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To Prepare for Pacific War by 2027, the United States Must Harden its Southern Flank

2027 War Readiness Week

By Henry Ziemer

The United States’ foundations as a global great power rest in no small part on its status as a regional hegemon. No single country in the Western Hemisphere can make a serious bid to balance Washington’s economic and military might, to say nothing of competing with the close but often-overlooked bonds of trade, culture, and family which constitute vital elements of U.S. strength in the region. Because they are so easily forgotten however, the United States has shown an alarming willingness to take its position in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for granted. The 2022 National Security Strategy proudly proclaims that “No region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere,” but the U.S. defense posture in LAC is at risk of being outflanked by extra-hemispheric competitors, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first among them.

While the PRC has led with economic engagement in its approach to LAC countries, military considerations have not been far behind. China has funded dual-use civilian and military infrastructure, most notably ports and satellite ground stations throughout the region. Today, Chinese-owned or operated ports dot the coastlines of LAC countries, secretive satellite ground stations collect signals intelligence in Argentina, and potentially Cuba, and PRC-supplied weapons have made their way into the hands of dictatorial regimes like Venezuela. In the event of a Pacific War, these capabilities and more would likely be leveraged by China to collect intelligence on and disrupt U.S. operations within the Western Hemisphere, as well as leverage its soft power within the region to court influence and keep LAC governments neutral or even sway some towards overt support of Beijing’s position in the conflict. While it remains improbable that China would seek to contest the Western Hemisphere theater with the United States by 2027, the combination of these hybrid tactics could severely undermine the United States’ position in the very region most critical for U.S. physical security.

Fortunately, the next three years present a number of opportunities for the United States to meaningfully strengthen its southern flank. Specifically, the United States should prioritize better coordination between its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and strengthen ties with regional allies such as Colombia and Argentina. Finally, any strategy aimed at countering China’s expansion in LAC must incorporate a resource-backed counteroffer to PRC investment in strategic sectors like ports, telecommunications, and power generation.

Why LAC Matters to the PRC

China’s relations within its own “near abroad” understandably figure heavily in most analyses of potential Indo-Pacific conflicts and their outcomes. To a lesser extent, scholars have also looked to Africa and the Middle East as regions that would be critical to secure China’s energy imports during a conflict. Even less understood, however, is the importance that the Western Hemisphere holds for the PRC and its ability to wage war from an ocean away. This is a major blind spot, as LAC has emerged over the past two decades as a keystone region for China’s economy and industry, exemplified by Brazil’s longtime status as the single largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment.

LAC, and particularly South America, is a vital source of natural resources to China. While the Middle East is crucial for China’s energy supply, the Americas are a linchpin of China’s food and mineral imports. In 2022, Brazil alone accounted for nearly 23 percent of China’s food imports, and nearly 60 percent of its soybean imports in particular. Maintaining access to LAC’s rich agricultural industry will be critical for China to continue to feed its 1.4 billion inhabitants in the event of a major conflagration.

LAC is also a key supplier of critical minerals to China, especially copper and lithium. Chile and Peru together accounted for half of China’s copper imports in 2022, while as of May 2024 Chile and Argentina provided a staggering 97.7 percent of China’s lithium carbonate. These minerals are essential for China’s economy as a whole, but also its defense sector as they are instrumental in everything from high-capacity batteries used to sustain fleets of autonomous systems, to the wiring and interconnects needed for basic vehicles and communications systems. More high-end capabilities depend on a staggering variety of rare minerals and metals, such as niobium, a critical component in advanced aeronautics and hypersonic missiles. Brazil sits roughly 94 percent of global niobium reserves, leading the PRC to assiduously cultivate an ownership stake over roughly a quarter of Brazilian niobium production.

Finally, China, like Russia, has almost certainly realized the benefits that a presence within the Western Hemisphere can accrue in terms of capacity for horizontal escalation. Moscow, under the so-called Primakov Doctrine has practiced this frequently, pursuing military maneuvers in the Western Hemisphere as a tit-for-tat escalation in response to U.S. support for Ukraine. In July 2024 for instance, Russia dispatched two naval flotillas to Cuba and Venezuela in direct response to U.S. easing of restrictions on long-range strikes by Ukraine into Russian territory. For China, the cultivation of dual-use infrastructure, combined with support for anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, would surely prove an asset in the event of war in the Indo-Pacific.

