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Russia-Ukraine War

A Russian Lake: Has the West Ceded the Black Sea to Russia?

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By Charles P. (Chuck) Ridgway, Jr.

In 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called the Black Sea a “Russian Lake” and encouraged NATO to do more to counter Russia’s efforts to exert control over it.1 Never was that control shown to be more complete than last August, when the Russian Federation Navy stopped and boarded Palau-flagged freighter Şükrü Okan in the southwest portion of the Black Sea, about as far from the Russian coast as you can get, delaying its journey and menacing its crew at gunpoint before determining that it was not carrying contraband and allowing it to proceed. This incident may be seen as the canary in the coalmine indicating imminent suffocation of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea.

The Need for Sea Control

Much has been made of Ukraine’s successful and impressive efforts at sea denial, forcing the Russian Black Sea Fleet to stay well out of coastal missile range and even destroying major units in their homeports as well as at sea. But in what is quite obviously a largely maritime war,2 Russia appears to be achieving its strategic aims despite these tactical setbacks. The Sea of Azov is completely controlled by Russia and a look at MarineTraffic shows that few vessels dare come within 100 nm of Odessa. While the boarding cannot be said to have taken place as part of a blockade, since Russia has not formally declared a blockade, only issued various warning areas3 and vague threats about targeting ships across the Black Sea,4 and is not attempting to enforce a blockade in the manner prescribed by international law, it is telling that the boarding took place where it did, putting the world on notice that ships anywhere in the Black Sea even vaguely suspected of heading towards Ukraine may be boarded, and possibly seized or sunk. While at the same time, President Putin protests when a US warship calls at Istanbul.5 For all intents and purposes, there exists a de facto long-distance blockade, for no other word adequately describes what Russia is doing in the Black Sea. This blockade’s legality may be questionable at best,6 but its effectiveness cannot be doubted. NATO nations, as well as the rest of the world interested in freedom of navigation—including, seemingly, Palau—are doing little to challenge this situation, effectively ceding the maritime domain of the Black Sea to Russia’s bullying and bluster. It seems the Black Sea has indeed become a Russian lake.

The international law of naval warfare covering belligerent interference with merchant shipping, such as blockades and the prevention of the carrying of war contraband, has always represented a compromise between the objectives of the belligerent and the harm neutrals are willing to absorb in losing a certain amount of freedom of navigation.7 The US Military Academy’s Lieber Institute for Law and Warfare has pointed out that the boarding of the Şükrü Okan was legal under “Belligerent Right of Visit and Search.”8 On the other hand, Russia is a signatory to UNCLOS and there are no circumstances permitted by UNCLOS where this boarding could be said to fall under the right of visit of warships. In boarding Şükrü Okan, the Russian navy clearly violated the terms of UNLCOS to which it is bound.

Admittedly, UNLCOS does not address any aspect of naval conflict. But can interference with freedom of the seas be considered legal when the war under which the boarding was conducted is both undeclared and itself illegal? Does UNCLOS cease to apply because one signatory decides to lay mines or stop by force another country’s merchant ships? Are neutral nations willing to accept that UNCLOS can be suspended unilaterally and without formal warning? Most countries, especially those that adhere to the principle of Qualified Neutrality,9 should tend to think not. If the world stands by and does nothing, then Russia’s actions become the new status quo, UNCLOS loses much of its meaning, and the Black Sea—along with any other maritime region where the world persistently acquiesces in the face of aggression—risks losing its status as an international body of water.

With the collapse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative last summer, Ukraine created the “Ukraine Humanitarian Grain Corridor” by which ships transit through the territorial waters of Bulgaria and Romania, and mainly use Ukrainian ports on the Danube to load grain. The corridor has allowed a certain number of ships to carry grain out of the Black Sea over the past few months,10 though questions remain about the sustainability of insurance costs, especially after a Liberian-flagged vessel was hit by a Russian missile in Odessa on November 9, 2023.11

Grain shipping routes in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion. (Graphic via BBC, based on United Nations data)

While Ukraine’s national bank has recently brokered a deal through Lloyd’s of London and other insurers to cut costs12 and many are calling the corridor successful, reports indicate that the grain exported is just a fraction of pre-war quantities: 700,000 tons from August to the end of October versus around 6 million tons a month before the Russian invasion.13 By December, a total of 200 ships had used the corridor carrying an estimated 5 millions tons of agricultural product14 — still well short of prewar levels. From a more strategic viewpoint, the fact remains that in order to export even this amount of grain, merchant ships must hug NATO nations’ coasts, reinforcing the point that the international waters of this part of the Black Sea are not open to shipping. If the shipping industry is unwilling to use the international route, can it still be considered international?

This situation brings up two interesting and related questions: What can be learned from this? And, what can be done about it?

Some Notable Lessons

The first thing that becomes apparent is that sea denial is insufficient when a country depends on open sea-lanes for its basic economic livelihood. While nearly all nations are dependent on the sea for their economic wellbeing, Ukraine’s dependence is stronger than most. A significant portion of its economy rides on its ability to export its grain. And the only efficient, indeed feasible, way to export the majority of it is by ocean-going cargo vessels transiting the Black Sea.

Ukraine’s sea denial efforts offer no help in escorting these vessels or otherwise reducing the perceived risk and, in some ways have enhanced it. Pushing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of the immediate environs of the Ukrainian coast has had the odd effect of causing Russia’s blockade to expand from a close blockade to one that covers essentially the entire Black Sea minus the territorial waters of the three NATO nations there. And laying defensive mines might have prevented a Russian amphibious assault on Odessa, but has added to the perceived risk to shipping while also allowing political cover for Russia to lay its own mines.

