Tag Archives: distributed lethality

Seamanship and Leadership, Tactical Concepts

Unleashing Unit Lethality: Revising Operational & Promotion Paradigms

February 26, 2016 Guest Author 1 Comment

By ENS Daniel Stefanus

As the US Navy begins to pivot away from dependent tactical group paradigms and towards more independent striking units under distributed lethality, it will become increasingly necessary to revise our operational dynamics. The rapid increase in communications and tracking has led to an era in which a remote admiral can guide the hand of all units under his or her purview. We must resist such temptations. The remote warfighter knows significantly less than the commanding officer (CO) on the scene. Moreover, the administrative and procedural burden placed upon these commanding officers has sapped much of their tactical creativity and tenacity, as Ian Akisoglu has argued. Equipping ships with upgraded combat systems is all well and good, but the warfighters who utilize them and their operational paradigms must also be upgraded. We must decentralize tactical authority back down to the unit level and significantly enhance tactical knowledge and creativity.

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The Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (NSMWDC)’s Warfare Tactics Instructors (WTI) program is a huge step towards a low centralization, high unit proficiency operational model. As these WTIs spread throughout the Fleet disseminating ideas and rising to command, we will see a manifest change in unit-level tactical understanding and ability. However, the WTIs alone cannot overhaul our tired Preplanned Responses (PPRs) and outdated doctrines. They need to be empowered with the flexibility and out-of-the-box thinking that are the hallmarks of successful, evolutionary organizations. Our overly rigid combat procedures cannot handle the complexities of gray wars and supersonic conflict. Hence we must accomplish this shift through both the WTI program and a cocktail of long-term reforms: create accelerated CO pipelines with longer CO billets, enhance and widely distribute warfighting simulators, expand Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) billets, and form an across-the-board “task force” to resolve the over-management of unit commanders.

450x299_q95 — Vice Admiral Tom Rowden and Rear Admiral Jim Kilby speak at the inaugural ceremony of the Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center in June 4, 2015 (US Navy Photo).

The Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community has long suffered from having truly great officers mired in bureaucratic office jobs while their surface skills atrophy. Yes, it is crucial that our rising stars learn from staff and Pentagon billets, but their command leadership must be prioritized if they are to be retained. As VADM Rowden explained during the previous distributed lethality topic week, “Distributed Lethality is MUCH more than just putting more missiles on ships—it is about investing in warfighting expertise.” In this spirit we must push our rising stars to the tip of the spear as fast as possible. We must provide an accelerated command pipeline for our most able officers if we are going to get the elite commanding officers that are the bedrock of distributed lethality’s effective implementation. By giving these high potential candidates more early command opportunities and accelerated pipelines to CO/XO billets, we will keep our best and brightest plugged into the Fleet with the latest tactics.

130616-N-KA046-009 MEDITERRANEAN SEA (June 16, 2013) The guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) is underway in the Mediterranean Sea. Barry is on a scheduled deployment supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class James Turner/Released) — USS Barry (DDG 52) steaming in the Mediterranean Sea.

Far too many officers have wasted years waiting for command only to then get short 12-15 month stints. This is a misunderstanding of what kind of commanding officers we want and how to utilize talent. A crew does not care about making sure every decent SWO gets the opportunity to command, they care about having the best CO possible. We push for quantity over quality for no real end as most post-command SWOs go on to do staff and other mostly dead-end oversight-based administrative jobs before retiring. Instead we must focus on providing our best prospective command officers with multiple years of command and sea time in order to make them the great, salty warfighters we need in future conflicts.

This adjustment will also renew Sailors’ faith in the position of CO as an elite surface warrior. One talented, highly-experienced CO with three years of DDG command is more valuable than three “good” quick-stint COs who are not able to come into their full leadership and warfighting potential in such a short time. If a CO is doing a great job, then there is no reason to rotate him or her out at 15 months just to let another officer wear the crown. Bureaucracy and entitlement should not get in the way of us accelerating, retaining, and utilizing the very best SWOs. No one should be destined for CO just because of good FITREPs. Only our very finest should assume command, and they should do so for multiple years to gain the critical, diverse experiences required of a true warfighting commanding officer. By allowing the best SWOs to skip obligatory shore duties and be screened early for command, and allowing more fleet elements to be commanded by early command LCDRs, we can offer an enticing value proposition to our most elite SWOs and keep them firing on all cylinders on their path to being the world’s finest naval captains. These COs are the glue that will make distributed lethality effective in practice.