Understanding the Risks

China’s current position in the Western Hemisphere presents three key wartime risks for the United States: (1) control over ports and maritime choke points, (2) dual use of space infrastructure to degrade U.S. space capabilities and threaten the homeland, and (3) disinformation and diplomatic pressure towards U.S. allies and partners.

The first risk is potentially the most proximate and decisive in the event of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese state-owned or based firms currently own or operate at least twelve ports across the LAC region. This includes the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on either side of the Panama Canal. The ports are leased and operated by Hutchison Ports, a Hong Kong-based private company which acquired the sites in 1997. While even at the time observers raised concerns over the potential for the Chinese government to exercise undue influence over Hutchison’s operations along this critical maritime artery, over the past decade the PRC’s steady erosion of Hong Kong’s independence only elevates this risk. Indeed, in 2017 a slew of laws, notably the National Intelligence Law, National Defense Mobilization Law, and National Defense Transportation Law, underscored that the Chinese government can enlist the services of any private company for the purpose of nebulously-defined national security interests. Two PRC state-owned companies, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), were also part of the winning bid to build the $1.3 billion fourth bridge over the canal, a major undertaking which (after serious delays) has at last begun to move forward.

The confluence of PRC infrastructure and China’s impressive soft power influence in Panama opens up a potential nightmare scenario for the United States in the event of an Indo-Pacific war. In such a scenario, China could either directly, or through a proxy, sabotage port infrastructure on either side of the canal, disrupting or entirely preventing transit through the choke point for a period of time. Not only would this serious impact U.S. trade and shipping, it would cripple the United States’ ability to quickly shift forces between Atlantic and Pacific theaters. With current wargames suggesting the first phases of a naval clash would result in major losses, the added weeks it would take for reinforcements to transit around the Strait of Magellan rather than through the Canal Zone could prove decisive.

Maritime traffic backed up near the Panama Canal in August 2023. (NASA photo)

While loss of the Panama Canal is one of the most clear-cut risks presented by China’s power position in LAC ports, it is by no means the only way China could leverage maritime infrastructure to its advantage. Ports by their nature collect massive amounts of data on the shape and flow of international trade. The PRC’s planned port and special economic zone in Antigua, together with other PRC-controlled ports, may grant Beijing a one-of-a-kind window into commerce moving throughout the eastern Caribbean and the sea lines of communication which run through it. In the case of ports directly owned or operated by PRC-based firms, like the Brazilian port of Paranaguá or the planned Peruvian megaport of Chancay, this intelligence-gathering capacity could be turned into an operational capability by strategically delaying or seizing key shipments to snarl supply chains for key goods and apply economic pressure on the United States and allies. Finally, presence in regional ports may allow the PRC to carry out more sensitive sabotage operations targeting associated maritime infrastructure, particularly the undersea cables which comprise the backbone of global internet communications. While perhaps not decisive in their own right, China’s position in LAC ports could accord it a host of benefits that are currently underappreciated in planning around a potential Pacific conflict.

Ports are not the only dual-use infrastructure of note. In recent years, reports have highlighted a proliferation of PRC-operated space infrastructure stretching from the very tip of the Southern Cone through Venezuela, and potentially even into the Caribbean. Most notable among these is the Espacio Lejano Research Station operated by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and located in Neuquén, Argentina. Authorized in 2014 under the government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the site has become notorious as a “black box” which even Argentine government authorities struggle to gain access to. To date, two inspections have been conducted of the facility, one in 2019 and another more recently under the Milei administration in April 2024 – indicating that serious political will is needed to gain access. In both cases, the Argentine delegation coordinated with the Chinese embassy prior to arrival, and the overall inspection process was relatively perfunctory, doing little to assuage U.S. or Argentine concerns about the facility’s potential for military use.

