For a discussion on the South China Sea, Sally DeBoer, our Book Review Editor, brings in CAPT James Fannell (USN, Ret), the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations (N2) for the US Pacific Fleet. During the course of his thirty year career, CAPT Fanell specialized in Indo-Asia Pacific security affairs, with an emphasis on the Chinese navy and its operations. CAPT Fanell is an experienced public speaker noted for his candor and expertise. He is currently a government fellow for the Geneva Center for Security Policy and the author of Red Star Rising.
CDA Institute Security & Defence Blogger Adam MacDonald, an independent scholar on Canadian foreign policy and Asia-Pacific security, looks at China’s approach to the Arctic.
China’s increasing Arctic engagements overall have been welcomed by the region’s stakeholders. There are, however, arguments in the media and some academic quarters that China’s growing involvement threatens to destabilize the region. Beijing, despite the absence of Arctic territory, is unilaterally asserting itself into the regional institutional architecture, challenging the pre-eminent role of the Arctic states and their sovereign rights, while their ‘Arctic envy’ to secure regional shipping lanes and resources currently is manifested through political and economic manoeuvring. In the future China may become more forceful in these endeavours, including possible military deployments in the North.
Much of these commentaries are imprecise and speculating at best, largely ignoring the pathways and processes China’s Arctic endeavours have evolved. Lack of specifics on how and why China constitutes a threat to the region, also, demonstrate these arguments derive from the more generalized (yet still problematic) ‘Assertive China’ narratives which have become dominate in Western analyses of Chinese foreign policy. Clearly, China is actively trying to alter the power dynamics in its immediate environment of East Asia. But it is premature to talk of a revisionist challenge to the international system writ large guiding the entirety of Beijing’s foreign engagements. Before assigning China’s Arctic activities to an underlying revisionist agenda, therefore, it is important to further analyze the lines of engagement Beijing is actually pursuing.
China does not have an official Arctic Policy due to the low importance of the region within their broader foreign policy strategy, which is focused on immediate access to resources. The Arctic, though, is an area of long-term interest motivating Chinese leaders to begin a ‘nascent stage of formulation’ in terms of constructing a regional strategy. Chinese academia, media and the military, also, have become more vocal and engaged in this process.
China’s Arctic engagements originate from and are still dominated by scientific research projects, specifically pertaining to climatic and regional weather phenomenon. These endeavours have increased significantly over the past decade including the 2004 establishment of the Yellow River Station in Spitsbergen, Norway; the creation of the China-Nordic Research Center in Shanghai in 2013; and the construction of an Aurora Station in Iceland. China, as well, is looking to establish an Arctic research centre in Canada and is building a second scientific icebreaker in conjunction with Finland. Some commentators are quick to dismiss Beijing’s scientific endeavours as camouflaging other more malign political goals, but one should not dismiss the fact that China faces massive environmental and climate change challenges, which motivates much of their scientific and climate work internationally.
Bilateral economic relations is the second line of China’s Arctic engagements. Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa remain Beijing prioritized regions for resource acquisition but the Arctic states, particularly the Nordic countries, have developed robust resource development projects with China. The strongest of these relationships is with Iceland, where China signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2013 and was awarded its first exploration license in the region for oil in the Dreki area. Chinese companies, as well, have invested billions into mineral-rich Greenland, a protectorate of Denmark. These relations, however, have not been entirely unproblematic. Iceland’s parliament blocked a land-purchase deal of a Chinese developer due to concerns over what the land would be used for and investments in Greenland have caused local anxieties over Chinese dominance in the economy, including the possible (but overhyped) importation of thousands of Chinese workers. China has also made inroads into the Canadian and particularly Russian energy markets, the latter following the post-Crimea sanctions régime that left Moscow short of capital and partners for Arctic resource development. But Ottawa and Moscow, more so than the Nordic states, are wary of the consequences of Chinese economic activities in the North. China’s ability and willingness, however, to invest significantly in these remote areas (particularly Greenland), requiring possibly decades of development before profitable returns are generated, motivates many Arctic stakeholders to engage Chinese companies despite concerns about their government ties and overall environmental and labour standards.