Second, a flag of convenience is no more than that: convenient, until it no longer is. After the Şükrü Okan incident in August, Türkiye waited several days before issuing a warning to Moscow about the boarding of the Turkish-owned and operated ship, with President Erdoğan stating that it was a matter for the flag state.15 An important duty of a flag state is to provide security to vessels on its registry and represent vessel owners’ interests in freedom of the seas on the international stage. Except for a few brief and very localized exceptions, this has not been an important consideration since the end of World War II, though Houthi actions in the southern Red Sea seem to be changing this calculus. None of the world’s leading flag states of convenience—not Liberia, Panama, Marshall Islands, or even Malta—are in much of a position to actively defend their merchant vessels, or even to apply any meaningful diplomatic pressure on a state aggressor as Russia has become in the Black Sea. It is not likely that President Putin will bat an eye at a protest filed by Palau in either the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or UN General Assembly. It is equally unlikely that the Russian Federation Navy would have chosen to board a ship flagged to a NATO member nation or, say, China at this stage of the conflict. Since vessel owners and operators, like the Turkish owners of the Şükrü Okan, cannot count on the support of their own governments when they choose a flag of convenience, it will be interesting to see if they, as the conflict at sea continues, or even expands, reconsider their choice of flag, perhaps preferring one with the naval and diplomatic might to protect their ships.

Third, a blockade no longer requires “effective enforcement”16 to be effective. Apparently, a single boarding, in which the boarded vessel was allowed to proceed, coupled with a few floating mines, is enough to warn off other neutral ships from heading to Ukraine, thereby allowing Russia’s “distant blockade” to expand across the entire Black Sea even while much of the Black Sea Fleet is now holed up in Novorossiysk. It may be a “paper blockade” but that seems to be enough in this conflict.

Fourth, the reason such limited means can produce so effective a blockade is that insurance considerations drive risk assessments in shipping. This is especially true in the Black Sea. Increased war risk premiums during the heyday of Somali piracy did not greatly affect traffic through the Gulf of Aden for a variety of reasons, mainly that relatively few ships of the total traffic through the area were actually attacked and there was no economically alternative route. Instead, the shipping industry and the international community adapted their behavior to increase security and deter attacks. During World War II, though merchant crews obviously faced great physical risk, governments assumed almost all the financial risk for ship and cargo loss (many of the ships and most of the cargo being government owned). The calculus appears to be different in the Black Sea: shipping grain does not offer a profit substantial enough to offset the war risk costs, maritime trade union concerns, and potential losses to either seizure or sinking. Merchant ship operators will begin carrying large quantities of Ukrainian grain when it again becomes profitable.

April 10, 2023 – Bulk carrier ARGO I docked at the grain terminal of the port of Odessa, Ukraine. (Photo via Bo Amstrup/AFP/Ritzau Scanpix)

Finally, the key to pushing Russian control of the Black Sea back towards the Russian coast lies with Türkiye. In the first place, Türkiye is a naval power in its own right and, should it come to it, is fully capable of taking on the Russian Black Sea fleet on more than equal terms. The Turkish fleet is in the best position to reassert control over, at the very least, the southern Black Sea including, for lack of a better demarcation, Türkiye’s EEZ17, and it is Türkiye, as a maritime nation, that has the greatest direct interest in doing so. Second, Türkiye’s control of the entrance to the Black Sea makes it the most important partner for those nations who wish to increase non-Black Sea naval presence there. In recognizing this, one must also recognize that the Montreux Convention, as it currently stands, serves Türkiye’s interests and Türkiye is unlikely to want to renegotiate it: any actions by non-Black Sea states will have to be in accordance with Montreux. Third, Türkiye, more than any other NATO Nation, has both working diplomatic relationships and economic ties (such as TURKSTREAM) with Russia that could allow for useful dialog with respect to Black Sea maritime control but which could also complicate such dialog.

The Way Ahead

Is there anything to be done about this situation? A variety of suggestions have been made, from establishing convoys of merchants ships through the blockade—and mine-infested—zone escorted by NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, to getting Russia to end the conflict. The former suggestion was soundly refuted by RUSI18 on the grounds that the economic/insurance considerations, the Montreux convention, and the nature of the current threat would make such escort impracticable to maintain and not very effective; the latter is clearly a pipedream—until Russia is ready to end the conflict, whether because Russia has achieved all its aims or because it has been defeated, the conflict will go on. So the question really becomes, what constraints is the rest of the world willing to accept on freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and what can they do to push back against the ones they don’t accept.

Here are some practical suggestions, arranged more or less from least to most provocative to Russia, and thereby in order of what would take the most backbone to implement.

First, improve maritime domain awareness (MDA) of the region. A September symposium in Greece highlighted the deficiencies in Black Sea MDA.19 While it is highly probable that no Russian surface ship or submarine of the Baltic fleet gets underway without being actively tracked by one or more NATO nations, and the same is likely true in most cases for the Northern fleet, this probably cannot be said for Black Sea assets. When a Black Sea Fleet Kilo-class submarine leaves Sevastopol and submerges, it is most likely immediately lost to sight until it returns. Improved MDA would allow for greater analysis of trends and recognition of changes in the situation sooner, such as new threats (recently laid mines) or evolution of broader diplomatic conditions (e.g. identifying what changed to make Russia no longer want to participate in the grain deal). It would also allow for better enforcement of sanctions on Russian oil, tracking of individuals of interest, and detection of Russian gray zone maritime operations.

Second, maritime air patrol should be enhanced. There is a significant shortfall of MPA assets and actual patrols over the Black Sea. Of the NATO Black Sea nations, only Türkiye has an MPA component. NATO AWACS aircraft have been reported operating over Poland along the Ukrainian border but not over the Black Sea. There is also reporting that US MPA aircraft are conducting missions over the Black Sea, but it is not clear with whom the information gathered is being shared.20 More MPA coverage would contribute to freedom of navigation, enhanced MDA, intelligence collection, and order of battle development.

