Tag Archives: Canada

Capability Analysis, Global Analysis, North America

Preparing for the RCN’s Future: Platform Growth and Naval Vessels

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The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) will begin replacing much of its fleet at the start of the next decade. To ensure that its fleet remains relevant over its thirty-plus years of service life, adequate platform growth potential must be factored into the design process of the new vessels.

The RCN has 15 surface combatants: three elderly Iroquois-class destroyers and 12 Halifax-class anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates. The ships of the former class were all commissioned in 1972 and the first will not be replaced until 2020 at the earliest. The Halifax were commissioned between 1992 and 1996 and the last unit will remain in service until it is replaced in 2033. All replacement dates are based on current estimates and assume no delays – an unlikely assumption given Canada’s procurement practices and the intricacies of systems integration on a new hull – and assume, of course, that there will be no project cancellation. Regardless, even in a best case scenario the last Iroquois will have served for an astonishing forty-eight years, and the last Halifax for thirty-seven years.

How can platform growth be incorporated into the fifteen-ship Single Class Surface Combatant Project? To answer this question it is useful to look at Canada’s most recent naval combatant class, the Halifax-class frigate, for lessons. The Halifax is a highly advanced warship by any standard. It is, however, primed for a single task: anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The mission requirement that determined the design was ASW for the purpose of protecting convoys in the Atlantic Ocean in the event that NATO went to war with the Soviet Union. For that mission it carries an impressive set of sonar and large numbers of anti-submarine munitions

Today the RCN has a very different core mission requirement: expeditionary operations. For this type of mission, the Halifax bow gun is inadequate for naval gunfire support and cannot take advantage of a series of new long-range naval ammunition built for larger guns. This shortcoming is made more acute by the fact that a smaller system cannot simply be replaced by a larger one unless sufficient hull volume has been allocated in the design. A similar shortcoming is its air defense system. The Halifax-class has no vertical launch cell system (VLS). VLS is a launcher system that is built into the deck to allow rapid launch of munitions. Additionally, it makes more efficient use of deck space and the ships’ volume. The Halifax-class cannot be retrofitted with a VLS system as adequate platform growth was not designed to allow for it. Instead, it has two Mark 48 eight-cell launchers that can only launch the RIM-162 Extended Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). As surface-to-air missiles go, this is a short-range system that allows the frigate only to protect itself.

A study of the Halifax-class frigate provides important lessons on why it is important to ‘design in’ platform growth on naval vessels – especially when they will be in service for many unpredictable decades. Perhaps the three-most important platform-growth requirements today are energy generation, deck space and internal volume, and VLS cells. Energy generation is important to ensure that the warship’s sensors, particularly its radar systems, can be replaced with more powerful, energy hungry sensors. Furthermore, it is quite likely that in the future naval vessels will be able to carry various types of direct-energy weapons (such as lasers) to deal with increasingly sophisticated and fast anti-ship weapon systems. To utilize such systems a warship must be able to generate sufficient electrical power.

VLS
A SM-3 anti-ballistic missile is launched from a vertical launch system (VLS) cell. To use this system Canada will have to purchase the longest VLS system.

Deck space, internal volume, and VLS cells are related platform growth priorities. As the example of the Halifax’s naval gun has made clear, if the RCN intends to at least retain the option of arming its vessels with long-range naval guns for littoral operations then it must at least ensure that sufficient deck space and internal volume is ‘designed in.’ Moreover, the flexibility VLS cells provide makes them a priority for all navies today. The American Mark 41 VLS system offers a system that comes in varying numbers of cells and varying cell length/depth. The latter is important as the choice of cell length/depth determines what munitions can be launched from it. For example, should Canada procure a warship with the longest VLS length/cell, and if it hadn’t ‘designed in’ a margin of growth for cell length below deck, then it will be unable to ever fit its vessels with the current crop of anti-ballistic missile defenses and land-attack cruise missiles. This reduces the mission flexibility of a warship class and reduces their effectiveness over their service life. To overcome this, longer VLS cells can be procured or at least factored into the design – ‘designed for but not with.’ In a similar vein, space and volume can be allocated for VLS systems that can be added in the future.

Given past experiences it is likely that Canada’s next-generation of naval surface combatant will serve many decades into the future. Given the increasing importance of littoral/coastal operations, climatic change in the Arctic, and the need to undertake expeditionary operations, it is paramount that any naval vessel be designed with sufficient platform growth in mind. By doing so, the RCN will be able to hedge against an unpredictable fiscal, geopolitical and environmental future.