Neuquén was notably also the first ground station operated by the PRC outside Chinese territory and capable of providing telemetry tracking and control (TT&C) which enables the maneuver and operation of satellites and other orbital vehicles. The facility’s strategic location in the southern hemisphere was also particularly important to supply TT&C capabilities for China’s Chang’e 4 and 5 lunar probes. Neuquén, and similar ground stations in turn compliment China’s growing space presence in Antarctica where in 2023 the PRC announced plans to begin construction of a new dual-use satellite ground station at its Zhongshan research base. TT&C is not just important for satellites and other scientific craft, it is vital for the operation of hypersonic glide vehicles, which conduct complex maneuvers that depend on ground data links for guidance and to better evade missile defenses. China, which according the Congressional Research Service, has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic weapon tests as the United States, could use this network of ground stations in the event of a conflict to strike at the United States from the south, in doing so evading U.S. missile defenses which are primarily concentrated on northern approaches. Chinese space infrastructure in LAC could furthermore help the PRC collect key data on the orbits and locations of satellites in doing so enabling PRC anti-satellite warfare capabilities during a Pacific war scenario.

The final risk involves PRC use of diplomatic influence alongside dis- or mis-information campaigns to shape the political environment in LAC to its favor in the event of a war with the United States. Key targets in such a scenario would likely be the seven LAC countries which still recognize Taiwan instead of the PRC. Beijing would undoubtedly seek to isolate and pressure these countries to shift their recognition prior to or even during a PRC invasion of the island. China could cooperate with other U.S. adversaries to magnify the effect of its disinformation campaigns. According to one report, in Argentina, Chinese and Russian media outlets work in concert with one another to produce “a virtuous cycle of disinformation.” Critically, these efforts would not need to actively sway countries into fully backing China’s campaign (with the exception of those regimes like Venezuela and Nicaragua likely predisposed to do so already), but would instead merely need to convince governments to remain on the sidelines. 

China could also use its economic heft as the number one or two trading partner for a majority of LAC countries to ensure neutrality, if not support from countries in the region. Again, the case of Russia proves instructive of how an authoritarian regime can deploy messaging and economic pressure to compel LAC governments. Shortly after his inauguration, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa proposed selling $200 million in legacy Russian and Soviet weaponry to the United States in exchange for new equipment (the United States would presumably pass the weapons it received along to Ukraine). Moscow retaliated by threatening phytosanitary restrictions on Ecuadorian banana imports, while launching a media push to claim that if the deal moved forward, Ecuador would make itself a belligerent on the side of Ukraine. The pressure worked, Noboa relented, and Ecuador’s banana exports continued apace. China, which carries significantly more economic weight in the region than Russia could prove a frightening prospect indeed for any government considering taking a vocal stance against the PRC in wartime. 

Taken together, the PRC has quietly amassed a host of capabilities within the Western Hemisphere to give it both tactical and strategic advantages against the United States in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The United States, for its part, has been slow to react to the scope of this threat and adjust priorities in LAC accordingly.

Bolstering Readiness in the United States’ Shared Neighborhood

There are a number of steps the United States can and should take between now and 2027 to gird itself and its regional allies in preparation for potential conflict with China.

Better Integrate SOUTHCOM in Pacific War Planning: A lack of integration across U.S. combatant commands risks cultivating a myopic view of Pacific war. Given the PRC and PLA’s global ambitions, any future conflict with China is unlikely to be restricted solely to one theater. As the above sections have illustrated, there are a number of areas where China could pursue a horizontal escalation strategy to gain an edge against the United States. Fostering greater exchange and intelligence sharing across combatant commands should be a priority to ensure the United States is ready to fight and win a war on multiple fronts. One early step could be to create a designated role for SOUTHCOM in key Pacific exercises like the Rim of the Pacific maritime warfare exercise. LAC militaries such as Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, already participate in this exercise. Carving out a greater role for SOUTHCOM could help bolster U.S. defense ties with regional militaries and build closer partnerships across combatant commands.

Another area for increased cooperation could be a cross-cutting effort across SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM, and partner governments to tackle illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, a threat which plagues communities and ecosystems across the Pacific. While not directly applicable in a warfighting scenario, such an effort would serve to build greater partnership and information sharing between combatant commands, and build goodwill among partners throughout the Pacific domain. 

Double Down on Defense Cooperation: While China has made headway in defense cooperation activities, the United States remains by far the preeminent security partner for the vast majority of LAC countries. However, more can be done to strengthen these ties and build partner capacity to respond to potential malign PRC activity in the hemisphere. One easy step would be to amend the Department of Defense’s Section 312 and 321 requirements that foreign military education training focus on “developing countries.” The Department of Defense’s current standards for designating a country as “developing” prevent partners like Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana, from benefiting from U.S. training programs. Amending these to include a more nuanced standard would open the door to a much wider array of military-to-military engagement.