Third, governments interested in supporting Ukraine’s ability to export grain should subsidize war risk costs. While subsidies to shipping to offset increased insurance and other war risk costs would not reduce the physical risk to crews or ships, they could make the carrying of Ukrainian grain more attractive. With the end of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Ukraine began offering subsidies for this purpose but it remains to be seen if this, combined with the new Lloyd’s deal, will be enough to offset costs adequately or if it will be financially sustainable for Ukraine or the insurers over the long term.21

Fourth, ship owners should consider reflagging their grain ships to registries that can offer naval protection and diplomatic gravitas. Palau, like Liberia or Panama, may not be in a position to impede Russian interference with ships of their registry, but all NATO nations are. Russia would need to be willing to risk significant escalation if it wanted to board, say, a German-flagged bulk carrier 30 miles out from the Istanbul Straight. It is not necessary to escort merchant ships—and probably not particularly effective as long as the main threat remains mines22—when the flag carries the weight of Article V with it. It may even be worth considering employing (appropriately-flagged) government-owned ships in the trade, which could also contribute to avoiding war risk costs.

Ship operators should harden merchant ships to prevent boardings. The world’s maritime polity learned a great deal about preventing boardings during the days of Somali piracy and many of the steps developed under “Best Management Practices”23 would serve equally well in repelling unwanted boardings in the Black Sea. Shipping operators or flag states may even wish to embark security teams, generally considered the most effective means at preventing piracy attacks. It is highly unlikely ship owners would choose to do this, but the possibility that a boarding could be opposed would force Russia to determine how far they want to go the next time they attempt a boarding. Is the Russian Navy really willing to sink a neutral flagged merchant ship with naval gunfire?

Navies should be conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the Black Sea. Neutral nation warships, and especially NATO Nation warships, whether under NATO or national operational control, should be operating and patrolling in all the international waters of the Black Sea. There is no legal or diplomatic reason why a group of neutral frigates should not be conducting routine exercises 20 nautical miles off Novorossiysk or shadowing every Russian Federation Navy ship that leaves Russian territorial waters. While the three Black Sea NATO nations are fully capable of this,24 the diplomatic effect would be greater if there were non-Black Sea-based ships involved, even if just a token and occasional involvement. Diplomatic work with Türkiye should focus on allowing non-belligerent warships into the Black Sea in accordance with Montreux for this purpose. FONOPS is a much better use of surface assets than convoy escort given current conditions in the Black Sea. Aircraft can do FONOPS too.

And, obviously something will need to be done about mines. The recent agreement among the Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye to create a mine-countermeasures task group is welcome news on this front.25

Many would argue that these steps are provocative and risk escalating the conflict in Ukraine.26 No one wants a World War III, but the simple fact is that it is up to Russia whether or not to start one by firing on NATO warships, or NATO nation-flagged merchant vessels. Excessive worry about provocation should not hinder warships of neutral or non-belligerent nations from operating wherever in international waters their governments should wish or from ensuring the free flow of goods to the world’s markets in accordance with established international law. Operating in international waters is no more an act of aggression than it is to walk down a dangerous alley at night ready for the worst. Such operations may well complicate operational freedom of movement and rules of engagement for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, for surely they wish to avoid unintended escalation as well, but not conducting them simply makes it excessively easy for Russia not to have to account for such possibilities in planning and executing its naval operations. And there is no reason to make it easy for Russia—especially when doing so cedes effective control over this important maritime space and hurts the world’s economy.

But principle is an even stronger argument for wresting back maritime dominance in the Black Sea from Russia: the principle of freedom of the seas, of the free flow of goods, and of the schoolyard principle that a bully shouldn’t be allowed to get away with it. And, of course, the principle of sea power. Every violation of UNCLOS, every loss of international access to any body of water, every impediment by force of arms to free trade hurts the sovereignty of other nations and chips away at the post-war international order that benefits the free countries of the world. The reason navies exist is to keep the seas open for the benefit of their citizens, but navies have to be willing to go into harm’s way to do so. For all of history, from the Peloponnesian War, through both world wars, to the Falklands conflict, war has been decided by sea power. The Ukraine War is no different. Russia appears to recognize this. Will the rest of the world?

Chuck Ridgway is a retired US Navy surface warfare and reserve Africa foreign area officer. After leaving active duty, he worked for ten years as a NATO international civilian at the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal. Since then he has consulted with a variety of organizations, including One Earth Future Foundation’s Oceans Beyond Piracy and Stable Seas programs, the United Nation Office of Drugs and Crime’s Global Maritime Crime Program, and the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Institute for Security Governance. A native of Colorado, he lives in Denver. This is his first piece for CIMSEC.

References

1. https://eurasianet.org/erdogan-plea-nato-says-black-sea-has-become-russian-lake

2. Midrats Podcast, Episode 662: Grain, Oil and the Unfreeing of the Seas, 23 July 2023

3. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217835.htm

4. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1145965/Russia-warns-that-ships-heading-to-Ukraine-are-now-a-military-target

5. https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2023-08-21/black-sea-russia-ukraine-turkey-us-navy-11114380.html

6. See Fraunces, M. G. (1992). The International Law of Blockade: New Guiding Principles in Contemporary State Practice. The Yale Law Journal, 101(4), 893–918, and https://lieber.westpoint.edu/russia-ukraine-war-naval-blockades-visit-search-targeting-war-sustaining-objects/ for discussions of the legal principles of modern blockades and an interpretation of Russia’s blockade of Ukraine.