Shahryar Pasandideh is a third year student studying international relations and Middle Eastern studies at Trinity College, University of Toronto. He is interested in contemporary debates on grand strategy, maritime security, Sino-American and Sino-Indian strategic interaction, and the military balance in the Persian Gulf region.
Disclaimer:

Any views or opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and the news agencies and do not necessarily represent those of the NATO Council of Canada. This article is published for information purposes only and was re-posted with permission from the Atlantic Council of Canada from its original form. 

Strategic Outlook

Arctic: The Final Frontier

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The Arctic environment is changing. These changes can have a major impact on the national security of the nations that border it. New regions of the globe that have never been easily accessible to mankind are now presenting the opportunity to greatly increase economic, political, and military interactions within the Arctic region. Natural resources that have never before been tapped are beginning to be accessible, and shorter and faster routes for shipping of goods and resources are opening.

Uncertainty remains as to the rate and extent of the changing Arctic climate as well as how fast human activity will increase in the area, but what is clear is that both are happening and will continue to happen. History shows that when new global economic opportunities present themselves, the competition for resources and territory can result in conflict. The United States must recognize this and work collaboratively with other nations to develop agreements and understandings within the region. This potential shift in the global geographic and economic picture shows a need for a strategy to meet these security challenges that the United States is currently unprepared and ill-equipped to address.

Does this mean I am going to see you around here more often?
Does this mean I am going to see you around here more often?

Assigning U.S. Northern Command as the single advocate for Arctic capabilities within the DoD in 2011 was a first step in addressing this lack of an Arctic strategy. This is a new region that presents unique problems and opportunities; therefore a tailored approach is necessary for addressing national security concerns while promoting and preserving international stability.

As the United States moves forward as an international partner within the Arctic it is important to continuously remain mindful that there are two sides to this new accessibility to resources. On one side are greater opportunities for international cooperation and strengthening of relationships with current and new partner nations. On the other side there is now an increased potential for dispute and conflict centered on claims to resources and territory. Disagreements among Arctic nations can have a destabilizing effect on the region, so promoting stability in accordance with international laws and norms is within the strategic interests of the United States.

The free navigation through international seas and straits for all peaceful nations continues to be a core aspect of U.S. maritime strategy. This policy should be no different within the changing environment of the Arctic. New sea-lanes are emerging that have the potential to greatly reduce shipping distances and help promote economic growth for all nations. These new sea-lanes are international straits within global commons and the United States must remain within a position to protect these sea-lines as they continue to evolve.

Hey Evgeni, I'll race you from Severomorsk to Vladivastok.
Hey Evgeni, I’ll race you from Severomorsk to Vladivastok.

The Arctic will continue to take on greater economic importance and as a result requires a comprehensive strategy that includes enhancements in our strategic capabilities. Current capabilities in the region – both in terms of technology and force structure – were developed without the Arctic playing much of a role in global matters. The United States is currently facing a great challenge, which if approached and managed properly can in fact be a great opportunity.

The United States is one of a very few nations that directly borders the Arctic. This means that the security of the Arctic is a strategic area directly related to the security of the United States. With the impression of more significant and immediate threats driving greater levels of attention to other areas of responsibility, such as the Middle-East or the Asia-Pacific region, it is only natural overlook, even unintentionally, other areas impacting national security like the Arctic. At the national level, the United States must determine the appropriate security framework to effectively evaluate all emerging security concerns within the region. This framework should utilize the unmatched capabilities and capacities of the military to ensure the United States is in a position to support cooperation among other friendly nations in the region.

Even with a strategy emphasizing the importance of the Arctic region on the global stage, the United States currently lacks the capabilities necessary to ensure it continues to play a leadership role in international affairs in the region. The most directly applicable capabilities would be maritime domain awareness (MDA), search and rescue (SAR), maritime interdiction, humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR), and air and missile defense (AMD). These capabilities must fuse with key cooperative partnerships with inter-agency as well as other friendly Arctic nations. This primary goal should be to ensure safety, security, and stability within the region. The right capabilities coupled with support from partners and fused together with effective communications will continue to convey that the United States plays an active and positive role within the Arctic and will continue to for the foreseeable future.