Another crucial step is rolling out well-made, easy to use, and highly accurate warfighting simulators. These can proliferate at all levels and will have demonstrable impacts on units’ tactical knowledge, understanding, and performance. As a child I played Jane’s Fleet Command (1997) ad nausem. In the process I became an 8 year-old who could speak intelligently about Exocet missiles and the dangers of submarine operations in the Taiwan straits. By allowing SWOs to continuously fight the enemy, wargame, revise tactics, and practically learn of the world’s military capabilities, we will have a more engaged and competent cohort of warfighters. We must find a way to leverage the enormous advances in computing technology and wargaming in order to best equip the minds of those who will be on the frontlines in future conflicts. Drills, PowerPoint, and brief-based schools are banal compared to the image of a cruiser being struck by an SS-N-22 while you scramble an F-18 squadron to counterattack against a flotilla of enemy DDGs hiding in the shadows of mountainous islands. Instinct and competence are forged in the fire of conflict, so – sans conflict – we must utilize highly-realistic simulators as the best alternative.

LCS simulator used to prepare crews (Lockheed Martin photo).

Moreover, our officer corps must not remain a closed system, an echo chamber of similar sounds. In order to best equip our frontline leaders with a diverse understanding of how to fight and know how other navies think and operate, we must go to these other navies. Seeing how a foreign navy functions can be incredibly illuminating and provide crucial perspective on what we do right and how we can improve. From the Dutch to the Japanese, we have a broad array of powerful naval allies who use alternative systems and doctrines to pursue their national maritime objectives. The Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) as it exists today is a woefully inadequate means of accomplishing such an exchange of ideas. Only a handful of SWOs are able to participate and gain critical foreign insight and experience. By ramping up PEP, we will open our officer corps to a diversity of ideas, procedures, and technologies that can only help our critical thinking and tactical skills in unpredictable and complex conflict scenarios. The core of distributed lethality’s effectiveness will lie in COs’ ability to harness their wardrooms’ creativity and diverse experiences to fight unexpectedly in spontaneous, unusual battlefields. This skillset can be enhanced by observing and understanding other navies and their methods.

Ultimately, the most critical and immediate reform that is necessary is a Task Force designed to peel back the red-tape and operational micromanagement of COs. This group would be composed of all levels of officers from ensigns to admirals. It would discuss and delineate exactly which procedures and processes are absolutely necessary for a flag officer to control and kick all other authorities back down to the unit CO. In combat there is no time to wait for the admiral’s move; the unit commander must be able to execute in an innovative and effective manner in order for distributed lethality to succeed. The CO needs to feel that they are the one fighting a battle, not their boss a thousand miles away.

All too often we are slaves to procedure and protocol even when they don’t make tactical or operational sense. This environmental context is the key to tactical victory and must be exploited, not glossed over by a PPR. In the end, distributed lethality can only succeed if it is executed by well-versed, innovative, and empowered commanding officers and their crews. If individual units cannot fight independently, then distributed lethality will become little more than beefed-up units operating in the same defensive strike group arrangements we currently utilize. Therefore the solution to our current tactical weakness is twofold: restrain over-management and bureaucratization while enhancing opportunities for our best talent in order to produce independent, highly capable warfighters with the operational latitude to sink fleets and win wars. We must do everything in our power to make this a reality now before the first missiles fly in a hot conflict.

ENS Daniel Stefanus is an associate editor at CIMSEC and a graduate of the Duke University NROTC unit. He currently serves as the Electrical Officer onboard USS ANCHORAGE (LPD 23) in San Diego, CA. The views expressed here are his own.

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis

Distributed Lethality: China is Doing it Right

February 26, 2016 Guest Author Leave a comment

Distributed Lethality Topic Week

By Alan Cummings

Distributed lethality is about “increasing individual warship lethality and then combining surface warships in innovative ways.” We can add some 21^st Century flair to the details, but the premise remains the essence of warships since time immemorial: go to sea and kill your enemy. Frankly, the U.S. Navy’s (USN’s) surface fleet is playing catch-up after the post-Cold War/ low-naval-threats era of the 1990s and 2000s. The fact that we needed to verify the value of capable warships with “a rigorous program of analytics” and numerous war games seems a poignant expression of the tactical and bureaucratic disconnect in the past decades. So for now, check out China and the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) if you want an example of Distributed Lethality in action.

