Tag Archives: China

Maritime Silk Road: Through a New Periscope

It was the Maldives’s turn to receive a sermon on the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) from China. Chinese President Xi Jinping invited Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen to participate in the 21st Century MSR, expand cooperation in tourism, trade and infrastructure, and enhance maritime cooperation. Apparently Yameen assured Xi that his country would “respond to the Chinese initiative.” Ali Hameed, former vice foreign minister of the Maldives, too had stated that the MSR was of interest to the Maldives. Earlier, Xi had approached Sri Lanka to consider the MSR, and Colombo indicated that it would actively examine the proposal. The MSR was also raised during Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari’s visit to China a few months ago.

Unlike in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the MSR has sent the Indian strategic community into a tizzy. A number of articles, commentaries, op eds, discussions and sound bites have concluded that the MSR is nothing but a Chinese ploy to get a naval ‘foothold’ in the Indian Ocean and reflects China’s creeping influence in the region. These reactions are quite natural given that China has aggressively pursued the agenda of building maritime infrastructure in friendly countries such as Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota) and now the Maldives – that are seen as bases/facilities to support People’s Liberation Army Navy’s future operations in the Indian Ocean and also the Chinese attempt to ‘encircle’ India.

However, it will be useful to examine the MSR through the prism of maritime infrastructure development and explore if India can leverage the MSR to its advantage. China has developed a sophisticated concept of marine economy that has been facilitated by its long coastline. Nearly 40 per cent of the Chinese population, 5 per cent of cities, 70 per cent of GDP, 84 per cent of direct foreign investment and export products are generated within 200 km of coast. In 1998, the Chinese government published a White Paper on marine economy which identified twenty different sectors for the development of the national economy. The China Ocean Information Center announced that the marine output in 2013 grew 7.6 per cent year on year to 5.43 trillion Yuan ($ 876 billion) accounting for 9.5 per cent of the national economy. In essence, the coastal provinces have contributed substantially to the overall national strength in terms of economic growth and play an important role in developing an export-oriented economy.

Today, China figures among the top countries in shipbuilding, ports (particularly container cargo), shipping, development of offshore resources, inland waterways, marine leisure tourism, and not to forget it is one of the top suppliers of human resources who are employed by international shipping companies.

mahinda-rajapakse-backs-chinas-maritime-silk-road-projectChina’s shipbuilding capacity is notable and is supported by plentiful of cheap labour and domestic ancillary industry which is endowed with exceptional engineering skills. Seven of the top ten global container ports are in China and the Chinese shipping fleet of 6,427 vessels ranks second behind Japan with 8,357 ships. Similar successes are seen in China’s fisheries production which is projected to reach about 69 metric tonnes by 2022 and it will continue to be top world exporter with 10 metric tonnes by 2022. Likewise, China ranked third as a tourist destination in 2012. The coastal regions are dotted with marinas, water sport parks and beach resorts and Sanya, Qingdao and Xiamen are home to the growing yacht and luxury boating industry.

These capabilities have been built over the past few decades and has placed China among the major maritime powers of the world and top Asian maritime powers – beating both Japan and South Korea. China is leveraging these capabilities and offering to develop maritime infrastructure in friendly countries that are willing to accept the offer – which at times makes an attractive investment opportunity, and can help these exploit the seas to enhance economic growth, and ensure food and energy security.

There is a sea change in the maritime strategic thinking of China and India. While the former has harnessed the seas to build its power potential, the latter needs to undertake a strategic evaluation of its maritime potential. India needs to make major policy changes to develop maritime infrastructure, offshore resources and exploit these on a sustainable basis. Although India is pursuing the path of building a modern three-dimensional navy with nuclear submarines, a new appreciation of the multifaceted maritime economic activity needs New Delhi’s attention.

India lacks maritime infrastructure and technology to exploit offshore marine organic, mineral and hydrocarbon resources that are critical to ensure sustained economic growth – which is high on the current government’s agenda. It would therefore be prudent to understand the MSR through the prism of an opportunity.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is the Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy or National Maritime Foundation. He can be reached at [email protected]. This article was cross-posted by permission and appeared in its original form at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Sea Control 50 – Japan’s Defense Policy

seacontrol2Get ready to hear two Asia Pacific analysts share their views on Japan’s remilitarisation and its implications for regional security. Natalie Sambhi, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, interviews Dr Tomohiko Satake, a fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo and visiting fellow at ASPI, and Dr Benjamin Schreer, a senior analyst in defence strategy at ASPI. Both analysts discuss the drivers behind the recent decision to reinterpret Japan’s constitution, the implications of Japan’s new white paper, and relations with China and Australia.

