is a fatal mistake for the US.

To be fair, concerns about straining US naval forces are valid and must be addressed. However, once again, these concerns must be addressed in accordance with US naval strategy, not against it. Indeed, an increased European commitment should not continue on the premise of split naval strength. This is an open subversion of all the basic principles of US naval strategy: overwhelming naval power, control of the sea lines of communications, and maritime dominance. If the United States concedes any of these to either friend or foe, the sea power that has supported US freedom and prosperity will crumble.

The United States must leverage NATO to align transatlantic allies. This will require two key steps. First, the United States must tone down its anger towards its transatlantic allies. Autonomy-seeking Europeans might be more incentivized to maintain their defensive posture if they view the United States as an adversary. So far, this trend has been evident, and there is no reason for the United States to make Europeans even less inclined to contribute to transatlantic efforts.

The second step could involve a more structured division of labor in the Red Sea. Throughout history, very few maritime crises involving land-based attacks on commercial shipping have ended without a major deployment of strength. While the United States has a strong interest in striking the Houthis to keep Iran in check, the Europeans have an interest in keeping SLOCs open. The current approach – the United States striking the Houthis from the sea while the Europeans continue their convoy-like missions – is a good starting point. However, the split command and lack of matching European resources must cease. To make this work, the Europeans should reduce their commitments in the Indo-Pacific until the Red Sea Crisis is resolved. This would allow the United States to allocate resources effectively between the two connected theaters. Likewise, the United States should clarify that a unified command is crucial to bring this crisis to a halt.

A better understanding of expectations and goals in the Red Sea could generate premises to mend transatlantic fences. Presently, no one has the perfect recipe to bring this crisis to a halt, and a split approach has likely extended the crisis. Not only have the Houthis taken the lead in messaging victory, but the first true victim of this crisis – the Israeli port of Eilat – has fallen under financial pressure. Time has run out for the United States to complain about Europe without a plan. Likewise, time has proven that the European Union is still not a reliable security actor. An integrated NATO strategy that accounts for both US and European perspectives is the only choice for victory. The alternative option spells defeat.

Anna Matilde Bassoli holds a M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a MLitt in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. She also earned a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Italy. She currently works in the think tank industry, focusing on tech policy and security.

Featured Image: The UK Royal Navy (RN) Type 23 frigate HMS Richmond (foreground) and Type 45 destroyer HMS Diamond hand over on station as the RN vessel contributing to Operation Prosperity Guardian. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)

NATO Week

Strengthening Unity of Effort in the Atlantic: Lessons from Wargaming

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Walter Berbrick and Terence Nicholas 

Based on our experience designing and analyzing recent Naval War College wargames in the Euro-Atlantic theater, U.S. and NATO maritime forces face several challenges in maintaining readiness, enhancing lethality, and accelerating decision-making—core priorities underscored by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The North Atlantic and High North are increasingly contested, as Russian submarine operations and grey zone activities intensify and China extends its influence deeper into strategically critical Atlantic corridors.

There are several areas where greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces could enhance warfighting readiness and crisis response. These include streamlining command relationships, enhancing maritime domain awareness, harmonizing rules of engagement, strengthening maritime logistics, integrating NATO into North American defense planning, and improving amphibious force employment. While NATO navies bring significant capability to bear, optimizing these areas will ensure that the alliance is positioned to deter aggression, enhance decision advantage, and maintain maritime superiority in an increasingly complex and contested security environment.

This article offers insights and recommendations based on our wargaming experience to help U.S. and NATO naval leaders strengthen operational integration, refine force employment, and better prepare for future maritime challenges in the Euro-Atlantic theater.

Streamline Unity of Effort in the Atlantic and High North

With multiple U.S. and NATO maritime commands operating across the Atlantic and High North, there is a valuable opportunity to enhance unity of effort by refining command relationships, synchronizing force employment, and accelerating decision-making. Effective coordination among U.S. Naval Forces North (NAVNORTH), U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM), and Striking Forces NATO (SFN) ensures that Allied maritime forces can operate seamlessly in a contested environment. Wargame insights consistently emphasize the importance of shared mission awareness, mission command, and persistent training to reinforce operational alignment and clarify multinational naval task force responsibilities.