Furthermore, the United States should seek to rise to the occasion in cases where LAC governments have already expressed interest in a closer security partnership. Ecuador, which is currently contemplating reversing a constitutional prohibition on foreign military basing to allow for a reopening of the former U.S. naval base at Manta could be a key ally in this effort. Argentina, which is currently pursuing an ambitious military modernization effort, and has expressed a desire to rise to NATO Global Partner status, could be another.

Harden Allies Against Chinese Economic Coercion: China’s investments in critical infrastructure throughout the region pose risks not only for the United States, but its LAC allies and partners as well. For instance, two PRC based companies, China Three Gorges Corporation and China Southern Power Grid International, now collectively control the entirety of Lima, Peru’s power supply. Combined with the forthcoming port of Chancay, China has a number of vectors through which it can apply pressure against a Peruvian government seeking to pursue a policy against Beijing’s interests. The State Department could lead a regionwide effort with allies and partners to map and evaluate risks posted by Chinese investments in critical infrastructure. The findings of this review should also be passed along to the U.S. Development Finance Corporation for review and to help prioritize investments aimed at reducing the amount of influence China can wield over LAC government through its infrastructure projects and trade links.

Conclusion

Future conflicts will not be constrained to a single geographic region. In the event of a Pacific war between the PRC and United States, LAC will almost undoubtedly find itself a zone of contention, whether it wishes it or not. Failure to incorporate this understanding into U.S. contingency planning for such a conflict therefore creates risks not just for the United States itself, but also its regional allies and partners who may find themselves in the crosshairs of PRC coercive efforts. There is still time to patch key vulnerabilities in the region, but a recognition LAC’s important role in future global crises cannot come soon enough.

Henry Ziemer is an Associate Fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on great power competition, transnational organized crime, as well as security and defense in the Western Hemisphere. His writing and commentary have been featured in CSIS, War on the Rocks, the Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal.

Featured Image: The Panama Canal. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Sea Control 555 – Infantry Battalions as Sensor Webs for the Fleet with Zachary Schwartz

By Brian Kerg

Brian Kerg, one of Sea Control’s new co-hosts, makes his debut. Here he interviews Major Zachary Schwartz of the U.S. Marine Corps about his new article, “Infantry Battalions as Sensor Webs for the Fleet.”

Download Sea Control 555 – Infantry Battalions as Sensor Webs for the Fleet with Zachary Stewart

Links

1. “Infantry Battalions as Sensor Webs for the Fleet,” by Major Zachary Schwartz, Proceedings, September 2024.

2. The Connecting File website.

Brian Kerg is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

The Four-Block Littoral Force Revisited: Force Design and Marine Littoral Regiment Boarding Teams

2027 War Readiness Week

By Clay Robinson

U.S. Central Command poses an opportunity for the Marine Corps. During his March 2023 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), CENTCOM commander General Erik Kurilla stated, “God forbid there’s ever a conflict with China, but we could end up holding a lot of their economy at risk in the CENTCOM region.”1 In the same testimony he pointed to how “72 percent of all Chinese oil is imported. That can make them vulnerable.”2 Then General Kurilla zeroed in on the sea lanes within the Middle East adding, “98 percent-plus goes through by ship. That makes them vulnerable.”3

The Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) could be the contact and blunt force that is tasked with the mission of holding key Chinese imports at risk in the Middle East. Force Design should be modified to embrace this mission by adding Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to the core mission sets of MLRs. The MIO mission is currently assigned only to Marine Expeditionary Units, but the MLR’s low signature, platoon-sized maneuver elements with organic operational mobility, combined with a “mothership” such as an Expeditionary Mobile Base (ESB) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), could make the MLR ideally suited for large-scale MIO.4

Force Design has received varying levels of critique, such as that from former Senator and Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb for charting a course that could “eliminate many of the Marine Corps’ key capabilities and permanently reduce the long-standing mission of global readiness.”5 Another criticism levied the concern that “A force tailored to fight in a specific region of the world may find itself unable to operate effectively in a markedly different climate. The Marine Corps cannot afford to have a significant portion of its fighting units dedicated to only operating in a specific area of the world — in this case, the Indo-Pacific region.”6 Adding the MIO mission to MLRs could represent common ground. By expanding the mission of the MLRs to provide greater utility outside the Indo-Pacific region, the Marine Corps can still address great power threats while enhancing global readiness.