7. It is debatable if NATO Nations can be considered strictly neutral in the Ukraine conflict, given that nearly all of them are providing war material to one of the belligerents.

8. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/russia-ukraine-war-naval-blockades-visit-search-targeting-war-sustaining-objects/

9. Commander’s Handbook on the Law of the Sea, § 7.2.1 (https://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=66281931)

10. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-alternative-black-sea-export-corridor-is-working-despite-attack-2023-11-09/

11. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-freighter-odesa-9f87d96cc6064094463fd2ecb0828b36

12. https://www.reuters.com/business/marsh-lloyds-launch-ukraine-war-risk-ship-insurance-cut-grain-costs-2023-11-15/

13. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-26/ukraine-suspends-new-black-sea-grain-corridor-due-to-threat-from-russian-warplanes-consultancy

14. https://maritime-executive.com/article/ukraine-marks-shipping-milestone-as-imo-pledges-more-assistance

15. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2356936/middle-east and https://turkishminute.com/2023/08/18/analysis-putin-navigated-dangerous-water-test-turkey-red-line/

16. Fraunces, M. G. (1992), page 897.

17. https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/RUS-TUR1987EZ.PDF

18. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-can-nato-overcome-russias-black-sea-blockade

19. https://geetha.mil.gr/diexagogi-synedrioy-maritime-domain-awareness-in-the-black-sea-sto-kenap-nmiotc/

20. US Navy P-8As are evidently “providing security” to vessels using the Ukraine Grain Corridor (https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/ukraine-conflict/1690835345-ship-sailing-from-israel-becomes-the-first-to-break-russia-s-grain-blockade) and there is reporting that they have also provided targeting information to Ukrainian forces (https://news.usni.org/2022/05/05/warship-moskva-was-blind-to-ukrainian-missile-attack-analysis-shows)

21. UATV Report: “Russia’s Grain Manipulations Failed: Ukraine’s Grain Corridor Resumed Operating Despite Threat”; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLY9-k96CuU

22. If Kalibr missiles start flying into the sides of merchant ships at sea, the need for escorts obviously changes, as would many other aspects of this conflict.

23. https://www.ics-shipping.org/publication/bmp5/#:~:text=Piracy%2Dspecific%20Best%20Management%20Practice,and%20other%20maritime%20security%20threats.

24. Information on where the Turkish Navy operates, in what strength, and if these patrols contribute to NATO-wide MDA, intelligence collection or deterrence is not publicly available.

25. https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/seeminen-schwarzes-meer-100.html

26. Some, but not all, of these steps may be included in the U.S. State Department’s work on a Black Sea security strategy. For example, in testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, James O’Brien, U.S. Assistant Secretary, European and Eurasian Affairs, stated that enhanced maritime air patrol had not been considered (https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-department-of-states-strategy-for-security-in-the-black-sea-region). Publicly available information on this strategy and other efforts directed by the Black Sea Security Act (2024 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act § 1247) is still too vague to allow speculation on what specific actions could be taken.

Capability Analysis, Europe

Should the U.S. Arm Ukraine with Anti-Ship Missiles?

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By Mykola Bielieskov

When it comes to U.S. military-technical assistance for Ukraine in the context of Russian aggression, sharing the Javelin anti-tank guided missile with the Ukrainian Ground Forces is what is typically mentioned. And at the beginning of March 2018 the U.S. State Department gave its approval for the provision of this kind of weaponry to Kyiv. There is nothing surprising in this, since the land forces of Ukraine bear the main burden of confronting and deterring further Russian aggression. However, today it is necessary to start talking about the needs of the other branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine given the challenges facing them.

A Navy Adrift

The situation in the Ukrainian Navy is close to a catastrophic one. The Russian Federation’s occupation of the Crimea in 2014 especially negatively affected the fighting capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy as nearly 80 percent of the fleet was lost due to capture and defection. In fact, four corvettes (Lutsk, Khmelnitsky, Ternopil, Prydniprov’ia), two minesweepers (Chernigiv, Cherkasy), the large landing ship Konstantin Olshansky, and the submarine Zaporozhye were captured by Russian forces. In addition, Russian occupants captured and never returned up to 15 auxiliary vessels.

The urgent need for platforms in the Ukrainian Navy could be solved by Western country transfers to Kyiv of older ships, which are decommissioned or near retirement. Actually, from time-to-time this idea is voiced by certain American experts. The U.S. government, among other things, is ready to provide the Ukrainian Navy with two coastal guards ships of the Island class. They, in contrast to Ukrainian artillery boats of the Gyurza-M class, have better seaworthiness and greater autonomy. However, the simple transfer of platforms can only partly solve the problems the Ukrainian Navy faces today. Getting Western ships can solve the problem with minesweepers or auxiliary vessels. However, the main question remains unaddressed: how could the Ukrainian Navy counter attempts by the Russian Federation to use its domination of the Black Sea for further aggression?

As the result of Russian aggression Ukraine lost in Crimea ground-based anti-ship platforms, which were armed with Termit anti-ship cruise missiles. Similarly, after the Crimea occupation, the missile boat Pryluky was returned to Ukrainian authorities but lacked its two Termit anti-ship missiles.

Today the Ukrainian Navy is not able to properly counteract possible attempts by the Russian Black Sea Fleet to carry out an amphibious landing operation. In this contest it is necessary to recall that in 2014-2015 the Security Service of Ukraine exposed and broke down covert attempts to create the so-called secessionist Bessarabian People’s Republic. This fictional republic was going to be based on territories of a southern part of the Odessa oblast. In the event of the establishment of this illicit territory, the Russian Black Sea Fleet would have had the opportunity to freely land the necessary troops and to maintain sea lines of communication with a new pseudo-state bordering western Ukraine along with occupied Crimea. Ukraine in this case could not have prevented such contingencies, since the Navy does not have the necessary anti-ship capabilities to destroy combat and landing enemy vessels.