China, finally, has been energetic in gaining entry into the Arctic governance structure and acceptance as a legitimate and non-threatening stakeholder. After two failed attempts, in 2013 China (along with a host of other Asian countries) were accepted by the Arctic Council, the pre-eminent regional organization, as Permanent Observers. Despite having no voting rights, Permanent Observers are allowed to take part in seminar discussions and participate in the organization’s working groups. One of the major conditions China (and other applicants) had to meet was acceptance of the Nuuk Criteria which includes acknowledging the pre-eminent role and responsibility of Arctic states in regional affairs; their sovereignty and sovereign rights; and recognizing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the legal régime governing the Arctic. This measure alleviated concerns associated with a more active China by showing their willingness to abide by the rules and conditions of the regional régime.
Chinese leaders, nevertheless, do assert that the Arctic possess certain trans-regional characteristics which necessitate the involvement of non-Arctic states (a position held by a number of other Asian states) and as a ‘Near Arctic State’ has a legitimate role to play. Despite some frictions, including over issues of extended maritime zoning claims by the Arctic coastal states which China sees a possibly marginalizing non-Arctic states access to the North, Beijing has decided to become part of the regional structure and not attempt to create parallel organizations and mechanisms to pursue its interests.
Contrary to portrayals of China as an assertive and bellicose outsider, Beijing’s actions have been conducted through legal and accepted channels, including participating at a low and non-intrusive level in the regional political architecture. Acknowledging the differences between Beijing and some Arctic actors over issues of maritime rights and the role of non-Arctic states in regional governance, there is very little evidence of China becoming more aggressive in these pursuits. The Arctic, furthermore, is a stable region characterized by an ever evolving rule-bound régime populated by developed states, including the world’s two nuclear superpowers, and the absence of war and failed states: conditions which heavily influence the pathways and processes China is and will pursue their interests in the future.
China’s interests in the Arctic, furthermore, align with their broader foreign policy goals of diversifying energy and resources suppliers, securing trade routes and becoming more active in global and regional governance instruments commensurate with their growing great power status and role. Speculations of China’s ‘aggressive’ posturing in the Arctic, however, will undoubtedly continue to inaccurately colour any discussion of the rising power’s actions in the Arctic; far more than any other Non-Arctic, and particularly Asian, state involved in the region.
Adam P. MacDonald is an independent academic whose work focuses on Canadian foreign policy in Asia, Chinese naval developments, and the ongoing political transition in Myanmar. He can be reached at [email protected]. (Image courtesy: alexshakun.blogspot.com.)
Welcome to part one of the March 2016 members’ roundup. Over the past month CIMSEC members have examined several international maritime security issues, including an increase in Russian naval activities and deployments, recent U.S. naval exercises demonstrating the Fleets’ application of the distributed lethality concept, laser technologies and the U.S. defense acquisition program and as usual, the increasingly tense security environment in the Asia-Pacific.
Paul Pryce begins the roundup in the Asia-Pacific with a discussion, on what he refers to as, the new era in Singaporean defense procurement. In his article at Offiziere, Mr. Pryce highlights that previous procurement strategies for the country’s Navy have focused on acquiring mainly European designed vessels, either built specifically for Singapore or purchased following a short period of service in the initial European country. However, the planned construction of eight indigenous Independence-class littoral mission vessels beginning in 2016 and the expected procurement of a domestically built light aircraft carrier through 2021 suggests that the Singapore’s shipbuilding capacity and overall maritime force projection capabilities are becoming increasingly strengthened – a significant implication for Singapore’s role in South East Asian security dynamics.
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Alex Calvo, for Asian Military Review, discusses the challenge Taiwan faces in securing a replacement for its four aged hunter-killer submarines (SSKs), two of which are vintage Tench-class World War II boats while the other two were commissioned in the Netherlands in 1987 and 1988. Mr. Calvo explains how Europe has become reluctant to support Taiwanese military procurement needs for fear of angering China while the United States no longer produces SSKs. He suggests that Taiwan may look to Japan as an alternative source for its SSK replacement largely due to recent efforts by the Japanese shipbuilding industry to win the contract for the Royal Australian Navy’s SSK procurement requirements while also noting a lack of other feasible alternatives.