Recent initiatives have bolstered deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic theater, such as the establishment of a second maneuver fleet under NAVEUR’s temporary control and a forward deployed expeditionary Maritime Operations Center (MOC) in Europe. These efforts have improved multi-echelon coordination and operational flexibility between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, demonstrating the benefits of closer integration. Additionally, refining command integration between SFN and MARCOM—two key NATO maritime components—presents a further opportunity to strengthen transatlantic force employment. SFN, responsible for high-end maritime strike capabilities, reports directly to SACEUR, while MARCOM serves as both NATO’s Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) and the Maritime Component Commander for multiple Joint Force Commands (JFCs). Ensuring secure communications, clear command authorities, and persistent joint training will enhance NATO’s ability to employ maritime forces rapidly and effectively at the task force and task group levels.

Another key step toward greater unity of effort is elevating JFC Norfolk to a 4-star command. As NATO’s only transatlantic operational command, JFC Norfolk serves a vital role in linking U.S. and NATO maritime operations, yet its current structure requires balancing U.S. and Allied priorities across multiple echelons. Elevating JFC Norfolk would enhance command focus on transatlantic operations, improve decision-making agility, and better align command relationships within NATO’s maritime architecture. Most importantly, structuring Allied maritime commands for crises and conflict—rather than peacetime—will ensure standing U.S. and NATO maritime forces and planners are ready and integrated to deter aggression and respond decisively in the Atlantic and High North.

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness and Situational Awareness

U.S. and NATO maritime forces have a unique opportunity to sharpen their maritime domain awareness (MDA) and situational awareness by strengthening intelligence-sharing and coordination across the Atlantic and High North. Both forces field some of the world’s most advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, but their full potential can only be realized through seamless integration of policies, technologies, and operational procedures. Enhancing coordination between key commands—NAVEUR, NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN—will create a more comprehensive and real-time picture of the maritime battlespace, enabling faster threat detection, more agile decision-making, and greater operational effectiveness in contested environments.

A critical step toward this goal is developing a federated Common Operating Picture (COP) that integrates multi-domain sensor data from both U.S. and NATO maritime forces. This approach would reduce ISR fragmentation, allowing commanders to detect, track, and respond to threats with greater speed and precision. Whether countering adversary submarine movements, grey-zone activities, or long-range maritime threats, a more connected ISR network would enhance decision-making, improve force employment, and reinforce deterrence, ensuring NATO and U.S. maritime forces maintain a strategic advantage in dynamic operational theaters.

However, technology alone is not the answer. Persistent joint training, operational scenario-driven wargames, and multinational staff exchanges will be essential to refining intelligence-sharing processes and breaking down procedural barriers. Regular stress-testing of ISR coordination in realistic threat conditions will enhance interoperability, clarify authorities, and increase confidence across the alliance. By taking these steps, U.S. and NATO maritime forces will build a more unified, resilient, and responsive transatlantic naval force—one that can anticipate, deter, and decisively respond to emerging threats in an increasingly contested maritime security environment.

Maximizing Authorities and Rules of Engagement 

In fast-moving maritime operations, commanders need the ability to act swiftly and in sync with their allies. U.S. and NATO forces operate under different Rules of Engagement (ROE) and authorities, but instead of seeing this as a constraint, there’s an opportunity to leverage these differences to enhance operational agility. A deeper understanding of how each nation’s approval processes work—who can authorize what and when—can reduce delays, increase interoperability, and open the door to more flexible force employment. When commanders operate with shared awareness of authorities, they are better equipped to act decisively and prevent adversaries from exploiting procedural gaps.

Expanding this understanding is a practical step toward greater coordination and combat effectiveness. If commanders know when and how NATO and U.S. assets can operate under each other’s authorities, they can more effectively integrate forces in real time. For example, U.S. and NATO surface and submarine forces could be tasked interchangeably in a crisis, making force posture more dynamic and responsive. Instead of working around bureaucratic seams, commanders could focus on maximizing the collective strength of the alliance to deter and respond to threats with greater speed and cohesion.

