Notes to the New Administration Week

By David Ware

As a retired U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Customs and Border Protection Supervisor in Hawaii, I have done warrantless border searches of yachts and fishing vessels as well as large commercial vessels. We apprehended many violators with arrest warrants from all over the United States. Seizures of weapons, including an AK-47, were made. Illegal drugs were often encountered. Illegal immigrants were taken into custody.

Intelligence and enforcement must go hand-in-hand. Many of these small boats simply pop over the horizon without notice or warning. Customs, Coast Guard, and the state of Hawaii cooperated to ensure a seamless approach. That was 30 years ago. In 2003, everything changed with the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In the aftermath of 9/11, Customs and Immigration inspections were combined into CBP, and their respective investigations were combined into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)/Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). This was a mistake because Customs’ role in border security was subjugated to strictly admissibility and immigration issues. We became part of DHS, a government entity still trying to define its mission today in 2025.

The United States has an enormous coastline, including the Pacific, the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and also the Great Lakes which we share with Canada. For political reasons, enforcement across the Great Lakes, including at the Port of Buffalo, NY, was curtailed several decades ago. But after 9/11, Customs reinforced the northern border before the southern border because it was considered more of a threat for terrorist penetration. There was also intelligence after the 9/11 attacks that suggested Al-Qaeda would put a weapon of mass destruction in a cargo container on a vessel, possibly coming across the Pacific from China or Japan, potentially into or via Hawaii.

What is concerning today is that the DHS intelligence and enforcement posture for national security purposes, for both large and small vessels, appears to have taken a backseat to focus strictly on immigration concerns. This creates a maritime security opening for adversaries to exploit.

Maritime security extends far beyond the continental United States. While illegal vessels come up from Mexico and Latin America on both the east and west coasts, the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia seek to dominate and control the high seas in strategic waters near U.S. allies and territories. It is not just PLA Navy warships that threaten America, it is China’s comprehensive maritime power and gray zone strategy, which includes a substantial coast guard and paramilitary element for which we have no commensurate response. Consider Chinese vessels approaching the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands without a visa, or illegally entering Guam on boats. Both are U.S. territories of strategic value. Chinese coast guard vessels and maritime militia are also on the frontlines of encroaching upon U.S. partners and allies in day-to-day operations, and could serve many wartime roles as well.

The new administration should focus on maritime security, both at home and abroad, because it has long been neglected. The number one threat to maritime security is China. Unguarded seacoasts are America’s greatest vulnerability.

David Ware is a retired federal officer with 42 years of combined military and civilian federal service. He served in the U.S. Air Force, with service in the Philippines and Okinawa during the Vietnam War era. He has extensive experience dealing directly with Pacific nations and territories in Project Cook and the Customs Asia-Pacific Enforcement Reporting System (CAPERS). He is a retired U.S. Customs and Border Protection supervisor and analyst.

Featured Image: A Coast Guard Cutter Diligence pursuit team interdicts a “go-fast” boat suspected of smuggling illegal drugs (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Cutter Diligence/Released)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Roshan Kulatunga

China’s national security strategy is shrouded in secrecy, making it challenging to access clear policy documents that shed light on its strategic ambitions. This need for reliable intelligence is underscored by China’s increasing interest in the Indian Ocean region, an area that has become a focal point of concern for U.S. policymakers and military strategists. The potential expansion of Chinese influence in this critical maritime zone raises alarms about the implications for regional security and U.S. interests, necessitating the development of effective counter-strategies to address China’s pursuit of gray zone warfare.

Gray zone warfare refers to activities that fall between conventional warfare and peace, often involving subversive tactics that can destabilize adversaries without triggering open conflict. China’s approach involves a systematic infiltration of various sectors, including technology, academia, media, and even political domains, to gather intelligence and insights into the strategies of possible adversaries. This multifaceted approach allows China to build a nuanced understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions while subtly undermining them.

Chinese interests in Sri Lanka has extended to various levels of society. There has been extensive infrastructure development projects focused on roads, airports, seaports, energy facilities, telecommunications, and water supply systems. Most of these projects are funded through loans, while some key strategic initiatives are structured as direct investments. A significant portion of this development is driven by Chinese involvement, including state-owned enterprises, private investors, contractors, and laborers. This involvement raises concerns about economic dependencies and geopolitical leverage. The noticeable presence of Chinese nationals across critical infrastructure projects, when hiring locals would have often been sufficient and even more beneficial to the host nation’s economy, highlights the need for a thorough assessment of their roles. It is essential to investigate any potential subversive tactics, such as economic coercion, intelligence gathering, or long-term strategic positioning, that could impact Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and regional security dynamics.

Despite the growing body of literature analyzing gray zone tactics, there remains a significant gap in research that delves deeply into the specific methodologies employed by China in executing these tactics. Understanding the precise methods of infiltration and influence is critical for developing effective countermeasures.

China’s strategy involves expanding its influence across diverse societal domains, from cultural exchanges to economic investments, which serve to extract valuable information and develop points of leverage against the United States and its allies. To effectively counter these actions, it is imperative for the U.S. to conduct a thorough evaluation of China’s gray zone activities and to create robust, comprehensive strategies that address the multifaceted nature of these threats.