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Playing Wild Cards in the SCS

Earlier this month I had the opportunity to attend a South China Sea simulation held by the International Peace and Security Institute at John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. Over at the ASPI’s The Strategist I detail some lessons from the simulated negotiations over developing a joint communique. In the run-up to the exercise I asked colleagues on Twitter and in the CIMSEC Facebook group to suggest “wild cards” that could be played to shake-up the talks. Unfortunately many of these turned out to be outside my bounds as a country representative from Vietnam (or really any country’s representative) to enact.  

But, not one to let their creative thinking go to waste, I thought I’d take a moment to assess their likelihood of impacting and altering the negotiations in a fundamental way. These are not judgments on the likelihood of whether such a scenario will occur – many are rather improbable, but they are after all called “wild” cards for a reason.

China’s South China Sea claim near the Natunas becomes a “pricklier” issue for Indonesia
Impact: Medium: A shift in Indonesia’s public position on whether it has an official dispute would add to the moral “weight” of those similarly embroiled, but it’s unclear China would alter its focus on bilateral negotiations as a result. Indonesia would lose something of its mantle of an impartial regional moderator. Taking it a step further and filing a case (or threatening to) with the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) would potentially be more impactful as leverage.  

China “discovers” a link between Uighur and Moro terrorists in the Philippines
Impact: Low: If it doesn’t move beyond rhetoric or international arrest warrants, but China could use such a claim to spook the Philippines (and counter-insurgency American military advisors) into thinking it the link may be used as pretext for unilateral action in defense of its interests.

China instigates a coup in the Philippines, followed by pro-Chinese government
Impact: High: A pro-Chinese government would potentially seek accommodation on disputed areas and be more willing to cede claims – whether territorial or for resource exploitation. 

Wild CardChina tries to split claimants by making deal with Philippines but pressing Vietnam
Impact: Medium: While the opposite is probably more likely, if China settled its claims with the Philippines it could try to isolate Vietnam and exert greater leverage for concessions in an ultimate deal over resources and/or sovereignty. Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam sits outside of American treaty obligations and de-linking the issue from an American treaty could also remove some of the incentives for the United States to be as actively involved in resolution of the dispute.  

Chinese PLA hackers hold NYSE hostage
Impact: Low: The stock exchange has tools to suspend trading and minimize the impacts of a disruption while fixing the breaches. Public outcry could force the United States into a tougher negotiating posture.

Algae bloom wipes out fishing stocks and forces fishing fleets into others’ EEZs
Impact: Low: What would be the resultant effects and actions are essentially already ongoing.

ITLOS decides in favor of Philippines
Impact: Medium: Unlikely to alter China’s negotiating position, but would add to moral authority of other claimants and could cause outside parties to back the Philippines or file their own ITLOS claims.

Philippines attempts to ground another ship while China attempts to stop them
Impact: Medium: Depends on the outcome of these attempts and any casualties, but would alter focus of the negotiations and potentially provide Philippines leverage to get China to stop its own construction. 

Vietnamese vessels attack a Chinese rig / Chinese attack and sink a Philippines rig
Impact: Medium: Although Vietnam and Chinese non-naval vessels have tangled in limited engagements over China’s placement of a rig this summer, the destruction of a rig or a large number of casualties would greatly increase tensions. If these were followed by ultimatums they could back negotiators into corners, although the difference in outcome would still likely not be much different from the above scenario.

U.S. starts reporting SCS naval/civil dispositions to news orgs in real time
Impact: Low: The greater transparency would likely have little impact on the talks, but could provide negotiators a common point of reference (and I for one would enjoy tracking the movements).

Peace suddenly breaks out
Impact: High: Certainly changes everything.