During a PRC invasion of Taiwan, U.S. INDOPACOM could unleash a “Hellscape” of thousands of unmanned platforms to swarm the Taiwan Strait and keep China’s military off balance until more assets arrive.7 Meanwhile in the Middle East, a more nuanced mission of MIO requiring skills akin to those proposed by Major General Dale Alford, USMC, (ret.) in his 2021 article titled, “The Four-Block Littoral Force,” could fall to the Marine Corps. Marines could be called upon to rapidly help CENTCOM impose economic costs on China by boarding high-value ships, plucking them from nearby maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

October 10, 2020 – Sailors and Coast Guardsmen prepare to recover a rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) while conducting small boat operations aboard the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10). (US Navy photo)

This force would form the nucleus of the prize crews that will keep the ships from reaching Chinese ports. MLR Marines would maintain control and security of the prize vessel and could be augmented by seasoned mariners with expertise in seamanship, navigation, and engineering. This additional seafaring expertise might come from members of the U.S. Coast Guard or a modern version of the U.S. Maritime Service (USMS) such as that proposed by Wade Heath who recently suggested that the USMS be codified as a full-fledged uniformed service, on par with the U.S. Public Health Service or National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.8

In his reimagination of General Charles Krulak’s Three Block War, General Alford describes the “Four-Block Littoral Force as emphasizing “operations in the littorals, especially maritime chokepoints.”9 General Alford’s Block 1 requires a littoral-focused gray-zone contact force with Marines operating persistently in maritime chokepoints, prepared to support the fleet.10 After Block 2 (the crisis response force), his Block 3 requires a blunting force of platoon, company, and battalion-level units that “could come from one, two, or perhaps even all of the following: a permanent base, an expeditionary advanced base, an amphibious ship, or perhaps even from non-standard, improvised commercial vessels.”11 General Alford concludes with a Block 4 (destroying force).

The contact (1) and blunting (3) blocks align well with the use of MLR Marines as a cadre of highly-trained boarding parties that feature an appropriate balance of quality and quantity for the mission. The combination of both quality and quantity is where the Marine Corps excels, making Marines better suited for a large-scale MIO mission over boarding parties formed by surface fleet sailors or special operators. The former lack both proficiency in seizing territory and the ability to use a variety of boarding team delivery platforms, to include helicopter insertion. The latter lacks the numbers that would be required to strangle an impactful portion of the Chinese maritime economy. There have simply never been enough resources to sufficiently train shipboard VBSS teams to excel using a variety of insertion techniques for what has almost always been a collateral duty mission for surface sailors. Meanwhile, SEAL Teams can truly excel at small numbers of these boardings, but there are just not enough of them to address the numbers of vessels required of this campaign. MLRs are also better suited for folding seized vessels into the broader littoral terrain and operations that MLRs focus on.

PACIFIC OCEAN (Sept. 23, 2015) Maritime Raid Force Marines prepare to board a rigid-hull inflatable boat. (U.S. Navy photo)

A MLR operating from an amphibious warfare ship or expeditionary mobile base (ESB) and conducting distributed operations across several LCSs might be capable of fielding upwards of 20 Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) teams. CENTCOM already operates the forward-deployed ESB, USS Lewis B. Puller, and plans are well underway to forward deploy four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Bahrain beginning in 2025.12 Although ostensibly planned to replace mine warfare vessels, these LCSs can be expected to ply the same constrained, littoral waters the MLRs could use and perhaps some efficiencies could result. The MLR could also benefit from aspects of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations and naval integration such as operating from foreign vessels, non-standard vessels, and vessels of opportunity that are routinely being tested and experimented upon, like the embarkation of Marines on LCS-class ships.13,14 Beyond the boarding mission, MLR Marines would be useful for the close-contact, gray zone encounters that frequently occur in steady state operations across theaters.  

Conclusion

In his June 2023 update on Force Design, General Berger reported that “The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to prioritize our sea-based expeditionary forces to maximize their forward presence as a keystone of our contribution to integrated deterrence. To deter or respond, we must be postured forward, operating from the sea.”15 Employing MLRs in maritime interception operations that can rapidly seize merchant vessels, form the nucleus of subsequent prize crews, and inflict pressure on great power rivals across multiple theaters can contribute significantly to deterrence. MLR Marines could be the professional teeth that hold Chinese maritime commerce at risk in the Middle East and elsewhere. As defense leaders look for creative yet feasible options to deter China from a 2027 invasion of Taiwan, the vulnerability of critical Chinese energy imports to maritime interdiction by agile MLR Marines could be part of the solution. It is time for Force Design to make the MIO mission a core contribution of the Marine Littoral Regiment.