In addition, the United States must strategically leverage its intelligence networks, tapping into various sectors of society to gather insights, enhance situational awareness, and bolster its response capabilities. By doing so, the U.S. can better prepare itself to confront the challenges posed by China’s expanding influence and protect its national interests in an increasingly competitive global environment.

The alliance between the United States and India represents a significant counterbalance to China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region. This partnership is characterized by a shared commitment to promoting stability and security in a region that is increasingly strategic in global affairs. To achieve its objectives, China effectively utilizes an extensive intelligence network that spans the region, allowing it to gather crucial information on military deployments, economic activities, and political developments. However, the covert nature of China’s security strategies presents a considerable challenge, often concealing the critical information needed to properly interpret the intent behind its actions.

In general, the security interests and posture of the United States can be anticipated with a fair degree of accuracy due to the democratic principles underpinning its foreign policies and strategic decisions. These democratic mechanisms promote transparency and debate, thereby enabling allies and adversaries alike to gauge potential U.S. responses and how they may impact the rules-based order. In contrast, China’s approach to security is characterized by a more secretive methodology, which often complicates external analysis and understanding of its strategic ambitions. This fundamental difference in approach underlines the contrasting philosophies that guide the United States and China in their respective security strategies. The U.S. must manage this asymmetry as it develops strategies to counter China’s gray zone tactics.

Commander (Dr.) Roshan Kulatunga (ret.) served 22 years of distinguished service in the Sri Lanka Navy. Throughout his career, he held prestigious positions both at sea and onshore, including serving as the Editor-in-Chief at the Defence Web within the Ministry of Defence in Sri Lanka. He earned his PhD in International Relations from the University of Peradeniya in Kandy, Sri Lanka.

Featured Image: PLA Navy cadets from the Naval University of Engineering conduct an overseas visit mission on a Bangladeshi navy vessel, Oct. 13, 2024. (Photo by Ming Yongsheng/Xinhua)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Ben Massengale

Much has been written lamenting the possible economic consequences of raising tariffs and other protectionist methods that could reduce trade with the U.S. However, imposition of those tariffs could provide a window of opportunity to revive the U.S. Merchant Marine by making foreign vessels less competitive in conducting trade in the U.S. This could be done by granting cargo imported by U.S.-flagged vessels a reduced tariff to not only compensate for the additional cost it takes to operate an American ship, but also making its operations significantly more profitable than its foreign competitors. Such incentives could help promote more private investment in American shipping companies and maritime infrastructure needed to support U.S. maritime security.

Previous government actions to support the Merchant Marine have been ineffective because they focused on shielding the Merchant Marine from the market instead of addressing the underlying problems. Most laws supporting the Merchant Marine focused on providing limited subsidies for U.S. operators and expanding cargo preference laws, such as by mandating certain cargo be carried only by U.S.-flagged and/or U.S.-built ships. The last major maritime law passed in 1920 (also called the Jones Act) established the current restrictions that only American-built, owned, operated, and flagged ships could engage in U.S. coastal trade (U.S. interstate commerce). Overseas built vessels could be U.S.-flagged but were banned from the domestic shipping market. Nothing was done to address the issues causing American ships to become more expensive to build and maintain, and therefore less competitive, than foreign ships. By shielding the fleet, Congress inadvertently minimized incentives for private operators or shipyards to modernize their fleets or practices that keep operating costs up. As a result, the number of U.S.-flagged merchant ships has only gone down and the number of operating shipyards has similarly declined.

As of 2024, there are 185 oceangoing U.S.-flagged vessels (of which 59 are containerships), which is insignificant compared to the over 6,100 containerships used globally. As over 900,000 ships visit American ports yearly, even the most generous exemption is unlikely to noticeably impact efforts to revitalize U.S. manufacturing in the medium term that are the tariff’s primary objective. However, assume a tariff relaxation of 15 from 25 percent for goods imported on U.S.-flagged ships (including those built overseas) was authorized. Consumers, in theory, would see a savings of $50 on a hypothetical $500 pre-tariff imported washing machine carried by a U.S.-flagged vessel over a foreign one, but this is unlikely to appear due to the limited capacity of the U.S. Merchant Fleet. It would result in the shipment of 2,500 shipping containers being $27 million cheaper than goods carried by a foreign-flagged vessel (assuming average value of goods per shipping container is $108,000). Given how the U.S.-flagged ships in 2018 were $6.5 million more expensive to operate annually than other ships, this expense would be covered by a single voyage, making subsequent trips drastically cheaper than other ships. Import companies would be heavily incentivized to use American ships for their imports.

Such exemptions would make the U.S. Merchant Marine profitable. If even stronger exemptions were offered for American-flagged and built ships, it would encourage private investment into American shipyards and related manufacturing to improve U.S. shipbuilding and repair capacity. This would also help the U.S. Navy’s efforts to increase its fleet size and readiness by expanding the foundation of the broader maritime industrial base.