To further streamline decision-making, establishing pre-approved Crisis Response Options and real-time coordination cells would allow forces to act immediately when needed. Setting clear engagement triggers across all warfare domains—surface, subsurface, air, cyber, and electronic warfare—would synchronize responses across NATO and U.S. maritime forces, closing decision-making gaps that adversaries might otherwise exploit. Aligning ROE where possible, increasing transparency of authorities, and enabling faster approvals will ensure that U.S. and NATO maritime forces can operate as a unified force, projecting deterrence and strength in an increasingly complex security environment.

Enhancing Operational Resilience

Sustaining maritime operations in the Atlantic and High North is not just about moving fuel, munitions, and supplies—it’s about ensuring forces can stay in the fight when and where they’re needed most. The ability to rapidly resupply ships at sea, repair battle damage, and sustain operations away from fixed infrastructure is what separates an agile, combat-ready force from one that risks being sidelined when it matters most. Wargaming has provided a valuable way to stress-test sustainment strategies, identify weak points before they become real-world problems, and explore new ways to keep fleets operational in contested environments.

A major takeaway from these efforts is the importance of stronger coordination between key sustainment commands like NAVNORTH, NAVEUR, MARCOM, and SFN. In fast-moving operations, small misalignments in logistics planning can lead to big problems. Establishing dedicated logistics coordination cells and integrating sustainment planning more deeply into operational decision-making can help ensure the right resources are available at the right time. The more aligned NATO and U.S. sustainment efforts become, the better prepared forces will be to sustain prolonged operations across the Atlantic.

Another critical piece is expeditionary logistics—the ability to keep ships on station without having to pull back to port for resupply and repairs. While the U.S. has made significant advances in vertical replenishment (VERTREP) and at-sea rearming, many NATO warships still rely on fixed facilities, which limits flexibility. Expanding interoperability in afloat logistics, forward-deploying repair capabilities, and developing mobile resupply facilities will keep ships in the fight longer. Additionally, prepositioning sustainment stockpiles across North America and Europe will help reduce dependence on major ports and ensure forces remain operational regardless of access challenges. Logistics isn’t just a support function—it’s a warfighting necessity. The ability to sustain combat operations anytime, anywhere will be a decisive factor in maintaining maritime superiority in the Atlantic.

Expanding U.S.-NATO Naval Integration for North American Defense

As security dynamics in the Atlantic and High North continue to evolve, there is a growing opportunity to strengthen U.S.-NATO naval integration and expand cooperation in North American defense. Traditionally, NATO’s maritime forces have focused on collective defense under Article 5, while homeland defense responsibilities have remained largely within national command structures. However, as adversaries increase activity across the Atlantic, greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces can enhance deterrence, improve crisis response, and provide more flexible force employment options.

One way to achieve this is by better integrating NATO maritime forces into existing U.S. defense planning and operations. Coordination among NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN has often been episodic rather than institutionalized, making it more reactive than proactive. By establishing routine collaboration, expanding NATO’s operational footprint in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, and refining joint maritime situational awareness, NATO and U.S. commanders alike can improve force synchronization and enhance maritime domain awareness. This approach would allow for faster response times, increased interoperability, and a stronger deterrent posture in the event of a crisis.

There are several practical steps that could further this integration. Embedding NATO liaison officers within NAVNORTH and NORTHCOM would improve real-time coordination, intelligence sharing, and joint maritime-air defense planning. Additionally, posturing NATO naval and air assets for homeland defense missions in the North Atlantic and Arctic would provide an immediate and credible deterrent while ensuring NATO forces are better aligned with U.S. homeland defense efforts. Expanding NATO’s ISR capabilities—such as maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and early warning systems—into NAVNORTH’s defense networks would significantly strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), reducing strategic surprise and improving early threat detection.