Acquisition decisions will be made to address the core mission areas within the Arctic. Vital to enabling any of these capabilities is the acquisition and proper maintenance of icebreakers to enable operations within the region today. Current capability levels do not even begin to adequately ensure safe and continued operations within the Arctic. A more robust icebreaker capacity and capability is essential to maintaining national presence within the region, enabling military operations, and thus preserving national and economic interests. The United States is significantly behind the icebreaking capabilities of other Arctic nations and this is a gap which must be filled to remain competitive in the region.

Part of the responsibility inherent with assuming a leadership role on the international stage is not only having the capability to respond to conflict if the need arises, but to also have the capability to extend a helping hand if necessary. Even with the changing climate, the Arctic is still an inhospitable place which can be more prone to accidents at sea, which can be more dangerous than in other areas of the world. These simple facts necessitate the United States’ possession of a capable SAR capability in the Arctic.

Current SAR capabilities are based on significantly lower levels of human activity in the region. As shipping, fishing, and drilling activities increase, available SAR capabilities will continue to fall further behind the needs. In more hospitable climates, response times of hours or even days may be acceptable. In the Arctic this is not the case. It is vital to credibility within the region that the United States enhances SAR capabilities through evaluating operating base locations and procurement of specialized equipment to include the navigation and communication infrastructure to make them a credible capability.

As the Arctic climate evolves faster than other more environmentally stable regions, it is even more important to continuously reevaluate posture and capabilities to prevent being caught off guard. Every effort is necessary to be ready in the Arctic at any time.

LT Jason H. Chuma is a U.S. Navy submarine officer who has deployed to the U.S. 4th Fleet and U.S. 6th Fleet areas of responsibility. He is a graduate of the Citadel, holds a master’s degree from Old Dominion University, and has completed the Intermediate Command and Staff Course from the U.S. Naval War College. His current assignment is to the Navy Warfare Development Command where he serves as a member of the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell. He can be followed on Twitter @Jason_Chuma

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Strategic Outlook

Notes From the North: Canada and Russia Bolster their Arctic Ambitions

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With a cold chill blowing through DC, it seems fitting to note several recent Arctic developments.

Canada on Friday submitted a claim to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that argues for an increased maritime share beyond its Exclusive Economic Zone of the (mostly) North Atlantic and Arctic, which would grant it rights to the resources contained therein on the seabed and is based on the nation’s view of the proper demarcation of the undersea continental shelves. Russia and Denmark are both expected to file overlapping claims with the commission.

Claims
Current and expected claims beyond nations’ EEZs.

While Friday was the “official” deadline for Canada, as it was 10 years after the nation signed the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), officials have said it will submit additional claims. Any such claims could extend to the North Pole once on-going scientific surveys have been completed to back the nation’s position (by treaty no country can claim sovereignty over the North Pole itself). Russia filed in 2001, although it was subsequently been told it needs further scientific backing and officials have stated they face “no real deadline” to finalize their claims, which included the undersea Lomonosov Ridge, running from the East Siberian coast along the North Pole to Canada’s Ellesmere Island, thus creating the potential for conflict if the next set of Canadian claims includes the Lomonosov Ridge. Denmark’s claims, based on its possession of Greenland, are due in 2014, and could likewise overlap with Canada’s. Norway has already had its non-contentious filings validated. The United States, meanwhile as a non-signatory to UNCLOS, is ineligible to submit claims to the Commission but has sought to bilaterally negotiate its claims according to UNCLOS principles, notably with Canada.

For those countries that have submitted, the Commission is expected to take as long as 5 years to process and scientifically validate the filings (actual arbitration is still up to the countries involved), and the the further north the claims, the less they have to do with resource exploitation. As reported by the AP, Michael Byers, “an expert on Arctic and international law at the University of British Columbia” said,

“We’re talking about the center of a large, inhospitable ocean that is in total darkness for three months each year, thousands of miles from any port,” he said. “The water in the North Pole is 12,000 feet (3,650 meters) deep and will always be covered by sea ice in the winter. It’s not a place where anyone is going to be drilling for oil and gas…So it’s not about economic stakes, it’s about domestic politics.” 

As anticipated, Russia, which has spent the year signaling its intent to bolster its Arctic naval forces, responded to Canada’s filings with more of the same. Our comrade at RussianNavyBlog noted on Monday the announcement of the formal incorporation of the Russian Navy’s Arctic Group of Forces in 2014 and basing arrangements and refurbishments:

Russia plants flag at North Pole, no sign of Santa or Buddy the Elf.
Russia plants flag at North Pole in 2007. No sign of Santa or Buddy the Elf.