The PLA(N) began building modern warships in the 1990s when they laid the keels for their first Luhu, Luhai, and Jiangwei-class vessels. Those vessels and every class of surface combatant since have counted anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) as their primary armament. Which is to say they were each deadly in the anti-surface warfare (ASuW) arena from day one. Ironically, as China was ramping up production of lethal surface combatants, the U.S. was ramping down. The last Arleigh Burke to incorporate the RGM-84 HARPOON (USS Porter, DDG 78) slid off the blocks in 1997 and every U.S. destroyer built since has been oriented around air defense. What little ASuW capability these later destroyers have is reliant on firing an SM-2 missile designed for air warfare in a secondary ASuW mode.

Fast forward to 2015, and you have two comparisons of the USN and PLA(N)- first by tonnage, then by strike-mile lethality.

Chart 1 — USN vs PLA(N) Surface Combatants by Tonnage

chae — USN vs PLA(N) Surface Combatants by ASuW Strike-Mile

As you can see, the USN may have the edge in tonnage but the PLA(N) takes the prize for lethality. It turns out the PLA(N) also has more hulls- which means their tonnage and armament are more, wait for it, distributed. Granted, a lot of that distribution resides in their Houbei PTGs. But if you’re focused on regional sea control, say like the South China Sea and Western Pacific, then those low-cost/high-lethality combatants are the perfect thing to disperse across contested locations, key transit areas, and chokepoints.

Today’s bottom line is that the PLA(N) can field more ASCMs and a wider variety of platforms than the USN. For most of the PLA(N), that lethality comes in the form of a warship with at least four YJ-83s, each delivering a 419-lbs warhead up to 100NM (some vessels have ASCMs with even longer ranges, like the YJ-18 and YJ-62). This means combatants with YJ-83s can hold a 200NM-diameter circle (or 31,400NM²) at risk of lethal effects. The Spratly Islands for example claim 120,000NM²; strategic distribution of a four-ship PLA(N) surface action group (SAG) gives ASCM coverage to 125,600NM². Raising the hull count or employing multiple SAGs makes the situation all the more frightening. Cue these vessels with rough targeting data (a.k.a. maritime domain awareness) from a Fiery Cross-based patrol aircraft and the PLA(N) has a full-blown system of distributed lethality.

Holding short of a war at sea, PLA(N) combatants are the muscle behind China’s maritime presence and influence operations. PLA General Zhang Zhaozhong implied this in early 2013, calling it a “cabbage strategy” to surround contested maritime claims (like Second Thomas Shoal) with layers of civilian, government, and military vessels. Then in 2014, PLA(N) vessels helped escort the Haiyang Shiyou 981 drilling rig in 2014 despite Chinese statements to the contrary. Talk about “combining surface warships in innovative ways,” China is using them as part of a layered politico-military offense to advance their maritime claims, one that easily transitions to combat operations if things deteriorate.

Implementing distributed lethality requires sound doctrine and a practiced C2 structure. That’s where the USN carries the advantage (for now) while we implement expedients like the modified TLAM and SM-6. However, much of our doctrine is either available via open source research or may have been compromised by cyber warfare. For example, the majority of our own textbook on “Surface Tactics 101” is available via a quick Google search for MTP-1D (the Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book). Paired with the equally available NWP 3-56 Composite Warfare Doctrine, and five minutes of Google research has provided the fundamentals of distributed tactics.

Whether the PLA(N) has incorporated U.S. C2 doctrine or developed a native system is likely hidden in classified reporting. However, we can look at broader open source examples to evaluate how practiced they are at operating warships together. For instance, rehearsals of combat resupply demonstrate coordination amongst combatants and the entire logistics train. Recent exercises with Russia, Australia, and the U.S. illustrate that the PLA(N) has become a capable partner for live fire exercises, amphibious landings, and maneuvering drills amongst other evolutions. I was once told that the key to combat at sea is showing up to the right location, on time, with weapons and radios that work (which may have been borrowed from someone else). I believe that is a valid definition, particularly in the context of distributed lethality, and one that the PLA(N) appears to be meeting.