Although Ukraine is developing its own anti-ship cruise missile Neptune, the first public test of which took place in late January 2018, the system is still nascent. The relevant sea-based risks and threats for Ukraine still exist. In addition, the question is how many Neptune missiles Ukraine will be able to purchase annually for their Navy, given that the entire budget for modernization and procurement of equipment is only $600 million this fiscal year.

As a result, it is urgently necessary to start a dialogue on the possibility of transfer to Ukraine of American Harpoon anti-ship missiles with the necessary equipment for guidance and data exchange systems. The U.S. military budget for 2018 FY provides for the allocation of up to $200 million to enhance Ukraine’s defense capabilities, including the possibility of using these funds for purchase of coastal defense radars, minelayers, minesweepers, and littoral ships. This document captures a change in the paradigm of thinking and awareness in the Pentagon of Ukraine’s vulnerability to threats from the sea. However, as has been said above, only vessels or even radar systems will not be enough to remedy the shortfall.

The U.S. Navy is currently developing new generations of anti-ship missiles (LRASM, Tomahawk, and SM-6 anti-ship variants) that have much longer range than the current Harpoon anti-ship missile. However, in the context of a closed sea like the Black Sea, it will be enough for Ukrainian Navy to deploy the latest modification of the Harpoon missile – the Block II ER+. The radius of this modification is up to 134 nautical miles or 250 km. It is notable that the Ukrainian anti-ship missile “Neptune” will have a similar range. It is also indicative that Finland is considering the Harpoon Block II ER + as the main weapon for the future four frigates of the 2020 project, which will operate in the similarly constrained Baltic Sea.

An F/A-18 carries the new Harpoon Block II+ missile during a free flight test Nov. 18 at Point Mugu’s Sea Range in California. The Navy plans to deliver the Block II+ variant to the fleet in 2017. (U.S. Navy photo)

The transfer to Ukraine of Harpoon Block II ER+ anti-ship cruise missiles and related equipment, together with their installation on future fleet and land-based anti-ship platforms, will not only eliminate significant gaps in the country’s defense capabilities. It will also help secure the safety of maritime trade, on which the economy of Ukraine depends critically. This decision will allow the United States to solve several important security issues in the Black Sea region at once. All this happens when the U.S. Navy has the smallest number of ships in almost a century (283 ships), and it faces the need for a permanent presence in numerous parts across the world’s oceans, including the Black Sea Basin. Strengthening the capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy will reduce the need for such presence. In addition, strengthening the anti-ship component of the Ukrainian armed forces will make its Navy a truly important component in any joint NATO Black Sea Fleet, an idea which has been discussed for several years. Today, the Ukrainian Navy cannot actually be an effective contributor to the joint efforts of the littoral states to contain the Russian Federation in the Black Sea basin. Ultimately, the presence of Harpoon Block II ER+ missiles together with the necessary radars and information exchange systems with other NATO countries will enable, in practice, to enhance the interoperability of the Ukrainian armed forces with NATO partners. In this way, it will contribute to the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and the fulfillment of the tasks of the Strategic Defense Bulletin.

Conclusion

Ukraine today, given the need of countering threats from the sea, is in a situation where the need for U.S. anti-ship missiles is much more important than obtaining Javelin ATGMs. The U.S. Defense Department’s budget for 2018 FY records the understanding that Washington should help Ukraine counteract not only land-based but also maritime threats that are actually much sharper, given the current state of the Ukrainian Navy. However, only the acquisition of appropriate anti-ship missiles such as the Harpoon Block II ER+ will enable the Ukrainian Navy to effectively counter the growing capabilities of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea. Such a bold decision will strengthen security in this part of the world, reduce the need for the United States to be constantly present, and make Ukraine a true contributor to Black Sea security.

Mykola Bielieskov is the Deputy Executive Director at the Institute of World Policy.

Featured Image: Day of the Ukranian Navy Ceremony, July 2016. (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine)

Capability Analysis, Europe

The Role of the Black Sea in Russia’s Strategic Calculus

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European Maritime Security Topic Week

By Byron Chong    

Introduction

As one of his last acts of 2015, on December 31st, Russian President Vladimir Putin formally approved his country’s new national security strategy. The content of the updated document reflected the sharp deterioration in Russia’s relationship with the West after the Ukraine crisis – it accused the U.S. and its allies of trying to dominate global affairs and described NATO expansion as a major security threat.1 When this document is analyzed together with Russia’s Military Doctrine issued the previous year, on December 25th, 2014, they provide valuable insight into understanding the Kremlin’s strategic concerns and long-term objectives. Both documents describe a country threatened by NATO’s encroachment towards its borders and its loss of influence over the ex-Soviet states on its periphery. They focus on the need to restore lost prestige and leadership over its neighbors, and halt the Alliance’s eastward expansion.2

For Russia to achieve these long-term objectives, its supremacy in the Black Sea is a critically enabling factor. The unique geography of the region confers several geopolitical advantages to Russia in its confrontation with the West. As such, the Kremlin has sought measures to strengthen its hold over the region. Firstly, it has sought to weaken NATO’s ties to the regional states, working to drive wedges into these relationships, and using military force when necessary to stop the Alliance’s expansion. Secondly, it has been expanding its military capabilities in order to challenge NATO’s presence in the region and ultimately dominate the Black Sea.