Commander Clay Robinson is a retired U.S. Navy surface warfare officer with over twenty-
five years of experience in naval operations and strategic planning. He is currently an
adjunct instructor with the U.S. Naval Community College.

References

[1] Hunt, Edward. “In the Middle East, the U.S. Holds China at Risk,” Foreign Policy in Focus, May 16, 2023, https://fpif.org/in-the-middle-east-u-s-holds-china-at-risk/

[2] Hunt, Edward. 2023.

[3] Hunt, Edward. 2023.

[4] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Marine Littoral Regiment,” The Official U.S. Marine Corps Public Website, January 11, 2023, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708146/marine-littoral-regiment-mlr/

[5] Webb, James. “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps,” The National Interest, May 8, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/future-us-marine-corps-152606?page=0%2C2

[6] Wilson, Gary, Woods, William, and Wyly, Michael. “Send in the Marines? Reconsider Force 2030 beforehand,” Defense News, August 4, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/08/04/send-in-the-marines-reconsider-force-design-2030-beforehand/

[7] Rogin, Josh. “The U.S. military plans a ‘Hellscape’ to deter China from attacking Taiwan,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/

[8] Heath, Wade, “Reestablish the U.S. Maritime Service,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/october/reestablish-us-maritime-service

[9] Alford, Dale, “The Four-Block Littoral Force: The Infantry’s attack toward Force Design 2030,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 2021, https://buff.ly/3jjNZpD

[10] Alford, Dale. 2021.

[11] Alford, Dale. 2021.

[12] Renfroe, Shannon. “LCS Quartet being lined up by Navy for Middle East Mine Operations,” Stars and Stripes, May 17, 2024, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-05-17/lcs-mine-countermeasure-ops-13875628.html

[13] Shelbourne, Mallory. “Moving Marines Across the Pacific Could Be Littoral Combat Ship’s Next Mission,” U.S. Naval Institute News, September 28, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/09/28/moving-marines-across-the-pacific-could-be-littoral-combat-ships-next-mission

[14] Reiher, Dan and Cuomo, Scott. “The LCS Advantage for the Navy-Marine Corps Team,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/lcs-advantage-navy-marine-corps-team

[15] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf

Featured Image: Arabian Gulf (July 26, 2019) Marines with the Maritime Raid Force, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) climb a tactical assault ladder to board the amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26) during a visit, board, search and seizure training exercise. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Matthew Teutsch/Released)

The Maritime Convoys of 2027: Supporting Taiwan in Contested Seas

2027 War Readiness Week

By Nathan Sicheri

Introduction

The 2027 scenario rests on the notion that President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to conquer Taiwan by force no later than 2027. Defeating an invading force will require more than establishing sea control, it will require sustained material support to Taiwan to resupply its armed forces and citizens while fending off a great power invasion. American delays in ship deliveries and the time of technology acquisition within the Department of Defense make it increasingly likely that the force the Navy sails in 2024 will be largely the same in 2027. The next three years of intensive exercises and warfighting development will do more to shape readiness for the conflict than any single capability. These efforts must focus on the key missions and skills that will have outsized impact on wartime success.

Convoy operations for sustaining Taiwan will offer a key method for strategic success. But if the PLA successfully isolates and invades Taiwan, U.S. and allied forces will have only several months at most to effectively resupply Taiwanese defenders. Unknown factors of American public support, Taiwanese political will, and Taiwan’s ability to sustain resistance may mean that decisive sea control may come too late to supply and support Taiwan within the shrinking window of opportunity. The U.S. must carefully consider how to provide logistical support to a besieged island deep within an adversary’s weapon engagement zone and with little enabling sea control.