If one is inclined to dismiss exercises and drills as liable to heavy scripting, then the PLA(N)’s blue water deployments show their C2 abilities are no fluke. These complicated operations (and the C2 required for them) are one snapshot in an evolution of PLA(N) doctrine that runs concurrent with their progress in warship technology. Even the larger Chinese defense organization is adapting to facilitate coordinated operations. Two of the five newly inaugurated theater commands will likely be tasked with maritime-centric missions in the East and South China Seas. More important than today’s snapshot, these trends indicate where China wants to take their C2 ability tomorrow. So what do these strategic moves mean for distributed tactics? If China has the C2 infrastructure, logistics support, and trust in its commanders to operate independently around the world then it stands to reason they can operate together in China’s near abroad.

Which brings up my last point on distributed lethality in the PLA(N): they win by implementing it locally. Warships from China’s East Sea Fleet at Ningbo need to cover 400NM to be in the disputed Senkaku Islands, while South Sea Fleet ships from Zhanjiang are 700NM from the Spratly Islands. PLA(N) vessels can cycle through combat patrols, maintenance periods, training evolutions, and resupply hops in 1/3 the distance a U.S. destroyer covers transiting from San Diego to Hawaii. Meanwhile, the USN still needs the missiles, variety of hulls (small, medium, and large combatants), and regional partners to make distributed lethality work in the Asia Pacific. China need only cast off lines.

Tactics come down to your ability to shoot, move, and communicate. Most of the USN surface fleet can move and communicate around the world, but can’t authoritatively prosecute a surface engagement. The PLA(N) is working on the skills to communicate in a coordinated attack, but they can move with ease in their near seas and they designed their surface combatants as shooters from the beginning. Both sides have identified where they are and where they want to go as far as tactical capability (which, for good or ill, seems to be similar places). So which challenge is easier- learning C2, or refitting and retraining a fleet? I guess the race is on.

Alan Cummings commissioned from Jacksonville University in 2007 and served as a Surface Warfare Officer in the USN until 2013. The opinions here are his own and do not represent the position of the U.S. government. Some material used here is drawn from research being considered for publication elsewhere. Original data is available via valid requests submitted to nextwar@cimsec.org.

Capability Analysis, Future War

The Elephant in the Room: E-2D and Distributed Lethality

February 25, 2016 Guest Author Leave a comment

Distributed Lethality Topic Week

By LCDR Christopher Moran and LT Ryan Heilmann

Admirals Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta introduced the concept of distributed lethality over a year ago as a “means to increase the offensive might of the surface force and employ ships in dispersed formations known as ‘hunter killer surface action groups.’”^{^[i]} The basic concept as outlined in the original article and further discussion has evolved into “the condition gained by increasing the offensive power and defensive hardening of individual warships and then employing them not only in traditional roles but also in different ways than have been the practice in the past few decades” according to Ryan Kelly.^{^[ii]} Discussion and interest grew around the country over the past year and with the formation of the Distributed Lethality Task Force. Many great minds have come together, primarily from the surface navy, to offer ideas and solutions. Furthermore, three key initiatives describe what needs to be harnessed within Distributed Lethality: To Deceive, Target, and Destroy.

One area of involvement that has been partially neglected in the distributed lethality discussion is aviation. In an update to distributed lethality, Admiral Rowden states:

“Nothing we do in Distributed Lethality should be seen as taking away from our historic and necessary role in enabling naval power projection and helping protect CVN’s and ARG’s. We start from the proposition that HVU operations and defense is our main mission, and then work to create operational problems with more lethal and distributed surface forces from there. Our proposition is that the Surface Force can do more, and we are going to take the necessary time to study and analyze that proposition in order to get it right.”^{^[iii]}

The perceived assumption is that the surface navy is either supporting power projection by providing “HVU operations and defense” or operating independently from the air wing with more “lethal and distributed surface forces.”

Dmitry Filipoff proposes a third option of a dispersed surface force that is supported by air wing assets:

“While distributed lethality deemphasizes carrier strike missions, the air wing will be a critical enabler for the distributed force. A distributed air wing can provide rapid response anti-submarine warfare capability and function as communications relays for maintaining a responsive decision cycle while the dispersed force operates under EMCON. The air wing’s screening and early warning functions will be indispensable for enabling commanders on the scene to exercise initiative and engage on their own terms.”^{^[iv]}

In this article we build upon the ideas of Mr. Filipoff, specifically focusing on the unique capabilities of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. Before proceeding further it might be helpful to offer some background information on the Hawkeye Community and its relevant areas of warfighting focus.