Kyle Mizokami, for Popular Mechanics, discusses China’s plans to establish aircraft carrier battle groupstasked with defense of the country’s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and overseas interests both regionally and perhaps globally. Mr. Mizokami highlights the nature of China’s first operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, as he explains its training role and limited capacity to carry large numbers of combat capable aircraft. However, he also notes that China has confirmed the construction of the Dalian carrier, which will have more hangar space for support and combat aircraft – but will still only displace about 50 000 tons, or half that of a modern U.S. carrier.
Leaving the Asia-Pacific, Dave Majumdar outlines the implications of Russia’s planned massive live-fire nuclear exercisebeing conducted by two Project 955 Borei-class ballistic missile submarines deployed with the Northern Fleet. In his article at The National Interest, Mr. Majumdar explains how one of the missile boats will sequentially launch all sixteen of its RSM-56 Bulava missiles at a depth of 164ft while highlighting that such an exercise, whether a U.S. or Russian ballistic missile boat, would only launch their entire payload in conflict as part of full-scale retaliatory or offensive nuclear strike. In a second article at The National Interest, Mr. Majumdar discusses the spotting of a Russian Project 667 BDRM Delfin-class ballistic missile submarine near French territorial waters – the boat carries sixteen missiles capable of carrying four nuclear warheads each with a range of 7500 miles.
Bryan McGrath, for the War on the Rocks, provides the ‘First Principles’ that will help guide the difficult task of structuring the U.S. Navy’s future fleet. Mr. McGrath emphasizes that the Navy must be sized and shaped into a fleet that allows for both combat-credible and presence forces to be positioned globally in a manner that secures national interests while effectively deterring major power conflict. He also mentions the implementation of the distributed lethality concept, where individual platform lethality is increased even as the force becomes geographically dispersed. On this point, Mr. McGrath argues that an individual combat capacity increase should not compel policy makers to reduce the size of the fleet, as one does not necessarily balance the others strategic importance. On the same topic at The National Interest, Dave Majumdar describes a recent test of the SM-6 missile where it was revealed that the system now retains effective anti-surface capability, a major step for distributed lethality implementation across the fleet.
Members at CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during the first part of March:
Kyle Mizokami, for Popular Mechanics, provides an analysis on the technological developments that have allowed lasers to enter military service with effective and useful capabilities. Mr. Mizokami notes that the U.S. Air Force, Army and Navy are all interested in deploying lasers across their forces with the Navy already fielding a laser aboard the Austin-class USS Ponce – while the rest of the fleet is anticipated to see large volumes of laser armament in the 2020-2021 timeframe.
Robert Farley, also for The Diplomat, describes China’s dependence on military technologies acquired from foreign powers. Mr. Farley provides specific examples outlining the importance of foreign technology throughout the PLA, including aircraft carriers, missile defense systems, surface vessels, ground armored systems and several fighter aircraft. However, Mr. Farley notes that this dependence is weakening as domestic innovation and technological breakthroughs are occurring rapidly.
Chuck Hill, for his Coast Guard Blog, provides an outlook for the future role and importance of the U.S. Coast Guard, highlighting its projected fleet size of nine frigate sized National Security Cutters and 25 light-frigate sized Offshore Patrol Cutters – an overall force of 34 surface combatants. In terms of personnel, the Coast Guard is already larger than the French and British navies and should therefore, according to Mr. Hill, be considered a significant maritime asset for U.S. national defense and a supplement to certain U.S. Naval operations. In a second article for his blog, Mr. Hill discusses the Sensor Hosting Autonomous Remote Craft (SHARC)and its possible uses for ASW and anti-drug smuggling operations. He also provides a video illustrating its unique features and special propulsion system.
CIMSEC has also recently (February) published a compendium discussing a range of strategies, challenges and policy options concerning Distributed Lethality. You can find a download link for all of the articleshere.
At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on CIMSEC or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].
Sam Cohen is currently studying Honors Specialization Political Science at Western University in Canada. His interests are in the fields of strategic studies and defense policy and management.
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The recent innocent passage of USS Lassen through waters claimed by China in the South China Sea, billed as a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) by the United States, highlights the inefficiency of US policy in the Asia-Pacific.