Significance of the Black Sea

The Black Sea holds a special significance in Russia’s strategic calculus for several reasons. Firstly, it is an important crossroads and strategic intersection for the entire region. Access to the Black Sea is vital for all littoral and neighboring states, and greatly enhances the projection of power into several adjacent regions. Indeed, dominating the Black Sea would allow Russia to project power toward the Eastern Mediterranean, the northern Middle East, the South Caucasus, and to the rest of mainland Europe.3 Russian military operations in Syria for instance, were supported by the naval presence it maintained in the Eastern Mediterranean – some of which were elements of its Black Sea Fleet.4 

Secondly, the region is an important transit corridor for goods and energy. Control over regional ports and sea lanes would give Russia the power to choke trade and energy routes and blackmail states into compliance. Moscow could also utilize its power and influence in the Black Sea to challenge and disrupt energy supplies via pipeline from the Caspian Basin to Europe. Such a move would weaken prospects for future energy deliveries from states like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and more importantly, undermine the European Union’s efforts to seek energy diversity outside Russia’s orbit.5 

A map of the Black Sea (Wikimedia Commons)

Thirdly, the Black Sea region can be considered as NATO’s ‘soft underbelly’ or the vulnerable spot in its eastern flank. The region is rich in cultural and ethnic diversity, and due to geographical proximity, share close historical ties with Russia.6 Historical grievances and ethnic tensions could be harnessed by Moscow as a means to interfere in its neighbors’ affairs and pressure regional governments into aligning itself with Russia. By ‘turning’ regional NATO members, Moscow could severely weaken the Alliance’s internal cohesion and undermine its credibility.7

Russia And The Littoral States

Despite the strategic importance of the Black Sea, Russia had initially lacked the political, economic, and military power to effectively assert itself over the region. This began to change in the early 2000s after major shifts in the regional political environment.8 In Georgia (2003-2004 Rose Revolution) and Ukraine (2004-2005 Orange Revolution), leaders who had been more susceptible to Russian influence were ousted and replaced with pro-Western governments.9 At around this time in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania successfully gained NATO membership – a move that Russia found itself unable to prevent. Of the six Black Sea littoral states, three – Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey – were now members of NATO, and the other two –Ukraine and Georgia – were working in close partnership with the Alliance.10 Alarmed by this turn of events, Russia sought to halt NATO’s expansion in the Black Sea by ensuring that Ukraine and Georgia would never ascend into its ranks. At the same time, it pursued policies to strengthen its own influence amongst the remaining states and weaken their relationship with NATO.11  

The invasion of Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated Russia’s determination to contain NATO in the Black Sea. At the Bucharest Summit earlier that year, the Alliance had been seriously considering Georgia’s application for membership, which greatly concerned the Kremlin.12 Thus, when Georgia sought to reclaim its two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that summer, Russia saw its opportunity. Its military moved swiftly to support the separatists and pushed back the Georgian forces. After its victory, Moscow agreed to a ceasefire. The invasion had prevented Georgia’s reincorporation, thereby keeping it in a weakened and divided state.13 More importantly, Russia kept a sizable military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, constituting a constant threat to Georgia’s stability and territorial integrity, effectively halting its progress towards NATO membership.14

Russia’s policy toward Ukraine has been similarly aggressive. In 2006 and 2009, Russia used its energy exports as an instrument of intimidation and influence, temporarily ceasing the supply of natural gas to Europe through Ukraine and increasing its energy prices.15 Bilateral relations improved when the pro-Russian leader Viktor Yanukovych became Ukraine’s president in 2010. This however, would not last. In February 2014, facing mass demonstrations calling for his removal, Viktor Yanukovych fled the country. The new government was vehemently anti-Russian and had clear preference for Western institutions like NATO and the EU.16 While this was disturbing news by itself, what really concerned Moscow was the status of its naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea. Officially owned by the Ukraine, the base was on lease to the Russians and home to its Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol was of great strategic importance, being Russia’s only warm water naval base and an important hub to project its naval power abroad.17 Hence, in order to ensure unrestricted access to Sevastopol, Russia moved in its forces and annexed Crimea in March 2014.18 Concurrently, it supplied arms and support to pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine allowing them to escalate their war against the new government in Kiev.19 In pushing the country toward civil war, Russia had sufficiently destabilized Ukraine and prevented it from becoming a Western stronghold on its own doorstep.

 Compared to Georgia and Ukraine, Russia’s policy towards the other littoral states has been relatively restrained. Given their status as NATO members, Moscow has been careful not to test the limits of the Alliance’s security guarantees. Instead, it has resorted to other means to exert its influence. In Turkey’s case, Russia has exploited the Erdogan government’s drift towards authoritarianism.20 Unlike most of the West which has criticized the Erdogan government for its alleged human rights abuses, the Russian leadership has remained supportive, which has earned praise and gratitude from Erdogan himself.21 Besides trying to decouple Turkey’s links to NATO, maintaining cordial relations with Ankara carries another strategic purpose for Moscow. Turkey controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits – the vital passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Should Ankara one day decide to close the straits, it could bottle up the Black Sea Fleet and severely limit Russia’s ability to project power further abroad.22

In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, Moscow has sought to subvert and weaken anti-Russian opposition within their governments. To that end, it has been alleged that the Kremlin has forged powerful ties to local business interests and provides support for pro-Russian political leaders and parties within both countries.23 This approach has been broadly successful in Bulgaria, as reflected in the growing support within the local political sphere to end the EU sanctions against Russia.24 Romania however, presents a bigger challenge. Although it has pursued dialogue with Russia, it has also pushed for greater NATO presence in the region. It has taken on a leadership role in the Bucharest Format – a multilateral grouping of nine NATO members created to follow up on NATO commitments.25  The country also currently hosts elements of the U.S. anti-missile shield, which has led the Kremlin to declare it “a clear threat.”26