Looking ahead, the current rotation of Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) between JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples means that JFC Norfolk lacks dedicated forces assigned during competition, limiting its ability to establish a continuous deterrent presence and provide a rapid response in the Atlantic and High North. Given the operational demands in both European and transatlantic theaters, relying solely on the existing SNMG rotation is insufficient to maintain persistent maritime presence and readiness. To address this, SACEUR should consider establishing an additional SNMG and a dedicated Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) detachment under JFC Norfolk. This would ensure a standing force capable of sustained ASW, surface warfare, and air defense operations in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, reinforcing NATO’s ability to deter aggression and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Strengthening U.S.-NATO Amphibious Integration

As maritime security threats evolve, U.S. and NATO amphibious forces have a unique opportunity to enhance integration, ensuring they are prepared for rapid employment in contested littorals. NATO fields highly capable amphibious units—including the U.S. Marine Corps, UK Royal Marines, Dutch Korps Mariners, and French, Italian, and Spanish Marine forces—yet their combined employment under NATO command remains a work in progress. Without a standardized framework for command relationships, questions around operational and tactical control can arise, creating opportunities to refine how these forces are assigned, tasked, and employed in competition, crisis, and conflict.

With near-peer competitors and regional actors expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the ability to project power and secure key maritime terrain is becoming more critical. Wargame insights have highlighted how U.S. and NATO amphibious forces could serve as a key element of deterrence, enabling fleet maneuver while limiting adversary freedom of action. At the same time, the current NATO command structure—where Striking Forces NATO (SFN) oversees high-end strike capabilities and MARCOM serves as the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC)—presents an opportunity to clarify how amphibious forces integrate into larger NATO maritime operations. Further alignment with Joint Force Commanders in Norfolk, Naples, and Brunssum will ensure these forces are positioned for effective and decisive employment.

To strengthen interoperability and readiness, aligning amphibious operations within a cohesive U.S.-NATO framework will be essential. This includes refining mission requirements across the continuum of competition, crisis, and conflict, as well as integrating these forces into routine joint planning, training, and execution cycles. Regular multinational exercises, wargames, and professional military education programs will reinforce interoperability, build familiarity between U.S. and NATO amphibious units, and enhance their ability to respond rapidly when called upon. By institutionalizing these efforts, NATO’s amphibious forces will be better prepared to operate as a unified, combat-ready force capable of deterring aggression and securing key maritime terrain in crises and conflict.

Way Ahead

Wargaming has long been a powerful tool for refining strategy, testing assumptions, and strengthening operational effectiveness. Over the past several years, we’ve seen firsthand how it can shape real-world planning and decision-making. By stress-testing command structures, exploring new approaches to force employment, and fostering greater integration between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, wargames have directly informed adjustments that enhance unity of effort across the Atlantic. These insights have helped refine coordination among key commands, sharpen deterrence, and improve readiness to respond to emerging threats in an increasingly complex security environment.

Looking ahead, there is an opportunity to build on this momentum by further aligning command structures, intelligence-sharing, sustainment networks, and amphibious operations. As the maritime domain becomes more contested, ensuring seamless coordination between U.S. and NATO forces will be essential for maintaining freedom of movement, deterring aggression, and preparing for high-end conflict. Strengthening transatlantic maritime integration will not only enhance crisis response but also enable a more agile and lethal force, ready to operate across the spectrum of competition and conflict.

To sustain maritime superiority, the focus must remain on proactive planning, persistent training, and continued investment in warfighting capabilities. As adversaries seek to exploit operational seams, U.S. and NATO forces must stay ahead by reinforcing their deterrent posture and refining how they fight together. Through deliberate efforts to streamline command relationships, improve operational integration, and expand warfighting capabilities, the alliance will ensure it is ready—not just to compete, but to prevail in any future conflict.

Dr. Walter Berbrick is a senior military analyst with Netsimco, a Saalex Company, and the Lead Analyst of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa. He served 15 years on the Naval War College’s faculty, leading the research design and analysis for the Trans-Atlantic Maritime Command and Control (TAMC2) wargame series from 2019 to 2024.

Dr. Terence Nicholas is an Assistant Professor in the Wargaming Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College. He currently serves as the Lead Designer of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official positions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government organization. Wargames, including the TAMC2 series described here, are not predictive and do not forecast future events; they serve as independent analytical research events intended to provide insights and inform decision-making.

Featured Image: HMS Prince of Wales and the embarked Air Wing leads NATO maritime forces as part of Joint Warrior 24-1, part of NATO’s Steadfast Defender exercise series. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)