Blockade Considerations

The debate on how Taiwan should prepare to deter or defeat the PLA includes asymmetric concepts using numerous affordable capabilities, or employing larger conventional assets.1 Regardless of the approach, a central operational problem will be how to sustain Taiwanese defenses and society if the PLA were to blockade the island. Taiwan may not be able to survive a PLA blockade or invasion for more than a few months, whether due to a material, political, or military collapse. Taiwan will require substantial American support to survive.2

Some officials recognize that a Taiwan contingency will likely begin with a PLA-imposed blockade, and how America responds to the blockade will determine whether Taiwan can survive Chinese aggression.3 In a blockade the PLA will likely refrain from firing the first shot to claim some sort of diplomatic high ground, daring America or its allies to shoot first and overtly break the peace. Breaking a blockade can mean different things, including running the blockade, forced entry, or a show of force. But all risk escalation unless the blockading force backs down. Breaking the blockade by force risks outright conflict, potentially leading to a PLA invasion of Taiwan and strikes against American and allied forces in the region. But not breaking the blockade will eventually lead to Taiwanese capitulation. Political calculations amplify the problem, as there is a lack of unanimity amongst the American people for their support of Taiwan against aggression. A 2023 poll showed Americans split on using the Navy to “break a Chinese blockade,” with a majority of Americans opposing putting U.S. troops in Taiwan to fend off an invasion.4

Supporting Taiwan in Contested Seas

Currently the U.S. Navy and allied forces are escorting vessels during strait transits in contested seas, as recently highlighted by Operation Prosperity Guardian, the ongoing defense of vessels in the Red Sea from Houthi attack. While providing critical experience for the sailors under fire, it is crucial that the lessons learned reach the fleet and are adapted to the more complex scenarios that could apply to escort missions in the Western Pacific. As of September 2024, the Houthis have used short-range ballistic missiles, unmanned explosive aerial and surface vehicles, and cruise missiles to attack warships and neutral shipping from the eastern shores of the Red Sea.5 The PLA inventory is far more complex and lethal.6 Most of the weapons employed by the Houthis have been subsonic threats within an enclosed sea, which is much different than the open Philippine Sea where vessels will be susceptible to multi-axis attacks from a wide variety of modern forces.

How modern convoy escort missions work in practice will require considerable time to sort out, hence its importance to begin training for an escort contingency prior to the outbreak of conflict. The Battle of the Atlantic was a continuous work in progress to figure out the multinational coordination required to effectively move men and material across the ocean, initially using lessons learned in the First World War but eventually integrating air power and intelligence to counter 1940s wolfpack tactics. In the modern era, the U.S. Navy went almost 35 years without conducting an exercise specifically focused on screening a cross-Atlantic convoy operation.7

Resupplying Taiwan will be far more complex and demanding due to the PLA’s extensive capability. Integrating numerous resupply ships into a CSG affords them a measure of protection but also creates a distinctly concentrated target that is more inviting of air and missile attack. Distributed operations may disperse the convoys but forces them to rely on the organic missile inventories of their limited numbers of escorts to fend off aircraft and missile raids. Distributed operations, especially for lightly armed supply ships, will shift the key source of survivability to counter-targeting rather than kinetic defense. How may convoys integrate into the counterintelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and counter-targeting concepts of an information warfare commander?8 The tactical problems of survivability and counter-targeting are essential to getting resupply ships into the WEZ and hopefully penetrating deeply enough to resupply a Taiwan under invasion.

America’s most significant advantage is its international partnerships and its ability to generate coalitions. America has four key treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific theater – Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. Japan is the best geographically positioned and maintains modern military capabilities. The Philippines is another likely partner but lacks naval power to contribute to convoy operations and sea control, principally providing staging and basing access for American forces. Australia provides basing farthest from the direct conflict area and a capable naval arsenal. Lastly, South Korea is positioned similarly to Japan to provide support for American operations. Allied bases and territories provide potential staging grounds and multiple axes to facilitate resupply, complicating the situation for the PLA. International exercises should integrate Indo-Pacific allies for contested convoy operations from their territories and between key points of resupply.

If convoys approach Taiwan unescorted, the PLA Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard, and possibly the Chinese Maritime Militia would redirect them, board, or attack them. The 2024 Philippine-Chinese dispute over the Second Thomas Shoal forewarns possible tactics for contesting resupply: violent boardings and shoulderings.12 The Second Thomas Shoal and nearby reefs do not hold nearly the same level of political importance as Taiwan, so one can assume vessels inbound towards Taiwan during a blockade or conflict will face more robust threats.