The BBC says that on Tuesday during a high-level meeting of Russian military leadership Putin commended the reopening of a previously closed high-Arctic airfield and reiterated the need to prioritize the Arctic, with a correspondent emphasizing that “this was one of his most direct orders yet.” The practical implications of the Arctic Group remains to be seen, and armed conflict is unlikely with announcements on both sides, as noted above mostly playing to domestic audiences. On the other hand, projections of increased shipping traffic and commercial activity in the north got a boost from the U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Navy this week when findings of a joint research project predicted ice-free summers by 2016, decades earlier than most (but not all) conventional models have estimated (see here for the official U.S. Navy timeline to ice-free transit). If true, the rush to solidify coast guard and national security functions near Santa’s Workshop may prove warranted. The Arctic remains a region to keep an eye on.

LT Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founding director of the Center for International Maritime Security and holds a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy. 
Strategic Outlook

Cast Adrift: Canada’s Maritime Strategy

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This article is a part of The Hunt for Strategic September, a week of analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies). As part of the week we have encouraged our friendly international contributors to provide some perspective on their national and alliance strategic guidance issues.

As the United States undertakes a rigorous review of its strategic guidance, Canadian defence planners should take note. An update is expected for an important element of American maritime strategy, Cooperative Seapower for the 21st Century, which calls for operations to be carried out ‘ideally’ in concert with allies. The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), to be issued next year, will assess the threats and challenges faced by the United States and set out long-term plans on how to develop American capabilities accordingly.

LeadmarkIn contrast, Canada lacks an equivalent to the QDR, with any strategic review conducted on an ad hoc basis. In 2001, a weighty tome was published by Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND), entitled Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020. As this was developed and released prior to the September 11th attacks and such operations as Active Endeavour, an update came in 2005, entitled Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark. Since then, no further updates to Canada’s maritime strategy have been released. In 2008, DND released the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), but this is primarily concerned with funding and procurement issues for the Canadian Forces as a whole. The CFDS is already badly dated; where it does briefly outline the Canadian Forces’ strategic objectives, it identifies security for the 2010 Winter Olympics as a top priority.

Canada could benefit greatly from an equivalent process to the QDR. One of the objectives of such a review should be to determine whether the Royal Canadian Navy is still in strategic lockstep with its allies. If a significant gap in capabilities and/or priorities is found, an update on the scale of Leadmark 2.0 may be necessary in order to ensure Canada is capable of upholding its commitments to its allies. There is some cause for concern as to whether Canada is already falling behind, making the need for a defence review all the more urgent.

In 2011, as a follow-up to the CFDS, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) was released. While some of the particulars are hazy, the NSPS is intended to modernize the Royal Canadian Navy, replacing many vessels that have been operating well past their intended date of retirement. For example, the Joint Support Ship Project will see Canada’s two Protecteur-class auxiliary vessels replaced with three Berlin-class replenishment ships. However, perhaps the most ambitious aspect of the NSPS is the Single Class Surface Combatant Project, which calls for the replacement of Canada’s 12 Halifax-class frigates and three Iroquois-class destroyers with 15 vessels of as yet unknown capabilities or classification. However, there are strong indications that these new vessels will be similar in many respects to the current Halifax-class frigate.

As some observers have noted, the United States Navy has placed greater attention in recent years on the littoral zone. Meanwhile, Canada remains focused on a traditional naval task force role, lacking sealift capabilities or any means of reliably deploying in littoral waters. If the Littoral Combat Ship is the shape of things to come, Canada’s expected frigates (or at least frigate-like vessels) may not be fully compatible. Though the Royal Canadian Navy will remain useful for maritime interdiction and generally supporting the United States in ensuring continental defence, Canada may find itself largely ignored by American strategists in favour of other, more compatible allies. Had DND undertaken reviews similar to the QDR, some course correction could have been made to Leadmark, its successor, and the subsequent NSPS. One can only hope that the Single Class Surface Combatant once unveiled will prove to be something capable of participating actively alongside US and NATO maritime forces.

Even so, calls for an update to Canadian strategic guidance have been limited. In analyzing Canadian public opinion, the original Leadmark laments, “some Canadians are unaware of their navy, and do not understand where ‘naval’ fits into a ‘national’ strategy.” 12 years later, one may wonder whether parliamentarians have also forgotten their navy, hoping that haphazard fleet-replacement will be a sufficient remedy.

Paul Pryce is a Junior Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia, he has previously worked in conflict resolution as a Research Fellow with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. His research interests include African security issues and NATO-Russia relations.