The Hawkeye was developed primarily as a blue water airborne early warning platform capable of long range detection of both aircraft and ships. While detection is the primary organic capability, Hawkeye aircrew are well versed executing real time command and control over a wide range of mission sets, including anti-surface warfare (ASuW). Through application of the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept, new air intercept controllers and mission commanders learn the basics of conducting ASuW during the earliest stages of their training, which is then built upon throughout the work up cycle. At the same time, as an airborne C2 asset the Hawkeye is more than capable of bridging the gap (both literally through network relay and bridging, and figuratively through the ability to have one coordination entity) between warfare commanders.

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye flown by Test and Evaluation Squadron TWENTY demonstrating proof of concept of in flight refueling. Photo taken by Kelly Schindler (US Navy). — E-2D Advanced Hawkeye flown by Test and Evaluation Squadron TWO ZERO demonstrating proof of concept of in flight refueling. Photo taken by Kelly Schindler (US Navy).

That being said, no amount of training or warfighting culture is going to matter if processes are not in place to make use of that corporate knowledge. Enter the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye with the APY-9 radar and associated sensors and communications equipment. While specific ranges of the radar are classified, suffice to say that the APY-9 greatly increases the ability of a strike group (or individual cruiser or destroyer) to detect and classify contacts at range. Furthermore, the data link and communication suite enables the Hawkeye to connect widely dispersed forces through multiple networks and means of voice communication. The continuing development of integrated fires offers unique employment options.

Taking into account the systems as well as the aircrew operating the platform, the organic and currently fielded capabilities of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye serving as the centralizing C2 node, bring the persistent ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), Command and Control, and strike group defense capabilities otherwise unavailable to the distributed fleet.

The overall theme of this article seeks to speak to several of the “key issues” brought up in Mr. Kelly’s call for articles, but particularly:

How should the upcoming Adaptive Force Package be employed: including Tactical Situation (TACSIT) execution, organic and inorganic targeting, fielding of modified weapons, and improved integration with Amphibious Forces and Expeditionary Marine Corps units in support of sea control operations?

Command and Control

First and foremost, the E-2 Hawkeye is an airborne command and control platform, capable of providing both C2 technology as well as “man-in-the-loop” decision making, necessary for effective control of a dispersed and dynamic battlespace. The E-2 is equipped with various data link capabilities which allow for the sharing of not only track data but also raw sensor information. Additionally, the communication suite in a Hawkeye includes V/UHF, HF, and SATCOM communications with various options for secure and anti-jam capabilities. The typical stationing altitude of a Hawkeye and the power output of the communication and data link equipment allows for a large range of operation ensuring a widely dispersed fleet can stay connected without the requirement for individual ships to maintain line of sight with each other.

Furthermore, the highly trained crew of the Hawkeye is capable of assessing the situation and making decisions for various commanders – carrying out their intent across various warfighting domains. This allows for the efficient choice of targeting solutions for offensive and defensive scenarios across the battlespace.

And finally, the warfighting experience of the crew allows for tailoring of information for specific recipients, ultimately cutting down the volume of information sent. For example, what the air defense commander needs to know is not necessarily what the surface warfare commander needs to know, or what the OTC or JFMCC need to know. The Hawkeye crew has the experience to tailor the information specifically desired by various levels of the chain of command, thereby limiting the total amount of information being transmitted. In an environment where uncontested usage of the electromagnetic spectrum is not guaranteed, knowing exactly what information to send and only sending that information becomes paramount in reducing our own electromagnetic footprint.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconaissance

One of the biggest challenges facing friendly forces in an “over-the-horizon” war is positive identification of a contact at range. With inherent line of sight limitations there is currently very little organic capability in a Carrier Strike Group to determine what exactly a particular OTH contact is. In an area of high surface and/or air traffic, the ability to identify a contact becomes a great concern for self-defense, especially in a distributed fleet. Ultimately what is needed, and can be provided by the Hawkeye, is an ability to maintain a single persistent track with consolidated ISR from multiple assets.

The airborne E-2 detects and localizes a contact, and begins to evaluate the contact using available onboard sensors. Simultaneously, the Hawkeye crew begins to work with any and all available ISR assets (EP-3, EA-18G, FA-18, UAV, surface ships) to determine any additional information to help with identification. A track with consolidated ISR information is then “pushed” to the fleet via available data links and/or voice communication as required. When the on station E-2 is forced to leave station due to the end of mission time, the relieving E-2 conducts a positive turnover of all tracks of interest ensuring no change in reported data. (Currently, station time is limited by fuel capacity, however in-flight refueling capability is currently in development for the E-2D which will significantly increase on station time). The result is a persistent, constantly communicated, consolidated “picture” of the area of interest. This picture is capable of being received by interested parties with very little, if any, electromagnetic emission.