It is difficult to determine how long it would take to build new shipbuilding capacity as no new American shipyards have been built in over ten years. Seven years is a reasonable estimate, given it took five years in the 1970s to construct the original Daewoo shipyard located at Okpo, South Korea (today one of the country’s three largest shipyards) and time to obtain regulator approval before breaking ground. Expanding the repair or shipbuilding capacity of existing private shipyards could be done in a smaller timeframe but would likely still take years to complete.

Tariff exemption is not the same as the cargo preference laws Congress has previously passed to prop up the Merchant Fleet. Those laws were intended to ensure guaranteed business for U.S. shipping companies, but also led to higher costs for the government due to the limited number of ships that met the requirements imposed by those laws. That business was largely dependent on the resupply of U.S. military forces operating overseas and American aid programs. A tariff exemption would work with the market instead of the government artificially generating one. American imports have always remained high, which makes them a more sustainable means of business support compared to cargo preference laws.

A tariff exemption will not completely restore the U.S. Merchant Marine by itself. Numerous other issues, such as high cost of labor and building material, still need to be resolved to address demand signals, labor pools, government regulations, the lack of shipbuilding and ship repair capabilities, and other costs imposed by the Jones Act. These are problems that will require Congress and the White House to work together to revamp the laws and policies needed to rebuild America’s maritime capabilities.

However, an exemption will grant U.S.-flagged ship operators more fiscal space to grow their operations and modernize their fleets. It will incentivize other shipping companies to change from their “flag of convenience” to the U.S. flag. These will generate more jobs because of the need to meet crewing requirements while introducing more competition into markets generated by cargo preference laws and lowering the cost of government shipping contracts. By making foreign-flagged ships less competitive in serving the U.S. economy, the new administration could move to strengthen the U.S. merchant fleet, incentivize more private investment in the American maritime industry, and make the Merchant Marine more capable of supporting the nation in times of crisis or war.

Ben Massengale is a Submarine Officer and the AY25 Visiting Navy Fellow to the Stimson Center. He is a graduate of Texas A&M Galveston and holds a Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.

Featured Image: CMA CGM Benjamin Franklin docks at the Port of Los Angeles. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

In past wars, small and well-armed ships have been a necessary complement to the large, multipurpose ships that dominate today’s U.S. Navy. China on the other hand utilizes a full range of maritime capabilities to outmaneuver the U.S. fleet. These ships can easily overwhelm the navies of smaller nations, like the Philippines, creating an unsustainable demand signal for support from large U.S. ships.

Scholars and engineers at the Naval Postgraduate School have developed a bi-modal fleet concept featuring a mix of small sea denial and large sea control vessels to correct this weakness. The key to implementing this strategy is the LMACC, or Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability. This small warship combines autonomy, AI, resilient communications, and passive cloud-based sensor fusion to fight inside the Chinese engagement envelope. It is intended to operate within a scalable, networked flotilla alongside a variety of unmanned systems as well as Marines ashore. This will extend their Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) doctrine into a more lethal and agile combined arms force able to overcome China’s capabilities. Furthermore, the features that make LMACC ideal for supporting Marines deep inside the first island chain also allow it to take on lower-intensity missions, such as special operations support and maritime patrol, making it an ideal choice for supporting President Trump’s stated goal of countering the cartels in the Gulf.

Unlike truly unmanned vessels, LMACC can be built today to affordably grow the fleet. It consists almost entirely of fielded systems and most preliminary design work is already done. Pre-covid estimates put the series production cost at about $100 million and its small size allows it to be built in struggling shipyards too small to build current warships. Furthermore, the human crew eliminates the legal and technological risks of unmanned systems. They can override the AI whenever needed and repair equipment that breaks down unexpectedly, building more confidence into these systems and informing future designs.

LMACC will also serve a critical function in developing future leaders. In today’s destroyer-centric surface fleet, platform command opportunities are mostly only available after more than a decade of service. LMACC is intended as an O-3 command, affording naval officers an opportunity to command earlier in their careers and develop critical leadership skills, including initiative, adaptability, and tactical acumen. Autonomous systems will become increasingly important, but cultivating command skillsets earlier in careers is a key benefit that smaller platforms bring to fleets.

Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to fund and build a prototype of the LMACC and its flotilla of innovations.

Dr. Shelley Gallup is a retired surface warfare officer. As an Associate Research Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Gallup has spent 25 years assisting the Navy in developing large-scale experiments at sea. His current work includes research in human-machine partnerships, the role of emergence in combat at sea, and leads the small warship LMACC project at NPS. He can be contacted at [email protected].

Ben DiDonato is a volunteer member of the LMACC team. He is responsible for LMACC’s armament and most engineering work. He has provided systems and mechanical engineering support to organizations across the defense industry from the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC) to Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, working on projects for all branches of the armed forces. He currently serves as vice president of technology for Expanse Laboratories Corporation, a startup developing novel physical encryption technology. He can be contacted at [email protected].

Featured Image: LMACC design screenshot courtesy of Ben DiDonato.