Conclusion

Maritime escort has taken a backseat in recent conflicts due to land route access and uncontested seas, but Taiwan will differ significantly from previous and ongoing 21st-century conflicts. Unlike Taiwan, Ukraine maintains a land border with friendly nations while Israel maintains sea control via allies and access to major sea ports for importing critical equipment. The success of Ukraine fending off Russian aggression without direct American military support, and Israel defending against Iran and its proxies, albeit with direct support, highlights the importance of military resupply. Taiwan suffers from being an island nation dependent upon imports in peacetime, let alone during a conflict. Sealift will be the only way to deliver necessary supplies at scale over a sustained period of time. Airlift and undersea forces can deliver some lightweight resources, but they cannot deliver nearly the same mass as sealift.

The United States must overcome the tyranny of time and distance to preserve Taiwan’s sovereignty. The U.S. Navy will not have the time nor capacity to establish sea control. It must train for contested maritime convoy operations unseen since World War II and develop innovative operational approaches that enable maritime resupply through heavily contested seas. Operation Prosperity Guardian has highlighted the importance of this problem set in the missile age, but the challenge America will face in a confrontation with China will involve far more lethal threats.

Protecting shipping will become a major operational requirement during a 2027 conflict, yet modern U.S. naval doctrine and training places little emphasis on this critical mission. This will prove shortsighted for sustaining Taiwan given how the nation’s survival will be on a short timer for resupply once a major invasion or blockade begins. If America waits for a Mahanian victory to enable unfettered resupply then it may risk strategic defeat, potentially ceding Taiwan to the PRC and having to plan for an even more costly amphibious counter-invasion to liberate the island.

Maritime convoy protection is not simply a byproduct of sea control, but rather a necessary and prominent mission for keeping allies in the fight. It is a fundamental expression of how U.S. naval power underwrites American alliances, yet it is a neglected operation America’s Navy must quickly relearn.

LT Nathan Sicheri commissioned from Virginia Tech NRTOC as a surface warfare officer in 2019. He served as the gunnery officer and repair officer on board USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73) during a Middle East deployment. His second assignment was as the Training Officer onboard PCU JOHN BASILONE (DDG 122) in Bath, Maine. He is currently assigned to Cryptologic Warfare Activity 66 at Fort Meade, MD as a Cryptologic Warfare Officer. He has written previously for USNI.

References 

1. Campbell, C. (2024, August 15). Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved September 15, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481

2. Heath, T. R., Lilly, S., & Han, E. (2023, June 27). Can Taiwan Resist a Large-Scale Military Attack by China? Assessing Strengths and Vulnerabilities in a Potential Conflict. RAND. Retrieved September 15, 2024, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1658-1.html

3. Alperovitch, D. (2024, June 5). A Chinese Economic Blockade of Taiwan Would Fail or Launch a War. War on the Rocks. Retrieved September 15, 2024, from https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/a-chinese-economic-blockade-of-taiwan-would-fail-or-launch-a-war/

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5. Blanchard, C. M. (2024, September 6). Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Issues for Congress (10). Congressional Research Service. Retrieved September 22, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12301#:~:text=Since%20October%202023%2C%20the%20Houthis,port%20of%20Al%20Hudaydah%2C%20Yemen.

6. Gormley, D. M., Erickson, A. S., & Yuan, J. (2019). A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions. National Defense University Press.

7. Eckstein, M. (2020, February 28). Navy Drills Atlantic Convoy Ops for First Time Since Cold War in Defender-Europe 20 – USNI News. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2020/02/28/navy-drills-atlantic-convoy-ops-for-first-time-since-cold-war-in-defender-europe-20

8. Barrett, K. R. (2023, September). Make Information Warfare the Supported Warfare Commander | Proceedings – September 2023 Vol. 149/9/1,447. U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/september/make-information-warfare-supported-warfare-commander

9. Dwyer, M., Tidwell, B., & Blivas, A. (2020, August). Cycle Times and Cycles of Acquisition Reform. CSIS. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200804_Dwyer_CycleTimes_V6.pdf

10. O’Rourke, R. (2024, September 24). Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25174318/navy-force-structure-and-shipbuilding-plans-background-and-issues-for-congress-sept-24-2024.pdf

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Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (February 10, 2024) — The Zumwalt Class Guided Missile Destroyer USS Michael Monsoor (DDG 1001) approaches the Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Pecos (T-AO 197) to take on fuel. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark D. Faram)