Strike Group Defense

A dispersed and more offensive fleet creates some advantages for carrier strike group defense. For the threat, the left side of the kill chain becomes lengthened as it will be harder to find and track their intended targets. On the other hand if the threat is able to identify the high value unit they could face less resistance as the friendly layered air and missile defense will be reduced in strength. A reduced number of assets concentrated around the high value unit will inherently result in less overall defensive missiles, however technological advances and weapon system upgrades that have already reached initial operational capability, such as the SM-6 and E-2D, can reestablish a layered defense and reduce the number of assets required to defend the carrier strike group. Furthermore, these capabilities increase the defensive effectiveness of individual units spread throughout a distributed force. NIFC-CA is a tool that can be utilized for CSG defense and potentially establish a non-permissive environment for threat aircraft, but it is not the end-all solution. Cross community tactics must be developed to optimize weapons target pairing. Training and work-up cycles need to be significantly more integrated to exercise and reinforce new air and missile defense processes. The capabilities are in place (or will be soon) to defend a high value unit in a dispersed fleet; CVW aircrew and Surface Warfare Officers must remain flexible and innovative to most effectively employ the new capabilities available to them.

An E-2d from VAW-125 launches off of the aircraft carrier USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. Photo taken Ben Hayashi (US Navy).

Conclusion

The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye is uniquely equipped and positioned to facilitate the deception of dispersed forces, the targeting of the adversary and ultimately, the destruction of designated targets. This assistance and support can enable the surface force to indeed perform better with a more lethal positioning of forces distributed across the battlespace. The development of distributed lethality will include identifying current gaps in training and capability that can make our force more lethal. As we as a Naval force continue to develop innovative ways to counter adversaries, we would be wise to develop cross-domain warfighting tactics and increase the interoperability of our forces.

LCDR Christopher Moran and LT Ryan Heilmann were both assigned to VAW-125, the first operational E-2D Advanced Hawkeye squadron. Their views do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any other agency.

^{^[i]} Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, Rear Admiral Peter Gumataotao, Rear Admiral Peter Fanta, ‘Distributed Lethality’, Proceedings Magazine – January 2015, vol. 141/1/1.343.

^{^[ii]} Kelly, Ryan. Distributed Lethality Task Force Launches CIMSEC Topic Week, Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) website, 1 February 2016. https://cimsec.org/21579-2/21579

^{^[iii]} Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, ‘Distributed Lethality: An Update’, CIMSEC website, 12 March 2015, https://cimsec.org/distributed-lethality-an-update/15484

^{^[iv]} Filipoff, Dmitry, ‘Distributed Lethality and Concepts of Future War’, CIMSEC website, 4 January, 2016, https://cimsec.org/distributed-lethality-and-concepts-of-future-war/20831

Capability Analysis, Future War

Reconfiguring Air Cushioned Vehicles to Enhance Distributed Lethality

February 25, 2016 Guest Author 3 Comments

Distributed Lethality Topic Week

By John Devlin

With the continuing buildup of Chinese and Russian navies, as well as increasingly capable regional actors, the task of leveraging a 300 ship US Navy using distributed lethality (DL) as a force multiplier in response remains a formidable task. It is reminiscent of another period in our history when our scientists and engineers had to conjure a way to prolong a life sustaining air supply while constrained to only limited resources available to a stricken space craft. Most of us are familiar with the story of Apollo 13 astronauts using duct tape and plastic bags to adapt parts never intended to work together in order to return safely back to earth. Those scientists and engineers toiled feverishly with various configurations before agreeing on a workable course of action. The birth of distributed lethality is similarly constrained, but with a much larger mission and far-reaching consequences.

BRAVO ZULU to the tacticians and engineers who adapted the SM-6 surface-to-air missile (SAM) to a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) to rapidly extend the stand-off range for our surface action groups (SAG). It is encouraging that these innovators were not dissuaded from their pursuit by the arguments against using an air warhead against a surface target or the $4M cost per unit or the command and control implications of shooting at a target so many miles over the horizon potentially dispersed among friendly vessels. This is an innovative first step to demonstrate the capability. The necessary refinements will follow as the value of this new weapon becomes accepted and integrated into battle group tactics.