As has been widely reported, while the US government portrayed the voyage of Lassen through the waters around Subi Reef as a freedom of navigation exercise to challenge Chinese claims to those waters under international law, Lassen conducted an innocent passage, which would have been allowed even in territorial waters under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and therefore not a challenge to Chinese claims. This compromised the US government’s stated goals for the operation.
East China Sea (Mar. 28, 2003) – The guided missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82) sails through the rough seas. Lassen is part of the USS Carl Vinson Battle Group that just recently completed participating in the joint exercise FOAL EAGLE and is continuing a scheduled deployment in the western Pacific Ocean. U.S. Navy Photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Inez Lawson.
This raises an important question of why the US intentionally compromised its objectives. It is unlikely that this was a result of neglect or ignorance, given the fact that everyone from officers on the ship to the Washington higherups who planned and approved the operation are familiar with international law and the protocol of an innocent passage. The most apparent intention of the US decision to conduct an innocent passage rather than a true FONOP is in an attempt to show restraint, and to avoid serious provocation of China. An important question, then, is whether the US, through its apparent restraint, succeeded in not provoking China.
At the moment, the US appears to have failed. One way of determining whether the FONOPlite provoked China is by examining statements from the Chinese Government and state media about the operation. Admittedly, this isn’t a perfect measure because the Chinese Communist Party is a relatively opaque organization, and it is inherently tough to parse the posturing from the genuine signalling, especially in party-run media outlets. But these statements can point observers in the right direction. Regardless of whether such credit is due, the United States has not gotten any credit in the Chinese press or from officials for its apparent attempt to show restraint. Indeed,opeds in the People’s Daily accuse the US of using FONOPs as “a coverup for the US to destroy peace and stability in the South China Sea” and officials “[urge] the US to stop sowing dissension and deliberately stirring up tension and stop deeds and actions that undermine peace and stability in the region.”
Subi Reef, a disputed land feature in the South China Sea, pictured in May 2015, and undergoing land reclamation to enlarge the island. Such activities have been a controversial development. (Source: US Navy).
Furthermore, the actions and words of the Chinese government agree with each other. Even if their statements were posturing, the pace of Chinese militarization of the sea has quickened. This is clear from recent announcements of new missile deployments, a radar station, and the flight of fighter jets to the sea. The interesting thing about all these developments is that none were announced by the Chinese government. If China was stoking nationalist fervor in an attempt to please citizens who would have been otherwise inclined towards dissent as a result of the recent economic slowdown the Chinese government would have announced these developments itself, and loudly publicize them. However, given its initial decision to keep quiet, observers can reasonably infer that China’s recent actions are driven by considerations of power rather public opinion. This lends even more credibility to the Communist Party’s public statements.
To an extent, the Chinese government has a point. If a foreign warship sailed within twelve nautical miles of US land, even if American claims to that land were questionable, most of the press and politicians of both parties would be outraged. A rough analogy is the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US had nuclear missiles in Turkey at about the same distance from the Soviet Union as Cuba is from Florida, but when Soviet missiles came to Cuba, there was widespread furor in America. Thus, it is questionable whether the FONOP could have been perceived as anything but a provocation.
Yet the FONOP’s true goal (making a statement under international law) was compromised in an attempt to allay Chinese concerns. If it is impossible to avoid provoking China, but the US desires to make a statement, it should do so more vocally and less equivocally. If, to avoid confrontation, the US compromises the legal goals of the FONOP, there is little substantive argument for the FONOP to be carried out at all. This paradox reveals a fundamental problem with US strategy and policy in East Asia – committing to a strategy neither of engagement nor of confrontation is futile because such a strategy will inevitably be interpreted as a strategy of confrontation. The assets necessary for the current “neither here nor there” strategy such as warships, fighter jets, and the like can easily, in China’s view, be repurposed towards a strategy of confrontation and encirclement. President Obama’s “pivot” can be seen in the same light, because while it diplomatic on the one hand, it has significant military aspects.