Strengthening the Military in the Black Sea

The second effort undertaken by Russia has been to build up its military capabilities in the Black Sea. To that end, the Kremlin has embarked on a long-term rearmament program designed to establish an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zone or ‘bubble’ over the region.27 The concept focuses on deploying capabilities that firstly, prevent forces from entering an area i.e. anti-access; and secondly, limits an opponent’s freedom of action and maneuver within the operational area, i.e. area-denial.28 Within an operational A2/AD bubble, long-range assets could be deployed to strike ground targets, interdict maritime traffic, and impose no-fly zones.29 During a conflict, such a strategy greatly increases the risk of causalities for any hostile force entering the A2/AD bubble. NATO decision-making could be undermined by the raised costs of reinforcing allies in the region, hampering their ability to exert collective defense and weakening the credibility of their deterrence.30  Moreover, NATO’s inaction would greatly enhance Russia’s prestige, demonstrating its ability to challenge the West.    

Within the Black Sea, Crimea will be the main platform for conducting A2/AD operations. Advanced defense systems have been deployed to the peninsula, such as the anti-ship Bastion-P missile system equipped with the P-800 Oniks cruise missiles, along with the anti-aircraft S-300v4 and S-400 Triumf missile systems.31 Upgrade program are underway to refurbish Soviet-era bunkers, reanimate early warning radar systems, and install high-tech electronic warfare equipment.32 Along with Russia’s other missile systems in Armenia, Krasnodar, and Latakia, its A2/AD capabilities extend over major parts of the region – covering much of the Black Sea, and parts of Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

https://gfycat.com/DescriptiveUnderstatedFanworms

The K-300P Bastion-P (NATO reporting name SSC-5) mobile coastal defense missile systems successfully hit a surface target in the Black Sea during a drill in September 2014. (RT)

The Black Sea Fleet is also undergoing a major modernization program. Moscow plans to spend $2.4 billion by 2020 to outfit the fleet with next-generation warships, submarines, and air-defense systems. Up to eighteen new units are being commissioned and many will be equipped with the versatile Kalibr-NK missile system.33 They will be joined by new air assets such as the Su-30M naval aviation fighter and other ground/air attack fighters and helicopters. These capabilities are meant to transform the Black Sea Fleet into a force capable of denying NATO access to the Black Sea and projecting power outward to threaten NATO interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East.34

Russia’s A2/AD capabilities will also be strengthened by the deployment of the Tupolev Tu-22M3 to the region. The long-range bomber can carry Kh-15 or Kh-22 missiles designed to destroy air defense systems.35 The bomber force will be protected by Russian fighters like the Sukhoi Su-24 which can secured a vast majority of the Black Sea airspace and greatly expand Russia’s strategic aviation patrol routes in the region.36 In deploying these different capabilities together, Russia would be able to form a multi-layered, interconnecting defense network that can threaten or interdict any force within the A2/AD bubble.

Enduring Challenges

Despite the aggressive measures taken by Russia, its dominance over the Black Sea continues to face enduring challenges. Turkey for instance, controls Russia’s access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, but its full cooperation cannot always be taken as a guarantee. Fundamental disagreements exist over the conflict in Syria, with Russia supporting the Assad regime and Turkey opposing it.37 The rise in tensions after the downing of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015 similarly demonstrates the precariousness of their relationship.38 In the event of a crisis, Moscow’s priority must be to ensure that Turkey at the very least remains neutral, allowing Russia to continue resupplying its forces in the Mediterranean. Should the passage be closed by an openly hostile Turkey, Russia would find its forces in the Mediterranean in great danger. With the second most powerful military force in the region, Turkey possesses the offensive capabilities to threaten Russia’s isolated forces.39 A defeat would deal a major blow to Russia’s prestige and status as a military power. Moscow therefore, must continue to engage Ankara, strengthening bilateral ties while seeking ways to find some compromise over their differences.

Istanbul and the Bosphorus Strait (Photo from International Space Station April 16, 2004)

Romania presents another troublesome neighbor for Russia. Although its military capabilities are no match for the larger power, its eagerness to encourage NATO presence in the Black Sea is in direct contradiction to Moscow’s long-term objectives. Both states share a number of unresolved disputes, such as over the theft of Romanian treasures during WWII and over Russia’s refusal to denounce the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.40 This may have in part, contributed to the Romanian leadership’s pursuit of Alliance membership and general distrust of Russian intentions. To neutralize Romania, Russia may promote pan-nationalist ideas such as the ‘Greater Romania’ concept. This would encourage regional disputes between Romania and its neighbors Ukraine and Moldova. Russia could also fan the flames by orchestrating demonstrations, infiltrating saboteurs, and supporting separatist activities.41 Russia could also hinder Romania’s exploration of natural resources in the Black Sea either through harassment or through legal means by claiming the territorial waters around recently annexed Crimea.42 These measures could intimidate Romania into aligning itself closer with Russia or at least distract it from seeking closer ties with NATO.

Russia’s pursuit of an A2/AD bubble in the Black Sea is also fraught with challenges. The massive rearmament programs come with a substantial price tag. Russia’s state revenues, however, have been severely depleted by the collapse of global oil prices and ongoing economic sanctions.43 In addition, Russia’s shipbuilding industry now faces a shortage of ship engines after Ukraine stopped sales over the annexation of Crimea.44  These issues throw into question how much of Russia’s modernization plans will actually be realized. The A2/AD strategy had been seen as a cost-effective measure to counter NATO’s overwhelming sea power. If Russia fails to achieve the full potential of its plans, it may seriously undermine the effectiveness and deterrence value of the A2/AD bubble. 