1223 — Figure 1. Air Cushioned Vehicle easily maneuvers over a rocky beach.

Let’s examine the advantages of the SM-6 in the SSM mode and why this adaptation is a smart and innovative use of existing ships and munitions. The missile dimensions are the same as the SM-6 in the SAM mode which allows the use of existing launchers and platforms. Crews are in place. As mentioned previously, the stand-off range is substantially improved. The kill probably of a continuous rod or fragmentation warhead against hardened ship targets is unlikely; however, a soft kill of the target’s sensors and communications antennae, at least initially, is almost as good as sinking it. It will likely blind the enemy’s fire control systems. The allocation of missiles in the ship’s missile magazines for SSM versus SAM targets is an old discussion and is only appropriate when discussed relative to the expected opposing force. Another potential negative is the $4M cost of these missiles. But nonetheless, this is a step in the right direction and is in alignment with distributed lethality.

Where else can the US Navy apply this type of innovative thinking to further increase lethality? How do we out gun, out run, and out maneuver opposing forces using the current inventory of platforms, weapons systems, C2, and manning? Why not reconfigure the 1^st generation Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) into shooting platforms? The VLS Hellfire missiles can be mounted in the cargo deck. Pedestal-mounted APKWS missiles could be similarly mounted. Chain guns such as the M61 Vulcan 20mm Cannon or the Mk38 25mm machinegun can all be mounted in the cargo deck for line-of-sight targeting. This craft has demonstrated 100 knots speeds. Its ability to maneuver in shallow water, reef zones, shifting sand bars, riverine, and beach zones gives it the maneuverability of no other afloat vehicle. This tactical advantage of speed and maneuver cannot be matched. It travels at near-helicopter speeds, can carry 10 times the helicopter’s payload, with four times the on-station time. It could be configured with an AEGIS Ashore Missile Payload and positioned at many improved and unimproved sites.

Initially, targeting can be line-of-sight with over-the-horizon targeting when DL integration development progresses. We have seen enemy fighters using mosques and urban

Figure 2. Air Cushioned Vehicle maneuvers from an obscure beach.

areas to shield them from incoming fire. We can expect enemy maritime forces to use fishing, merchant vessels, and fleeing refugees as defensive shields. Engagement criteria, for at least the initial engagement skirmishes, will be line of sight positive identification via manned observation or remote observation. Clear Rules of Engagement (ROE) will need to be developed and practiced. Greater forward force autonomy should be anticipated to ensure engagement success.

The air cushioned vehicles will be positioned forward of the battle group in picket roles in archipelagic regions or in strategic straits such as the Strait of Hormuz where the shifting sandbars are not an obstacle to maneuvering for these vehicles. Their maneuverability will allow them to cut the escape routes of marauding high speed conventional craft who traverse narrow channels with impunity because they know the potential of grounding a chasing naval vessel is an unacceptable risk to the USN. Submarine based threats and mined areas are also of limited concern for a vessel that has no draft.

But these air cushioned vehicles are not suitable to plow through high seas. How can we get them to theater and provide operating support? Platform Supply Vessels (PSV) have been performing this type of role in the off-shore oil industry for three decades. They have transported the heavy equipment and operating supplies that allow oil rigs to operate at sea for long periods. These vessels are designed to carry a tremendous volume of drill mud, fresh water, and fuel needed for use in off-shore oil drilling. The drill mud storage tanks can be used to ballast down the stern and allow self-propelled access to air cushioned vehicles. They are rugged vessels and are built to withstand the rigors of high seas. In the

Figure 33. PSVs can carry Air Cushioned Vehicles to theater on this wide open deck.

post-Deepwater Horizon off-shore oil industry, they have reduced the high insurance costs of hoteling crews on the rigs by providing hotel services on the PSVs. As a consequence of the shale oil revolution and low world oil prices, new PSVs are tied to their piers because operating them is no longer profitable. They are available for lease, purchase, or contracted services.

As the new LCAC 100 comes into service, the old LCACs are headed to the scrap pile. Why not reconfigure them with modular weapons to give the US Navy a combatant craft that can out gun, out run, and out maneuver opposing forces?

John Devlin is Director of Navy Programs with ISPA Technology and a retired US Navy Captain. He was a Tactical Action Officer (TAO) in carrier battle groups as a Surface Warfare Officer and has experience in littoral operations as a Special Operations Officer.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.