This is, to a large extent, a manifestation of the Security Dilemma, in which the actions taken by one state for the purposes of strengthening its defense against hypothetical future attacks is interpreted by another state, usually a regional or geopolitical rival, as proactive preparation for future conflict. The security dilemma spurs the rival state to strengthen their defences, beginning a cycle of military upgrades popularly called an arms race. This dynamic unfortunately appears to be at work in East Asia even with defensive weapons, given given China’s vocal opposition to South Korea’s
A test launch of the THAAD missile defense system. (Source: US Army).
The security dilemma is closely related to the Thucydides Trap, a dynamic taking its name from at the end ofBook 1, Chapter 1 of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, stating that the most important cause of war between Athens and Sparta was the rise of Athens’ power relative to that of Sparta, which the Spartans considered to be an existential threat to their citystate. The Thucydides Trap is often referenced in the context of USChina relations. While the Thucydides Trap is an example of the Security Dilemma, they are not exactly the same. The Thucydides Trap refers to relative shifts of the balance of state power, and the Security Dilemma, on the other hand, is usually used to refer to deployment of weapons systems, rather than state power in general. The distinction is precise, but it exists nonetheless.
How, then, can the United States maneuver around the Thucydides Trap? The current “neither-here-nor-there” policy is probably not the best option, given the fact that tensions in the South China Sea continue to rise. A cursory analysis would suggest that America’s options are binary confrontation or conciliation. But this would be oversimplifying the available options. State politics are not binary, there is a wide spectrum of possible actions (hence Clausewitz’s famous “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means”). A committed strategy of confrontation is not optimal, and even if it was, it would be politically impossible. A tack toward conciliation would probably require concessions on too many national security interests to be a viable strategy.
A better strategy would require constant communication with China about not only current developments in the area, but clarifications that US and allied actions are purely defensive in nature, rather than attempts at encirclement. Observers can reasonably conclude that such communication already occurs, but it should be stepped up. US and Chinese leaders should be in contact as close as US and Soviet Leaders were at the height of the Cold War. Many deployments by US allies and partners of defensive systems, such as THAAD, are in direct response to threats other than China (namely North Korea) so their deployment should be explicable to Chinese officials. The only place where a such a strategy of communication would fall short is where US and Chinese interests are in direct and irreconcilable conflict, as they are in the case of Taiwan. However, the status quo established by the Shanghai Communique, in which the United States acknowledged the One-China Policy and stated its support to a peaceful solution to the question of Taiwan’s status, seems to be acceptable to the US and to China, at least over the short to medium term, so barring the unforeseeable, this asymmetry of interests should not be fatal to a strategy of increased communication.
A map showing territorial claims in the South China Sea (Source: VOA News)
While it is probably too late for the Obama administration to make a lasting initiative to rationalize diplomacy in the East Asian Littoral, this makes it all the more necessary for the next administration to have a clear vision, no matter what that administration’s party affiliation happens to be. Its vision must be not only clear, but decisive, because a strategy of both engagement and confrontation is not an effective way of pursuing either. A tack to either direction, but not to either extreme, is necessary. This requires an evaluation of US interests in the region. Of course, regional stability and safety of merchant shipping in the area are vital US national security interests, as is continued reassurance of allies. What all of this entails ought to be the subject of further discussion. More importantly, the US needs to envision and debate the status of other interests in the region, and the cost of achieving or protecting them. A strategy of increased engagement would likely require concessions on some nonvital interests, while a more confrontational strategy would entail significant risk. Either way, the current US policy has limited viability over the long term, and carries with it all the risks, but few of the benefits, of a more purposeful strategy.
David Hervey is an undergraduate in his third year at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. He is studying Political Science and Economics, with research interests including political philosophy, low-intensity conflict, and the Asia-Pacific region.
For a discussion on the South China Sea, Sally DeBoer, our Book Review Editor, brings in CAPT James Fannell (USN, Ret), the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations (N2) for the US Pacific Fleet. During the course of his thirty year career, CAPT Fanell specialized in Indo-Asia Pacific security affairs, with an emphasis on the Chinese navy and its operations. CAPT Fanell is an experienced public speaker noted for his candor and expertise. He is currently a government fellow for the Geneva Center for Security Policy and the author of Red Star Rising.