Conclusion

As this paper has described, Russia has pursued highly aggressive policies in order to secure its dominance over the Black Sea region. What Moscow must bear in mind however, is that control over the region is not an end in itself, but the means to achieve a greater objective – to keep out NATO interference. In this regard, Russia’s measures have somewhat backfired. Concerned over Russia’s rising belligerence, NATO at the recent Warsaw Summit pledged to increase Allied military presence in the region. Besides strengthening Allied capabilities in the air, land, and sea, there will be increased allied visits to Romanian and Bulgarian ports, and enhanced inter-Alliance training and exercises.45 While it can be argued that these are merely symbolic measures, they could signal the beginning of a gradual NATO build-up around the Black Sea. Perhaps Russia’s greatest challenge now is to find a way dominate the region without causing anxiety amongst the littoral states, as that in turn, may trigger an increased NATO presence. After all, it would be a supreme irony if Russia’s efforts to shut out NATO instead became the contributing factor for a growing Allied presence.

Byron Chong has a Masters in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. A passion for history and international politics drew him to this field after his first degree in engineering. His research interests include security issues in Europe and the Asia Pacific.

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Endnotes

1. BBC News, “Russia security paper designates Nato as threat,” 31 December 2015, accessed March 15, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35208636

2. Olga Oliker, “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 7, 2017, accessed March 18, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy

3. Janusz Bugajski and Peter B. Doran, “Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe,” Centre for European Analysis – Black Sea Strategic Report No.1 (2016): 2.

4. ibid., 3.

5. ibid., 2, 3.

6. Chris Miller, “Why the Black Sea?” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 23, 2017, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.fpri.org/article/2017/01/why-the-black-sea/

7. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 3.

8. Corentin Laguerre, “Russia’s Self-Inflicted Security Dilemma,” Center for International Maritime Security, December 12, 2016, accessed March 15, 2017, https://cimsec.org/russias-self-inflicted-security-dilemma/29977

9. Boris Toucas, “The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea Region: A Brief History,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2, 2017, accessed March 15, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/geostrategic-importance-black-sea-region-brief-history

10. ibid.

11. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 5.

12. John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014, accessed March 15, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

13. ibid.

14. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 5.

15. Toucas, “The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea Region.”

16. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault.”

17. Jason Chuma, “The Mediterranean: Driving Russia’s Strategic Decisions since 1676,” Center for International Maritime Security, December 15, 2016, accessed March 15, 2017, https://cimsec.org/mediterranean-driving-russias-strategic-decisions-since-1676/30070

18. ibid.

19. Alexander J. Motyl, “Kiev Should Give Up on the Donbass,” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2017, accessed March 15, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/02/ukraine-will-lose-its-war-by-winning-it/

20. Daniel Dombey, “Turkey’s Erdogan Lurches toward Authoritarianism,” Financial Times, May 6, 2014, accessed March 15, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/e89e8d74-cfc1-11e3-a2b7-00144feabdc0

21. Christian Caryl, “New Model Dictator: Why Vladimir Putin Is the Leader Other Autocrats Wish They Could Be,” Foreign Policy, February 13, 2015, accessed March 16, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/new-model-dictator-putin-sisi-erdogan/

22. Jonathan Altman, “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 1 (2016): 74.

23. Dimitar Bechev, “Russia’s Influence in Bulgaria,” New Direction – The Foundation For European Reform, May 12, 2015, accessed March 17, 2017, http://europeanreform.org/files/ND-report-RussiasInfluenceInBulgaria-preview-lo-res_FV.pdf

24. Slav Okov, “Ending Russia Sanctions Among Goals for Bulgarian Kingmaker,” Bloomberg, March 14, 2017, accessed March 17, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-14/ending-eu-s-russia-sanctions-among-goals-for-bulgarian-kingmaker

25. Toucas, “The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea Region.”

26. Samuel Osborne, “Russia calls Romania a ‘clear threat’ and Nato outpost for hosting US missile shield,” Independent, February 9, 2017, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-romania-clear-threat-nato-outpost-us-anti-missile-shield-putin-tensions-a7571031.html

27. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 10.

28. Guillaume Lasconjarias and Alessandro Marrone, “How To Respond to Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)? Towards a NATO Counter A2/AD Strategy,” NDC Conference Report No. 01/16, February 2016, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=480

29. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 11.

30. ibid., 9,10.

31. Loic Burton, “Bubble Trouble: Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” Foreign Policy Association, October 25, 2016, accessed, March 17, 2017, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/10/25/bubble-trouble-russia-a2-ad/

32. Bleda Kurtdarcan and Barın Kayaoğlu, “Russia, Turkey and the Black Sea A2/AD Arms Race,” National Interest, March 5, 2017, accessed March 17, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-turkey-the-black-sea-a2-ad-arms-race-19673

33. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 12.

34. ibid.

35. Burton, “Bubble Trouble.”

36. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 12.

37. Altman, “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean,” 79.

38. Toucas, “The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea Region.”

39. Altman, “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean,” 76.

40. Henry F. Carey, Romania Since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society, (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004), 21.

41. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising,” 9.

42. ibid.

43. ibid., 10.

44. Steve Micallef, “The Ambitions and Challenges of Russia’s Naval Modernization Program,” Center for International Maritime Security, December 13, 2016, accessed March 17, 2017, https://cimsec.org/ambitions-challenges-russias-naval-modernization-program/30008

45. Boris Toucas, ” NATO and Russia in the Black Sea: A New Confrontation?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 6, 2017, accessed March 15, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-russia-black-sea-new-confrontation

Featured Image:Russia’s Black Sea fleet, in the Crimean port of Sevastopol (Stringer/Reuters)