“Three Warfares,” Yankee Style
Impact: Medium: If the United States tries to play to media, psychological, and legal warfare it could encourage the other claimants to make ITLOS cases, sign UNCLOS itself (presuming of course it could pass Congress), and declare that it will actively enforce ITLOS ruling when decided as pertains to treaty ally Philippines. On the media front, popular American television show Deadliest Catch could film its next season in the South China Sea, while a psychological approach could threaten to inundate disputed territory with the sounds of Justin Bieber. Combined, these approaches may make Chinese team more willing to negotiate…or just more resentful.

Thanks to Dan Hartnett, Bryan McGrath, Chris Rawley, Armando Heredia, M. Taylor Fravel, Theresa Fallon, Craig Hooper, Natalie Sambhi, and Doug Gates for their inputs.

Taiwan’s Defense: National Interests over Semantics

The Diplomat has recently brought us a debate on international law – centering on the legality of military intervention on behalf of Taiwan during a conflict with the PRC. Zachary Kech kicked off by proposing that Japan’s recent reinterpretation of Article 9 of their Constitution to permit collective self-defense could allow for Japan defending Taiwan in the event of an attacked from China. This was followed by Julian Ku arguing that intervention by any nation on behalf of Taiwan against the mainland would be illegal since Taiwan is neither definitively recognized as an independent nation nor a United Nations member. Michal Thim quickly refuted those claims in an article, which is followed again by Julian Ku coming back with some clarifications on personal opinions and reiterates the original argument. Finally, Michael Turton and Brian Benedictus co-authored a somewhat convoluted argument that actually Taiwan’s unsettled status as an independent nation makes military intervention acceptable.

With no disrespect meant toward the authors, the merits of discussing this point are mostly academic. Though the debate may be stimulating to those with an interest in the topic and some might learn more about the subject of international law as a result of it, it has little to no bearing on practicality.

One of the key questions present in all of the articles is if Taiwan is an independent nation or an extension of mainland China and how international law views each situation. Clearly arguments can be made in support of both positions or else we would not have so many articles written about it in the past couple of weeks, but does it really matter? Whatever semantics used to describe relationships with Taiwan or China, the U.S. has active relationships with both of them.

Money keeps this machine running
Money keeps this machine running

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, China is currently the U.S.’s second largest goods trading partner with $562 billion in total goods trade during 2013 and Taiwan is currently the 12th largest with $64 billion in 2013. Would any of this change if the United Nations passed a resolution stating Taiwan was not an independent nation and officially a part of the larger mainland China? Of course not. Money, and more importantly national interests, will conquer over semantics any day.

Whether the U.S. or Japan would defend Taiwan if China decided to repatriate the island through military force should have nothing to do with semantics and everything to do with strategic interests. The strategic basis for protecting Taiwan or not is neither the subject of this article nor the debate at the Diplomat which inspired it. This article makes no comment as to should or would other nations protect Taiwan, but instead discusses could they.

There is so much talk about international law in the debate. International law, as opposed to simply international norms and conventions, has been in vogue since the fighting of two world wars and the founding of the United Nations. Why? Because law has an absolute and moral feel about it. If you are breaking the law then you are doing something wrong and others have a moral obligation to stop you. If you are following the law then you are doing something right and others have a moral obligation to support you. This grossly oversimplifies the complexities of international relations. Decisions are made to promote strategic national interests and all nations are not necessarily playing by the same moral and ethical code. In the domestic concept of law, you have a like peoples under a recognized government authority with enforcement power. This does not seamlessly translate to the international stage of co-equal governments with differing interests and no central authority with absolute enforcement power.

Welcome back
The Party welcomes you back

If China decided tomorrow to repatriate Taiwan with military force and the U.S. and Japan intervened, would they be protecting a sovereign nation from an invading force or helping to liberate a people from a government they do not want? This semantic difference might matter when deciding what article of the United Nations charter you are going to try to use for propaganda to gain support for your cause or generate opposition for your enemies or what the victor who writes the history will use to justify their actions in the history books. But in all practicality, nations should base their use of force on national strategy and not semantics.

LT Jason H. Chuma is a U.S. Navy submarine officer currently serving as Navigator and Operations Officer onboard USS SPRINGFIELD (SSN 761). He is a graduate of the Citadel, holds a master’s degree from Old Dominion University, and has completed the Intermediate Command and Staff Course from the U.S. Naval War College. He can be followed on Twitter @Jason_Chuma.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.